UNODC and AFPAK STRATEGIES Loom Large for Vienna Friends of

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000222 SENSITIVE SIPDIS SRAP for Paul Jones E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR AF PK UN PTER UK SUBJECT: UNODC and AFPAK STRATEGIES Loom Large for Vienna Friends of Afghanistan REF: A: 08 UNVIE VIENNA 170 B: KABUL 1064 C: UNVIE VIENNA 195 D: UNVIE VIENNA 152 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a meeting on April 28 chaired by the UK Ambassador, Vienna's Friends of Afghanistan heard a presentation by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on its 2009-2011 Afghanistan counter-narcotics strategy. UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa informed delegations he would travel to Afghanistan on the week of May 4 on a fact-finding mission, specifically with regard to narcotic issues on the Afghanistan-Iran-Pakistan border ("triangle border"). He expressed his hope that UNODC would be briefed on ISAF military operations executed against heroin labs, convoys and markets. Other UNODC officials discussed new developments in their ongoing efforts to promote the rule of law and combat the opium poppy/heroin problem, with a specific focus on its Triangular Initiative. Ambassador elaborated on the new U.S. AFPAK strategy, for which delegations expressed their support. (Note: Pakistan was not invited to join the Friends group owing to Afghanistan's characterizing it as "premature". (Ref A) End Note.) Reflecting sensitivity over suggestions that Indian companies had become a major source of heroin precursors, the Indian Ambassador persistently and aggressively questioned UNODC officials on the origin of precursor chemicals to Afghanistan, and when UNODC would initiate a precursor monitoring project to determine the origins of such chemicals. Mission was encouraged by the unqualified support for the AFPAK strategy, and by UNODC's increasing emphasis on its long-standing regional approach for combating Afghan drugs. END SUMMARY. -------------- UNODC's 2009-2011 Afghanistan Strategy and Budget Shortfall -------------- ¶2. (SBU) UNODC's Kabul office recently rolled out its draft Afghanistan Strategy Paper 2009-2011 to major donors in Kabul (Ref B). Both Costa and Bernard Frahi, Deputy Director of UNODC's Division of Operations described the increasing regional dimension of UNODC's efforts in Afghanistan, trying to identify within its Rainbow Strategy where UNODC could add value and implement programs. Frahi highlighted UNODC's efforts to strengthen Afghanistan's western border with 25 new posts, and to supply additional equipment and mentoring programs to the Afghan police and other law enforcement officials, including the new police garrison in Nimroz charged with monitoring the triangle border. Frahi also noted UNODC's provision of basic training in office management and alternative development programs for five Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) offices being established in the provinces, as well as law libraries for six new provincial Justice Support Centers. Finally, Frahi detailed the creation of a High Office of Oversight in Kabul to help in the fight against corruption, and noted UNODC assistance to the Afghan Bar Association in this regard. Frahi stressed that UNODC had a total Afghanistan budget of USD72 million for 2008, and delivered USD20 million of services with a 94pct implementation rate. ¶3. (SBU) Frahi expressed concern about the projected budgetary shortfall for UNODC's 2009-2011 Afghanistan strategy. While the USD6 million budgeted for research and analysis will be fully funded, UNODC expects a more than 50pct shortfall for UNODC's other programs in Afghanistan: in health and human development, and governance, security and rule of law. He promised to disseminate a list of such unfunded and under-funded projects. [Note: Frahi and Costa's power point presentations have been forwarded to INL/PC. End note.] -------------- Indian Ambassador Makes His Point -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Interrupting Costa and Frahi, the Indian Ambassador pointedly asked why UNODC had yet to initiate a project aimed at better understanding the origins of the precursor chemicals currently crossing Afghanistan's borders. Costa and his staff attempted to explain the magnitude and complexity of the precursor problem, and the difficulty of creating any report or monitoring mechanism. However, the Indian Ambassador insisted on UNODC explaining "the obvious source of the precursors." Despite Costa's plea not to make this a "bilateral issue," the Indian Ambassador continued his aggressive line of questioning. ¶5. (SBU) Chair UK Ambassador asked the meeting to move on to the next agenda item, with the understanding that the precursor chemicals issue would need to be further addressed. Costa pointed to the Mexican decision to outlaw the importation of potassium pomagranate (a precursor for cocaine) as an example of how to start the fight against acetic anhydride (a precursor for heroin). The Afghan Ambassador pointed out that last fall Afghanistan formally declared that the country had no legitimate use for acetic anhydride, thereby making any import illegal. Costa, apparently surprised by this information, stressed the need to implement this law. ¶6. (SBU) Afghan Ambassador complimented the UNODC for its Triangular Initiative, but lamented that its focus so far is only drug trafficking. In his words, "Our neighbors are consumers as well, and wherever these drugs go, so goes corruption. The time has come to deal with our neighbors on increasing cooperation on consumption, corruption and precursors." Costa demurred, but stated that the Triangular Initiative could in the future lead to other illegal "flows" like arms, humans and money. -------------- UK: Helmand Plan May Work, CARD Fully Funded -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Mark James, Head of UK's Counter Narcotics Strategy Team in the Afghanistan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, updated the Group on UK's current counternarcotics plan in Helmand Province and its CARD Program. While the results of the Helmand plan will not emerge until next growing season, James stated that initial indications show success in depressing opium cultivation, and a very positive effect on Afghan perceptions of the provincial government, which is increasingly viewed by the people as responsive to and engaged in their concerns. James also admitted that while eradication is a controversial subject, it is one component of Afghanistan's national strategy. He stressed that eradication should be manual, ground-based, conducted early in the growing season, and targeted to those areas where alternative development is possible (such as the food zones in Helmand). Finally, James briefed the Friends on CARD, which he described as essentially a rural development program targeted at maintaining a province's poppy-free status. James stated that it is currently fully funded, at least for the first 12 months of its implementation. -------------- Costa Asks for ISAF Briefing on Military Operations -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Costa expressed support for the ISAF-NATO decision to conduct counter-narcotics military operations against the opium market (Ref C) He named Operations Diesel, Buenos Aires, Tucker and Henry as those of which he had knowledge from press reports. However, he reiterated his wish to be de-briefed on current and future operations, so that UNODC could factor these operations into its ongoing analysis of poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking (Ref C). ¶9. (SBU) Costa also expressed satisfaction that the long-standing and thorny issue of the ATTA trade/transportation agreement would be addressed during upcoming Washington visits by the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He said it is now time to "neuter the problem" and update the agreement. ¶10. (SBU) Responding to a question from the German Ambassador about the effectiveness of UNAMA coordinating activities, Costa retold the story of Kai Eide pointing out that there are many "c's" of concern -- including "coordination"-- and blaming member states for the lack coordination . The Afghan Ambassador agreed, stating that such coordination has been lacking since day 1. He described a "parallel mechanism" that is working alongside, but not in concert with, the Karzai government. James defended the coordination in Kabul, but acknowledged that it is informal in nature and needs to be more strategic. -------------- AFPAK Strategy Receives Support -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Drawing on Department non-papers, Ambassador elaborated on the goals and methods of the new AFPAK strategy, as well as the President's support for the Kerry/Lugar legislation. The Afghanistan Ambassador expressed his government's full support for the strategy, calling it "even better than we could have hoped." He referred to a Charlie Rose interview of Special Representative Richard Holbrooke during which Ambassador Holbrooke asserted that even with the best possible government and border control in Afghanistan, akistan's western tribal areas would still be a undamental problem. Germany, Canada, UK, the Euroean Commission and Turkey expressed similar suppot. The Turkish Ambassador reminded the Friends hat a regional approach to deal with the problemthe Ankara Process-already exists. The German Ambssador complimented the work of UNODC's Terroris Prevention Branch in Pakistan, and stated his goernment was looking to continuing funding of tha project. Japanese DCM touted the Japan's recent USD3 million contribution to UNODC's Afghanistan rojects, and stated it was considering another UD2 million to Iran border projects. (Note: The SD3 million was Japan's first-ever donation for NODC's Afghanistan activities. At Japan's request UNODC is also preparing a country paper on Pakitan. (Ref D). End Note.) European Commission Ambssador agreed that Pakistan demanded "upgraded atention." Canada, Germany and EC all said they wer looking to increase and/or widen their assistane in the region. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The unqualified support for our AFPAKstrategy was encouraging, especially in light of ssertions by Canada, Germany and EC that they ar looking to increase and/or widen their assistane in the region taking advantage of UNODC's unique capabilities to operate cross-border between Pakstan, Afghanistan and Iran. Furthermore, James' entative assessment of the gains made in Helmandspeak to the positive impact comprehensive countr-narcotic strategies can have on public confidenc in government. Finally, UNODC's attempt to vie the challenges in Afghanistan through an expanding regional lens-including Operation TARCET against precursor chemicals and the Triangular Initiative to promote counternarcotics cooperation among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, reinforces the USG position that the issues of heroin, governance, security and terrorism are inextricably interlinked and must be tackled in a comprehensive manner. ¶13. (SBU) On the same day as the meeting, Embassy Kabul dispatched a cable on "Implementing a Comprehensive Counter-Narcotics Strategy" (Ref B) END COMMENT PYATT