UNODC HIGHLIGHTS URGENT FUNDING NEEDS FOR IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000173 SIPDIS INL FOR TOM WILLIAMS, S/SAGSWA FOR DENNIS ROSS, S/SAGSWA FOR ALEX DEHGAN, NEA FOR TODD SCHWARTZ, S/P FOR JILLIAN BURNS, S/P FOR PETER HARRELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2023 TAGS: PREL IR KNNP PA SNAR AF SUBJECT: UNODC HIGHLIGHTS URGENT FUNDING NEEDS FOR IRAN PROGRAM REF: A. UNVIE VIENNA 00117 ¶B. UNVIE VIENNA 00172 UNVIE VIEN 00000173 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey Pyatt for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e) ¶1. (C) Summary. Presenting on the status of their programs in Iran on drug demand reduction, drug supply reduction, and rule of law efforts, UNODC officials on April 15 argued that most of their programs with Iran have been successful, but the overall program remains seriously underfunded, putting its continuation at risk. Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh added his own plea for international cooperation with Iran to combat the narcotics trade, especially through the provision of much-needed equipment to Iranian counternarcotics forces, noting that the drug issue is a "shared responsibility." The Washington-approved U.S. presence at the meeting was also appreciated, including by Iran. End Summary. -------------- Iran Programs Successful but Underfunded -------------- ¶2. (U) UNODC Chief of the Co-Financing and Partnership Section Johann Weijers kicked off an April 15 presentation of the UNODC's country program on Iran by expressing satisfaction with the growing support for a regional approach to the counternarcotics issue in Afghanistan and an honest admission that the meeting was a "fundraising event" as will be a May meeting of the ambassadors of the mini-Dublin Group in Tehran, which will be chaired by the Director General of Iran's Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ). ¶3. (SBU) Roberto Arbitrio, head of UNODC Europe and Central/West Asia office, and the head of UNODC's office in Tehran for several years, described three elements of UNODC's Iran programs: partnership, a regional approach, and the Triangular Initiative. According to him, the partnership comprised the mini-Dublin Group, the Iranian DCHQ, the Health Ministry, and NGOs. He also briefed the group on the successes of supply reduction initiatives, including the March 8 tri-border counternarcotics operation which was part of the Triangular Initiative (see Refs A and B). He stressed that the lessons learned session to evaluate where improvements could be made in cross-border cooperation would probably take place in late April and said he recognized that the outcome of this session would be important for the development of initiatives for bilateral support. ¶4. (U) Iran desk officer and Paris Pact Coordinator Antonino De Leo began his presentation by praising the success of drug control efforts in Iran and noted that this is due both to UNODC-sponsored efforts and Iran's own prioritization of the issue. Iran told UNODC that it spends 600 million dollars each year on interdiction efforts and drug control and treatments and that the DCHQ coordinates the efforts of about 13 Iranian ministries that are dealing with the problem. De Leo illustrated the magnitude of Iran's domestic problem by citing some remarkable statistics. UNODC estimates that 50 percent of opium produced in Afghanistan is trafficked to or through Iran and over 60 percent of Iranian inmates are in prison for drug-related offenses. However, De Leo noted that this represents a 33 percent reduction in the number of people imprisoned for drug offenses, presumably since 2007. He also highlighted that Iran is very advanced in its study of drug addiction and displayed a quarterly Iranian publication on drug addiction studies. In addition, there is regional recognition of Iran as a leader in drug demand reduction. Consequently, delegations from the region, and more broadly across Asia, often go to Iran to learn from its programs. Although De Leo sees Iran's work with reducing drug demand in its prison population-including the introduction of methadone maintenance treatment and HIV-control programs-as respecting prisoners' rights, he noted that it is important both to promote the adoption of international standards in Iran as well as exporting Iranian best practices. ¶5. (U) De Leo also reported successes in rule of law programs, including support to the process of reviewing the Iranian anti-narcotics law based on UN conventions, a draft bill on the promotion of alternatives to imprisonment that is currently being reviewed by the Majles, support to the UNVIE VIEN 00000173 002.2 OF 003 development of Iran's law against money laundering that was adopted in January 2008, the establishment of a financial intelligence unit in Tehran, and Iranian ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption. ¶6. (U) De Leo gave the specifics of UNODC's funding needs for Iran, noting that the program funding had fallen far short of the UNODC's budget from 2005 to 2008, especially in funding for drug supply reduction (six million dollar shortfall) and drug demand reduction (approximately a five million dollar shortfall) programs. Rule of law program funding came much closer to meeting budgetary needs. Current and future programs are also in "urgent" need of additional financial support, according to De Leo. UNODC drug supply reduction activities currently are only funded to 42 percent, drug demand reduction programs are funded to 17 percent, and rule of law efforts have received 74 percent of the needed funding (slides from UNODC's presentation that detail Iran programs needing funding and the amount of funding passed in Hall-Williams email). De Leo noted that they needed between four and five million dollars to maintain its level of activities in Iran through 2009 and to mid-2010. An outside evaluation of the program is underway and will be completed in June 2009 to determine future areas of cooperation on all three areas of counternarcotics programs with Iran. (Note: Mission will follow up and pass on a copy of the evaluation report when complete. End Note.) -------------- Soltanieh Asks for "Symbolic" Support -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh reiterated Iran's commitment to combating drugs, noting that Supreme Leader Khamenei had called this effort a "jihad." Nevertheless, Iran believes that counternarcotics efforts are a "shared responsibility" because the effects are felt internationally. Because this is an international problem, Iran does not appreciate when other countries refer to support to these programs as "donations." Rather, Iran wants to work cooperatively with those countries affected. Soltanieh added his own plea for international cooperation with Iran to combat the narcotics trade, especially for much-needed equipment for Iranian counternarcotics forces which are suffering a high number of casualties and need help to improve their combat efficiency. He argued that countries have used the "excuse" that the equipment is dual-use in nature to avoid providing support. However, Iran would be willing to help increase international confidence that it would use the equipment responsibly and would even pay for this equipment itself. Iran would be willing to take "serious steps" towards some type of end-use monitoring by UNODC to "ensure" that the end user of such equipment is the counternarcotics police and that it is being utilized in the intended way. ¶8. (SBU) Soltanieh also lobbied for monitoring equipment for Iran's ports, arguing that as Iran closes its border to traffickers, they will shift routes and enter Iran by sea. He showed a diorama of the tri-border area and announced that this month, Iran is scheduled to complete the construction of berms and trenches along about 1000 kilometers of its border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Expressing disappointment in the lack of funding from the mini-Dublin Group to meet program needs, Soltanieh argued that the funding necessary is "peanuts" and that Iran does not need the money. Rather, the provision of funding by the Group would be an important symbolic gesture, and the Iranian government would "much appreciate" assistance either bilaterally or through UNODC. Soltanieh also welcomed cooperation and visits to Iran to see its counternarcotics efforts by "all parties" in the room. ¶9. (U) Soltanieh gave Iranian government figures for its drug seizures in 2007 and 2008 (full figures passed separately in Hall-Williams email),noting significant increases in seizures of opiates in several forms (heroin, morphine, opium) as well as other drugs, such as hashish (marijuana). The figures also illustrated an 83 percent increase in the number of drug traffickers arrested and a 96 percent decrease in the arrest of drug abusers, which UNODC noted was due to Iranian drug demand reduction programs that decreased the number of new and repeat offenders. De Leo noted that many of these programs were funded by UNODC and the mini-Dublin Group. UNVIE VIEN 00000173 003.2 OF 003 -------------- U.S. Presence Appreciated -------------- ¶10. (C) Even though MsnOffs complied scrupulously with the Washington direction not to speak at this event, the U.S. presence at the meeting did not go unnoticed. At the conclusion of the meeting, an Iranian Mission official approached UN Affairs Counselor to say that it was "good" that the U.S. was there. UNODC was also pleased we attended, and the Russian official said "I know why you were quiet, but it's good that you are here." UNODC is clearly hoping for more active U.S. participation in such events in the future, and External Relations Officer Muki Jernelov approached MsnOff to ask whether there was anything UNODC could do to facilitate U.S. funding for these or other regional programs, noting that UNODC is anxious to help find ways for the U.S. to contribute that would accommodate U.S. restrictions on provision of assistance to Iran. PYATT