IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO EYES NARROW VICTORY WHILE

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000310 SIPDIS DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD DOE FOR NA-20 NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2019 TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO EYES NARROW VICTORY WHILE PREPARING FOR A THIRD ROUND REF: A) UNVIE 268 AND PREVIOUS B) TOKYO 1464 Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for 1.4 reasons b and d Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (S) Entering the final days before the July 2-3 balloting, Japanese DG candidate Yukiya Amano shared the same assessment of the race on June 29 as he has previously but tempered by some new concerns. Japan still calculates "around 20" commitments. Factoring in a 20-30 percent average margin for error in sec ret ballot UN elections, Japan assesses that this means Amano has little to no margin and another stalemate is entirely possible. Japan is also still counting Mexico and Ireland as undecided. Japan is banking on two defections from Echavarri (Romania and Germany) once he is eliminated in the early rounds, and two to three possible conversions from Minty's camp at least in the final "confidence" (i.e. leading candidate) vote to secure at least 24 votes (two-thirds of the Board if there are no abstentions). However, aside from India, Japan has not received any concrete assurance from core Minty supporters (despite positive signals from Argentina),and is not confident the Indian Perm Rep will follow his instructions to vote for Amano in the "confidence" vote. For its part, South Africa, disappointed by falling just short of a blocking third of the vote in the June 9 straw poll, has redoubled efforts to shore up "soft" supporters and has also approached New Agenda Coalition partners to support Minty in a "confidence" vote, (i.e. sixth vote for the second candidate),though he would still have no chance of getting 24 votes. Although this will have no impact on the outcome, the Board Chair reported separately June 29 that Slovenian DG candidate Ernest Petric will tender a withdrawal letter by June 30. ¶2. (S) A number of rumors have recently added to Amano's anxiety. First, there is persistent talk both within the Secretariat (abetted by DG ElBaradei in press interviews) and on the part of some countries about the need for "consensus" and/or speculation that Amano will fall short of the required two-thirds vote. To counterbalance such rumors, Japan is stressing that the IAEA will be "in trouble" if the DG election is not resolved this week and that while consensus is "desirable," it cannot be an obstacle to appointment of the Director General. Having failed to reach consensus, the Board Chair has organized the vote in accordance with the rules of procedure. Japan also cites the precedent of former DG Hans Blix's election in 1981 by 23 votes (22 required then as the Board was smaller); Blix became a superb Director General serving four terms. Charge fully agreed that the Secretariat has no business intervening in the election process; a point we have made repeatedly to DDG-level interlocutors who also recognize the need for neutrality. ¶3. (S) Japan's second major concern is that Spain and/or Russia could seek to force a stalemate in the hopes of Echavarri emerging as a "consensus" candidate in a third round. To forestall such rumors, Amano is claiming that some countries have already encouraged Japan to re-nominate him for a third round, should it become necessary. Visiting Japanese Vice FM Minorikawa will also relay this message in his Vienna lobbying this week. (Comment: While presenting this as a tactical argument, it was clear from the discussion that Amano anticipates being re-nominated in the event of a third round and may have been fishing for U.S. support. End Comment.) Japan received a "clear no" when it approached Madrid with a "gentlemen's agreement" to support each other's candidates in the "confidence" vote, thus increasing suspicion that Spain may vote tactically for Minty once Echavarri is eliminated to force a third round. Japan requests the U.S. and other supporters appeal to Spain, in particular. Amano qualified Russia as "very worrying" and repeated rumors that Russia would not support Amano even if he secures a two-thirds vote. Amano did not have a readout from the G-8 Ministerial in Trieste, but to date Moscow remained inexplicably evasive. It was not clear if the rumors meant that Russia is just trying to dissuade others from supporting Amano or if Russia would actually follow through, i.e. by calling for (or getting others to call for) another vote to re-confirm the result in the "Appointment Stage" on the afternoon of July 3. (Note: The Board Chair will call for appointment of the DG by acclamation but anyone can request a further vote even at this stage. End note.) Once appointed by the Board, Japan discounts the possibility of an unprecedented challenge in the IAEA General Conference, which formally approves the appointment, though Japan is confident of majority support if this were the case. Charge advised that if Amano is elected DG, Japan should quickly reach out to P5 and IBSA countries, all of which have an institutional stake in the IAEA. ¶4. (S) Some G-77/NAM also still hold out the hope of drafting Director General ElBaradei in the event of another stalemate. Although to date ElBaradei has not expressed any interest in staying on, a DDG quietly probed Charge about such a scenario. Amano questioned whether Russia may be open to "extending" ElBaradei's tenure, but Charge noted the Russian Governor's frustration with ElBaradei during the June Board session. While the IAEA Statute stipulates a four-year term of office for the Director General, under this scenario, ElBaradei would be elected to a further term on the understanding that he would step down after a year or two. Idle talk of such a scenario makes it all the more imperative to resolve the DG election this week. The Board Chair agreed with us on the attractiveness of settling the vote this week, and held out the prospect of completing all balotting on July ¶2. End Summary and Comment. Country-by-Country Count -------------- ¶5. (C) Japan has received "firm" commitments from the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Australian, Burkina Faso, Canada, Ecuador, Finland, France, Iraq, Lithuania, New Zealand, The Philippines, the United States, and Uruguay. Switzerland and Turkey are also "not a problem" and Amano is also confident of UK support (though the UK does not disclose its vote). Japan has confirmed The Philippines' commitment with President Arroyo. Uruguay has also recently recommitted to Japan. Saudi Arabian support is "firmer" but not in writing. Japan has worked on Ghana intensively both in capital and at its Geneva Mission, assessing Ghana to be "more solid than last time." Burkina Faso has also lobbied Ghana and other Africa Group members on Japan's behalf. ¶6. (C) Once Echavarri is eliminated, Romania has assured Amano of its support; Japan does not believe it can expect more from Bucharest. Amano requested U.S. help in clarifying Berlin's intentions as he remains not 100 percent sure that Germany would defect upon Echavarri's elimination, though MFA experts expected this to be the case. In a follow-on conversation today, German Ambassador Luedeking (having just returned from Berlin) confirmed to Charge that though uninstructed, if it comes down to an Amano-Minty final, he "cannot imagine" Germany would do anything other than vote yes on Amano. Germany wants to bring this long process to an end, Luedeking noted and concurred that while ElBaradei's current intention is to retire, he could be talked into re-entering the race if the July vote produces another stalemate. ¶7. (C) Amano is concerned that Mexico, though it voted for him in the straw poll, remains undecided between Amano and Echavarri (who is reportedly visiting Mexico City June 29)and is unsure about Mexico's vote in an Amano-Minty runoff (we strongly suspect Mexico abstained in March.) Charge relayed a comment from Mexican Ambassador Diaz that Amano needs to worry about his perception by the "South" in general. Ireland is also undecided, and while Amano does not believe Dublin would support Minty in a runoff, he fears Ireland could be influenced by the need for "consensus." Ireland is not likely to be receptive to pressure from big countries, but Japan may ask for U.S. assistance at the last minute in securing its vote. ¶8. (C) Though far from confident about Malaysia's intentions as a "soft" former Minty supporter, Amano noted that the Malaysian Ambassador's recent departure left a CDA from a technical Ministry that is positively inclined to Japan in charge of its local Mission. The positions of other Minty supporters (China, Argentina, Brazil, India, Algeria, Egypt and Cuba) remain unchanged though Japan has appealed for support in the final "confidence" vote (i.e. Yes/No vote on "leading candidate") with limited success. Amano unequivocally ruled out China voting in his favor. Thus far, Japan has only received a commitment from New Delhi to support Amano in the "confidence" vote. Charge reported that NSA Jones had also received good signals in Delhi regarding the new Congress government's commitment to partnership with the U.S. However, both Amano and Charge shared concerns about Indian Perm Rep Kumar disobeying instructions (Comment: Kumar's performance in the June Board on seeking to block nuclear fuel banks, despite positive signals from Delhi, does not give us much assurance. End Comment.) There remains a possibility of an Argentine "conversion" in the final round. Following a FM telcon in early June, in which Buenos Aires promised "to not say 'No'", Argentine Ambassador Curia told Amano that he was seeking instruction on the "confidence" vote. Charge reported that the Secretary had spoken to the Argentine FM last week as we promised. ¶9. (C) Japan continues to work on Brazil but has not yet received a clear indication of support in a final confidence vote. Algeria and Egypt have been unreceptive to Japan's overtures and Cuba remains difficult. Neither a June 9 call by FM Nakasone nor a June 22 visit by State Secretary Hashimoto to Algiers resulted in any positive indication for the "confidence" vote, notwithstanding the fact that Algerian Board Chair Feroukhi has a personal stake in the successful conclusion of the DG election. Election-Day Scenario -------------- ¶10. (C) Amano had recently consulted with Board Chair Feroukhi on election-day procedures but he is disinclined intervene too much on this aspect. Japan has no issue with the Secretariat's basic scenario though Feroukhi had not made final decisions. In a separate discussion with the Board Chair June 29, Feroukhi inidcated to Charge that she hopes to compress all the votes into a single day session, as opposed to holding the elimination rounds and first three rounds July 2 and the "confidence" (or leading candidate) votes on July 3, as originally envisioned. It is not clear whether the Appointment Stage, in which a new DG is formally appointed (the Board Chair hopes by acclamation, though another vote may be called) would be on July 2 or 3rd. Feroukhi also confirmed that she expects a letter of withdrawal from Slovenian DG candidate Petric by June 30. Waxing philopsophical, she fully agreed with Charge that it would best to conclude the DG election this round rather than reopening the nomination procedure, which would be likely to generate multiple new candidates. ¶11. (S) Since Japan cannot exclude the possibility of a stalemate, Amano queried the Board Chair's intentions in the event of a third round. Feroukhi indicated that she would allow four weeks from the election for nomination of a new slate by early August. However, Amano was quite perturbed to hear that in a third round, Feroukhi felt it her responsibility to seek an early consensus. If consensus is not possible, she envisioned a vote in the September Board just prior to the IAEA General Conference. Amano viewed this emphasis on "consensus" (or a delayed vote) as "risky" for Japan and as benefiting either Echavarri or the remaining option of ElBaradei. (Comment: Amano betrayed his intention to seek re-nomination in a third round. Absent instructions, Mission has not conveyed U.S. views on a hypothetical Amano renomination. End comment.) ¶12. (S) Asked for his assessment of the Board Chair's performance, Amano adjudged Feroukhi to be rather effective thus far but was unsure if she would remain neutral in a high stakes third round, in which the NAM would promote an ElBaradei or another developing world candidacy. Amano noted that rumors that Feroukhi has been lobbying behind-the-scenes for Minty. PYATT