WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT: (PART II OF II) EXPERTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000215 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/CATR, T, PM/DTC, PM/RSAT DOD FOR OSD: PDASD/S&TR, DUSD/TSP DOD ALSO FOR DIR DTSA/ST AND DIR DTSA/STP DOD ALSO FOR USD/(A&T)/ODUSD(I&CP) AND USD(A&T)/IDA USDOC FOR BXA/EA/OAS AND BXA/EA/OSTFPC E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2019 TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM SUBJECT: WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT: (PART II OF II) EXPERTS GROUP MEETING MARCH 30 - APRIL 9 REF: A. STATE 30105 SPRING 09 EG GUIDANCE ¶B. UNVIE 214 Classified By: Charge Geoff Pyatt, Reason 1.4 (d). THIS IS PART TWO OF TWO; CABLE DIVIDED BECAUSE OF LENGTH. SEE REF. B FOR PART ONE. -------------- List Review: Items Still Under Consideration -------------- ¶16. (SBU) CAT 1 (advanced materials) proposals still under consideration: ¶A. 1.A.1.b./1.C.10. Editorial changes. JP001. With respect to 1.A.1.b., this proposal makes the straightforward editorial change of adding the phrase "having any of the following." The 1.C.10. portion of JP001 overlaps US008 and CA003. The U.S. chaired an informal working group to produce a single text incorporating all three proposals. On the 1.A.1.b. portion of this proposal, Germany, the UK and Japan were on study reserve. The U.S., Canada and Belgium were in support. The Japanese delegation explained its study reserve (on its own proposal) by pointing to the discussion in the informal working group which led to a need to reconsider its proposal in Tokyo. On the 1.C.10 portion of JP001, Japan has not dropped its proposal to add "and prepregs and performs therefor" to the chapeau. Australia, Canada, Germany, the UK and the U.S. were on study reserve for this change. The Japanese delegation again said that based on what it had heard at the spring EG, it intended to review this portion of the proposal. ¶B. 1.B.1. Decontrol of 2, 3, and 4 axis tape-laying machines. US005 Rev 1. The biggest challenge for the USDEL with this proposal was explaining the difference between tape-laying and tow-placement machines. There was also extended discussion of how these machines worked and how their axes were identified. Germany, France and Japan are on favorable study reserve for US005 Rev 1. All three expressed confidence that they would be able to join consensus after further review. Canada was the only country on study reserve. It had previously had a different understanding of the differences between tape-laying and tow-placement. At the end of the spring EG, the Canadian delegation said that it appreciated USDEL's offer to provide definitions of the different machines, but that the information already provided might be sufficient. Canada requested time to review that information in Ottawa. ¶C. 1.C.2.b. Clarification of the scope of control of 1.C.2.b. AU002. Rev 1. Australia agreed to a number of changes to this proposal based on comments made at the table. The U.S. and several other delegations pointed out that there were means other than sintering or compacting to make metal alloys using powder metallurgy. UK and Korea are on study reserve for this proposal. Canada, Spain and the U.S. are on favorable study reserve. Australia requested time during the intersessional meetings to do additional work on this proposal as well as AU001. ¶D. 1.C.c.e. Aluminum alloys not made using powder metallurgy. AU001. Several delegations, including the U.S., raised questions about foreign availability with respect to this proposal. Germany noted that the technology involved was dated. There is significant resistance to this proposal. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, the U.S. and South Africa are on study reserve. Sweden supports AU001. Australia requested time during the intersessional meetings to do additional work on this proposal. ¶E. 1.C.10. Carbon Composites. US008. The U.S. chaired an informal working group that produced a text incorporating US008, CA003 and JP001. This text is WA-EG (09) TWG 06. The approval of the CA003 simplifies the chapeau of 1.C.10. in line with U.S. guidance. A number of delegations raised questions about US008. France, Germany, Japan, the UK and Russia are on study reserve. Canada is on favorable study reserve. USDEL received time during the intersessional meetings to do further work on this proposal. E ¶F. Category 1 Annex and ML. Adding CAS registry numbers. JP002. Several delegations raised concerns about this proposal. The first issue was the need for a note similar to the current Note 2 to the ML explaining how CAS numbers should be used in the list. Japan will consider how this might best be done. Questions were also raised concerning the benefit of adding CAS numbers for common items such as silicon. The Japanese delegation requested that other delegations review JP002 and provide it with a list of those CAS numbers suggested to be added to the lists by Japan that seem problematic. Japan will compile that list and circulate it prior to the intersessional meetings. There was no tour de table on this proposal. Time has been allocated during the intersessional meetings for additional work. ¶17. (SBU) CAT 2 (materials processing) proposals still under consideration: ¶A. 2.B.6. Coordinate Measuring Machines (CMM). US009. US009, the CMM proposal carried over and revised from last year, continued to meet significant resistance. There are a number of problems still to be resolved. The lack of an industry standard for measuring probe accuracy is an issue. The Dutch counter proposal based on a new, and as yet unpublished ISO standard, complicated discussion. Japan thought that the phrase "using all compensations available" should apply to all of Category 2. The UK raised questions about differentiating optical probes from scanning probes. Both Japan and the UK expressed reservations about the decontrol for 6 percent of the longest axis. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden are on study reserve. USDEL requested time do additional work on this proposal during the upcoming intersessional meetings. Germany, the UK and the Netherlands all plan to bring industry experts to the intersessional meetings. ¶B. 2.B.6. Coordinate Measuring Machines (CMM). NL001. The Netherlands tabled a counter proposal to US009 based on discussions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting held in Vienna the same week as the EG. NL001 draws on a new ISO standard. It was pointed out that the new ISO standard has not yet been published. This complicates the issue as until it is published it is not official. However, a number of states want to consider it as an alternative to US009. Comment: A quick review of the new ISO standard by the USDEL did not seem to offer solutions for the problems that the U.S. has been raising in the EG with respect to CMMs for the past year and a half. End Comment. NL001 will also be addressed during the intersessional meeting. ¶18. (SBU) CAT 3 (electronics) proposals still under consideration: ¶A. 3.A.1.b.11. Frequency Synthesizer Control. US012. Several delegations raised concerns about this proposal. The UK delegation expressed concern with the term "stand-alone" in the current text of the Note to 3.A.2.d. and questioned whether the note was still needed in 3.A.1.b.11. The Canadian delegation questioned which sub-entry took priority when an item overlapped parameters of several sub-entries. The Canadian delegation also asked whether a Nota Bene should not be placed in 3.A.2.b. to reflect that the previous text for frequency synthesizers had been moved. No tour de table was taken on this proposal. USDEL promised to consult experts before responding, possibly with a revision of the proposal. ¶B. 3.A.2.b. Definition of "Frequency Switching Time". US013. The German delegation thought that the change in the definition from 100Hz to 1 percent was a tremendous expansion of the current scope of controls. USDEL promised to study the German concern and revise the text if necessary. Near the conclusion of the EG the USDEL seemed to convince the German head of delegation that the U.S. text was correct and would not have unintended consequences. No tour de table was taken on this proposal. Subsequent to the Spring EG, the head of the German delegation contacted the head of the USDEL indicating that they still see the proposed wording as an expansion of the existing controls. ¶C. 3.B.1.c. Anisotropic Etching Equipment. US010 Rev 1. Several delegations raised concerns about US010 Rev 1. Japan raised a concern that edge exclusion of 2mm or less could be read as a control parameter and not as a means for determining non-uniformity. USDEL promised to work on rewording the proposal to correct that possible misinterpretation. Belgium, Canada, Germany and Japan are on study reserve. Sweden is in support of this proposal. ¶D. 3.B.1.e. Wafer Handling Systems. US015. Questions were raised about "functionally different" and "are to be connected". The latter appeared to be an end-use control. The UK delegation asked how a licensing officer would know what was going to be connected to what. Canada asked that the second sentence in the decontrol note that contains a double negative be written as positive control text. USDEL answered the questions on "functionally different" and "are to be connected" and agreed to consider developing positive text to eliminate the double negative in the decontrol note. There was no tour de table on this proposal. ¶E. 3.B.1.i. Control on Masks for IC. JP003. This proposal met considerable resistance. Russia said this was a considerable expansion of the current controls. Korea said that it was not the proper way to address this issue. In a bilateral meeting with the USDEL, the Japanese delegation stressed that Japan was looking for consistency in its approach to mask controls. Belgium, France, Korea, Russia and the U.S. are on study reserve for this proposal. ¶F. 3.B.3. Integrated Circuit Editing Tools. US011. The Netherlands circulated a non-paper, WA-EG (09) NL002 in response to US011. The Dutch delegation acknowledged the concern presented in US011, but said there are practical concerns with using dual-beam systems for reverse engineering (i.e., it might take more than 9 months to analyze one chip). The Dutch delegation also said there are more efficient ways of removing layers from an integrated circuit and that with a dual-beam system it is difficult to get gas into the system. Therefore a single beam system might work better. In a similar vein, the Korean delegation said that it had concerns about the misuse of equipment (i.e., for reverse engineering),but was also concerned about controlling more than is necessary. USDEL conducted separate bilateral meetings with both the Dutch and Japanese delegations on this topic. The bilateral meeting with Japan will be described below. With the Dutch delegation, USDEL pointed out that there was an error in the calculations presented by the Dutch. By the U.S. calculations, it would take a month to a month and a half rather than the nine months indicated by NL002 to examine a chip. USDEL promised to provide a response to the other points raised by the Dutch. Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Russia and Sweden are on study reserve for this proposal. ¶G. 3.B.3. Integrated Circuit Editing Tools. JP007. USDEL conducted a bilateral discussion with the Japanese delegation on our competing proposals. The Japanese thought that the U.S. proposal did not go far enough in catching machines that were capable of reverse engineering. However, the Japanese delegation also noted that they would not control the Japanese products that the U.S. showed to illustrate the type of equipment that the U.S. thought would be caught by US011. The Japanese delegation said that they did not believe that the Japanese products were capable of editing. To reinforce that point, JP007 contains a local definition of "integrated-circuit editing equipment" to ensure that the Japanese equipment would not be caught. There was no tour de table on JP007. The Japanese delegation said that they would review its proposal based on what it had heard during the EG. ¶19. (SBU) CAT 4 (computers) proposals still under consideration: ¶A. 4.A.1.b. & 4.D.3. Deletion of 4.A.1.b. & 4.D.3. CA004. Several countries questioned the deletion of these entries. Finland, Germany and Japan are on study reserve. Korea is on favorable study reserve. Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, the UK, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and the U.S. support CA004. ¶B. 4.A.3.g. Revision of External Interconnects. US004. Japan and the UK raised questions about the meaning of "closely couple." The UK said that it was still looking for a way to simplify the language. Japan and the UK are on study reserve. Canada is on favorable study reserve. ¶C. 4.D.3. Medical decontrol for 4.D.3. and 5.A.2. Note. GB003. USDEL registered concerns about adding software decontrols to the medical equipment exemption and noted that it thought that the adoption of the U.S. proposal on ancillary encryption might solve the UK's problem. USDEL said that it would work with the UK on this issue. Canada and the U.S. are on study reserve. Germany is on favorable study reserve. The 5.A.2. portion of this proposal that would decontrol specially designed medical equipment that employs cryptography received general support from Encryption TWG participants. This TWG discussion focused on whether the proposal needs to read 'equipment and components' (rather than simply 'equipment') in order to achieve the intended decontrol of embedded operating system encryption libraries and other components. On the 5.A.2. portion of the proposal, Belgium, Finland, France, Norway and the U.S. are in support. Canada is on study reserve. Germany and Sweden are on favorable study reserve. Pending the outcome of discussion in the Encryption TWG, this portion of the proposal may be unnecessary if the U.S. ancillary encryption proposal (US003) is agreed. ¶20. (SBU) CAT 5 Part 1 (telecommunications) proposal still under consideration: ¶A. 5.A.1.i. Control of real time virtual radars. FR007. While countries were generally sympathetic to the French desire to control this equipment, many expressed the concern that the language was very broad. Germany asked specifically to see data sheets for the type of equipment that France intended to control. It might be possible to tighten up the text by reference to actual performance specifications. Canada, Germany, Japan, the UK, Russia and the U.S. are on study reserve. France promised to review its proposal, provide data sheets and would consider a revision based on comments made during the EG. ¶21. (SBU) CAT 5 Part 2 (encryption) proposals still under consideration: ¶A. 5.A.2. Note 4. Ancillary Encryption. US003. This proposal has become the basis for further work in the Encryption TWG. The broad view among the Encryption TWG was the wording of US003 needs to be made more clear and specific for implementation to be consistent among Participating States. Several states raised concerns regarding the possible decontrol of certain maritime vessel tracking systems (VTS) and of networked security cameras. The TWG spent considerable time discussing the desired scope of the proposal, and working on possible new wording. This work will continue during the intersessional meetings. ¶B. 5.A.2.a. Clarification of specially designed components. CA005. The Encryption TWG offered alternative wording to CA005. Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, Sweden, and the U.S. are on study reserve. With respect to the TWG alternative text, Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, Korea, the UK, Sweden and the U.S. are on favorable study reserve and Germany supports the text. Canada agreed to reconsider its proposal and possibly revise it. ¶C. 5.A.2. Note a. Personalised Smart Cards. JP004. This proposal was extensively discussed in the Encryption TWG, with several states expressing strong interest in retaining existing C5P2 controls on reprogrammable smart cards. Japan will reconsider its proposal and possibly revise it. Whether or not Japan carries it forward will depend to some extent on the outcome of discussion in the TWG based on US003, which would decontrol most non-reprogrammable smart cards suggested by JP004. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and the U.S. are on study reserve. Germany and Korea are on favorable study reserve. ¶D. 5.A.2. Note a. Improved decontrol text. CA009. Concerns were raised in the Encryption TWG that CA009 might be too broad and would decontrol items that some states want under control. U.S. and several other states posed technical questions seeking a better understanding of the proposal. After discussion, the Encryption TWG did not see CA009 to be as promising as US003 as a means of meeting the Plenary mandate to simplify the decontrols in 5.A.2. There was no tour de table on this proposal. Canada agreed to suspend discussion of CA009 pending the outcome of discussion of other 5.A.2. proposals during the intersessional meetings. ¶22. (SBU) CAT 6 (sensors and lasers) proposals still under consideration: ¶A. 6.A.1.a.1.a. Clarification of Bathymetric Survey Systems. GB001. USDEL expressed concerns that in trying to close one loophole the UK may be opening another. The UK thereby undertook to revise this proposal. There was no tour de table on GB001. ¶B. 6.A.1.c. Diver Detection Systems. GB002. This proposal was taken up by an informal working group that considered both GB002 and JP008. The working group produced greatly simplified text in WA-EG (09) TWG 011. The UK subsequently withdrew GB002 in favor of the text in TWG 011. Germany, Japan, Korea, the UK, Norway, Russia, and the U.S. are on study reserve for the TWG text. Canada is on favorable study reserve. Additional work will be done on this issue during the intersessional meetings. ¶C. 6.A.1.c. Diver Detection Systems. JP008. This proposal was also addressed in the informal working group on diver detection systems. Whereas GB002 was aimed at controlling individual sonar-based systems, JP008 is focused on sonar networks. There was no tour de table on JP008. Additional work will be done on this proposal during the intersessional meetings. ¶D. 6.A.2. Nota Bene. Clarifying the control status of optical sensors. JP005. This proposal was addressed in the LLL TWG. See paragraph 7 above. Japan will consider the information provided by the LLL TWG in deciding whether to proceed further with this proposal. There was no tour de table on JP005. ¶E. 6.A.3. Nota Bene. Controlling certain underwater cameras. JP006. This proposal was addressed in the LLL TWG. See paragraph 7 above. The issue of how to handle cameras that are potentially subject to control in both Category 6 and Category 8 will be further addressed in the intersessional meeting of the LLL TWG. There was no tour de table on JP006. ¶F. 6.A.3.b.2. Revised Control for Scanning Cameras. DE001. Based on discussion in the LLL TWG, Germany plans to revise DE001. Germany will look for some other parmeter than altitude to decontrol scanning camera that are not of concern. There was no tour de tble on DE001. ¶G. 6.A.5.d.1.d. Semiconductor Laer Stacked Array Power Density. US019. US019 ws addressed in an informal working group. The rsults of these discussions are recorded in WA-EG(09) TWG 008 and TWG 012. The U.S. agreed to issuea revised proposal based on the results of thesediscussions. Japan was insistent on adding contrls for an array stack that is a component. Thiscould be done either through a technical note orby adding components to the chapeau of the contro. Comment: Prior to the EG, the U.S. had not cosidered this to be a pressing issue, as these item are still under U.S. development. During the wrking the group, the U.S. offered to withdraw th text and revisit the issue in the future. Japanse insistence on dealing with this issue may indcate that Japanese development is farther along han current U.S. development. End comment. Therewas no tour de table on this proposal. The U.S.has agreed to chair an intersessional meeting to o additional work on this proposal. ¶H. 6.A.8.. Clarification of controls on radar systems. CA007. USDEL raised concerns about the use of the term "real time", expressing a desire to see an actual time parameter. Canada, after conferring bilaterally with the U.S., agreed to consider revising its proposal. Italy, the UK and the U.S. are on study reserve on CA007. Australia supports CA007. ¶23. (SBU) CAT 7 (Navigation and Avionics). One proposal is still under consideration: ¶A. 7.A.7. Unmanned Vehicle Conversion Systems and Software. US023. The presentation by the USDEL elicited a favorable response from most of the delegations who spoke on this proposal. The views of delegations are quite varied from preferring to expand the U.S. proposal to others expressing concern that it may be too broad. There is reservation with the wording in the Technical Note. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Korea, the UK, Russia and Sweden are on study reserve. Japan is on favorable study reserve. The U.S. has agreed to chaira working group on this topic during the intersessonal meetings. ¶24. (SBU) CAT 9 (Propulsion). One proposal is still under consideration: A.9.E.3.a.9. Modification of FADEC controls. GB012. The UK offered a presentation by representative from Rolls Royce to explain GB012. Work was cotinued in an informal working group. The result of that work can be found in WA-EG (09) TWG 005 While attempts were made to clarify the currentcontrol text, this issue still needs considerable ork. There was no tour de table on this proposal The UK has agreed to chair an intersessional wrking group on this topic. ¶25. (SBU) ML proposas still under consideration: ¶A. ML5. c. Detectio Equipment for ML5.a. and ML5.b. GB004. USDEL tied to convince the UK delegation that the additio to ML5.c. was unnecessary and might actually mae the text less clear. Germany, Poland, Sweden nd the U.S. are on study reserve. ¶B. ML6. 9, ad 10. Adding common military missions to the cotrol text for ground vehicles, vessels and aircraf. FR006 Rev 1. This proposal was referred to aninformal working group. Based on that work, Frace issued a revised proposal. A number of delegaions continue to express concern about the broadscope of this proposal and question whether it povides any clarity to the current text. Australi, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Korea, the UK, Sweden and the U.S. are on study reserve. France ill chair intersessional meetings on this topic. ¶C. ML8. Specially designed explosives, propelents and pyrotechnics. GB005 Rev 1. Based on US. comments, the UK revised GB005. Germany adde a caveat to the revised text. Germany can suppor the text if "not specified in ML8" is deleted fom the Note. Canada, Russia and the U.S. are onstudy reserve. ¶D. ML8. 34.b. Text Clarificatio. GB010. Only Japan remains on study reserve fo the ML8. 34.b. portion of GB010. Australia, Frane, Korea, Sweden and the U.S. support this clariication. ¶E. ML8.e.6. Text Clarification. GB01. Only the U.S. remains on study reserve for te clarification in ML8.e.6. Canada, Germany and rance support this portion of GB011. ¶F. ML10.h. implification of control entries for parachutes.GB006. Several countries requested more time to cnsider whether the proposed clarification actualy improves the current text. Canada, France, Gemany and the U.S. are on study reserve. ¶G. ML1 and 1.A.5. Armour protective equipment clarificaton. FR003 Rev 1 and GB013. These two proposalsare mutually exclusive and there does not seem t be any way to reach a compromise. The current ext does not specify the level of protection requred to meet the controls, leaving that decision o national discretion. National practices differ. French practices are similar to those of the U.S The UK argues that accepting the French proposl would require it to rewrite its domestic contros on body armor. German national practices are imilar to those of the UK. Canada, Germany, Itay, the UK, Russia, Sweden and the U.S. are on stud reserve for the ML13 portion of FR003 Rev 1. Cnada, France, Italy, Russia and the U.S. are on sudy reserve for the ML13 portion of GB013. ¶H. ML17. p. Fuel Cells Specially Designed or Modified for Military Use. US007 Rev 1. Several delegations expressed concern about the scope of this proposal. USDEL chaired an informal working group to revise the definition of a "fuel cell" after several alternatives to the U.S. text were offered. Based on the results of that working group, USDEL issued a revised text with a slightly modified definition. The UK has withdrawn its alternative definition, but a Korean alternative that closely tracks with the revised U.S. definition remains on the table. There are lingering concerns about what constitutes a fuel cell specially designed or modified for military use. Japan voiced special concerns in this regard in bilateral consultations with the USDEL. USDEL pointed out that dual-use fuel cells that the military chose to acquire would not be controlled by this text; only those fuel cells that had been designed or modified to meet military specifications. Canada, Japan, Korea, the UK and Sweden are on study reserve. France is on favorable study reserve. PYATT