IAEA: SECOND ANALYTIC TRAINING SESSION PROVIDES

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000251 SIPDIS IO FOR A/S BRIMMER, IO/T, ISN/MNSA FOR RCOCKERHAM, NCPC FOR KSTROH, ISN FOR RNEPHEW E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2034 TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA SUBJECT: IAEA: SECOND ANALYTIC TRAINING SESSION PROVIDES NEW EVALUATION TOOLS TO SAFEGUARDS INSPECTORS REF: A. 08 UNVIE 00564 ¶B. MONGIELLO-NEPHEW E-MAIL 9/12/08 ¶C. FERNANDEZ-COCKERHAM E-MAIL 12/5/07 ¶D. 01 STATE 026438 Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (S) Summary. In response to a continuing request from the IAEA Safeguards Department for assistance in improving its analytic methods, the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC),with the close support of CIA's Sherman Kent School, sponsored training for IAEA Safeguards officials in analytic tradecraft techniques from 30 March through 1 April 2009 at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The course (the second running since mid-November 2008) introduced another group of Safeguards Department's open-source analysts, inspectors, and trainers to rigorous analytic methodologies. Safeguards officials hope for continued U.S. support in offering this course several times a year in order to adequately address the long-term needs of the Safeguards Department and to continue to reinforce and "transform the safeguards culture" from solely nuclear material accountancy to a state-level analytic approach. The IAEA's feedback for this course, like that of the prototype running in November, was extremely positive. ¶2. (S) Mission endorses the need for a multi-year training effort and requests the support of the Department, CIA/DI and its Sherman Kent School and the National Counterproliferation Center in addressing the course needs and frequency. End Summary. -------------- IAEA's Interest in Analytic Training -------------- ¶3. (S) As noted in Ref A, the Director of Safeguards Information Management Division (SGIM),Jacques Baute, requested U.S. assistance from Ambassador Kenneth Brill, Director of NCPC, in November 2007 to train the IAEA Safeguards Department in analytic tradecraft and techniques. SGIM provides the Department of Safeguards with services relating to data processing, secure information distribution, information analysis and knowledge generation necessary for the IAEA to draw independent, impartial, and credible safeguards conclusions. Separately, DDG for Safeguards Olli Heinonen in early September 2008 also expressed interest in receiving such training, and later relayed this interest to Ambassador Brill in Washington D.C. on September 12 (Ref B). Heinonen put the request in context, noting the current IAEA practice of framing its safeguards assessments in terms of analyzing whether all available information is "consistent," "not inconsistent," or "inconsistent" with claims made by the inspected party. He would like to see an evolution in safeguards methodology that helps shift the burden of proof when verification questions arise from the IAEA to the inspected party. He requested assistance in training his staff on confidence levels in assessments and information credibility, and in the consistent use of risk assessment terminology. (Comment: This training provides an excellent opportunity for the USG to establish a common assessment vernacular with the IAEA.) These points were emphasized by Baute and the Section Head for Safeguards Training, Jean-Maurice Crete, at the completion of the first round of analytic training who both referred to the effort as a means of "transforming the culture of the IAEA" to encourage analytic support to inspection missions and reporting. -------------- Analysis Workshop - 30 March-1 April -------------- ¶4. (S) Before the workshop, and following from lessons learned during the initial the November 2008 running, Mission worked closely with the IAEA and Department of State, NCPC, and the Sherman Kent School to fine-tune the training(Ref C). U.S. contractor Norman Green, from the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, developed and again presented the bulk of the analysis workshop for the IAEA. He was supported by Kevin Stroh from NCPC as a co-instructor. (Comment: For the purposes of the training course, Green is described only as a U.S. contractor/trainer and Stroh as a State Department officer, in keeping with past precedent.) ¶5. (S) The workshop addressed the IAEA's requests to ensure students have an enhanced understanding of the nature of collaborative analysis and the role that structured analytic methodologies can play in testing key analytic assumptions, challenging "group think" and gaining insight into complex issues. Based on the highly positive feedback from the dozen IAEA officials who attended the course (representing inspectors from OPS sections, analysts from SGIM),as well as post-workshop reviews with IAEA management, there was clear consensus among IAEA participants that the training is hitting the mark in helping to enable the analytic culture the Agency seeks to further develop. -------------- Course Material: A Work in Progress -------------- ¶6. (S) To continue to evolve and refine the course, the IAEA requested adjustments to the course content to increasingly emphasize actual analytic experiences derived from case-studies of real-world proliferants. For example, MsnOff, Stroh, and Baute recalled an Iraq Retrospective Exercise done for the IAEA in December 2000 (Ref D) in which Stroh and other USG participants shared actual case study materials and analyses with IAEA officials at that time. Safeguards officials also offered to draw on their inspection information and experience as another potential source of data to construct further case study applications for the analytic techniques in the workshop. -------------- Comment and Next Steps -------------- ¶7. (S) The IAEA has identified this training as a top priority for enabling its safeguards cadre to enhance strengthened safeguards implementation. Mission sees U.S.-provision of this training as an invaluable catalyst for prompting discussion with senior Safeguards officials of further adjustments to IAEA safeguards and training implementation in support of achieving the U.S. objective of stronger IAEA assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. For example, our provision of this course has provided the vehicle for prompting the IAEA to begin to move toward reviewing its safeguards training curriculum to inculcate the analytic ethos throughout. Mission strongly recommends continued long-term U.S. provision of this training course, and requests Department consider (including with NCPC or others as appropriate) means for funding the conduct of this course 2-3 times per year. ¶8. (S) The Mission strongly endorses the continued participation of Green and Stroh in this training effort, particularly given Green's deep training skill and Stroh's IAEA and Iraq-relevant background that could be drawn upon for the next course running, nominally requested for this summer and that could include a reprise of sorts of the earlier Iraq analytical case study. ¶9. (S) Gabriela Fernandez (IAEA section, 43 1 31339 4823, FernandezGA@state.sgov.gov) is the Mission's POC for this activity. SCHULTE