IAEA/IRAN: BOARD URGES COOPERATION AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000293

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPHS RENUMBERED)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2024
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BOARD URGES COOPERATION AND
NEGOTIATION

REF: REFTEL UNIVE VIENNA 000286

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES: GEOFFREY PYATT for
reasons 1.4(c) and (e)


--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The June 17 IAEA Board of Governors discussion on
Iran, although overshadowed by Director General(DG)
ElBaradei's concluding intervention scolding Iranian
Ambassador Soltanieh for Tehran's lack of engagement with the
IAEA (reftel),highlighted the need for Iran to begin full
cooperation and take advantage of the new opportunity for a
negotiated solution. Overall, the tone of the Board
statements on Iran was strong, with the exception of a few
hard-line NAM states, who continued to serve as a mouthpiece
for Iran. The majority of Member States called on Iran to
meet UNSC and Board requirements and registered serious
concern about Iran's lack of cooperation on key technical
issues, including possible military dimensions (PMD) of
Iran's program and Iran's refusal to implement Code 3.1
Modified of its Safeguards Agreement.


2. (SBU) In addition to the core like-minded states, Mexico
and Argentina delivered statements highly critical of Iran.
Thirty-three of the thirty-five Board Member States spoke or
were spoken for by the EU and NAM, and five states spoke
under Rule 50. Many of the statements expressed regret that
Iran had not suspended uranium enrichment and heavy
water-related activities in violation of UNSCRs and had
instead expanded its centrifuge capabilities. Most Board
members requested additional transparency and cooperation on
the "alleged studies" or PMD issue, with many regretting
Iran's stonewalling. Several countries expressed concern
that Iran still refuses to provide design information
verification (DIV) access at the IR-40 Heavy Water Research
Reactor (HWRR) at Arak, with some recalling the IAEA Legal
Advisor's earlier comments that this refusal was
"inconsistent with Iran's safeguards obligations."

3. (SBU) The NAM statement reaffirmed its "principled
positions" on the inalienability of rights, cautioned against
undue pressure and interference with IAEA verification, and
stressed the distinction between "legal" NPT obligations and
voluntary confidence building measures. The NAM troika of
Cuba, Egypt and Malaysia each supported Iran's position and
focused criticism on Member States not authorizing the IAEA
to provide "alleged studies" documentation to Iran. Taking
this a step further, Cuba endorsed Iran's call to be removed
from the IAEA agenda. The NAM troika gave no nod to P5 1 or
U.S. overtures to Iran. Other NAM state interventions,
including by the Philippines, South Africa, India, Algeria
(and Iraq, Libya and Indonesia under rule 50) were more
balanced and supportive of engagement.


4. (SBU) In his opening remarks to the Board meeting, the
DG largely focused on the "new initiative of the U.S. to
engage Iran in direct dialogue, without preconditions and on
the basis of mutual respect." He said he was "encouraged" by
the "new initiative" and urged Iran to respond with an "equal
gesture of goodwill and trust-building," and suggested that
as a prelude to dialogue a "freeze for freeze" should be
adopted. Rather than heed the DG's call, Iran responded
with familiar arguments, charging that certain Member States
have turned this into a political crisis and are using the
IAEA to promote hidden agendas. Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh
argued that Iran's case should be removed from the Board
agenda because there was no technical justification for its
continued consideration. Soltanieh criticized the U.S., EU,
and Canada for giving "unbalanced" statements that ignored
the positive points in the DG's report. He said that after
listening to the U.S. statement he sees no adjustments in
U.S. policy, despite promises of change. As a result, he
concluded that "all peace loving countries" had to think
twice about dealing with the U.S. End Summary.

--------------
DG Endorses the Obama Initiative
--------------


5. (SBU) The Director General (DG),in his opening
statement to the Board on June 15, largely focused his
comments on the "new initiative of the U.S. to engage Iran in
direct dialogue, without preconditions and on the basis of
mutual respect." He noted that it was regrettable that Iran
has not implemented any of the measures called for by the
UNSC and Board, and that no movement by Iran has been made on
outstanding issues, including possible military dimensions

(PMD). ElBaradei explained that he was "encouraged" by the
"new initiative" and urged Iran to respond with an "equal
gesture of goodwill and trust-building," which could include
implementation of Code 3.1 and the Additional Protocol (AP).
He also suggested that, as a prelude to dialogue, a "freeze
for freeze" be adopted.

--------------
China and Russia Call For Cooperation
--------------


6. (SBU) Both China and Russia called on Iran to meet
international obligations and fully comply with UNSC and
Board resolutions. China noted with concern that Iran had
not suspended enrichment-related activities, and had not
cooperated with the IAEA in resolving the remaining
outstanding issues. China advocated a negotiated solution to
the Iranian nuclear issue while recognizing Iran's right to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy as long as it fulfilled its
international obligations. China encouraged Iran to
strengthen cooperation with the IAEA and implement the AP,
and expressed hope that "all parties" would take advantage of
the opportunity for a peaceful solution.


7. (SBU) Russia supported the IAEA's efforts to uncover the
full history of Iran's nuclear program-i.e., those related to
the outstanding issues-noting the importance to establishing
trust. Russia said that diplomacy is the only option for
resolving this issue and hopes that negotiations prove
successful.


--------------
EU and Like-Minded Deliver Strong
Statements Highlighting Iran's Failures
--------------


8. (C) As EU President, the Czech Republic delivered a
powerful EU statement that described a worsening situation
with Iran and encouraged Iran to seize the opportunity to
engage with the P5 1 and EU High Representative. The EU
found it worrying that Iran continues to increase its uranium
enrichment capability, and noted that Tehran had no "obvious
civilian application" for such capability. The EU explained
that Iran's long list of failures-no cooperation on PMD, no
suspension, no Code 3.1, no AP-was of "grave concern," and
urged Iran to meet all of its UNSC and Board requirements,
extend additional transparency measures, and join the
relevant nuclear safety conventions in order to find a
long-term solution. The EU also asked the Secretariat to
deliver to the Board, either in the course of the current
meeting or at its earliest convenience, a briefing conveying
an assessment of PMD that would describe the "nature" of the
information available to the Agency, as well as an analysis
of the issue and a suggested way forward with Iran. This
request prompted the Chair to recall that the IAEA had
delivered a technical briefing on June 10, noting that she
doubted much could have happened in the interim. Professing
not to speak for the Secretariat, however, she turned to DDG
Safeguards Olli Heinonen to respond. Heinonen seconded her
observation that there was nothing new to report beyond what
was contained in the DG's June 5 report. The Board Chair
subsequently reflected this in her summary (much to the EU's
chagrin). (Comment: French DCM mentioned to Mission in
advance that the EU would call for a "special briefing," but
he did not indicate the call would open the door to an
immediate response. In opening that door, the EU left itself
exposed to the outcome that Board Chair Feroukhi engineered.
While we strongly support the EU objective, we believe the
request was badly executed in that the skids were not greased
with Feroukhi or with DDG Heinonen. There should have been
no expectation on the EU part that anyone in the Secretariat
would be prepared off-the-cuff to provide the sort of
tentative analytic conclusions we and the EU would like to
hear from the Secretariat. Mission will continue to work
quietly to rebuild momentum toward a fuller presentation of
Secretariat analysis and conclusions on PMD. End comment.)


9. (SBU) Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand all
delivered similarly strong statements that noted it was
essential for Iran to promptly and substantively respond to
the IAEA's questions regarding PMD projects and to meet all
Board and UNSC obligations, including suspension, AP
implementation, and Code 3.1. They said it is also essential
to take advantage of the opportunity for direct dialogue with
the P5 1. Australia emphasized the importance of improving
the containment and surveillance measures at Natanz and urged
Iran to cooperate with the IAEA in that respect. Australia
also suggested the IAEA include a comprehensive stock-taking
of outstanding issues in the next DG's report. Canada noted
that is was "particularly troubling" that Iran had not

provided any cooperation on outstanding issues associated
with PMD. Like the EU and Australia, Canada also called on
the Secretariat to include an annex in the next DG's report
detailing the Secretariat's assessments regarding the
military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. (Comment: In
contrast to the DG's reftel point that how the Secretariat
writes its reports is up to the Secretariat, Heinonen said he
would "carefully consider" the Australian and Canadian
requests.)


10. (SBU) Japan stated that it was "deeply regrettable"
that Iran continues to expand enrichment-related activities,
especially work on new generation centrifuges, and urged Iran
to return to the negotiation process without further delay
based on the comprehensive package proposed by the P5 1. New
Zealand regretted that the DG's report did not relieve its
ongoing concerns about the nature of Iran's nuclear program,
especially with regard to PMD. Albania, fully associating
itself with the EU statement, delivered a strong statement
highlighting that no real progress on outstanding issues had
been made, and that the Board, the IAEA, and Iran were
"deadlocked" because of Tehran's refusal to cooperate and
comply with UNSC and Board resolutions.


11. (SBU) The Swiss statement summarized three aspects in
the DG's June 5 report that continue to develop in a negative
direction-increased centrifuge installation and operations,
no cooperation on PMD, and refusal of DIV access.
Switzerland explained that it was important for Iran to agree
to improved containment and surveillance measures at Natanz.
Switzerland also called on Iran to cooperate on PMD, as well
as Member States to "make use of the documents as
appropriate." Bosnia and Herzegovina, speaking for the first
time in the Board under Rule 50, associated itself with the
EU statement and called on Iran to implement the UNSC and
Board resolutions. Bosnia noted that little progress had
been made on the Iran issue over the past six years, but
hoped for a diplomatic solution.


--------------
Turkey Reuses March Statement
--------------


12. (SBU) Turkey's statement, almost a carbon copy of
their March statement, was balanced, but did not specifically
call on Iran to act. Turkey attached importance to the
effectiveness of the IAEA's safeguards system and noted with
satisfaction that the IAEA has been able to continue to
verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in
Iran, but also noted that the IAEA was not yet in a position
to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Iran. Turkey considered it
important that the outstanding issues related to Iran's
nuclear program be addressed in a constructive and
transparent way without further delay, and that progress on
PMD could be facilitated by moves from those who provided the
information. Turkey noted that, as a neighbor of Iran, it
was prepared to contribute to the resolution of the ongoing
crisis of confidence through peaceful and diplomatic means.

--------------
GRULAC Reflect Like-Minded Concerns
--------------


13. (SBU) Among the GRULAC, Mexico delivered one of the
most potent Board statements on Iran, followed closely by
Argentina. After acknowledging that material at Natanz is
under containment and surveillance, Mexico expressed concern
at limitations on safeguards by not applying Code 3.1 at Arak
and concern that, despite repeated requests from the DG, Iran
has not provided substantive explanations regarding PMD, and
the requested access to centrifuge manufacturing and R&D
facilities. Mexico underlined the AP as an "essential
requirement" as well as conformity with UNSC and Board
requests on suspension. The forceful Mexican statement
repeatedly took Iran to task for its absence of cooperation
at "every angle," and urged Iran to cooperate "effectively
and without delay" to resolve "every pending item," though
Mexico also referred in passing to cooperation by Member
States in providing documents, as did Argentina. Mexico
placed the standoff on Iran in the context of renewed
commitments to disarmament, including by the U.S., and
commended the positive U.S. attitude toward promoting
dialogue and preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle
East. "Inflexible positions" that run counter to
international law and UNSC resolutions should not undermine
this progress, Mexico affirmed, citing also UNSC sanctions on
DPRK. The otherwise strong Mexican intervention ended with
an oblique reference to the Director General election and the
need for clear Agency leadership on verification issues.


14. (C) (Comment: Immediately after Mexico delivered its
statement, the Iranian Deputy Permanent Representative to the
IAEA delivered a hand written note to the Mexican Perm Rep,
which, judging from the timing, probably expressed Iran's
displeasure with linking North Korea to Iran. End Comment.)



15. (SBU) Argentina began by "lamenting" the lack of
progress and Iran's contradiction of UNSC requirements on
suspension, including at Arak, and the AP. Like Mexico,
Argentina called for application of Code 3.1 and early DIV at
Darkhovin and for Iran to resolve PMD issues by providing
substantive information and access to facilities. Argentina
stipulated that Iran should clarify PMD documents believed by
the Agency to be "objectively correct" to show that these are
not nuclear in nature, while Member States should develop new
modalities to share documents with Iran. The Argentine
statement concluded by appealing to Iran to undertake all
necessary measures (UNSC and additional transparency
measures) to demonstrate the peaceful nature of its program
as quickly as possible.


16. (SBU) In a characteristically short statement, Brazil
conveyed a candid assessment that the current DG's report did
not differ substantially from the last one and registered no
progress. Brazil hoped for progress to resolve doubts about
Iran's peaceful purpose and looked forward to future
negotiations

--------------
NAM Troika: No Evolution in Position
--------------


17. (C) Although the NAM statement delivered by Cuba did
not include a verbatim recitation as in the previous three
Board meetings of the July 2008 Tehran Ministerial statement,
the NAM reaffirmed the "principled positions" taken
heretofore on Iran. There was no evolution in the NAM
position which reflected the group's sole operational purpose
in Vienna, serving as an apologist and mouthpiece for Iran
and Syria (a service which both Iran and Syria duly
acknowledged in their respective national statements under
Rule 50.) (Comment: This proclivity would only be
exacerbated, or perhaps become more transparent, if Iran
succeeds in securing a slot on the NAM troika at the NAM
Summit in Egypt in July. End Comment.) While paying lip
service to diplomacy and dialogue and calling for
"substantive negotiations without preconditions," the NAM
statement did not mention the P5 1 offer to Iran or U.S.
willingness to engage in direct diplomacy, though national
statements by other NAM members welcomed the new U.S. stance
.


18. (SBU) Rather, the NAM statement hewed to established
positions, reaffirming inalienable NPT rights without
discrimination and including respect for states' choices,
specifically citing those of Iran on fuel cycle policies.
The NAM reaffirmed the IAEA as the sole competent
verification authority, cautioned against undue pressure and
interference with IAEA verification, and stressed the
distinction between "legal" NPT obligations and voluntary
confidence building measures (CBMs). (Comment: The Director
General's intervention at the conclusion of the item directly
addressed the latter point but with little effect on the NAM.
End Comment.) As has become customary, the NAM cherry
picked "positive" aspects of the DG's report by citing
non-diversion of declared material, no evidence of
reprocessing, containment and surveillance at the FEP and
PFEP, environmental sampling, and 26 unannounced inspections
since March 2007. Also as in the past, the NAM supported the
Director General's request for Member States to provide
copies of the "alleged studies," painting this as an obstacle
to verification while making no mention of Iran's failure to
cooperate on PMD issues. Taking all of this into account and
the completion of the "work plan," the NAM once again "looked
forward to" safeguards implementation in Iran in a routine
manner. The statement also made the usual call for a NWFZ in
the Middle East and condemnation of any threat of attack on a
peaceful nuclear facility as a grave violation of the
international law.


19. (SBU) Cuba's national statement went a step further
than the NAM statement in insisting that there was no
justification for keeping the Iran nuclear issue on the
Board's agenda. Cuba again painted Iran as the victim of an
unprecedented inspection regime that had turned up no proof
of undeclared activity after five years and impinged on
Iran's national security. Cuba also echoed Iran's arguments
on outstanding issues having been addressed a year ago under
the "work plan," questioning information of "doubtful origin"

and calling for routine implementation of safeguards. Cuba
blamed geopolitical interests for keeping Iran on the agenda
while turning a blind eye to "double standards" in the Middle
East. The Cuban statement ended with its usual call to
return the Iran file to Vienna noting that "today as never
before," we see conditions that allow the issue to advance;
this was the only acknowledgment of a change in the
international dynamic. Speaking under Rule 50 as a non-Board
member Venezuela was almost as ardent as Cuba in insisting on
routine implementation of safeguards in Iran and questioning
the documents of "doubtful origin" that it urged be shared
with Iran.


20. (C) National statements by NAM troika members Egypt and
Malaysia also demonstrated no real departure from previous
recent statements. Egypt reaffirmed that the Iranian nuclear
issue could not be viewed in isolation from establishing a
NWFZ in the Middle East and application of IAEA safeguards in
Israel, while Malaysia forthrightly decried the "lack of
seriousness" and "imbalance" with respect to Israel versus
Iran. Egypt stressed, in particular, compliance only with
legal NPT obligations while anything "in excess" of this was
limited and could not be based on "non-credible
allegations"--i.e. including those of the U.S. (Comment: In
its public position as a NAM standard bearer, Egypt expressed
none of the concerns about Iran relayed privately to
Ambassador Schulte prior to the Board. End Comment.)
Malaysia welcomed continued cooperation by Iran that had led
to resolution of all "work plan" issues and likewise impugned
the credibility of the "alleged studies." Like the NAM
statement, neither Egypt nor Malaysia made mentioned U.S. or
P5 1 overtures to Iran.

--------------
"Balanced" NAM Statements
--------------


21. (SBU) While associating with the NAM statement,
national statements by the Philippines, South Africa, India,
and Indonesia, under Rule 50, were more balanced than those
of the troika, as has also been the case in prior Board
meetings. Usually helpful NAM member Ecuador did not speak
on the Iran agenda item this time. The Philippines welcomed
non-diversion of declared nuclear material and Iranian
cooperation with IAEA inspections, but expressed concern with
the lack of progress on outstanding issues which it urged
Iran to resolve by providing "continued" transparency and
access. The Philippines added that "other concerned parties"
should also cooperate. As it has previously, the Philippines
called for AP implementation in compliance with UNSC and
Board resolutions. Ending on a strong note, the Philippines
welcomed U.S. willingness to engage in direct dialogue and
shared the Director General's hope that Iran will respond in
kind.


22. (SBU) South Africa also began with a recitation of the
"positive elements" of the report related to declared
material, before lamenting the fact that after five years the
Director General was still not in a position to provide
assurances on the absence of undeclared activities. South
Africa called on Iran to address outstanding issues, but also
on Member States to provide documents. The SAG statement
focused on the AP as "critical" in allowing Iran to prove to
the world the nature of its nuclear program, in addition to
calling for implementation of Code 3.1 and mandatory steps
required by the UNSC. South Africa concluded by welcoming
"indications" of renewed dialogue.


23. (SBU) In a short statement, India highlighted the need
for clarification of outstanding issues, noting the Director
General's remarks that there had been no movement on these
issues, and urged Iran and "others concerned" to provide
information and transparency. After calling for a diplomatic
solution, India concluded with its customary jab about "the
supply side of proliferation,"-i.e. Pakistan. Rule 50
speaker Indonesia was also "balanced" in welcoming "progress"
and IAEA and Iranian efforts on the "work plan," and called
on "all parties," including Iran, to cooperate in addressing
remaining issues. Indonesia was encouraged by the new U.S.
approach in creating a conducive atmosphere for negotiation
and echoed the Director General's hope that President Obama's
offer would lead to a settlement.

--------------
Other Arabs Also More Balanced
--------------


24. (SBU) In a measured statement, Iraq called for a
"balanced policy" by all parties while recognizing the
legitimate demands of the IAEA and Board and UNSC
resolutions. Throughout its statement, Iraq called on "all

parties" to rely on dialogue and avoid escalation. Iran also
called on Iran to adhere to the AP, and provide substantive
information on PMD issues, as well as others to provide
copies of documentation. Algeria welcomed U.S. willingness
to engage in direct dialogue and noted that it was encouraged
by the prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.


25. (SBU) Libya, under Rule 50, welcomed the DG's continued
verification of the non-diversion of declared nuclear
material in Iran, but also called on Iran to increase
cooperation with the IAEA so that the nature of its program
could be fully understood. Libya also called on the
international community to deal with all issues on equal
footing-i.e. Israel. Saudi Arabia did not speak on Iran but
delivered an unhelpful intervention under the Syria agenda
item (septel).

--------------
Iran Pushing for Removal from Agenda
--------------


26. (SBU) In his prepared statement to the Board, Iranian
Ambassador Soltanieh laid out Iran's case that it should be
removed from the Board agenda because there was no technical
justification for continued consideration of its file. He
emphasized that over the last six years the DG had issued
twenty reports in which he stated that there is no evidence
of the diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.
Soltanieh asserted that Iran should have been removed from
the agenda in 2004 when the IAEA verified Iran's explanation
that the source of LEU and HEU contamination in Iran was
foreign, but that "a certain state" driven by political, not
technical considerations, made a new allegation, which Iran
later proved to be baseless. Finally, Soltanieh blamed the US
for not turning over the "alleged studies" documents, which
precluded the IAEA from resolving the issue.


27. (SBU) In an effort to keep driving a wedge between Board
members, Soltanieh argued that Iran remained on the agenda
because a couple of countries wanted to create more intrusive
safeguards to interfere in the internal affairs of Member
States. Soltanieh cited attempts to make the AP mandatory, a
US proposal to establish the committee on strengthen
safeguards, and the additional restrictions on technical
cooperation as evidence that the focus on Iran at the IAEA
was a pretext for restricting the rights of other Member
States. In his final plea to resume routine inspections in
Iran, Soltanieh cautioned that keeping Iran on the agenda
would have serious consequences for the IAEA's credibility.


28. (SBU) After delivering Iran's prepared statement,
Soltanieh criticized the U.S., EU, and Canada for giving
"unbalanced" statements that ignored the positive points in
the DG's report. He said that after listening to the U.S.
statement he sees no adjustments in U.S. policy, despite
promises of "change." As a result, he said that "all peace
loving countries" had to think twice about dealing with the
U.S. Soltanieh ended by informing the IAEA that a new chapter
in Iran-IAEA relations was possible if the IAEA resumed
routine safeguards in Iran at which point Iran would resolve
ambiguities, "if any."

--------------
Chair's Summary
--------------


29. (SBU) In her summary, the Chair (Algerian Ambassador
Feroukhi) noted that several Member States expressed serious
concern that the Agency was still not in a position to
determine the nature of Iran's nuclear program and that Iran
had not complied with UNSC resolutions and with previous
Board requests. Several Member States noted the need for Iran
to implement the AP and the Code 3.1 and to resolve the
outstanding issues which raise concerns about PMD. In
addition, several Member States requested that the States
that provided the Agency with documentation related to the
"alleged studies" authorize the Agency to share them with
Iran. The summary stated that several Member States deplored
that Iran had not allowed the Agency to carry out at DIV at
the IR-40 and had not provided the design information on the
nuclear facility that Iran intended to construct in
Darkhovin. Several Member States expressed concern that Iran
was the only country to build and possibly operate a nuclear
power plant without being party to the relevant nuclear
safety and security conventions. Several members called on
Iran to consider positively the offer made by the P5 1 and
noted the DG's proposal of a "freeze-for-freeze" as a prelude
to such dialogue.


30. (SBU) Several Member States said that they looked
forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted

in a routine manner, that undue pressure or interference in
the Agency's verification activities jeopardized the Agency's
credibility, and that they supported a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in the Middle East.

--------------
U.S. Statement
--------------


31. (U) Begin text of U.S. statement:

Madam Chair,
The United States appreciates this latest report on the
implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and compliance
with its UN Security Council obligations. We thank the
Director General and the Secretariat for their continued
serious and professional efforts in conducting their
verification mission in Iran.

Once more, we have before us confirmation that the Agency's
task is not an easy one. Indeed, the language of the
Agency's reports has become repetitive in its description of
Iran's refusal to comply with its obligations while advancing
its proscribed nuclear program and denying the IAEA the
access and information it requires.

Iran has so limited the Agency's ability to carry out its
investigation into the many outstanding issues surrounding
Iran's nuclear program that no progress has been made toward
a resolution of this issue since August 2008. As a result,
the latest Director General's report represents, once again,
another opportunity missed by Iran to address the concerns of
the international community with respect to its nuclear
program. We regret that no progress has been made in the
IAEA's investigation. We regret that no progress has been
made with respect to Iran's fulfillment of its UN Security
Council, NPT, and IAEA obligations. And we regret that no
progress has been made in establishing the confidence of the
international community as to the exclusively peaceful nature
of Iran's nuclear program.

As President Obama noted in Cairo on June 4, the question now
is what future Iran wants to build: one of inclusion and
cooperation as a responsible member of the international
community, or one of increasing isolation. We call on Iran's
leaders to demonstrate genuine commitment to peace and
security in the Middle East and to the non-proliferation
regime. Unfortunately, to date, Iran's ongoing
noncompliance continues to erode the foundation of mutual
confidence and trust upon which the entire nonproliferation
regime - and the IAEA safeguards system in particular - is
built.

Madam Chair,
I wish to focus on three key items.
Let me address first the issue of Iran's past efforts to
design a nuclear warhead. The Director General's report to
this Bard in September 2008 discussed various proposals fr
Iran to address the many outstanding issues reated to
possible military dimensions to its nuclar program. In
November, the Director General aked that Iran assist the
Agency by providing it ith access to documents, information
and personne to demonstrate, as Iran has asserted, that its
arhead activities were not nuclear-related. The Drector
General encouraged Iran to provide clarifcations and
substantive explanations to support ts contentions about the
considerable informationprovided to the IAEA by multiple
states.

It i therefore disappointing that over nine months hav gone
by and Iran has failed to take what the Diector General
calls an important first step in adressing these long
outstanding issues. What conlusion should the Board draw
from Iran's refusalto even meet with the IAEA inspectors,
much lessprovide substantive answers to the IAEA's
questins?
Iran claims that all of the IAEA's concerns have been
addressed. Unfortunately, this is far from the case, as the
DG report demonstrates. As the Board responsible for this
Agency, we have a responsibility to demand fulsome answers to
the Secretariat's questions when the Agency is unable to
fulfill its basic function of providing assurances as to the
peaceful nature of a state's nuclear program. When a state
such as Iran, which has failed to observe its safeguards
agreement fully for decades, is known to have engaged in
weapons-related work, it makes this task all the more vital.

Second, it remains deeply troubling that Iran continues to
make progress in its uranium enrichment program despite its
standing, legally-binding obligation to suspend such
activity. The fact that Iran has now produced over 1,300 kg

of low enriched uranium hexafluoride is cause for serious
concern to the international community. Iran is now either
very near or in possession of sufficient low enriched uranium
to produce one nuclear weapon, if the decision were made to
enrich it to weapons-grade. Iran also continues to install
and test additional centrifuge cascades. Far from having
suspended its centrifuge activities or moderating them, Iran
has nearly doubled its number of operational and
near-operational centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at
Natanz in less than a year, and member states were informed
at last week's technical briefing that Iran is now testing a
more advanced centrifuge, the so-called "IR-2 modified". This
is deeply regrettable. As the Director General noted in his
opening statement, Iran must take steps, such as a "freeze
for freeze", implementing its design information verification
requirements, and adhering to the AP, that build
international confidence in its nuclear program to overcome
fears that Iran continues to seek a weapons option.

Third, we note with concern that Iran's work on the Arak
Heavy Water Reactor has continued, as has Iran's apparent
production of heavy water at the associated plant.
Construction of this reactor could provide Iran with the
capability to produce one or two weapons worth of plutonium
annually if the reactor is brought on-line.

Iran argues that it has no intent to use the Arak reactor for
military purposes and that IAEA safeguards are intended to
provide us confidence that this is the case. However, Iran's
refusal to meet its safeguards obligations deprives us of
that confidence. As the report lays bare, Iran persists in
its refusal to implement fully its safeguards agreement, much
less the Additional Protocol called for by the Board and UNSC.

This lack of cooperation is no more evident than with Iran's
persistent refusal to permit the IAEA to conduct a Design
Information Verification (DIV) inspection of the Arak
reactor. As described in the DG report, Iran's response to
IAEA requests for access to the reactor has been uniformly
negative and dismissive of the Agency's concerns. To justify
its response, Iran claims to have unilaterally dispensed with
its obligation for early declaration of nuclear facilities
under the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to
its Safeguards Agreement, though the IAEA has asserted that
there is no provision in the IAEA Statute or Iran's
Safeguards Agreement that permits the unilateral modification
of its obligations. Indeed, the IAEA's Legal Advisor has
indicated that Iran's failure to apply Code 3.1 is
"inconsistent with" its safeguards obligations. Further, the
Secretariat has informed Iran in writing that it cannot
unilaterally alter its safeguards obligations by suspending
Code 3.1 and by denying insp
ections at Arak.

While at first some may have questioned the practical
significance of Iran's stance, the Director General makes
clear the serious implications of Iran's refusal to grant the
Agency access to IR-40, which "could adversely impact the
Agency's ability to carry out effective safeguards at the
facility, and has made it difficult for the Agency to report
further on the construction of the reactor." In short, Iran
is increasingly putting the effectiveness of Agency
safeguards at risk by not allowing such inspections at Arak.

Similarly, over a year ago, the Director General requested
Design Information Verification information for the new power
plant Iran plans to construct at Darkhovin. And once again,
Iran has refused to provide such information to the IAEA.

Last week's technical briefing by the IAEA raised questions
regarding the future of safeguards at Natanz as well.
Containment and surveillance measures are the bedrock of IAEA
safeguards. We hope that the Agency and Iran will be able to
come to an appropriate agreement regarding the safeguards
approach at Natanz, while we continue to urge Iran to meet
its UNSC obligation to suspend all activities at Natanz
without further delay.

Madam Chair,
Over the past four years, we have seen Iran increasingly
refuse to cooperate with the IAEA and provide the access and
transparency required of it by the UN Security Council.
Iran's refusal to implement the Additional Protocol or even
to fully implement its Safeguards Agreement merits the
sustained attention of the international community and a
vigorous response by the members of this Board.

President Obama was clear in his speech in Cairo: "Any
nation -- including Iran -- should have the right to access
peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its
responsibilities under the NPT. That commitment is at the

core of the treaty, and it must be kept for all who fully
abide by it." We urge Iran to fulfill all its
responsibilities, including to engage fully and transparently
with the Secretariat in resolving outstanding issues without
further delay. We urge Iran to provide the IAEA immediately
with all requested information on past, present and planned
nuclear activities in Iran and to acknowledge its continuing
responsibility in that regard.

Iran's current posture with respect to the IAEA deeply
undermines Iran's assertion that its nuclear program is
exclusively peaceful in nature. It is incumbent on Iran to
take the necessary measures to re-establish its credibility
with the international community and demonstrate that Iran is
living up to its international responsibilities. Only in
this fashion will Iran be able to reassure us all as to its
peaceful intentions.

Madam Chair,
My government is committed to a diplomatic resolution of
international concerns over Iran's nuclear program and the
P5 1 dual track approach. We continue to call on Iran to
seize the opportunity and to respond substantively to the
P5 1 offer on its nuclear program made two months ago in
April 2009. We are willing to engage in direct diplomacy
based on mutual respect and interests and we seek a willing
partner. However, as I have already stated, with rights come
responsibilities.

We urge Iran to fulfill its international nuclear obligations
and accept the promise of a negotiated and comprehensive
settlement. We hope that Iran will not miss this opportunity
to resolve its six-year- long stalemate with the
international community by taking immediate steps to restore
international trust and confidence. We look forward to a
time in which Iran is greeted by this Board as an IAEA member
state in good standing and urge Iran to do what is necessary
to make that a reality.

My Delegation seconds Canada's call for the public release of
DG Report Gov2009/35.
Thank you, Madam Chair.

End text.
PYATT