IAEA Symposium on Nuclear Security Relates Terrorism Threat

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000240 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA NA-20 LOONEY, NA-20.1 KOONTZ NA-21 BIENIAWSKI/SHEELY/ILIOPULOS/STAPLES/CUMMINS, NA-25 HUIZENGA/VOGLER, NA-24-WHITNEY/GOOREVICH/PERRY/O'CONNOR/LAMONT AGNE NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY SUBJECT: IAEA Symposium on Nuclear Security Relates Terrorism Threat to Nuclear Power Expansion ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium, attended by over 500 participants representing over 90 countries, dealt with issues involved in protecting nuclear and other radioactive materials from the hands of criminals and provided a forum for discussions with nuclear security counterparts. The Symposium took place against the backdrop of renewed interest in nuclear power, current efforts to develop a Nuclear Security Plan guiding the IAEA's interim nuclear security priorities, and increased concern regarding the need for greater nuclear and radiological security worldwide. The Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's Ken Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, led the U.S. delegation to the Symposium and held meetings with counterparts from South Africa, Canada, and Jordan, as well as IAEA Deputy Directors General Waller, Heinonen, and Sokolov, and Office of Nuclear Security Director Nilsson, and with World Institute for Nuclear Security Executive Director Roger Howsley. Ambassador used the opportunity to engage counterparts from over three dozen Vienna missions, in an official dinner and separate afternoon gathering, on mainstreaming nuclear security in the IAEA organization and budget. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The Symposium on Nuclear Security was convened 30 March to 2 April at IAEA headquarters in Vienna by the IAEA in cooperation with the European Police Office, INTERPOL, the Joint Research Centre, European Commission, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN Counter Terrorism Task Force, the United Nations - Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Customs Organization, the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS),the World Nuclear Transport Institute. The following report focuses on USDEL interactions in the symposium and in bilateral side meetings, in the sequence they occurred. -------------- South Africa Open to Pelindaba Visit -------------- ¶3. (SBU) DoE/NNSA Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator Baker thanked South African IAEA Governor Abdul Minty for the successful recent cooperation in export controls/Commodity Identification Training. Baker also noted his hope for expanded bilateral nuclear and radiological security cooperation, stating for example that the U.S. has converted several HEU-fueled research reactors to LEU fuel and would be interested in sharing our lessons learned in this area with South Africa. Baker also offered to explore radiological physical protection cooperation, especially in light of the upcoming 2010 World Cup, and mentioned recent domestic partnerships with the University of Pennsylvania and several other universities. ¶4. (SBU) Minty noted the success in the area of export control with the NNSA and stated that he would like to continue to proceed trilaterally (with Argentina and the U.S.) in this area. He responded by saying the South African Government was very interested in reactor conversion and would like to see more information on the topic. (A February 2009 U.S. nonpaper on nuclear and radiological security assistance was presented to the South African Mission for Minty on the topic on April 1.) Minty also said that an MOU with the U.S. was ready for signature in the area of nuclear energy collaboration; however, there seemed to be a delay now. He noted that the South African resources are currently stretched due to work on the pebble bed reactor, but that cooperation remains a priority. ¶5. (SBU) Minty then turned to the issue of security at Pelindaba. Minty said that he and his staff have searched for a formal request from the U.S. regarding concerns the U.S. has about security at Pelindaba and have not been able to turn up any such request, although he stated that often such communications go directly to the concerned Departments, bypassing the MFA. (NOTE: Later in the conversation Minty repeated that USG should send relevant communications directly to his attention in the MFA. End Note.) Minty stated that he was unaware the U.S. had documented such concerns. He added that in his discussions with former Acting U/S John Rood, he was told that the U.S. had concerns initially but was satisfied with South Africa's efforts. Minty said he set up two meetings with Ministers for Ambassador Schulte after inviting him to South Africa, however, the ambassador had been unable to travel due to conflicting commitments. Minty stressed that he has no problem with U.S. officials coming to Pelindaba at any time, and that he was very eager to clear up any concerns that the U.S. may have about the facility and would ensure that he himself was present during any such visits. Minty then went through a description of the break-in and pointed out that the only item taken, a notebook, was left at the gate. He also stressed that the intruders were on the commercial side of the site and were nowhere near the site's "nuclear perimeter." The one concern he did have was allowing the television crew film access and filming rights to so much of the facility during the "60 Minutes" segment; for security purposes he might have done that differently in hindsight. ¶6. (SBU) Minty said he is very open with the U.S. He recalled he had worked with us immediately on the AQ Khan network issue and reminded that his country got two successful convictions. (He observed that Pakistan is very upset with South Arica for the prosecutions.) Minty stated that he is not very happy with other countries' results, but he is satisfied with the U.S. interactions. He feels some "developed countries" that were involved with the investigation did not behave as well. (Note: Minty regularly complains about Germany in this regard.) Minty believes that the networks are out there and the only way they can be cracked is by working together. He is happy that the IAEA is beginning to collect information on networks from public sources, but he feels the missing link is that the chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) needs to set up a system so that when a country gets an export request and subsequently denies export, it should be reported both to the government and the IAEA. (Note: the NNSA team did not comment on this reference to NSG denial sharing.) He has pressed for the 1540 Committee to look at networks; however, he indicated that since South Africa is not on the Security Council anymore there is no movement. (Interestingly, Ambassador Minty stated during this conversation that he has never said that "nonproliferation and disarmament must be balanced," because "nonproliferation is critical.") ¶7. (SBU) On the topic of shipments from ports in South Africa, Minty said that there must be more advanced notice on ships coming in. Five days is not enough notice to get information through the internal system. He said there is a cluster of ministries and interagency level meetings, and it takes several weeks to approve these types of shipments. Minty went on to thank the U.S. for the cooperation. -------------- Canada Emphasizes Global Partnership Agenda -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Baker thanked Troy Lulashnyk for Canada's close cooperation with NNSA on nuclear threat reduction initiatives. Lulashnyk said that cooperation between the U.S. and Canada is incredible and very successful because we have similar visions. Canada feels that NNSA is a leader in this business of international nonproliferation cooperative activities, with 1-2 billion dollars spent on these efforts through DOE/NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and Second Line of Defense (SLD) programs alone; Lulashnyk feels we are winning most of the fights. He stressed that Canada is excited about the new Administration's vision and is interested to see how this vision is developed and operationalized. He indicated that Canada can help back up this vision with money; the challenge (per Lulashnyk) is to get other countries on board. Lulashnyk noted that the G-8 pledged $20 billion in 2002 but there is a question in Canada's mind on how you get the Europeans and Japan to do more. Lulashnyk also emphasized his view that expanding G-8 efforts beyond Russia and the FSU is a priority, and that the new challenge for Russia was "training and sustainability." Lulashnyk closed by saying again that Canada is willing to help now and in the future with funding and it was important to have others step up and also contribute. -------------- IAEA DDG Waller Defends PSC, Appeals for SAL -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Baker raised the issue of the IAEA's newly instituted Program Support Costs (PSC) with IAEA Deputy Director General (DDG) for Management David Waller. Baker pointed out our disagreement over the application of PSC had held up NNSA's recent extrabudgetary contributions (Aprx 4M USD) to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund. Specifically, Baker requested greater transparency regarding the use and application of the PSC. Waller said that the 7 percent PSC is now necessary because the Agency is "cross subsidizing" due to the huge growth of extra-budgetary contributions; current administrative services were being squeezed in supporting extra-budgetary activities, which is not proper in his view because there are also regular budget activities that need to be addressed. Waller pointed out that the IAEA is the last major international organization to introduce a PSC, and that most UN organizations have had them for years at an average of 13 percent, not 7 percent. Waller said he understands that transparency is important and noted that, while it is impossible to account for "every dime," the Agency can generally explain what is done and stood ready to do so. He stressed his hope that this issue not "bleed" into the Program and Budgeting Committee meeting in April. ¶10. (U) Baker mentioned that a GTRI contribution ($1.5 million) was recently exempted from the PSC under a "grandfather" clause, and that NNSA was hopeful that a Second Line of Defense contribution ($1.2 million) similarly could be exempted since the funding and scope of work was agreed to with the Agency prior to July 2008. Waller responded that if there is strong evidence that the money and scope of work was agreed to prior to July 2008, exemption should be possible. When Baker inquired as to the PSC's application to Cost Free Experts (CFE),Waller confirmed that the PSC will be added to contributions unless the CFE is in a service area within management to support the administrative burden from extra-budgetary contributions. He also said the one procurement manager that the U.S. does fund is priceless, however he currently only works on support programs. (Comment: Mission is pursuing a separate clarification of PSC rates for CFE's.) ¶11. (SBU) Waller then turned to the issue of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) and required funding for its operation. Waller noted that there is a 20 percent increase in operations at SAL and that there is an urgent need for funding for infrastructure and other upgrades. He said that a total of 40 million Euros is needed for SAL. Baker responded that NNSA (in concert with DOS) would look into this issue. -------------- Making the Case to "Mainstream" Security -------------- ¶12. (U) On March 30, to conclude day one of the symposium, Ambassador Schulte hosted Ambassadors or DCMs from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Romania, and Russia at dinner with NNSA's Baker, Andrew Bieniawski and Dave Huizenga, IAEA DDG Waller, and the Office of Nuclear Security's Anita Nilsson and Tim Andrews, plus UNVIE notetakers. Ambassador Schulte opened with a few words on the IAEA 2010-2011 budget proposals, specifically the increase in regular budget support for the Office of Nuclear Security. He acknowledged the impact of the global financial crisis that had occasioned the recent G-20 summit, but asked those around the table to imagine the global economic impact of terrorists detonating an improvised nuclear or radiological device. Against that backdrop he emphasized the importance of mainstreaming nuclear security within the IAEA and how the 2010-2011 budget starts the process. He then asked DDG Waller to comment further. ¶13. (SBU) Waller noted that the Secretariat's 2010-2011 proposals are not just budgets, which refer only to price tags, but they reflect the program activities that the Secretariat believes Member States expect to be carried out. Waller acknowledged a delicate political balance must be maintained among IAEA programs. He said the nominal budget increase of about 20 percent aimed at (a) meeting statutory requirements on the Agency that have grown with the expanded use of nuclear energy in all forms around the globe and (b) correcting shortfalls in investment that resulted from years of "unrealistic" zero real growth treatment. Getting a regular budget increase for nuclear security was also crucial, Waller said, as the program's activities related to the gravest threat we commonly face. He argued the ONS was in an untenable position; relying on uncertain and irregular extra-budgetary funding resulted in cherry-picking for projects and, at times, too much funding for some and zero funding for others. Waller pointed out that the current 2010-2011 budget proposals would leave nuclear security reliant for 66 percent of its resources from extra budgetary funding in 2010 and 50 percent in 2011. This is in contrast to the 95 percent extra budgetary portion of the budget in 2008. Waller said the budget is the Agency's Secretariat giving its best advice on where money should be spent. As a citizen and a tax payer, he said, he fully supports zero growth in other international organizations; however, no other international organization has regulations to implement or mandates to push forward like nuclear safeguards. In his view, it is not possible to implement these activities responsibly with zero growth. ¶14. (SBU) NNSA's Ken Baker echoed that we need to all together work to address the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. He emphasized the need for multilateral support and adequate support to the IAEA. He also mentioned that it is difficult for the Agency to plan for the long term utilizing only voluntary contributions and that the Agency needs to focus on such an important issue as nuclear security and be able to sustain momentum over the long term. ¶15. (SBU) Waller pointed out that the 2008 regular budget for nuclear security was only 1.1 million Euros; very little can be done in this important area with this regular budget. Ambassador Schulte argued the need for nuclear security to be a core function and showed two charts that give perspective to the relative increase for nuclear security as compared to technical cooperation. Bieniawski also said that it is important to put stability into the Agency's process of nuclear security. ¶16. (SBU) Romanian Ambassador Feruta commented there were many valid arguments that nuclear security programmatic activities should be a core part of the regular budget. He noted that nuclear programs are expanding due to the current nuclear energy renaissance, and any flaws or accidents could mean a disaster for all nuclear activities. All countries need to match commitments made for nuclear energy development. This is an activity where time is of the essence even though there is the financial crisis. Romania agreed that this is an investment worth making and his Mission would advocate this view to Bucharest. ¶17. (SBU) French DCM Gross said France shares similar objectives in nonproliferation and thanks the U.S for stepping forward with $10 million for the Global Partnership. France also wanted to thank Russia for all the work on upgrading their facilities. However, it is clear in France's view that if $20 million was put into the Agency that they would not have the where-with-all to use the money effectively, and having Russia was essential in this process. France argued that the Agency must be able to absorb the proposed increase in funding in operations, and Paris did not think this is possible. Gross noted the Agency had $120 million of Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) resources invested in government bonds that in France's view could be borrowed against if there is a shortfall elsewhere. (Comment: France underestimates the political resistance this would face from G-77.) Waller countered that the Secretariat had no standing authority to borrow and that a specific Board decision would be required; borrowing from the TCF reserves was likely to be politically challenging, he observed. ¶18. (SBU) German Ambassador Luedeking praised Anita Nilsson and her work in nuclear security and sustainability. However, Germany has an issue with the 2010-2011 budget increase overall and with the optics of a 600 percent increase for nuclear security. It is virtually impossible to agree with an increase of this magnitude, he said. Germany favored that funds be sought elsewhere, for example as proposed by France (borrow against TCF money). Germany agrees that nuclear security should be a core function and that 5 percent of the regular budget is not right, however, the program had to be increased within an overall zero growth policy. Anita Nilsson then mentioned that her office is currently in the red and there is no additional funding. There are activities that are being cancelled due to the shortfall. ¶19. (SBU) Japanese DCM Nakane stated that there are still contributions that have not been used for countries like Kazakhstan and should be considered as additional funding. Japan also noted that 70 percent of the budget is spent on personnel and not implementing activities, and they understand that a major part of the regular budget increase in nuclear security will be used for personnel. Japan also felt as though it was important to encourage the G-77 to support the increase; however all should realize that the increase is drastic. Ultimately, Japan shared the opinion that nuclear security is an important activity for the Agency and they would think about the best way to achieve the goal of increasing the nuclear security budget. ¶20. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte then asked the group to share their thoughts on how to get the G-77 to agree with the nuclear security increase, particularly since a majority of the Office of Nuclear Security missions benefit G-77 countries. Germany responded that it is difficult because the feelings are so deep along ideological lines of what the IAEA should be focused on, i.e., the G-77 feel that TC is "theirs" and propagate the view that nuclear security is a preoccupation of the industrialized countries. Nilsson then pointed out the 75 percent of the 22.9 million Euros spent in 2008 went to low-income countries (including Central Asia and Eastern Europe). Russian Ambassador Zmeyevskiy mentioned that the consequences of not implementing nuclear security have never really been realized. In Russia's view, member countries do not feel as though there is a real threat; there is a need to make countries interested in getting assistance, but it may take years to persuade them. It is also necessary for the Ministries of Finance to convince their countries it is important by funding nuclear security activities. ¶21. (SBU) Canadian DCM Wood said that progress has been made in the area of nuclear security and we have been successful. Canada supported the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) becoming part of the regular budget from the very beginning and that extra budgetary funds are used to focus on higher and more immediate threats. However, Canada expressed it is not realistic to try to fix all the problems in one biennium budget; it may take several biennia to fix the problem. Also, it is not helpful to discuss the issue of nuclear security being balanced with other parts of the Agency; it should be thought of as a more holistic, better integrated Agency if nuclear security is a core mission. In addition, Canada feels it does not get a full accounting from the Agency Secretariat and pointed out that the Safeguards budget was under-spent by 5 percent in 2008. That said, Canada does agree that nuclear security should be a core part of the Agency. ¶22. (SBU) Netherlands DCM Coppoolse noted that The Hague had supported nuclear security becoming a part of the regular budget four years ago. She recalled specifically that her own first intervention in an IAEA Board meeting on instruction had addressed three items: safeguards noncompliance on the part of Iran, promotion of women in the Agency, and getting the NSF in the regular budget. On convincing the G-77, Netherlands feels that going through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is the best route. The Netherlands does have a concern with the overall budget increase of 23 percent and thinks there needs to be a more creative way to increase the budget, which should be discussed in the EU and Geneva Group. ¶23. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte then suggested doing a GICNT event in the developed world. Canada mentioned that there is also a question of the future of the GICNT, Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI),and Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Baker said that GTRI's budget has gone to up significantly and that the nonproliferation program in the National Nuclear Security Administration could rise to $3 billion in U.S. FY-2010. Bieniawski also pointed out that with many of these programs are being implemented in G-77 countries. ¶24. (SBU) Waller suggested that it would be good to get testimonials from countries on what is being done in the area of nuclear security. He also pointed out that regularizing the budget helps make Cost Free Experts (CFE) regular staff and thereby increases the degree of confidentiality and helps retain expertise within the organization. Waller then said it is not possible to enhance the Agency within the existing budget. He has been at the Agency for sixteen years and it cannot be done this way and it is not a viable option. ¶25. (SBU) Germany said it seems that nuclear security is being held hostage by the overall budget and an increase in one area creates a larger appetite in other areas as well and that is the ultimate problem. Nilsson thanked everyone warmly for their input on the future of nuclear security at the Agency. She pointed out that ONS wants to continue with voluntary contributions as well and wants to focus regular budget funding on long term activities such as publishing guidance documents. When all the funding is directed towards hard security (physical protection upgrades),soft security items cannot be funded (recommendation and guidance documents). She pointed out that the practical realities of the G-77 must be separated out from the budget discussions. It is the case that from a programmatic level the G-77 countries do want the support of ONS, however, due to the funding situation, it cannot happen fast enough. ¶27. (SBU) Ambassador closed the discussion, adding that sustainability is also an important factor in nuclear security and that the culture of security should be just as important as the safety culture. He agreed that it would be impossible for the Agency to administer all these programs alone; however, there are key niches within the Agency and many countries want to only deal with the UN or IAEA flag. He agreed we need to get the G-77 countries discussing the benefits of nuclear security through the Missions in Vienna and also begin using the GICNT to promote nuclear security. -------------- DDG Sokolov on Nuclear Power Promotion -------------- ¶28. (SBU) IAEA DDG for Nuclear Energy Yury Sokolov noted the long-standing good working relationship that his office has with NNSA. He stated that since (former UNVIE Energy Attach) Anne Starz took a regular IAEA staff position, he hoped the U.S. would provide another CFE to his office to work on that portfolio. ¶29. (SBU) In response to Baker's query on the application of Project Support Costs (PSC) and its impact to Sokolov's department, Sokolov said that there is no simple answer. He noted that even "in house" there is not a unified view and that the case-by-case application of PSC to extrabudgetary projects actually started years ago. He said he understood from a management and administrative point of view why cost recovery through OSC was necessary. ¶30. (SBU) Sokolov then turned the discussion to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and stressed his personal belief that this is a very positive initiative. There is no other forum currently available for collecting ideas at the ministerial level annually. He feels this forum should not be used to report on small activities but to bring principal activities to broad notice. Sokolov mentioned that the Agency supports 53 countries without nuclear power, whereas GNEP is only supporting 10-15; he stated that on one hand GNEP is a good forum but on the other had it has very small outreach. Sokolov noted that it is important that countries interested in nuclear power need to start with an effective program, not immediately be introduced to the "Three S Concept" ( Safety, Security, Safeguards). He feels this concept should be integrated into the program and not pulled out as a separate concept. ¶31. (SBU) Hans Forstrom on Sokolov's staff then mentioned the research reactor at the Vinca Institute in Serbia, noting that the European Commission recently committed an additional $5 million for the nuclear fuel to be returned to Russia. -------------- Joint IAEA Office Nuclear Security (ONS)and NNSA Activities -------------- ¶32. (SBU) Anita Nilsson began by stating that the first drafting meeting for the new 2010 Nuclear Security Plan would be held in April 2009, with a focus on core group activities that can be used by all countries, transport security of nuclear and radiological material, and the categorization of radioactivity. ¶33. (SBU) Nilsson asserted that the PSC issue is currently "crippling" her operations, as her funding was being held up. She said a solution to the 7 percent PSC must come soon or she will have to begin cancelling activities. State ISN/MNSA foreign affairs officer Cockerham emphasized that the PSC needs to be transparent, and an explanation should be given as to why the funds need to go to management and not program implementation. Nilsson commented that an explanation of the PSC was already developed and the DG has decided the path forward. Regarding additional funds to ONS, Nilsson noted she would like to have more flexibility in how funding is used and examine having an account that can be spent down over a period of time. In addition, she hopes that if the 2010-2011 IAEA budgets are adopted, she will have more regular budget funding allocated to ONS and be able to do more long-term planning and hire more regular staff (citing the importance of maintaining the necessary geographical balance). ¶34. (SBU) Baker inquired as to Nilsson's estimated timing for completion of the revision to IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4. Nilsson seemed to imply that her office required a larger role in this revision effort, noting how much had been done via the "Core Group." She noted that there were some "conceptual" issues to be resolved, specifically: 1) the appropriate level of detail in the guidance and 2) the interface between radiological-related documents (e.g., the issue of irradiation, which is still being discussed.) ¶35. (SBU) Nilsson also noted her satisfaction with recent NNSA-ONS cooperative activities, specifically a security sustainability pilot project with GTRI. She also noted that she would like to add modules on Trigger List and dual-use commodity ("equipment") recognition to ONS's counter-illicit smuggling/nuclear security courses, and requested NNSA assistance in that area. The NNSA team pledged to take that back to appropriate staff within the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security for response. -------------- Dr. Jamal Sharaf Director General, Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission -------------- ¶36. (SBU) Baker noted Jordan's strong regional leadership on nonproliferation, and Jordan likewise praised the cooperative relationship. Jordan especially noted the successful partnership with the Second Line of Defense program, stating that Jordan hopes to cover additional 2-4 border crossings (perhaps 2 on the Syrian border and 2 on the Saudi border). Jordon also mentioned that Jordan is looking at constructing a "mini" HAMMER facility within the region, possibly as an elaboration of the Cooperative Monitoring Center in Amman, and similar to the HAMMER facility at the Department of Energy's Hanford Site. Jordanian officials requested NNSA support on this issue. He noted that Jordan feels establishing such a facility in the region is important due to the difficulty of getting U.S. visas for stateside training; with a Jordanian facility, he stressed, key GCC participants from Lebanon, Egypt, and elsewhere would not require visas. Jordan said they also talked to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) about establishing a facility in the region, and noted that they would like to have access to use NARAC facilities for environmental monitoring activities. Baker noted the NRC and NA-40 (Adm. Krol) as the appropriate POCs for these issues and said that he would take this back to Washington. -------------- Briefing with Missions -------------- ¶37. (U) A NNSA briefing was given by Baker, Bieniawski and Huizenga to several Missions (Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, Vietnam, Pakistan, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, Algeria, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, UK, Mexico, Turkey) on NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Second Line of Defense activities. Participant response was positive, with one foreign representative suggesting that there is only one global threat, and that is "terrorism." The group was impressed with the various activities NNSA has underway throughout the world and praised U.S. efforts overall in this area. -------------- World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) cooperation with NNSA -------------- ¶38. (SBU) Roger Howsley, Executive Director thanked NNSA for its support of WINS and updated on efforts to build WINS support, stating that WINS is recruiting staff and currently looking at 2 or 3 permanent positions, then other positions in the coming months. In addition, WINS is working to indentify/recruit Board Members--particularly in Russia, France, Japan and Argentina. Howsley expects that the Board would physically meet once a year, and would hold several other meetings via telephone. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶39. (SBU) The IAEA's nuclear security efforts are undertaken in the framework of four-year Nuclear Security Plans approved by the IAEA's Board of Governors. The next plan, covering 2010 -2013, is in preparation and it is important that the U.S. press the IAEA to adopt a systematic approach that identifies core-long-term activities, emphasizing the sustainability of nuclear and radiological security improvements. Furthering this goal is the incorporation of IAEA security activities into the regular budget; this could reduce exposure of nuclear security activities to the uncertainty of voluntary contributions and most importantly brings the nuclear security activities of the IAEA into the Agency's mainstream. SCHULTE