Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TUNIS930
2009-12-24 11:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tunis
Cable title:  

TUNISIAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE "LOYALS" AND THE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TS 
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VZCZCXYZ0020
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0930/01 3581124
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241124Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7096
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000930 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TS
SUBJECT: TUNISIAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE "LOYALS" AND THE
OPPOSITION

REF: A. TUNIS 868

B. TUNIS 834

C. TUNIS 813

D. TUNIS 792

E. TUNIS 769

Classified by Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000930 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TS SUBJECT: TUNISIAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE "LOYALS" AND THE OPPOSITION REF: A. TUNIS 868 ¶B. TUNIS 834 ¶C. TUNIS 813 ¶D. TUNIS 792 ¶E. TUNIS 769 Classified by Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In recent calls on leaders of most of Tunisia's "opposition" parties, the Ambassador heard widely varying views and assessments of national political life. Several leaders of parties loyal to the government heaped slavish praise on President Ben Ali for his purported wisdom, prudence, and vision, even as they (timidly) pointed out national areas for improvement. Leaders of each of Tunisia's three genuinely independent legal opposition parties, by contrast, were grim: government repression is reaching unprecedented heights, they believed, and prospects for democratic transition have never seemed bleaker. The U.S. and the EU have some leverage and/or moral authority, the opposition leaders thought, and might help Ben Ali find the will to make changes. End summary. ¶2. (C) Between December 17 and December 22, the Ambassador called on leaders of six of Tunisia's eight legal political parties (excluding the head of the ruling (and omnipotent) Democratic Constitional Rally (RCD) with whom he met in late November (ref A).) The Ambassador met with the heads of three parties loyal to the Ben Ali goverment: Mondher Thabet, head of the Social Liberal Party (PSL),Ismael Boulahya, head of the Democratic Socialist Movement (MDS), and Mongi Khamassi, head of the Green Party for Progress (PVP). The Ambassador also called on Ahmed Brahim, head of the Tajdid ("Renewal") Movement, who waged a spirited if anemic presidential run against Ben Ali in October, Mustapha Ben Jaafar of the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberty (FTDL),and Maya Jrebi and Nejib Chebbi, the Secretary-General and founder, respectively, of the Democratic Party for Progress (PDP). -------------- -------------- Things Are Good... and Getting Better (More or Less) -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The offices of the PSL and the MDS are decorated with prominent portraits of President Ben Ali, bearing captions highlighting the President's many virtues. While portraits of Ben Ali were conspicuously absent from the lime green walls of the PVP's headquarters, party leader Mongi Khamassi &#x
000A;quickly compensated for this with a 50 minute monologue underscoring his great admiration for the President and his numerous achievements in office. Oddly, the leader of this "green" party was more than 40 minutes into his remarks to the Ambassador before he mentioned the environment, and then only briefly. Khammassi's principal theme was that Tunisia was gradually and irreversibly moving forward toward full democracy and pluralism. ¶4. (C) Asked about contacts between the PVP and the green parties of Western Europe, Khamassi recalled that the French Green Party had backed his rival Abdelkader Al-Zitouni and had later dismissed the PVP as a shell. "These French do not want to see real political parties in Tunisia, only marionettes which they can control," Khamassi explained. (Note: The PVP's critics charge that the party was hastily stood up by the Ministry of Interior in 2006, preempting the efforts of ecologist (and GOT critic) Zitouni to form Tunisia's first Green Party, in consultation with European counterparts. End note.) The PVP went from zero to six parliamentary seats in the October elections, making it eligible for public financing. Asked how the party was funded before it reached the parliament, Khamassi maintained that he had done so mainly at his own expense. ¶5. (C) Mondher Thabet of the PSL was another talkative party leader, whose welcoming remarks to the Ambassador lasted a full hour. Thabet underscored his admiration for President Ben Ali, his fierce opposition to Islamism, and his firm belief in free markets. The PSL is in many respects an ideological ally of the U.S., Thabet repeated on several occasions, praising in particular President Obama's speech in Cairo. Asserting his independence from the government, Thabet complained that "Nessma" and "Hannibal," Tunisia's two leading independent stations, were blocked from presenting news programs, leaving State TV to play a role "like Goebbels." Thabet acknowledged that unemployment was a serious problem, but praised Ben Ali's efforts to defuse the root causes of the 2008 unrest in the impoverished interior mining region of Gafsa. The PSL went from two to eight seats in the October elections. ¶6. (C) Of the three "loyal" parties, Ismael Boulahya made the most convincing case that the MDS constitutes an actual party rather than a shell, even if it is a mere shadow of its former self. In fact, the MDS, founded in the 1970s by Ahmed Mestiri, a former Defense Minister under President Bourguiba, is widely believed to have won the 1981 legislative elections, a victory allegedly overturned fraudulently on Bourguiba's orders. Mestiri's successor as party head was jailed by Ben Ali in the late 1980s, and replaced, through government intervention, by the much more compliant Boulahya. Nonetheless, Boulahya became animated when asked about the differences between the MDS and the ruling RCD, characterizing the deportment of RCD MPs as boorish and monopolistic. Today, the MDS holds 16 seats in the 214 seat parliament, the most of any party other than the ruling RCD (which holds 161 seats). The MDS still regularly organizes public colloquia, particularly on economic policy issues. Boulahya expressed to the Ambassador interest in working with the U.S. Embassy on leadership training for the party's youth wing - an idea we will scrutinize and consider. -------------- Independent Opposition Paint a Bleak Picture -------------- ¶7. (C) There was a stark contrast in tone and content between the Ambassador's discussions with the leaders of three "loyal" opposition parties and his discussions with the leaders of Tunisia's three legal (and genuinely independent) opposition parties. Ahmed Brahim, who waged a spirited, if anemic presidential campaign in October (ref E),pointed out the ironic contradiction between Ben Ali's crushing electoral victory (refs C and D) and his government's painfully apparent thin skin and insecurity (ref B). Brahim noted the Interior Ministry's continuous surveillance, and imposition of restrictions, on the Tajdid Movement's leadership, and its constant harassment of the party's rank and file. "If Ben Ali had such a glorious electoral victory why does he treat me (who took 1.6 percent of the vote) like such a dangerous person?" ¶8. (C) Brahim's Tajdid Movement holds two seats in parliament - the only seats belonging to a genuinely independent opposition party. Brahim said Ben Ali's position of strength, towering over Tunisia's political scene, left him well placed to start laying the groundwork for democratic transition, but there were so far no indications that the President has any such intention. "We will continue to work, and continue to seek opportunities for participation and dialogue," Brahim affirmed. ¶9. (C) Similarly, Maya Jribi and Nejib Chebbi, the Secretary-General and founder, respectively, of the PDP, the opposition party singled out for the harshest treatment by Ben Ali's Interior Ministry, cited to the Ambassador the latest round of harassment, arrests, and prosecutions of independent activists as evidence that the trendline was clearly toward greater repression in national political life. Chebbi assailed the GOT's application of its counterterrorism law, which led to harsh jail terms for many youths, most of whom had not been shown to be dangerous, but who may have made the mistake of visiting jihadist websites, however briefly. This approach was accelerating disenfranchisement and radicalization rather than countering it, Chebbi maintained. ¶10. (C) Jribi and Chebbi applauded the USG for "taking a stand" on Ben Ali's October election, avoiding counterproductive confrontation while sending a clear signal that Washington did not accept the GOT's undemocratic approach. Jribi underlined the importance the PDP attached to "global solidarity" in the face of domestic isolation and repression. The party's leadership took courage from its contacts and support from U.S.-based groups such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, Human Rights Watch, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy, Jribi noted. Chebbi said the PDP was determined to continue to play a role in spite of the GOT's efforts to marginalize it. "We are not a covert force," he stated. "We believe peaceful and legal political action will eventually deliver results," Chebbi underlined, the government "must open a serious national dialogue with civil society." ¶11. (C) Likewise, Dr. Ahmed Ben Jaafar of the FTDL underlined to the Ambassador his view that Tunisia was suffering a "serious disequilibrium" in its political life that could eventually lead to a dangerous societal disintegration. "The elements of an explosion are present," he warned. Ben Jaafar, who had publicized in the summer of 2009 his interest in running for president in October, was eventually ruled technically ineligible under the terms of the election law revised in 2008. (Some observers believe the law was specifically tailored to prevent Ben Jaafar and Chebbi from running.) Discussing increasingly repressive trends, Ben Jaafar observed that the GOT is slowly but surely strangling the independent press, noting that the FTDL's publication Al-Mouatinoun ("The Citizens"),strapped for cash and hampered by government obstructions to its distribution, had recently been forced to transform itself from a weekly to a monthly, and could soon fold altogether. ¶12. (C) Asked about potential solutions, Ben Jaafar echoed both Chebbi's call for a national dialogue and Brahim's view that Ben Ali was now well placed to "make a courageous decision for reform" even if that was not in the perceived interest of "his clan." The key necessary ingredient, Ben Jaafar emphasized, was will. The European Union has potential influence, he continued, noting the Tunisian government's request for "advanced status" (like Morocco's) in its Association Agreement with Tunisia. Similarly, President Obama's June Cairo speech had created good will and opportunities that must be exploited, Ben Jaafar thought. The U.S. and EU should find ways to apply advice and constructive pressure on the Ben Ali government, he continued. ¶13. (C) Ben Jaafar placed great importance on an anticipated cabinet shuffle, said to have been under preparation since the ruling party's annual conference on November 7. "I hope some credible personalities will take key positions," he said. Ben Jaafar expected Prime Minister Ghannouchi to retain his seat and allowed that he had a well-deserved reputation for competence and honesty. At the same time, he thought, a technocrat like Ghannouchi is least likely to pursue meaningful political reforms. Perhaps, at least, some of the (unnamed) "worst offenders" will go, Ben Jaafar mused. GRAY

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