Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA268
2009-06-09 13:25:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO MAKES A STRONG SHOWING IN

Tags:  AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0268/01 1601325
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091325Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9565
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0228
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 0153
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 0046
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000268 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN
PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
DOE FOR NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO MAKES A STRONG SHOWING IN
STRAW POLL BUT VICTORY NOT IN HAND

REF: A) UNVIE 260 AND PREVIOUS B) STATE 58951

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Comment
--------------------

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000268 SIPDIS DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD DOE FOR NA-20 NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019 TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO MAKES A STRONG SHOWING IN STRAW POLL BUT VICTORY NOT IN HAND REF: A) UNVIE 260 AND PREVIOUS B) STATE 58951 Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (S) The results of the June 9 informal straw poll -- Amano 20, Minty 11, Echavarri 4, and Poncelet and Petric both 0 -- place Amano in good stead for the formal vote, which the Board Chair announced would be held over a two-day session on July 2-3. Certainly, the momentum is with Amano and many Board members are impressed by his better-than-expected showing, even outdoing our most optimistic predictions. However, Minty's likewise better-than-expected show also rings a cautionary note. Although Amano is buoyed by the result, he needs to focus on the fact that he had not yet converted any of the "Minty 12," a reality Amano recognized in a telcon with Ambassador Schulte after the vote. We suspect that Malaysia, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia stuck with Minty in the non-binding poll despite putative commitments to Amano, though they may yet support him in the formal vote. The one defector from the Minty 12, probably Russia, likely supported Echavarri in the straw poll. If none of the 12 "convert" to Amano in the formal vote, Minty will retain his "blocking third" of the 35-member Board, and thus prevent Amano from getting the required two-thirds support to be appointed Director General. ¶2. (S) It will be incumbent on Amano in the next few weeks to redouble efforts to convert Minty supporters, in particular. In addition to the three putative conversions, Russia, India and Brazil will be key targets that may be swayed by their long term interests in the IAEA. On the margins of the straw poll, Brazilian DCM reported that a Lula-Aso telcon this week had gone very well (better than anticipated) and Brazil would likely support Amano in the event Minty backs out. Amano, while upbeat, recognizes that Minty's strong showing means tough work ahead. He estimated that India, Argentina, Egypt and Cuba could shift in the final "leading candidate" vote. Japan will share a list of suggested targets for U.S. lobbying after analyzing the straw poll results. Meanwhile, Echavarri
's tally was less than what Amano had expected. His relatively weak showing indicates that Echavarri will likely be eliminated in the formal voting. We suspect that his four votes included Spain, Romania, Russia and Mexico (or perhaps Germany, as Japan suspects) but can only confirm the first two. None of the others would disclose their secret ballot vote when informally canvassed after the poll. Echavarri supporters, including Spain, should be encouraged to support Amano after Echavarri is eliminated as expected. It would be optimal if Echavarri could peel off a couple more Minty supporters in the coming weeks so as to be a "back-up" option. (Note: In the event of a stalemate, the slate of nominations would be re-opened for another four weeks. End note). Amano's strong showing in the straw poll makes it unlikely for Echavarri to have much of an impact on Amano supporters. Finally, as for Petric and Poncelet, the former has already indicated to Ambassador Schulte he will withdraw. Mission seeks guidance on whether to approach Belgium (see para 6). ¶3. (SBU) At the conclusion of the straw poll, the Board Chair announced that a Special Session to conduct the election will be held on July 2-3, thus putting an end to all speculation about dates. She indicated that she had come under much pressure during consultations with candidates and Board members and appears to have taken our advice on setting an election date upon the conclusion of the straw poll. The two-day election process will begin with the formal elimination round on the morning of July 2, followed by up to six rounds of voting in the runoff. End Summary and Comment. A Cautionary Note -------------- ¶4. (S) Insofar as the non-binding poll is predictive, an Amano-Minty rematch is likely in the final runoff after the elimination rounds of formal voting but so too is the possibility of continued stalemate. Minty retained his core support in the informal poll -- 11 of his "blocking" 12 votes. The sole defector from the original Minty camp, probably Russia, likely went to Echavarri. In short, Amano does not seem to have converted any of the "Minty 12" at least in the non-binding poll notwithstanding commitments of support from Malaysia, Philippines and Saudi Arabia, which were among the twelve. (Comment: Since it is unlikely that any Amano votes converted to Minty, these are likely the three culprits, but we cannot confirm how countries voted in the secret ballot. End comment). Of course, Minty supporters that have putatively committed to Amano may have felt less bound by their commitments in the informal poll than they would be in the formal vote, i.e. their conversion may yet happen. If it does not, and if Russia shifts back to Minty after Echavarri is likely eliminated, Minty could once again block Amano from getting to 24 (two-thirds of the 35-member Board). Winnowing the Field -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte met with an angry Ernest Petric immediately after the straw poll, who said that he would advise his government to drop his candidacy following the result as he wanted nothing further to do with the Agency. Petric was angry with everyone except the U.S., whose vote he understood based on our relationship with Japan, and thanked us for our openness. He acknowledged Ambassador Schulte's friendly warning weeks ago that he may not get any votes. Petric was angry with Europe for not providing him any support (he had expected at least Albania) despite having encouraged him to stay in the race. He questioned the meaning of "Europe" if almost all the Europeans voted for Japan. Petric was also angry with the NAM for sticking with Minty, a losing candidate, rather than supporting him as a possible consensus candidate. Lastly, he was angry with Japan for running a "dirty campaign" and estimated that Amano would be incapable of running the Agency effectively and start his tenure with a fractured Board. Ambassador Schulte strongly discouraged such accusations and encouraged Petric to support the good of the Agency, the importance of which Petric wholly acknowledged. ¶6. (SBU) Belgian candidate Poncelet was not present for the straw poll and the Belgian Mission seemed stoic about the result, dismissing this as "only the first round." The Board Chair told Ambassador Schulte previously that Poncelet, unlike Echavarri and Petric, had not ruled out withdrawing after the straw poll. Guidance request: Mission requests guidance as to whether Ambassador Schulte should approach Belgian MFA Disarmament Director Bauens, whom he knows personally, about Poncelet's intentions. Alternatively, the Department may wish to approach the Belgian government to encourage Poncelet's withdrawal and expedite the process of concluding the election. SCHULTE

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