IAEA/DG RACE: FIVE CANDIDATES AT CLOSE OF

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000189 SIPDIS DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD DOE FOR NA-20 NSC FOR CONNERY NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019 TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA MY SI SF BE SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: FIVE CANDIDATES AT CLOSE OF NOMINATIONS REF: A) UNVIE 188 B) UNVIE 180 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reaons 1.4 b and d. Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) As of the close of nominations April 27, there are five official candidates for IAEA Director General: Yukiya Amano (Japan),Abdul Minty (South Africa),Luis Echavarri (Spain),Jean-Pol Poncelet (Belgium) and Ernest Petric (Slovenia). No further candidates can join the race at this juncture. The next step will be the conducting of non-binding straw polls, expected at the end of May, whereupon UNVIE expects at least one European candidate, likely Petric, may voluntarily withdraw due to insufficient support. A Special Session of the IAEA Board of Governors will be convened in June to conduct a formal vote, we hope but the date has not been set (ref a). The balloting will begin with a series of elimination rounds and end in a run-off between the two front runners. The addition of three new Europeans to the Amano-Minty mix makes it more likely that several of the eight EU Board members will support one of the three European candidates and thus detract from Amano's core support. We expect two of the three Europeans will either withdraw or be eliminated before either Amano or Minty would be expelled from the race, but it is unclear whether Echavarri or Poncelet will emerge as the strongest European. Petric told Ambassador he expects that Poncelet could attract many EU votes, including that of France, while others point to the Spaniard's potential to get Latin support. Since neither Echavarri nor Poncelet have nonproliferation experience and both are associated with the nuclear power sector, anti-nuclear Ireland and New Zealand may be expected to stick with Amano. ¶2. (S) Summary cont.: The last round of elimination voting is likely to include Amano, Minty and a European. To guarantee at least a second-place finish, and thus inclusion in the final run-off, a candidate would need at least 12 votes (Note: Mathematically, a candidate can finish second with less than 12 votes, the higher the front-runner's support. End note.) With this in mind, Amano has re-started his campaign from scratch, lobbying Board members one by one and taking no vote for granted, but is confident he can get to ¶12. Minty is expected to hold on to his core support, estimated to be at least 8-10 votes. Any European would need to beat out Minty to finish second. In our view, the higher Amano's vote count, the less support there will be for the remaining European candidate, and the more likely a replay of the March Amano-Minty vote would be. While an Amano-Minty runoff may seem clear cut, it can easily lead to another stalemate if Amano loses a single vote and/or fails to attract the one vote that cost him the election in March. The second but less likely outcome, an Amano-European runoff, would allow for two potentially acceptable alternatives. In such a scenario, Western Board members could defect to whoever emerges as the "leading candidate" to avoid a stalemate. ¶3. (S) Recommendation and action request: As a first step, Mission recommends consultation with P5 capitals to evaluate current thinking on the candidates. As we saw in March, Russia and China are key swing votes. Second, while our primary objective is to see Amano as a front-runner, we will need to access whether we want to prompt an Amano-Minty or an Amano-European runoff, i.e. whether it is possible to eliminate Minty. To accomplish this, our demarches would have to take account of a secondary objective, keeping a European viable. The Newcomers -------------- ¶4. (C) Among the three European newcomers, former Slovenian Ambassador and Board Chair is the best known among Vienna Missions but likely the least well-positioned. Petric acknowledged to Ambassador Schulte April 24 that if the decision were made locally, he would have a serious chance, but it will be made in capitals. He does not have the resources or plan to lobby capitals unless "by some miracle," he makes the final run-off. Petric does not see himself as an "EU candidate" but rather as a consensus builder and the candidate of "everybody and nobody." He explains that he entered the race in view of the polarizing Amano-Minty vote and before knowing of the other candidates. Were he to be elected DG, Petric promises to spend his time in Vienna and address areas "neglected" by ElBaradei such as relations with the Board and oversight/management of the Secretariat. He is attuned to U.S. priorities such as the fuel bank and sees the IAEA as mainly technical with a limited "political" impact. The background note supporting his candidacy supports IAEA safeguards, safety and technical assistance. Currently a Constitutional Court judge in Slovenia, Petric has also served as Ambassador to the United States (1991-1997) and as Deputy FM in addition to his posting in Vienna. (Petric, Echavarri and Poncelet CVs emailed to Department.) ¶5. (C) Although talked about in IAEA corridors for the last few months as a potential candidate, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) DG Echavarri is not well known in Vienna circles. His CV documents more than 20 years of involvement with the work of the IAEA, and he has occasionally participated in IAEA Board meetings and the General Conference but he is not a prominent personality here. Among his accomplishments at the NEA, Echavarri cites leadership in the relationships of that agency with Russia, China and India, and there are rumors that Russia encouraged his candidacy for IAEA DG. Echavarri has been NEA DG since 1997 and served previously as director of the Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum and as a nuclear regulatory commissioner. For ten years, he worked for Westinghouse and is an engineer by training. Most of what we have learned about Echavarri seems positive, though we have also heard some derogatory information as to his management style from NEA staff. According to the Spanish Mission, Echavarri is expected in Vienna the week of May 4 to begin his campaign in earnest. ¶6. (C) Jean-Pol Poncelet is the dark horse whose potential support should not be underestimated. Petric expects Poncelet could get a majority of EU votes that do not go to Amano, including that of France (he is currently a senior VP at Areva),though we have no indication from the French Mission that is decided. His association with the nuclear industry may make Poncelet unpalatable to anti-nuclear Ireland among EU members on the Board and certainly to New Zealand. The only politician among the candidates, Poncelet has an impressive resume, having served as a Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Energy, and as external relations director of the European Space Agency. ¶7. (C) The entry of three European candidates into the fray will detract more support from Amano than it will from Minty, though it is unclear at this point which is the strongest European, Echavarri or Poncelet. The EU will not vote as a bloc, however, and Amano will likely maintain some EU support. Echavarri can also draw Latin support away from both Amano and Minty, including possibly Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay, while Cuba and Brazil are likely to stick with Minty. Two Scenarios -------------- ¶8. (C) Amano remains a strong candidate but as Petric has observed, his key weakness is being seen as "unwanted" by many and divisive. As another astute observer of the IAEA scene, Israeli Ambassador Michaeli, reported to Ambassador Schulte April 27, that Minty's main target in reentering a race he demonstrably cannot win is to block Amano's election, according to the South African Ambassador. Michaeli was impressed that the NAM were able to re-enlist Minty when it became clear that Malaysian Bin Muslim was not viable. It is also possible that the NAM/G-77 is seeking to block any Western candidate to allow for a thus far disinterested ElBaradei to extend his mandate, as the French fear. Michaeli advised that WEOG Board members ought to make clear that they would not allow a return of ElBaradei and are prepared to continue the election process through the IAEA General Conference in September if need be. ¶9. (C) The current slate of candidates is likely to result in an Amano-Minty re-match or, if properly engineered, an Amano-European runoff. Michaeli argued for the second scenario and saw this as an opportunity for the "Western camp" to eliminate Minty or avoid another stalemate that could bring back ElBaradei, a subject of enormous discontent in Tel Aviv. He assesses that the West has approximately 19 votes on the Board, to Minty's eight. Michaeli acknowledges that it would be difficult to implement this strategy, and that it would take leadership and pre-agreement, i.e. as Amano and a European would be going after more or less the same votes. However, it would be far better, he argued, to have two Western candidates and let the NAM choose between them. Ambassador Schulte noted that there would be some risk that a European could outvote Amano and become the "leading candidate." The original Amano-Minty scenario may be more clear cut, with Amano having to shift only one vote to win, he noted. Michaeli saw no prospect of any previous Minty supporter, such as Russia or Argentina, shifting its support to Amano. He believed that an Amano-Minty rematch would likely end in another stalemate and strongly favored the alternative scenario. ¶10. (S) Comment: As we continue to strategize on the DG race, we will need to assess which scenario is more favorable to U.S. interests, recognizing the need for a carefully calibrated campaign in support of Amano if we are to avoid another deadlocked Amano-Minty re-match. Since this is a secret ballot, vote counting remains hazardous. The straw poll in late May will give us a first chance to test the candidates, by which time we will be better placed to offer an authoritative assessment of Amano's viability. SCHULTE