Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ULAANBAATAR288
2009-10-05 04:40:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Cable title:  

FRAUD SUMMARY - ULAANBAATAR

Tags:  CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASES XP MG 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUM #0288/01 2780440
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050440Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3047
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
UNCLAS ULAANBAATAR 000288 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP
DEPT FOR KCC WILLIAMSBURG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASES XP MG
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - ULAANBAATAR

REF: STATE 074840

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLAS ULAANBAATAR 000288 SIPDIS DEPT FOR CA/FPP DEPT FOR KCC WILLIAMSBURG E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASES XP MG SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - ULAANBAATAR REF: STATE 074840 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Fraud continues to be widespread and a serious problem among Mongolian applicants. In addition to the persistent low-level NIV fraud, post has been struggling with significant fraud in asylum cases and in immigrant visa cases. Post has also encountered several instances of applicants with legitimate passports issued in fraudulent identities. The Government of Mongolia has limited or ineffective checks and controls on its key documents. Passports, civil registry documents, court degrees, and school records are routinely issued with false information. The Government of Mongolia has improved its passport issuances procedures and is prosecuting the former head of the passport office for fraud, but there are still a lot of false passports circulating and false breeder documents are easy to come by. The fraud is prevalent in all types of applicants and all socio-economic categories from the obviously poor and unemployed to famous musicians and even to Members of Parliament. The fraudulent applicants are primarily economic migrants or individuals wishing to visit family members illegally present in the United States. Post has seen no evidence of fraud being used to cover terrorist or organized criminal activity. Ulaanbaatar's new Fraud Prevention Unit is now fully functional and working closely with the RSO and with DHS. The unit has successfully identified several visa brokers and forwarded their names to the police. However, the police do not prioritize document fraud and have not prosecuted anyone. The Unit has also identified fraud in several asylum, immigrant, and petition-based NIV applicants leading to their revocation and has blocked several small-scale attempts at alien smuggling (primarily familial). (End Summary) -------------- ¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ulaanbaatar is a high fraud post in one of the poorest countries in Asia. Unemployment is high and there is a wide-spread belief in seeking improved fortunes abroad. Even well-off, well-connected individuals, such as the children of members of parliament, are eager to live in the United States. There are large numbers of economic migrants in Russia, China, South Korea, and in the United States. Current media estimates are that there are up to 30,000 Mongolians living in the Unite
d States - the overwhelming majority presumed to be illegally resident. The largest Mongolian communities in the United States are found in four cities: Washington D.C./Arlington, VA, San Francisco/Oakland, Chicago, and Denver. However, in response to the increasing illegal populations, over the last few years the Embassy has been cracking down on fraud and has improved adjudication standards. The Embassy has also made a concerted effort to reach out to qualified applicants and encourage them to apply and to highlight our fraud prevention successes. These efforts have led to a reduction in the number of unqualified applicants and lowered the overall refusal rate from 70% to 50% over the last year. ¶3. (SBU) One additional factor that can create challenges in the fraud environment is that prior to 2003 passports were inconsistent in their transliteration of Mongolian names. Furthermore, in all passports prior to 2003 the given and the patronymic names were reversed. This inconsistency - especially in the transliteration of names - can make matching identifies difficult. Post would recommend that Mongolian name check algorithms be updated to reflect the previous switching of given and family names and variance in transliteration. -------------- ¶B. NIV -------------- ¶4. (SBU) There is wide-spread fraud in NIV applications - although almost all of it focused on reaching the United States for economic or familial motives. Fraud is prevalent in all visa categories. False documents are endemic in all visa categories. ¶5. (SBU) STUDENT FRAUD: There is wide-spread fraud in student visa applications. The most common form of fraud is in false bank documents or in lying about family members in the US. Given the fraud, we place very little faith in bank statements or even bank books; instead we rely on more in-depth interviews to identify whether their lifestyle is consistent with the claimed resources. Perhaps the worst fraud is in students applying for English Language Training in the United States which is an excellent route to work illegally in the United States. These applicants rely on relatively unsophisticated fraud and often include false bank statements, employment letters, study contracts, etc. Applicants will occasionally borrow money for a short period to boost their balances. In response to the overwhelming fraud and abuse of this category, post has essentially stopped issuing visas for ESL study in all but the most exceptional circumstances. ¶6. (SBU) GROUP-FRAUD: It is almost de rigour for any group to include non-qualified applicants as part of the group. These add-ons are sometimes friends or family of the group organizer and sometimes have paid to join in. As a result of this wide-spread practice, we work closely with the Commercial and Public Affairs section in screening groups very carefully. ¶7. (SBU) WORK VISAS: Post handles a very small number of H, L, P, and O visas. However, this category is certainly not exempt from fraud. Indeed, the fraud involved in work visa categories is generally significantly more sophisticated than in other categories. We have also seen fraud in P visas ¶8. (SBU) BUSINESS AND TOURIST VISAS: Given the poverty and economic uncertainty in Mongolia, there is little legitimate tourist travel to the United States from Mongolia. Most applicants are traveling for business or to visit family. Often the fraud will include lying about visiting family in the US - some otherwise qualified people will lie about family in the US out of a misplaced fear that we would refuse them or because a family member is there illegally. Business conferences or tourist trips are a common route for applicants attempting to disguise family members in the US. ¶9. (SBU) PERFORMER VISAS: We have also had several problems with professional performers (including several famous musicians) traveling on tourist visas to perform in the United States. We carefully monitor Mongolian-language websites in the US where these performers often advertise. Our efforts have led to the revocation of visas and a finding of 6(c) for some top Mongolian performers. Disturbingly, some of these applicants were assisted by officials from the Mongolian Embassy in Washington. ¶10. (SBU) RELIGIOUS VISAS: We do not have any particular fraud concerns relating to religious visas. There have been some isolated fraud cases particularly with fake Buddhist lamas, but it does not appear to be a popular route for fraudulent applicants. ¶11. (SBU) DIPLOMATIC VISAS: Mongolian diplomatic personnel stationed abroad - both in the US and in third-countries - and other Mongolian government officials have been linked to several fraudulent applicants and to alien smuggling. Diplomatic personnel will often attempt to claim extended family members as their children. We try to review birth certificates carefully and to match travel patterns, but this is a difficult fraud to catch. We have identified several fraudulent applicants linked to "diplomatic" personnel in third-countries. We urge all posts to exercise caution when adjudicating Mongolian nationals in third-countries, even if they are associated with the Mongolian Embassy or claim to be Government officials. Mongolians seem to believe that they have a better chance of qualifying in third-countries. -------------- ¶C. IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Ulaanbaatar began adjudicating immigrant visas at post in September 2008. Previously immigrant visas were adjudicated at US Embassy Seoul. To date, post has issued approximately 160 immigrant visas (including Ks and DVs) and refused 28 applicants. Despite the low number of refusals, fraud is a serious concern with immigrant visas. ¶13. (SBU) FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRANT VISAS: We have serious concerns relating to family-based immigrants visas. The majority of our cases so far have been American husbands petitioning for the children of their Mongolian wives. Many of the wives went to the United States illegally and then were able to get legal status through questionable marriages. Given the ease of acquiring false documents (including divorce certificates) and the number of Mongolians illegally present in the United States with children left behind in Mongolia, we are concerned about the possibility of family-based petitions as a route for alien smuggling. The family-based cases filed at post seem to be significantly better than petitions filed in the United States with little or no fraud detected. ¶14. (SBU) We have also identified problems with fianc or IR/CR cases. Several of the applicants have met the profile for Mongolian prostitutes working in Beijing on short-term visas. Unfortunately, we are unable to confirm or sustain any ineligibilities either under 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude or under (212(a)(D) Prostitution or Commercialized Vice. The Chinese government does not do criminal record checks for individuals there on short-term visas. We do not have sufficient evidence to revoke the petition of these applicants. ¶15. (SBU) EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRANT VISAS: We have adjudicated only a handful of employment-based immigrant visas. Misrepresentation of their prior experiences in order to qualify for the visa appears to be common. The lack of good business and employment records makes it difficult to confirm fraud in this area. -------------- ¶D. DV FRAUD -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Fraud is generally not an issue with diversity visa applicants. Some applicants may have presented false high school certificates But it is very difficult to check those. ¶17. (SBU) One separate issue is that a lot of cases arrive at post inappropriately flagged for fraud reviews based on name discrepancies between the DV application and the DS-230. This discrepancy is a result of a difference in translation relating to family name. Mongolians typically have three names - their given name, their patronymic/surname, and a clan or tribal name. The clan name can also be considered their family name. We therefore do not consider the name discrepancy to be a fraud indicator for Mongolian applicants. -------------- ¶E. ACS and PASSPORT FRAUD -------------- ¶18. (SBU) We have yet to experience any fraud relating to passports. Most Americans applying for Passports in Mongolia have a long history of travel. We do pay particular attention to children of Mongolian nationals born in the United States as we consider this the most likely route for fraudulent applications. -------------- ¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Post has no reason to suspect fraud in either individual adoption cases or in the local adoption process. We meet often with local officials responsible for adoptions, visit the key orphanage and government officials and review police procedures regarding abandoned children. ¶20. (SBU) The Government of Mongolia has revised their adoption procedures to ensure greater government oversight of international adoptions. GoM has vigorous screening procedures to ensure that children placed for adoption are indeed orphans. The first step is a search for the parents by the local police when a child is first placed into an orphanage. The orphanage will occasionally request additional searches as well. When a child is selected for adoption, a review committee overseen by the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor will carefully screen children to confirm that they are indeed orphans or otherwise eligible for adoption. -------------- ¶G. USE OF DNA TESTING -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Post has just begun limited use of DNA testing. We are not aware of any social customs that would affect DNA testing, but we are constrained by limited local testing ability. -------------- ¶H. ASYLUM and OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD -------------- ¶22. (SBU) Visa 92/93s present some of the worst fraud of all visa categories. Fraud is rampant and pervasive. We are repeatedly faced with obvious fraud in the underlying asylum claim, and also fraud in the relationships. We would urge much closer screening of asylum claims. Many of the asylum claims could be easily verified or disapproved if post were consulted in advance. Post stands ready to assist in verifying these claims as requested. -------------- ¶I. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL -------------- ¶23. (SBU) ALIEN SMUGGLING: Alien smuggling is a problem, but is not organized. Alien smuggling is to done on a small scale by visa brokers (assisting individual applicants),by family members, or business colleagues. ¶24. (SBU) There is an active community of visa brokers and visa centers who promise to help people apply for visas. Some of these centers are legitimate and focus on translation and help with visa forms, but many are brazenly fraudulent. They will openly advertise online and in newspapers . Visa brokers, some of whom may have links to organized crime, charge around $200 US to prepare the documents with a bonus of $5,000 to $10,000 if the applicant is successful in obtaining a visa. Visa brokers tend to pair applicants together for purported business travel. The brokers then provide an entire packet of information to the applicants. These applicants often have contacts in the United States who have arranged a job for them, but who are unable to otherwise qualify for visas. ¶25. (SBU) Family-based alien smuggling is a particular problem in Mongolia. Family groups are large with custody often being shared among various family members. Many families are also separated with parents living and working illegally in the United States which creates lot of incentive for relatives to attempt to smuggle the child into the US. Given the unreliability of birth certificates, this can be difficult problem to catch. One fraud indicator is if the birth certificate has been recently re-issued (e.g. there is a significant gap between the birth and the issuance date). Original birth certificates are less likely to be fraudulent. ¶26. (SBU) Another group of alien smugglers is business people who will arrange fake employment letters, sponsorship agreements, etc. for friends or colleagues. It seems to be done more as a favor for friends then in any systematic way to make money. We see similar activities by government and/or diplomatic officials. ¶27. (SBU) TRAFFICKING: The consular section has not encountered any cases of trafficking between Mongolia and the United States. See the Trafficking in Persons Report for more background about trafficking in Mongolia. ¶28. (U) ORGANIZED CRIME: Nothing to report. ¶29. (U) TERRORIST TRAVEL: Nothing to report. -------------- ¶J. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS -------------- ¶30. (SBU) Post enjoys an excellent relationship with the RSO Office which places a high priority on preventing visa and passport fraud. We now have an in-house FPU, but continue to work closely with the RSO and his team of two investigators. We handle routine fraud in-house, and involve the RSO and his investigators in more serious fraud including alien smuggling, passport fraud, or anything that involves a potential criminal element. -------------- ¶K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, and CIVIL REGISTRY -------------- ¶31. (SBU) Document fraud is rampant in Mongolia. This is true for unofficial documents like bank statements, employment letters, letters of invitation, and for official documents like birth certificates, marriage documents, and even passports. The issuance of official documents is dispersed among many different offices and regions of the country and corruption is widespread. Falsely-issued marriage, birth and divorce certificates, along with fake diplomas and grades are easily available. The good news is that there is a central civil registry that keeps accurate records of birth and marriage certificates and they respond to written requests for confirmation of a document. This can take several weeks, but their response is largely trust-worthy. ¶32. (SBU) Passport fraud is prevalent in Mongolia. It was especially rampant in 2003 - 2004, but revised procedures have made fraudulently issued passports less common. The new passports are more difficult to alter, but with little control of breeder documents, passport fraud is still possible. The government is currently prosecuting some officials involved in fraudulently issuing passports. We are cooperating with local authorities, but to limited effect. ¶33. (SBU) There is a small but active trade in passports with US visas. These passports are often altered using photo-substitution and used for travel to the United States. One applicant admitted purchasing a passport with a U.S. visa for $3,500. -------------- ¶L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES -------------- ¶34. (SBU) Local government officials are not concerned with consular related fraud and provide minimal support. We have referred several visa broker cases to the police to no effect. The only exception is when the cases involve false or fraudulently-issued official government documents. Even in these situations, the police take little action. We have raised this in our annual bi-lateral negotiations, but we do not expect much change. -------------- ¶M. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN -------------- ¶35. (U) Nothing to report. -------------- ¶N. STAFFING AND TRAINING -------------- ¶36. (U) The Unit consists of two individuals who work on fraud part-time. The FPM is a second-tour officer with FSI training on Fraud Prevention as well as previous experience as fraud prevention manager in his previous consular tour. The investigator is an experienced visa clerk who has received the relevant FSI training, but would benefit from additional on-the-job training. We sent our LES to Guangzhou last summer to review fraud practices. This was an excellent learning experience. Hill

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