EU ON "HARM REDUCTION": THROW US A BONE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000001



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958

TAGS: SNAR, UNODC, UN

SUBJECT:EU ON "HARM REDUCTION": THROW US A BONE



REF: A) UNVIE 00666, B) UNVIE 00660

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Summary

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1. In negotiations leading to the March 2009 meeting of the

Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the European Union has insisted that

any review of the 1998 UNGASS Political Declaration Addressing the

World's Drug Problem include the ever-controversial term "harm

reduction." Thanks in part to recent senior-level engagement by A/S

Johnson and others, we believe the EU is starting to soften is

hard-line stance although it will insist on language beyond what has

previously been used in UN resolutions. In order to capitalize on

this development, it would be helpful to: 1) engage the EU and

clarify the parameters within which it is willing to negotiate "harm

reduction" 2) work with allies on this issue to determine their

tolerance for flexibility as well as assess their preferred manner

of future engagement and 3) craft alternative language that will

satisfy our concerns and provide the EU with a chance to resolve

this thorny issue. By following this three-step approach, the U.S.

will more likely appear as a proactive, constructive, and able

leader to the other delegations, a role that we hope will produce a

successful conclusion of the 10-Year Review of the 1998 UNGA

Special Session (UNGASS) resolution to fight drugs. END SUMMARY.



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Background

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2. Some European Union members include in their drug demand

reduction strategies the concept of "harm reduction," an ill-defined

term which could encompass everything from counseling to medically

prescribed heroin injected in clinics. Although "harm reduction" is

a secondary issue in the overall efforts to reduce the demand for

illicit drugs, it plays no role in reducing the world's drug supply

or the control of chemical precursors. However, the EU has

increasingly placed primary importance on "harm reduction" in their

approach to the UNGASS review exercise, referring to it in opening

remarks to this fall's UNGASS working groups, as well as insisting

on referring to the term throughout the text of the draft action

plan that has emerged from these working group negotiations.



3. The U.S. and its allies have consistently pressed the point that

the primary goal is to reduce demand of drugs, not the harm

associated with drug use. In the past the U.S. and like-minded

countries have kept the term out of UN drugs-related resolutions,

including the 1998 Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Drug

Demand Reduction, and the November 2008 UNGA drug resolution.

Nevertheless, recognizing that some countries identify "harm

reduction" measures as part of their national comprehensive

strategies to reduce demand, delegations in the 1998 UNGASS were

able to reach compromise language that reads, "Demand reduction

programmes should cover all areas of prevention, from discouraging

initial use to reducing the negative health and social consequences

of drug abuse..." The 1998 language has proven to be quite durable,

consistently being used as a substitute for any explicit "harm

reduction" reference, as happened in resolutions at the annual UN

Commissions on Narcotic Drugs (CND) after 1998, and in the UN

General Assembly in November 2008. (Note: in 2006 a UNGA Political

Declaration on HIV/AIDS included the term in relation to drug use

and when reaffirming that prevention of HIV must be the mainstay of

any response to the pandemic. End note.)



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EU: Softening but also

Insisting on "Progress"

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4. Over the past few weeks UNVIE has engaged in "harm reduction"

discussions with EU members in a variety of fora complimenting the

strong message that A/S David Johnson delivered here in early

December. (reftel A) We have detected an EU willingness to soften

its hard-line stance on the issue of "harm reduction." At a dinner

Ambassador hosted in honor of INL Assistant Secretary Johnson, UK

Ambassador told DCM and missionoff that the EU's main goal was to

"move the ball forward, however incrementally." His main concern,

he stated, was that whatever comes out of the March 2009 CND, the EU

cannot afford to "go backwards." In subsequent conversations, our

UK interlocutor told missionoffs that the EU needs "something more"

than the 1998 Political Declaration language, or the November 2008

UNGA omnibus drug resolution language. An EC representative and a

Czech Health Ministry official acknowledged to missionoff that

getting the term "harm reduction" into the 2009 CND documents would

be difficult, but insisted that they needed "something that would

show the increasing realization that harm reduction measures are a

part of many nation's drug demand reduction strategies." In short,

they insisted that any agreement show an "evolution" of past

language.



5. Germany has been carrying the "harm reduction" ball for the EU

in the UNGASS discussions in Vienna. UNA Counselor urged her German

counterpart to be politically realistic about this issue, noting

that at the recent G-8 Lyons-Roma meeting in Kyoto, Russia, Japan,

and Canada, in addition to the U.S., opposed the EU's position on



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"harm reduction" language. In addition, she pointed out, a number

of G-77 (e.g., Pakistan) and GRULAC (e.g., Colombia) countries are

also opposed. On the margins of the annual Paris Pact Policy

Consultative Group meeting in Vienna December 15-16, UNA Counselor

made the same points to Axel Kuechle, a senior MOFA official from

Berlin, who also represented Germany at the Kyoto G-8 meeting.

Kuechle acknowledged the political realities and expressed a

willingness to find compromise language. However, he also made the

point that the 2009 documents should indicate some progress beyond

the 1998 language.



6. At the December 15 coordination meeting Ambassador hosted with

the incoming Czech presidency, UNA Counselor raised similar points

to the Czech ambassador and his colleagues (reftel B). Czech

counselor Petr Havlik gave the same response, noting the need to

show "progress" on this issue in the political declaration to be

negotiated for the high-level segment of the 2009 CND. The Czech

officials expressed willingness to work with the U.S. and asked us

to propose alternative language.



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Continue to engage with the EU

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7. From our perspective, the EU has been negotiating for some time

in "bad faith" on this issue When the UNGASS review process they

created failed to yield favorable results on "harm reduction," they

switched tactics and are now trying to undermine that very same

process. Their rather dogmatic stance on this issue -- which local

Ambassadors attribute to the Commission in Brussels -- seems to have

prevented constructive communication. Nevertheless, we need to

continue to engage with the EU and to offer alternatives, keeping in

mind their premise that the 1998 language needs to evolve "however

incrementally."



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Build Alliance with Like-Minded

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8. Since the U.S. is not the only country opposing "harm

reduction," UNVIE will continue to reach out to like-minded

delegations to gauge their tolerance for flexibility. Such efforts

could lead to a coordinated common position and/or agreed

alternatives. On the other hand, if some of the other states we

prepared to weather a confrontation with the EU, we may want to take

a harder stand and reject any proposal that does not hew exactly to

the 1998 or the 2008 UNGA language.



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Comment

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9. The EU seems to be softening its insistence on "harm reduction,"

apparently realizing that negotiations on the term itself have been

and will continue to be fruitless. And certainly at the

Ambassadorial level, there are a few in Vienna who are prepared to

see this issue scuttle the Commission on Narcotic Drugs meeting or

occupy much more diplomatic band width. Although they have made no

specific offer of alternative language, our European allies have

laid down a marker that the 2009 documents would have to show

"evolution" from 1998 and 2008 language. Their willingness to

compromise will depend not only on the strength of our (and our

allies') opposition, but also on our willingness to find a

constructive compromise. If we take the pen proactively, i.e.,

offer alternative language, we would more likely control the

process, demonstrate leadership to the like-minded, and secure

cooperation with all. A U.S. delegation seen as a leader who is

proactive, constructive and engaged is vital to the successful

outcome of the UNGASS Review at the March, 2009 CND.





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