S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000189

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D(S), P, T, IO, ISN
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
DOE FOR NA-20
NSC FOR CONNERY
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA MY SI SF BE
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: FIVE CANDIDATES AT CLOSE OF
NOMINATIONS

REF: A) UNVIE 188 B) UNVIE 180 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for
reaons 1.4 b and d.

Summary
--------------

1. (S) As of the close of nominations April 27, there are
five official candidates for IAEA Director General: Yukiya
Amano (Japan), Abdul Minty (South Africa), Luis Echavarri
(Spain), Jean-Pol Poncelet (Belgium) and Ernest Petric
(Slovenia). No further candidates can join the race at this
juncture. The next step will be the conducting of
non-binding straw polls, expected at the end of May,
whereupon UNVIE expects at least one European candidate,
likely Petric, may voluntarily withdraw due to insufficient
support. A Special Session of the IAEA Board of Governors
will be convened in June to conduct a formal vote, we hope
but the date has not been set (ref a). The balloting will
begin with a series of elimination rounds and end in a
run-off between the two front runners. The addition of three
new Europeans to the Amano-Minty mix makes it more likely
that several of the eight EU Board members will support one
of the three European candidates and thus detract from
Amano's core support. We expect two of the three Europeans
will either withdraw or be eliminated before either Amano or
Minty would be expelled from the race, but it is unclear
whether Echavarri or Poncelet will emerge as the strongest
European. Petric told Ambassador he expects that Poncelet
could attract many EU votes, including that of France, while
others point to the Spaniard's potential to get Latin
support. Since neither Echavarri nor Poncelet have
nonproliferation experience and both are associated with the
nuclear power sector, anti-nuclear Ireland and New Zealand
may be expected to stick with Amano.


2. (S) Summary cont.: The last round of elimination voting is

likely to include Amano, Minty and a European. To guarantee
at least a second-place finish, and thus inclusion in the
final run-off, a candidate would need at least 12 votes
(Note: Mathematically, a candidate can finish second with
less than 12 votes, the higher the front-runner's support.
End note.) With this in mind, Amano has re-started his
campaign from scratch, lobbying Board members one by one and
taking no vote for granted, but is confident he can get to

12. Minty is expected to hold on to his core support,
estimated to be at least 8-10 votes. Any European would need
to beat out Minty to finish second. In our view, the higher
Amano's vote count, the less support there will be for the
remaining European candidate, and the more likely a replay of
the March Amano-Minty vote would be. While an Amano-Minty
runoff may seem clear cut, it can easily lead to another
stalemate if Amano loses a single vote and/or fails to
attract the one vote that cost him the election in March.
The second but less likely outcome, an Amano-European runoff,
would allow for two potentially acceptable alternatives. In
such a scenario, Western Board members could defect to
whoever emerges as the "leading candidate" to avoid a
stalemate.


3. (S) Recommendation and action request: As a first step,
Mission recommends consultation with P5 capitals to evaluate
current thinking on the candidates. As we saw in March,
Russia and China are key swing votes. Second, while our
primary objective is to see Amano as a front-runner, we will
need to access whether we want to prompt an Amano-Minty or an
Amano-European runoff, i.e. whether it is possible to
eliminate Minty. To accomplish this, our demarches would
have to take account of a secondary objective, keeping a
European viable.

The Newcomers
--------------


4. (C) Among the three European newcomers, former Slovenian
Ambassador and Board Chair is the best known among Vienna
Missions but likely the least well-positioned. Petric
acknowledged to Ambassador Schulte April 24 that if the
decision were made locally, he would have a serious chance,
but it will be made in capitals. He does not have the
resources or plan to lobby capitals unless "by some miracle,"
he makes the final run-off. Petric does not see himself as
an "EU candidate" but rather as a consensus builder and the
candidate of "everybody and nobody." He explains that he
entered the race in view of the polarizing Amano-Minty vote

and before knowing of the other candidates. Were he to be
elected DG, Petric promises to spend his time in Vienna and
address areas "neglected" by ElBaradei such as relations with
the Board and oversight/management of the Secretariat. He is
attuned to U.S. priorities such as the fuel bank and sees the
IAEA as mainly technical with a limited "political" impact.
The background note supporting his candidacy supports IAEA
safeguards, safety and technical assistance. Currently a
Constitutional Court judge in Slovenia, Petric has also
served as Ambassador to the United States (1991-1997) and as
Deputy FM in addition to his posting in Vienna. (Petric,
Echavarri and Poncelet CVs emailed to Department.)


5. (C) Although talked about in IAEA corridors for the last
few months as a potential candidate, OECD Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA) DG Echavarri is not well known in Vienna
circles. His CV documents more than 20 years of involvement
with the work of the IAEA, and he has occasionally
participated in IAEA Board meetings and the General
Conference but he is not a prominent personality here. Among
his accomplishments at the NEA, Echavarri cites leadership in
the relationships of that agency with Russia, China and
India, and there are rumors that Russia encouraged his
candidacy for IAEA DG. Echavarri has been NEA DG since 1997
and served previously as director of the Spanish Nuclear
Industry Forum and as a nuclear regulatory commissioner. For
ten years, he worked for Westinghouse and is an engineer by
training. Most of what we have learned about Echavarri seems
positive, though we have also heard some derogatory
information as to his management style from NEA staff.
According to the Spanish Mission, Echavarri is expected in
Vienna the week of May 4 to begin his campaign in earnest.


6. (C) Jean-Pol Poncelet is the dark horse whose potential
support should not be underestimated. Petric expects
Poncelet could get a majority of EU votes that do not go to
Amano, including that of France (he is currently a senior VP
at Areva), though we have no indication from the French
Mission that is decided. His association with the nuclear
industry may make Poncelet unpalatable to anti-nuclear
Ireland among EU members on the Board and certainly to New
Zealand. The only politician among the candidates, Poncelet
has an impressive resume, having served as a Deputy Prime
Minister, Minister of Defense and Energy, and as external
relations director of the European Space Agency.


7. (C) The entry of three European candidates into the fray
will detract more support from Amano than it will from Minty,
though it is unclear at this point which is the strongest
European, Echavarri or Poncelet. The EU will not vote as a
bloc, however, and Amano will likely maintain some EU
support. Echavarri can also draw Latin support away from
both Amano and Minty, including possibly Mexico, Argentina
and Uruguay, while Cuba and Brazil are likely to stick with
Minty.

Two Scenarios
--------------


8. (C) Amano remains a strong candidate but as Petric has
observed, his key weakness is being seen as "unwanted" by
many and divisive. As another astute observer of the IAEA
scene, Israeli Ambassador Michaeli, reported to Ambassador
Schulte April 27, that Minty's main target in reentering a
race he demonstrably cannot win is to block Amano's election,
according to the South African Ambassador. Michaeli was
impressed that the NAM were able to re-enlist Minty when it
became clear that Malaysian Bin Muslim was not viable. It
is also possible that the NAM/G-77 is seeking to block any
Western candidate to allow for a thus far disinterested
ElBaradei to extend his mandate, as the French fear.
Michaeli advised that WEOG Board members ought to make clear
that they would not allow a return of ElBaradei and are
prepared to continue the election process through the IAEA
General Conference in September if need be.


9. (C) The current slate of candidates is likely to result in
an Amano-Minty re-match or, if properly engineered, an
Amano-European runoff. Michaeli argued for the second
scenario and saw this as an opportunity for the "Western
camp" to eliminate Minty or avoid another stalemate that
could bring back ElBaradei, a subject of enormous discontent
in Tel Aviv. He assesses that the West has approximately 19
votes on the Board, to Minty's eight. Michaeli acknowledges

that it would be difficult to implement this strategy, and
that it would take leadership and pre-agreement, i.e. as
Amano and a European would be going after more or less the
same votes. However, it would be far better, he argued, to
have two Western candidates and let the NAM choose between
them. Ambassador Schulte noted that there would be some
risk that a European could outvote Amano and become the
"leading candidate." The original Amano-Minty scenario may
be more clear cut, with Amano having to shift only one vote
to win, he noted. Michaeli saw no prospect of any previous
Minty supporter, such as Russia or Argentina, shifting its
support to Amano. He believed that an Amano-Minty rematch
would likely end in another stalemate and strongly favored
the alternative scenario.


10. (S) Comment: As we continue to strategize on the DG race,
we will need to assess which scenario is more favorable to
U.S. interests, recognizing the need for a carefully
calibrated campaign in support of Amano if we are to avoid
another deadlocked Amano-Minty re-match. Since this is a
secret ballot, vote counting remains hazardous. The straw
poll in late May will give us a first chance to test the
candidates, by which time we will be better placed to offer
an authoritative assessment of Amano's viability.


SCHULTE