IAEA/GC: BREAKING THE MIDDLE EAST LOGJAM - REQUEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000326 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, T, S/SANAC, S/SEMEP, ISN - BURK ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA, IO/T E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019 TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA EG IS SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: BREAKING THE MIDDLE EAST LOGJAM - REQUEST GUIDANCE REF: A) UNVIE 306 B) UNVIE 241 Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See para 5. ¶2. (C) New Zealand Ambassador Jennifer Macmillan, designated to be the 2009 IAEA General Conference (GC) President, sounded despondent July 1 about the prospects of breaking the logjam in the GC on Middle East issues. She warned Charge of a "poisonous confidence deficit" on the part of Egypt and the Arab Group versus the West. Egypt feels particularly betrayed by the EU, which it accuses of bad faith in the 2008 GC and as having colluded with Israeli amendments to its Middle East Safeguards (MES) resolution. She reported that Finland had to intercede to get Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi to even agree to meet with the Swedish EU Presidency, which is heavily vested in this issue (ref a). Feeling burned by the French EU Presidency last year, Egypt does not want any French involvement in negotiations. Meanwhile, the Arab Group will propose the same Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC) resolution as in the last GC and claims it has lined up significant support to defeat any Western-sponsored "no action motion." (Note: Israeli Mission provided July 8 a copy of a letter from Arab League SYG Moussa to the Swedish PM asking for support of the INC resolution with the text appended. There is a new preambular para "welcoming the recent international initiatives calling for a 'nuclear weapons-free world.'" End Note.) The Arab Group opening bid, according to Macmillan, remains adoption of the Egyptian MES text by near-consensus coupled with a vote on the INC resolution. Charge assessed that the Arab position amounts to pocketing what they have so far via the usual two-track approach. He lamented that the parties, which are not even speaking to one another, seem less inclined to compromise than to score political points, holding the GC hostage in the process. While we would like the Arab Group to see broader value in the IAEA General Conference beyond Middle East issues, they have been singularly focused. Macmillan cautioned that this Middle East "hangover" affects everything (including beyond the GC, specifically, our work on Iran and Syria issues in the Board) and she does not want the General Conference to again "descend into chaos," a message Charge promised to relay to Washington. As a first step, Macmillan plans to invite key Ambassadors from the Arab Group, EU and like-minded in mid-July for a frank discussion under Chatham House Rules. In the interim, the Vienna Arab Group, accompanied by a visiting Arab League representative who is reportedly here to "rally the troops," has requested to meet with UNVIE July 16. ¶3. (C) As Charge remarked to Macmillan, Arab/Egyptian good will toward a new Administration in Washington presents an opportunity that should not be wasted by either side. This is especially true in the run up to the 2010 NPT Revcon; as Fawzi has noted previously (ref b),returning to consensus on Middle East issues at the IAEA GC could help pave the way for a successful Revcon (Note: The opposite is also true. Another debacle in the IAEA GC could have a negative impact on the Revcon. End note). Forging a new consensus on the Middle East would also allow the General Conference to focus on core IAEA areas rather than being held hostage to this issue. However, consensus will continue to be elusive unless we take account of several lessons learned from the last three General Conferences following the breakdown of the "old consensus" in 2006: First, we cannot rely on the parties to deliver a new consensus as it seems clear that neither Israel nor Egypt/the Arab Group has interest in doing so on terms the other can accept. Even when Egypt and Israel negotiated directly last year, their respective positions did not evolve. Israel seems more inclined to consider parliamentary gambits than to compromise on "substance" whereas the Arab Group's only "substantive" interest is in singling out Israel. Without naming Israel, the hard-line Egyptian DCM advised Macmillan any attainable consensus would be "meaningless." Second, the "old consensus" and old tactics, including the well-worn "no action motion," show little prospect of success. After three years of trying, we have seen no evidence that Egypt can be persuaded to accept "linkage" between the MES and Arab Group INC resolutions. Three years of wrangling over what might comprise "substantive" GC Presidential Statement (PRST) language acceptable to all parties has led nowhere. There is also seriously reduced prospect of us winning a "no action motion" (which we won only by a hair last year),as the Arab Group/NAM has done its groundwork lobbying others in anticipation of this. While Israel may have other amendments or parliamentary tricks up its sleeve, going down this road again will not promote U.S. rapprochement with the Arab world. Lastly, outgoing DG ElBaradei will be of no help and could be unhelpful, as we have already seen examples in the June Board of his departing-elder statesman status making him less restrained and less politic toward Israel. Macmillan opined that the best thing ElBaradei could do is "keep his mouth shut" during the GC. ¶4. (C) Despite this, all is not lost. Any momentum arising from the change in U.S. administration should be reinforced by a direct approach to Cairo capitalizing on the "re-set" in U.S.-Egypt relations. Among others in Vienna, the Lebanese Arab Group Chair wants to be helpful, having witnessed the Middle East debacle firsthand as 2007 GC President, and the Moroccan Ambassador has also played a constructive role. The Swedish EU Presidency is anxious to broker an acceptable compromise on this issue, which Stockholm sees as a Vienna priority for its Presidency (ref a). GC President-designate Macmillan is also a trusted and like-minded interlocutor who has weathered all the previous GC battles. However, consensus will require fresh thinking, rather than relying on stale formulations out of step with current realities. One possibility that the EU and others have entertained in the past is the idea of merging the MES and INC resolutions into a single resolution. As drafted, the INC, which is entirely focused on Israel, cannot serve as a basis for compromise. However, we could return to the text of the 1995 NPT Revcon resolution, considered sacrosanct by the Arab Group, which contains delicately crafted language on some of the main stumbling blocks: the "contributions" of the peace process to a NWFZ; concern about the existence of unsafeguarded facilities; and accession of all states in the Middle East "without exception" to the NPT, without naming Israel. (Note: The Arab League letter to Sweden referenced above also highlights the 1995 NPT resolution. End Note) Of course, Israel never agreed to the 1995 NPT resolution and may object to some aspects being adopted in Vienna. By the same token, basing ourselves on the 1995 resolution would build Arab Group confidence as to our intentions for the 2010 Revcon. Macmillan was not sure if the atmosphere in Vienna is past the point of considering a single resolution, but we can at least try. Even if this should fail, our efforts (working with the likeminded) would reinforce the view that we are not the recalcitrant party, resistant to compromise. We are also open to other ideas for breaking the logjam in the IAEA General Conference. We are aware that the EU is discussing resuscitating some kind of Middle East Forum, but do not know the status of this initiative; in the past the prospect of a "Forum" has not been a sufficient "substantive" gain to placate the Arabs. ¶5. (C) Guidance Request: Mission requests Washington guidance on the foregoing and any other ideas we may float in Vienna prior to Charge's scheduled meeting with Arab Group/ AL July 16. Should Washington see merit in at least exploring prospects for a single resolution as a basis for renewal of consensus, Mission suggests initiating an exploratory discussion with the local Israeli Ambassador who has requested to see Charge July 10 on this issue. Mission will use the July 16 meeting with the Arab Group to explore proactive willingness to work with all parties on a solution, while leaving open other options, if necessary. Engagement with Cairo will be key if there is hope of lifting this issue beyond the MFA, which tends to focus on the Israeli vice Iranian threat. Mission therefore welcomes Washington inclusion of General Conference issues in any high-level engagement with Cairo and stands ready to support that dialogue in any way possible. Finally, Mission notes that last year the Washington-based official attending the GC for Middle East issues was of DAS-level. In keeping with the Administration's desires to re-set Arab relations, Mission requests Department consider participation by A/S or equivalent/ higher level to support Middle East negotiations at the GC. PYATT