CODEL LOWEY AND WAXMAN,S VISIT WITH IAEA AND CTBTO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000276 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AORC MNUC PREL TRGY IR IAEA KNNP SY KN SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY AND WAXMAN,S VISIT WITH IAEA AND CTBTO -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY) and Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA) challenged IAEA DG ElBaradei's assessment of the threat Iran poses to Israel in a May 26 private meeting. ElBaradei used the opportunity to reiterate his views about international fuel banks, explain the IAEA's authority on weaponization-related issues, complain about the IAEA's lack of and limits placed on funding, and express criticism of what he sees as past U.S. policy failures on Iran, DPRK, and Syria. In a separate meeting, Tibor Toth, Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO, explained the role of the CTBTO's verification and monitoring system and encouraged the U.S. ratification and entry into force of the Treaty. End Summary. -------------- DG ElBaradei Repeats Same Lines from Press Interviews -------------- ¶2. (U) During a meeting with Congresswoman Lowey and Congressman Waxman on May 26, IAEA Director General (DG) ElBaradei and DDG Management David Waller discussed the IAEA's role in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and current verification issues. ElBaradei largely repeated similar points from his recent strand of press interviews. He said that more countries are becoming interested in nuclear power and the IAEA is there to help them achieve it in a safe and secure manner, recognizing that one way to strengthen the NPT was through a multinational fuel cycle and fuel bank. ElBaradei noted that an international fuel bank would make it difficult for countries to justify having their own nuclear fuel cycle program. ElBaradei welcomed President Obama's comments about nuclear disarmament in Prague. ¶3. (SBU) Regarding nuclear verification in Iran, ElBaradei made some provocative comments, noting that the IAEA was wrongly criticized for "missing it", bwhen in fact, Tehran's construction of the Natanz centrifuge complex had not been a violation of its safeguards agreement since Iran was not within 180 days of introducing nuclear material. ElBaradei also stated that he did not believe Iran really had intended to "hide" the Natanz facility since it was so large. He argued that the trouble started when Iran "breached" its safeguards obligations by not reporting some past experiments with nuclear material. Downplaying that Tehran "may have" conducted some "studies" in the past, ElBaradei said that the IAEA does not see a nuclear weapons program in Iran today and that he doubts Iran will cooperate further with the IAEA on outstanding issues until it has a broader policy dialogue with the U.S. ¶4. (SBU) ElBaradei criticized U.S. policy for failing on Iran, but indicated he has hope for the U.S. with its new "willingness for openness," and implored the U.S. to make some kind of "grand bargain" for a win/win outcome. He believes Iran wants nuclear technology for respect, energy, and an "insurance policy" to be seen as a regional power and to be recognized by the U.S. He noted that this issue will take time, and it is important for both Iran and the U.S. to realize they need each other, especially on issues related to Afghanistan, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinians, etc. ¶5. (SBU) Responding to Congresswoman Lowey's questions about the IAEA's authority to monitor/investigate weaponization-related activities, ElBaradei said that the IAEA's authority is limited to those activities involving nuclear material, which excludes delivery systems and weaponization activities. He then said the Additional Protocol (AP) would essentially allow the IAEA to go everywhere, although the IAEA cannot make guarantees on the absence of covert activities. Both Lowey and Congressman Waxman asked if there were other mechanisms that would help the IAEA perform or broaden its verification duties. ElBaradei used this opening to complain about how "shamefully unfunded" the IAEA was; how Member States put conditions on funding for nuclear security ; how the IAEA needs to have a new environmental sampling laboratory; and how the IAEA needs access to satellite imagery. ¶6. (SBU) Lowey asked what one should do about a country -Iran-that wants to annihilate Israel. ElBaradei replied that although he knows Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad says a lot of offensive things, he personally does not speak Farsi and is not sure that Ahmadi-Nejad's comments were translated correctly. Waxman asked if Iran having a nuclear weapon would drive others in the Middle East to pursue such capabilities. ElBaradei responded that he did not think so, UNVIE VIEN 00000276 002 OF 002 since Iran would not use a nuclear weapon on a neighbor. Lowey then commented that officials in Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan have all expressed concern during meetings with her over Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. ElBaradei explained that he was much more worried about the Taliban being so close to Islamabad, since Pakistan actually does have nuclear weapons. Responding to Waxman's question about Iran's desire for nuclear weapons, ElBaradei stated that his gut feeling was Iran would like to have nuclear weapons technology, but would sit on it, as "Japan and Brazil" did. Waxman then noted the importance and/or fear that other countries would have if Iran was a "virtual" nuclear weapons state. ElBaradei replied that was why it is important to negotiate, using both pressure and incentives, and have a tight inspection regime. He said the U.S. a generation ago achieved a paradigm-break with China and should do so now with Iran. ¶7. (SBU) ElBaradei also criticized the U.S. for "mismanaging" the North Korean nuclear issue, commenting that North Korea has the "trump card"-nuclear weapons-and will use it to gain concessions. Unlike Iran, ElBaradei stated that North Korea could be bought off, and that the international community should not allow the "human tragedy"-the starving people-to continue, especially since the targeted sanctions have not hurt the regime. ¶8. (SBU) Waxman asked ElBaradei why he was so critical of Israel and the U.S. for Israel's attack on the Syrian nuclear reactor, given that Israel and Syria still are in a state of war. ElBaradei replied that he does not support the use of unilateral force, and the IAEA should have been given a chance to do its job, but now the IAEA is stuck an "impossible task" of ascertaining what the Syrians were constructing. Waxman asked what the IAEA would have done it if had been informed of the Syrian activities before the attack. ElBaradei said the IAEA would have gone to the Syrians first, gotten cooperation, and confirmed whether or not Syria was building a reactor. -------------- -- DPRK Example to Explain CTBTO Monitoring System -------------- -- ¶9. (SBU) The Codel also met with Ambassador Tibor Toth, Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO),on May 26. Toth explained the functioning of the International Monitoring System (IMS),the verification system of the CTBT, using the recent alleged nuclear test by the DPRK as an example of how the system functioned. Toth stressed the improvements made in the system in the last ten years and noted the importance of continued U.S. engagement on the technical side. He also spoke of the importance of U.S. ratification to catalyze the entry into force of the Treaty. The Codel toured the Operations Center of the PTS, where all IMS stations are continuously monitored. ¶10. (U) Note: The CODEL had the opportunity to review this message. SCHULTE