IAEA/IRAN: P5+1 EXPERTS MEETING USEFUL MECHANISM FOR TECHNICAL DIALOGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000192



NOFORN

SIPDIS



CORRECTED COPY (PARA 28 CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

THAT WAS INADVERTENTLY LEFT OUT OF THE ORIGINAL CABLE.)



E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2024

TAGS: AORC, IR, IAEA, KNNP, MNUC

SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: P5+1 EXPERTS MEETING USEFUL MECHANISM

FOR TECHNICAL DIALOGUE



Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte FOR REASONS 1.4 (c) AND (e

)



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Summary

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1. (C) P5 1 experts and an EU representative met at the U.K.

Mission on March 9 to discuss technical issues contained in

the IAEA Director General's reports on Iran and what that

report implies for Iran's progress on its nuclear program.

This was the third meeting in a series of similar experts'

discussions (previously held in May 2008 and June 2007). By

pre-agreement, the meetings do not produce agreed/common

conclusions, but there were no objections to the UK

Ambassador's summary of discussions noting that Iran's

current centrifuge operations at Natanz were not adequate to

support Tehran's stated commercial objective, although they

had improved substantially over the 2007 performance. The

experts also noted it was of concern that Iran has not

cooperated with the IAEA on issues related to possible

military dimensions. All agreed to show continued support

for the IAEA's investigation into these issues.



2. (C) France, the U.K., and the U.S. provided all the

presentations on Iran's nuclear fuel cycle,

weaponization-related activities, and IAEA safeguards, but

Russia offered useful commentary about the status of the

Bushehr power reactor. China was more engaged than in

previous meetings and was heavily focused on questions

regarding Iran's centrifuge performance and the possibility

of further progress by Iran on that front. DDG for

Safeguards Olli Heinonen participated at the end of the

session and usefully answered questions about Iran's

centrifuge program and Iran's refusal to allow IAEA access to

the Heavy Water Research Reactor. He also reviewed the fact

that select sensitive issues from the August 2007 work plan

had been kicked back to the "alleged studies basket" in order

to facilitate reaching that basket as the IAEA attempts to

engage the Iranians on the most sensitive, military-related

aspects of the investigation. Heinonen was unambiguous in

dismissing Iran's "need" to have copies of the "alleged

studies" documents, an issue unhelpfully raised by the German

DCM. Overall, experts found the discussions useful,

especially since there seemed to be no dissent on the

unofficial conclusions made. No one objected to the Chair's

suggestion that the group should meet again. End Summary.





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The Enrichment Part of the Fuel Cycle

--------------



3. (C) The French began the discussion by highlighting

Iran's indigenous sources of uranium -- from phosphate

deposits (a potential future source),the Saghand uranium

mine, and the Gachin uranium mine. The French noted that the

ore processing facility at Ardakan, which will process the

uranium from Saghand, is scheduled to start operations in

March 2009, according to Iranian statements, while the

current status of the ore processing facility at Gachin is

unknown. They also pointed out that even if the mines at

Saghand and Gachin operated at their stated capacity of

approximately 70 tons per year, this amount of uranium would

support only about 50 percent of the demonstrated capacity of

the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan. Regarding

activities at the UCF, the French explained that Iran's

current uranium stockpile was dwindling, with less than 100

tons of uranium remaining, and that Iran had significantly

slowed down operations at the UCF during 2008 and 2009, most

likely to preserve its declining stockpile. The French noted

that Iran is thought to have uranium-bearing phosphate rock

deposits in the northern part of the country, with uranium

content ranging from 50 to 700 parts per million, and that

Iran might in the future look to exploit these deposits.

Regarding potential sources for importing additional uranium,

the French experts mentioned the Congo without further

elaboration. Such transfers are proscribed under UNSCR 1737.



4. (C) The U.S. noted that operations at the UCF already

have been impacted by the uranium shortage and that Iran can



never be fully independent for its complete nuclear fuel

cycle. The U.K. added that the current uranium shortage will

not have a near term impact on operations at Natanz, since

Iran has plenty of UF6 to keep existing centrifuges running

for several years. The U.S. suggested that countries should

be on the look out for Iran trying to procure uranium or

large amounts of uranium-bearing phosphate rock from abroad,

and also possible efforts to modify existing phosphoric acid

production lines to extract the uranium.



5. (C) Turning to enrichment-related activities, the U.K.

led the discussion with a detailed presentation on Iran's

centrifuge progress and performance in 2008. The U.K.

estimated that the IR-1 (P-1) cascades at the Fuel Enrichment

Plant (FEP) performed at an average level of 0.6 separative

work units (SWU) per machine-year during 2008. The U.S.

indicated agreement with this value, adding that performance

peaked during mid-2008 and declined somewhat since then. The

U.K. developed a sliding scale of Iranian uranium enrichment,

concluding that after 5 years, Iran could possess 20 tons of

low enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) with 8 units of 3,000

centrifuge machines, at Iran's current pace of

installation--approximately 2 cascades per month--and

operation. The U.S. noted that this was about two-thirds of

the amount needed for a single annual fuel reload for a

Bushehr-type reactor. Russia inquired as to UK views on

whether Iran has enough centrifuge parts to continue cascade

installation at a rate 2 per month; the U.K. noted that it is

conceivable that they do, but that it is difficult to say

absent further Iranian transparency. The U.K. noted that it

is possible Iran still needs to procure some associated

parts. Both the U.K. and the U.S. noted that Iran had

operated its centrifuges at Natanz considerably better in

2008 than in 2007, but it was implausible, as disussed at the

previous experts meeting, that Tehran could reach its claimed

commercial program goal with the P1-type/IR-1 centrifuges.



6. (C) Russia agreed that equipping all 8 cascade units or

beyond at Natanz with P-1/IR-1 machines was a "waste" in the

commercial context. Russia also replied that Iran does not

need a commercial program to support the Bushehr reactor

because Russia already has committed to support the lifetime

operations of that reactor, including by providing fuel. The

U.S. commented that although centrifuge operations in 2008

were "mediocre," Iran had now demonstrated centrifuge

operations such that it had the technical ability to produce

highly enriched uranium (HEU) if it so chose. Consequently,

even if Iran did not have a viable commercial capability,

Iran is capable of producing significant amounts of low

enriched uranium. The U.S. also called into question the

assumption that Iran was focused on developing a commercial

capability, and that it is possible Iran was intending only

to demonstrate a "fait accompli" capability in the face of

international pressure and to produce a stockpile of LEU.



7. (C) The U.S. asked what were the drivers--political,

technical, or both--for Iran not feeding UF6 into the nine

installed, but not-yet-operating, cascades in Unit A26, and

when might Iran transition from the IR-1 centrifuge to one of

the new generation machines. The U.K. agreed with the U.S.

comment that it was possible that Iran was performing more

mechanical and quality control tests, and fixing leaks and

other problems before proceeding forward with operations of

additional cascades, unlike in the past.



8. (C) Germany said it had a "feeling" that Iran would use

the first cascade hall of 27,000 machines for the IR-1

centrifuges and fill the second cascade hall with the more

advanced centrifuges. The U.K. responded that the relatively

low numbers of the new generation centrifuge machines--IR-2,

IR-3, and IR-4--in the pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) at

Natanz seems to indicate that the Iranians are still in the

test and development stage.



9. (C) France presented a chart of Iran's production of low

enriched UF6 and asked for others' assessments on how much

low enriched uranium (LEU) would equate to a "significant

quantity" (SQ) of HEU, if it were further enriched and

converted to metal. The U.K. responded that in a simple

steady-state system, 1000 kg of low enriched UF6 would equal



one SQ, but Iran would need more than that for its first

weapons-worth of material. France noted their estimates were

roughly around 1500 kg for Iran's first weapon. There was no

dissent among experts to 1500 kg as the likely threshold.

France also asked if Iran could produce 20 percent enriched

uranium at Natanz using its existing cascade configuration.

The U.S. indicated that Iran could re-feed the 3.5 percent

enriched uranium that it currently is producing to achieve

roughly 20 percent enrichment, but did not know what measures

Iran might have to take to ensure the higher enrichment level

did not produce a safety/criticality issue in the cascade

feed and withdrawal systems. The U.S. pointed out that it

would be more practical to use only a portion of the existing

cascades for such re-feeding, leaving the remaining cascades

to continue low enriched UF6 production.





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The Reactor Side of Things

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10. (C) The U.K. led a short discussion on reactors and

fuel fabrication, noting that this section of Iran's fuel

cycle was well behind the uranium enrichment track. In a

particularly helpful intervention, Russia reiterated (without

prompting) the statement it had made at the previous experts

meeting that Iran's fuel cycle/fuel fabrication activity

currently has no connection to the Bushehr reactor, because

there already is a contract for Russia to provide 10 fuel

loads--which will last for a little more than 10 years--for

the reactor. Replying to the U.S. question if it was

possible for the fuel to be lQd into Bushehr the second

quarter of this year, as indicated in the IAEA Director

General's February report, Russia said that it was possible,

but it was more difficult to determine when the reactor would

go critical. The U.S. asked if Russia would supply Iran with

the licensing so that Tehran could make its own fuel for

Bushehr once the 10-load contract runs out. Russia responded

that when negotiating fuel contracts with Iran, Tehran

insisted on only the first 10 loads, but Russia expects to

supply fuel for the lifetime of Bushehr and it would not

agree to provide Iran the necessary technology/license to

make its own fuel for the Bushehr reactor.



11. (C) France asked if the 10-load contract had actually

been signed by the Iranians and was "in effect." Russia

responded that the contract had been "agreed to," and that is

what mattered. The U.S. commented that IAEA-sponsored

Iranian safety and regulatory training for Bushehr was not

scheduled until later this year, and posited that there might

be a safety issue associated with operating Bushehr before

that training takes place. Russia replied that its

technicians would be in charge of all the operations at

Bushehr in the near term, so it did not matter when the

safety training for Iranians took place. (Comment: In a

side conversation with the Russian ROSATOM representative

Koutchinov, Msnoff pressed further the issue of Bushehr

start-up. Koutchinov made clear that Iranians will have very

little to do with the operation of Bushehr for some time,

stressing that for "at least the first year or two," Russians

will be in full control of the reactor. Koutchinov said the

Bushehr plant has evolved into a "joint venture," implying

that Russia has asserted a wider scope of control over

near-term operations. End Comment.)





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Concerns with Lack of Progress on

Possible Military Dimensions

--------------



12. (C) The U.S. started the discussion on possible

military dimensions (PMD) and noted the IAEA has not been

able to make any progress on this issue of serious concern

since August 2008 because of lack of Iranian cooperation.

The U.S. noted that the IAEA has reported at length on the

extensive documentation related to Iran's effort to design a

nuclear warhead and that the only response Iran has offered

is that the information is "fabricated." The U.S. explained

that the IAEA first began reporting on Iran's nuclear



weaponization-related work in January 2006 and continued to

describe in detail the nature of the work in subsequent DG

reports and technical briefings.



13. (C) Recalling the U.S. Intelligence Community's

assessment in the 2007 NIE that Iran halted its nuclear

weapons work in 2003, France asked about information in DDG

Safeguards Olli Heinonen's February 2008 technical briefing

which indicated some activities had taken place in 2004. The

U.S. responded that the information in Heinonen's February

2008 briefing was consistent with the 2003 weaponization halt

assessment, since some activities were wrapping up in 2004.

The U.S. commented that acquisition of a nuclear weapons

capability requires more than just the work on a nuclear

device. Instead, production of fissile material is key, and

Iran has continued to develop that capability. At the end of

the day, the U.S. noted, it is important for Iran to fully

disclose any past weaponization-related work, implement the

Additional Protocol (AP),suspend all proliferation sensitive

nuclear activities, and fully cooperate with the IAEA in

order to begin to restore international confidence in the

peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. If Iran does not

do this, U.S. experts said, that would suggest Iran wishes to

hide and preserve its past work, perhaps to keep a future

weapons option open.



14. (C) The U.K. expressed concern that the PMD issues

receive less and less attention in the DG's reports. Russia

agreed, but noted its view that the IAEA has shared as much

information as it has related to PMD and that there is

nothing new to report. Sharing the concern that less

attention seems to be paid to PMD, the U.S. recalled that the

2007 NIE assessment indicated that the 2003 weapons halt was

at least partially due to the increased international

scrutiny and pressure at the time. It is extremely important

to continue the international pressure, in the U.S. view, so

that Tehran does not feel comfortable reversing the halt.



15. (C) The DCM from the German Mission asked why copies of

the alleged studies information could not be provided to Iran

and remarked that some Board members saw this as a hindrance

to the verification process. The U.S. suggested that it

would be a good idea to get Heinonen's opinion on that issue,

in particular whether the IAEA inspectors truly saw this as a

hindrance to their investigation. The U.K. replied that

Heinonen has made very clear to them that the IAEA is not

asking for anything more to be shared with Iran, especially

since Iran refuses to cooperate on what the IAEA already has

shared. The French noted that Iran still has not provided an

answer to the origin of the uranium hemispheres document and

how it came to be in Iran. The U.S. acknowledged this, and

noted that it is also important that the IAEA receive all

possible assistance in resolving concerns that foreign

expertise was provided to Iran regarding design of an

implosion device.



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Other Outstanding Issues

--------------



16. (C) The U.S. noted that in addition to the outstanding

issues related to PMD, Iran still has not clarified the

IAEA's concerns about the nature of the Lavizan facility and

equipment, has not granted the IAEA access to the Gachin mine

and ore processing plant, and that several issues from the

August 2007 work plan that were not resolved were pushed to

the "alleged studies" section of the work plan. Russia asked

how the IAEA could address all these issues as long as Iran

refuses to implement the AP. The U.S. replied that the UNSC

has empowered the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues;

therefore, the IAEA has the right to seek clarifications on

these issues, but cannot do so without Iranian cooperation.



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Safeguards and Verification

--------------



17. (C) France took the lead in discussing safeguards and

verification of Iran's nuclear program by mentioning that the

IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared



nuclear material, implement full safeguards at Natanz, and

perform 21 unannounced inspections at Natanz, but Iran

continues to refuse design information verification (DIV)

access to the IR-40 and design information for the reactor to

be built at Darkhovin. France also noted the problems in the

past that Iran created over the designation of inspectors and

issuing visas. France recalled the IAEA's Legal Office

opinion, provided during the March Board meeting, that

Iran's refusal to implement Code 3.1 Modified and allow IAEA

access to the IR-40 reactor was inconsistent with Tehran's

safeguards obligations. The U.S. noted that we should

inquire with Heinonen as to the point at which failure to

provide DIV access was imperiling safeguards integrity.



18. (C) Describing additional concerns about the IAEA's

ability to verify/investigate Iran's nuclear program, France

stated that there were less than a dozen inspectors in Ops B,

there continues to be a rapid turnover of IAEA officials

associated with the Iranian nuclear account, and the IAEA's

"Iranian" expertise is tenuous, citing the retirement of the

IAEA's centrifuge expert last summer. Germany agreed that

there were a lot of issues with Iran's cooperation, but the

biggest problem most likely was the non-implementation of the

AP, especially if there was an undeclared facility somewhere

in Iran. France reiterated the importance of Code 3.1

Modified, and commented that we should focus on the issue of

prompting Iranian implementation of its related obligations.



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U.K.'s Summary of Discussions

--------------



19. (C) The U.K. Ambassador summarized the main points from

the meeting, stating clearly these were not "official, agreed

to positions," but just general conclusions from the Chair's

perspective. (Note: China and Russia came to the meeting in

the understanding that ground rules from the previous

meetings would obtain, ground rules which preclude any formal

agreement on shared conclusions. End note.) The main points

were:



--Iran's centrifuge operations in 2008 had improved from

2007, but the centrifuge performance still was relatively

poor and not at a steady state;



--the performance of Iran's centrifuge operations was not

adequate to achieve Tehran's stated commercial goals;



--delays in centrifuge cascade commissioning may have more to

do with centrifuge operators attempting to address

performance problems than any political signal from Tehran to

the international community;



--there has been a complete lack of progress on PMD and the

IAEA has been unable to report any developments on these

issues;



--the P5 1 shared the concern that the outstanding issues

have not been adequately addressed by Iran, and Tehran must

provide the IAEA access to individuals, documentation, and

locations associated with PMD; and



--the P5 1 will continue to support the IAEA on the Iranian

nuclear issue.



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Session with DDG Heinonen

--------------



20. (C) As requested, Heinonen and IAEA weapons expert

Chris Hutchinson joined the meeting before it concluded.

After a brief summary of the agenda, the U.K. Chair posed

several questions, Heinonen responded and subsequently

answered additional questions from the experts. Heinonen

explained that the IAEA does not have much access to the

actual centrifuges at Natanz (as they are inside casings),

but said the installation of the IR-1 has been linear,

although the commissioning--feeding with UF6--has not.

Heinonen said the believed the installation of the additional

IR-1's suggests that Iran has faith in its ability to operate



those machines, but he said he would not add to the

speculation as to why the Iranians have not yet fed UF6 into

them. Heinonen described the low enriched UF6 reporting

discrepancy at the physical inventory verification (PIV) in

November 2008 as an Iranian operator calculation error. He

said the IAEA is conducting a systematic internal review of

the matter and also continues to work closely with Iran to

assess the causes of this error and help change practices in

the future so that it does not happen again.



21. (C) Regarding the question of providing copies of

"alleged studies" documents to Iran, Heinonen explained in

detail that the IAEA has been seeking answers from Tehran on

these issues since 2005 and that Iran has been given

repeated, ample access to the information, but still claims

only that they are "forgeries." Noting specifically the

IAEA's attempts to investigate possible military-related

procurements, Heinonen described the process by which some

questions in the IAEA work plan for Iran were kicked back to

the final "alleged studies" basket of issues because Iran

would not deal with them under other, earlier issues. He

also said the work plan stated that "access," not copies or

originals, to the documentation would be provided to Iran.

Tehran, however, has tried to change the "rules of the game"

over time and started to focus on a call to receive

"originals" only in September 2008. Heinonen mentioned that

he does not foresee any progress on these issues in the near

term, especially without AP access and the implementation of

Code 3.1 Modified.



22. (C) Responding to a question from the French about

visas and the designation of inspectors for Iran, Heinonen

said the IAEA currently had available the personnel it needs

to work in Iran, but a problem could arise if the IAEA and

Iran were to hold technical discussions requiring

experts/consultants who are not designated inspectors, for

example, Chris Hutchinson. The U.K. asked what Iran's

long-term plans were for the installation and operation of

the new generation centrifuges at Natanz. Heinonen replied

that he thinks Iran has realized the IR-1 is not the most

dependable machine and he would be surprised if Iran

installed 54,000 IR-1s in the FEP at Natanz. He speculated

that maybe the fourth unit of 3,000 machines at the FEP would

consist of a more advanced centrifuge.



23. (C) Germany asked if the LEU produced at Natanz was for

Bushehr fuel and if Iran could enrich uranium beyond 3.5

percent. Heinonen said the safeguards agreement for Natanz

allows up to 5 percent enrichment. Iran could choose to

increase that level, but it would have to notify the IAEA.

The U.S. asked if the safeguards approach for Natanz would

change as the number of centrifuges or assay were to

increase, and Heinonen responded that the camera positions

would have to be rearranged and the frequency of unannounced

inspections increased. In response to a query from the U.K.,

Heinonen specified that safeguards cameras at Natanz cover

the perimeter of the cascade halls, focusing on input/output

points. He also noted that, unlike such inspections under

the IAEA's "Hexapartite" approach to safeguards at enrichment

plants, inspectors at Natanz can go "anywhere underground"

they like, i.e., there is no set course inspectors must

follow during unannounced inspections. Heinonen said this

combined monitoring assures that Iran cannot take machines in

and out of the cascades without the IAEA knowing.



24. (C) Responding to the U.S. question about the source of

the uranium dioxide (UO2) that Iran is using to produce fuel

rods at the FMP, Heinonen said he thought the UO2 was being

produced at the UCF, although he was not 100 percent sure.

He also said that Iran has a stock of UO2 that it acquired

from abroad in the early 1990s. (Comment: In a separate

conversation with Msnoff, two other IAEA officials--strictly

protect--reported the UO2 being used to produce fuel rods at

the FMP came from the imported material and not Iran's own

domestic production. One official also noted that although

Iran was producing fuel rods, they had yet to build the fuel

assemblies. End comment.)



25. (C) The U.S. commented about the difference between a

State's legal obligations under the comprehensive safeguards



agreement and transparency measures, and how Syria now seems

to be taking cues from Iran's behavior. Is there really a

clean break between obligations and "transparency?" Heinonen

said he did not think it was a clean break and that it was

difficult to make the exact determination of where voluntary

transparency begins. The U.K. asked if the Board could

assist the IAEA Secretariat in this area, and Heinonen

recalled a 1992 discussion on the strengthening of safeguards

as well as States implementing the AP.



26. (C) China noted that the assessed SWU for Iran's

operations of the IR-1 centrifuge in 2008 was 0.6 and asked

if this low number was because of the poor design of the

centrifuge. Heinonen said, "I wish I knew." The U.S. asked

if Iran's DIV refusal for the IR-40 was an immediate concern

and what Iran planned to do with the spent fuel from that

reactor. Heinonen said he has no information on spent fuel

plans for the IR-40 and that currently the main concern for

DIV access is for UNSC reporting responsibilities, since Iran

is at least 4-5 years away from operating the reactor.

Heinonen then emphasized that safeguards concerns will grow

over time and "we shouldn't tolerate this Iranian behavior

too long." Germany asked about the status of the Heavy Water

Production Plant (HWPP),which will support the IR-40

reactor, and Heinonen said the IAEA was as "equally blind"

about the operational status of the HWPP, but he did not

think Iran currently was producing high quality heavy water.



27. (C) Responding to Germany's question about the status

of the uranium metal production line at the UCF, Heinonen

explained that Iran has yet to test that process at the UCF,

although all the equipment is installed. Heinonen also

stated that Iran could not produce HEU metal at the UCF with

the current set-up and safeguards, as different equipment

would be required to make HEU metal. France asked why the

uranium metal document is under seal in Iran and not in

Vienna. Heinonen replied that the IAEA has asked to move the

document to Vienna, but Iran has yet to turn the document

over to the IAEA. The U.K. asked about Iran's time scale for

converting the low enriched UF6 into UO2--for reactor

fuel--at the UCF. Heinonen said that there was little work

left for Iran to complete on that process, but all low

enriched UF6 remains at Natanz. (Comment: In a separate

meeting with Msnoff, another IAEA official--strictly

protect--said that both the U metal and UO2 productions lines

at the UCF were still under construction, although the U

metal line was further along. Another IAEA official reported

that the R&D work at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose

Laboratories using the LEU from the PFEP at Natanz--as

reported in the DG's February report--was for converting the

enriched UF6 into UO2. The official said Iran indicated it

would use the low enriched UO2 for medical isotope testing,

but the IAEA continues to seek additional information from

Tehran regarding this. End comment.)



28. (C) China inquired about how many centrifuge components

and raw material for component manufacturing Iran currently

has. Heinonen explained the IAEA's knowledge regarding

Iran's component manufacturing and materials capabilities had

diminished since the suspension agreement and AP were no

longer in place. He said that before the IAEA lost access in

2007, Iran had enough components for approximately 10,000

IR-1 centrifuges. He remarked that during his January 2008

visit to Kalaye Electric, he discovered that Iran was

actively reverse engineering components for more advance

centrifuges. Also at that time Atomic Energy Organization of

Iran (AEOI) head Aqazadeh claimed that Iran was

self-sufficient in making the high-strength aluminum alloy,

maraging steel and magnets it needs for centrifuges.

Heinonen commented that he did not think the maraging steel

the IAEA had previously seen in Iran was appropriate for use

in producing IR-2 centrifuges. He also noted that Iran would

need a source of carbon fiber to build composite centrifuges

and he had no idea where that carbon fiber would come from.

He described maraging steel and carbon fiber as possible

"bottlenecks" in the Iranian centrifuge program. Heinonen

further stated that he believes that the Iranians have come

to realize that the IR-1 is not the "ultimate solution" and

he believes that the "IR-2 is the future". He also noted

that the IR-2 and the IR-3 have approximately the same



dimensions but are constructed of different materials. He

stated that the IR-2 and the IR-3 appear to be subcritical

machines and approximately half the height of the P-2, but

the same diameter. He further believes one to be maraging

steel and the other to involve carbon composite.



--------------

Comment

--------------



29. (C) The U.S. delegation believed this meeting

worthwhile as a means for engaging Russian and Chinese

experts on the technical facts of the Iranian nuclear

program, facts that we hope will be accurately reported to

more senior officials in Moscow and Beijing. Specifically,

the meeting again provided a relatively depoliticized forum

for experts to hear the details regarding IAEA interactions

with Iran. Perhaps most valuable on this from was Heinonen's

clear statement that Iran already has the option for all the

"access" it needs to PMD documents and "we shouldn't tolerate

this Iranian behavior too long" with regard to Tehran's

continued refusal allow DIV access to the IR-40. We note

that Chinese participation was more robust than in the

previous two such experts meetings, and that China's

questions focused heavily on better understanding the level

of Iran's centrifuge prowess. Members of the U.S. delegation

engaged the Chinese Mission and CAEC representatives in an

extended discussion on this issue over the lunch break.

These expert meetings have evolved into a relatively

comfortable mechanism for discussing technical issues on Iran

at the expert level, and convening them is also a useful

optic for the IAEA Secretariat to witness.



--------------

Participants

--------------



30. (C) The following people participated in the experts'

meeting.



China:

Mr. Liu Hongbin, Expert from CAEA

Mr. Li Sen, Chinese Mission in Vienna

Mr. Qu Guangzhou, Chinese Mission in Vienna



EU Council Secretariat:

Dr. Stephan Klement



France:

Mr. Arnaud Mentre, MFA Paris

Colonel Paupert, Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale

Mr. Zacharie Gross, French Mission in Vienna

Mr. Marc Albert, French Mission in Vienna

Mr. Stephane Baude, French Mission in Vienna



Germany:

Mr. Olaf Krosing, Director, MFA

Mr. Martin Langer, Head of Section IAEA, MFA

Mr. Guido Kemmerling, German Mission in Vienna

Mr. Michael Kugler, German Mission in Vienna



Russia:

Mr. Vladimir Koutchinov, Rosatom

Mr. Vladimir Sergeev, Russian Mission in Vienna

Mr. Andrey Karasev, Russian Mission in Vienna

Mr. Mikhail Knodratenkov, Russian Mission in Vienna



U.K.

Ambassador Simon Smith, UK Mission in Vienna

Mr. Simon Mustart, FCO London

Mr. John Schofield, MOD London

Ms. Caroline Cliff, UK Mission in Vienna

Mr. Richard Vowles, UK Mission in Vienna



U.S.

Mr. Richard Nephew, State Dept

Mr. Kurt Kessler, UNVIE Mission

Ms. Chala Cripps McDonald, UNVIE Mission

Ms. Andrea Hall, UNVIE Mission

Mr. Roger Miller, Lawerence Livermore Lab



Mr. Jeffrey Bedell, Los Alamos Lab

Mr. Steve LaMontagne, DOE/NNSA

SCHULTE