IAEA/IRAQ: FORMALLY FINDING IRAQ IN COMPLIANCE

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000193 SIPDIS ISN/RA FOR DANIEL; NEA/I FOR NOTAR, KENNA; L FOR MITCHELL, HIRSCH; BAGHDAD FOR FINGARSON, AHN, SWINEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2034 TAGS: AORC IAEA IZ KNNP SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAQ: FORMALLY FINDING IRAQ IN COMPLIANCE WITH ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT REF: 08 UNVIE 00525 Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Key IAEA officials advised MsnOff in separate discussions that there is no question within the IAEA Secretariat that Iraq is in full compliance with its safeguards obligations. However, Laura Rockwood of the IAEA's Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) noted that the Agency has not "formally" communicated that conclusion to member states and the UNSC. Noting that such a formal conclusion is a precondition for lifting WMD-related restrictions imposed on Iraq by the UNSC in 1991 (see paras 7-8 for background), Rockwood noted that there is no set process on bringing noncompliance cases to closure. She said one possibility was a letter request to the IAEA that would trigger a discussion within the Secretariat on whether the decision should be made by the Board of Governors or by the Director General. ¶2. (S) Separately, Ambassador Schulte met with Iraqi Ambassador to reiterate the USG commitment to assist Iraq in lifting UNSC restrictions. In this context, Ambassador Schulte raised the possibility of obtaining a formal finding of compliance from the IAEA,while noting that we have no instructions as yet from Washington on how to proceed. The Iraqi Ambassador expressed willingness to request the Director General to inform the Board that Iraq is in full compliance with its safeguards agreement. ¶3. (S) As Washington weighs strategies for lifting WMD restrictions in Iraq, Mission recommends pursuing a Board decision, vice solely relying on a proclamation from the Director General (DG),to close the case on Iraq's past noncompliance. Per reftel, Mission notes that in the case of Libya, USG sought to begin to establish the principle that the Board, vice the DG on his own, has ultimate authority in noncompliance cases. Such a precedent is important in the current context of ongoing Iran and Syrian IAEA safeguards investigations. The next Board meeting is scheduled for the week of June 15, but Mission is not optimistic that a resolution on Iraq could be ripe for adoption at that time given the short time available for the Secretariat to generate the necessary report to the Board in advance of the June Board meeting. End Summary. -------------- Need a "Formal" Finding of Compliance -------------- ¶4. (S) Principal Legal Officer from the Office of Legal Affairs, Laura Rockwood, recalled on April 27 that no "formal" finding of renewed full safeguards compliance has been issued on Iraq. Rockwood (and also during a separate meeting Herman Nackaerts, the Director of Safeguards Operations B, which is responsible for safeguards in Iraq) noted that, while the finding may not be "formal," Iraq is indeed in full compliance with its safeguards agreement. ¶5. (S) Rockwood said there has never been a case where noncompliance has been formally and explicitly "overturned." Even in the case of Libya, the IAEA issued a report noting how noncompliance has been corrected. The Agency would soon reflect in the pending annual Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) that the IAEA has now determined that Libya's declarations are "complete," but it did not issue an explicit formal finding of renewed full compliance and has no plans to do so. (Note: The "completeness" conclusion is in the context of Libya's implementation of the Additional Protocol.) ¶6. (S) Rockwood suggested the Secretariat would need a request from a member state to begin the internal discussion on how to notify member states and the UNSC that Iraq is in compliance with its safeguards agreement, such as a letter request. Rockwood noted the options of the DG issuing a finding that Iraq was in compliance, or the Board making such a ruling, since it was the Board that found Iraq in noncompliance in 1991 (GOV/2532). (Comment: Per reftel and for purposes of setting an appropriate precedent that precludes any move by DG ElBaradei to prematurely close the Iran investigation, we pursued a resolution on Libya at the Board of Governors meeting in September 2008 welcoming Libya's full cooperation with the IAEA investigation and supporting a return to routine safeguards implementation. That action served to highlight the Board's ultimate authority in noncompliance cases; a point also of potential relevance in Syria. End Comment.) -------------- Background -------------- ¶7. (S) UNSCR 707 (1991),which restricts Iraq from pursuing most nuclear activities, indicates that the "Agency" must determine that Iraq is in full compliance with its safeguards agreement. (The Agency encompasses the Member States and the IAEA secretariat.) UNSCR 687 (1991) also issues restrictions on nuclear activities in Iraq, giving the responsibility to the Director General in establishing a plan for inventorying and monitoring Iraq's compliance. ¶8. (S) Rockwood expressed her private reservations about whether the timing was right to pursue lifting WMD-related sanctions in Iraq due to the security situation, but understood the political sensitivities of denying access to nuclear technology to developing nations. -------------- Meeting with Iraqi Ambassador -------------- ¶9. (S) Ambassador Schulte met with Iraqi Ambassador Tariq Aqrawi on April 29. Ambassador Schulte reiterated the commitment of the United States to work with Iraq to help lift UN restrictions through the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement and UNSCR 1859 (2008). Ambassador Schulte shared a list of nonproliferation-related organizations in Vienna that presented the GOI possible resources and opportunity to work on the process to help lift sanctions. This includes the IAEA, which serves as a resource for safeguards, safety, and security, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, and the Hague Code of Conduct. ¶10. (S) Ambassador Aqrawi said the removal of sanctions is very important. On the Additional Protocol (AP),Ambassador Schulte noted that Iraq still needs to bring the protocol into force. Iraq signed the AP on October 9, 2008, but needs to provide written confirmation that its domestic requirements for entry into force have been met. Mission will follow up with our Iraqi colleagues to stimulate an early response on the AP to the IAEA Secretariat. ¶11. (S) Ambassador Schulte raised the issue of Iraq's compliance with its safeguards agreement. The Iraqi Ambassador immediately responded that indeed Iraq was in compliance. Ambassador Schulte noted the need for a formal finding of compliance, according to the IAEA's Office of Legal Affairs. Ambassador Schulte conveyed that we are currently discussing with Washington on what the next steps should be and had no instructions on how to proceed. One option would be for the Director General to report to the Board that Iraq is in full compliance, followed by a Board decision endorsing this finding. Ambassador Aqrawi was eager to request such a report from the Director General to have the issue addressed at the June Board of Governors. (Comment: Iraq is currently a member of the Board of Governors and will sit as a Board member during the June and September 2009 Board meetings. End Comment.) Ambassador Aqrawi thought that such a resolution should not be a controversial issue for the Board. Ambassador Schulte reiterated that we need to think about how to proceed before requesting a report from the Director General, including who would ask, who would draft the resolution, who would put the resolution forward, etc. -------------- Comment and Next Steps -------------- ¶12. (S) As Washington considers the way forward on lifting WMD-related restrictions in Iraq, Mission recommends a course that would help solidify a precedent against ceding to any DG what Mission believes is a Board prerogative to restore "good standing" in cases where the Board has found past noncompliance. Naturally, as in the original finding of noncompliance, any such action re-establishing Iraq's full compliance would be predicated on a report from the Director General. ¶13. (S) Mission, therefore recommends that the Board decide Iraq is back in compliance with its safeguards agreement. The best option would be to get Iraq to request a special short report from the IAEA to the Board indicating that Iraq is in full compliance. The Board could then adopt a resolution noting that the past noncompliance issues are closed, and the UNSC could act on the basis of that Board resolution. ¶14. (S) Mission acknowledges this course raises a question as to timing. Mission understands that the UN Secretariat will release a paper in June indicating what steps Iraq should take to facilitate the lifting of restrictions. Washington will need to consider timing in Vienna related to the UN paper, but we understand that a finding of full compliance with safeguards is already a prerequisite for lifting restrictions. In addition to the ongoing policy process (and time constraints) in Washington and USUN/UNSC, the June Board is already shaping up as a very full agenda. There is no guarantee that the issue of DG succession will be behind us by the June meeting. Also, Iran, Syria, possibly DPRK, the annual Safeguards Implementation Report, and de-restriction of Board documents such as DG reports on safeguards issues (e.g., on Syria and Iran) will be on the June Board agenda, along with possible Board action on one or more Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF) proposals. Washington will want to consider whether and how all these various issues can be made to interact to our advantage. Finally, Mission is not at all certain that the Secretariat could generate the necessary report before the June Board. According to Rockwood, there would certainly be internal debate and consideration as to the Secretariat's view on the mechanism to bring Iraqi noncompliance to formal closure, which will also require time. Mission expects Director General ElBaradei would consider the implications of the precedent for Iran as well. He might not be highly-motivated to act quickly to facilitate the precedent that the Board decides the outcome of noncompliance cases. ¶15. (S) Finally, Mission notes that whenever we proceed with any Board action there is a certainty that some member states will take the opportunity to re-live the Iraq experience in ways unhelpful to our objectives. Certainly Cuba, perhaps Egypt on the Board, and Iran and Syria speaking as non-Board members would use the opportunity to claim U.S. "fabricating" information about them "just like the U.S. did about Iraq." However, as this is a routine accusation from these such quarters, Mission believes that the desire for a good precedent on Board action would outweigh any concern about prompting such rhetoric. SCHULTE