ELECTIONS 2009: DOWN AND OUT IN CENTRAL TUNISIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000780 SIPDIS LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL TS SUBJECT: ELECTIONS 2009: DOWN AND OUT IN CENTRAL TUNISIA REF: A. TUNIS 746 ¶B. TUNIS 741 ¶C. TUNIS 694 Classified By: Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) As in recent pre-election visits to Tunisia's second and third largest cities, and a trip to Tunisia's south, poloff's mid-October visit to the central Tunisian interior revealed overall public indifference and resignation toward the presidential and legislative elections set for October ¶25. Civic activism in Central Tunisia has been stifled by government repression, a dearth of ideas, and infighting. When asked about elections, contacts responded with a sense of resignation and defeatism, expecting no surprises. Rather than focusing on politics, our interlocutors in central Tunisia were more concerned with the flight of the younger population from poverty and unemployment in the region. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Poloff spent three days traveling in the south-central cities of Kairouan, Sidi Bou Zid, and Sbeitla in central Tunisia. Historically a major center of Islamic learning in North Africa, Kairouan is today primarily a tourist town, famous for the Great Mosque of Sidi Uqba and the basins built by the Aghlabite Dynasty. The city suffers from administrative neglect and apparent mismanagement of tourism revenues, as well as an influx of citizens from neighboring towns seeking employment. Sidi Bou Zid, an hour's drive southeast of Kairouan, is an impoverished town largely devoid of sustainable employment opportunities for the city's many native university graduates. Sbeitla is a smaller town compared to Kairouan but is a significant tourist destination due to its Roman ruins. -------------- Kairouan: Civil Society is "Literally Dead" -------------- ¶3. (C) The entrance into Kairouan is crowded with "Ben Ali 2009" posters and other political posters that some contacts claimed have been there for years. The ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) headquarters, located prominently near the city's entrance, heavily adorned with Ben Ali banners, cuts an imposing figure. By contrast, opposition activists are obliged to hold official meetings in their private homes or unofficially in coffee shops. Contacts noted that the ban on campaign banners outside of the official campaign period (October 11-24) was strictly enforced for opposition parties and uniformly unenforced for materials posted by the ruling party. ¶4. (C) Poloff met in Kairouan with representatives from the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) and the Tajdid ("Renewal") Party. Ahmed Kilani, founder of the LTDH chapter in Kairouan, former member of the Democratic Socialists Movement (MDS),and current Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (FDTL) sympathizer, embodied the frustration of civil society within the city and the region in general. Kilani repeatedly stated that civil society was "literally dead" in Kairouan, the population showed no interest in civil society and the conditions under which civil society attempted to function were "abysmal." According to Kilani, Kairouan residents were "immune" to the elections and expected no surprises in the results. The ordinary resident was basically ignorant of the existence of opposition parties or their alleged ideological independence from that of the RCD. Kilani stated that citizens were so jaded by the controlled political environment that they tended to lump all political parties together with the ruling RCD, and had no interest in any (purported) ideological differences amongst them. ¶5. (C) A strong advocate of human rights and the patriarch of Kairouan civil society, Kilani claimed that the city was originally "Tunis in miniature" when it came to civil society activism. However, over the years, infighting among civil society activists, combined with the GOT's repression and control, had effectively inhibited progress and eliminated any public interest in civil activism. The ruling RCD had stepped in to fill the void. Kilani alleged that local leaders of two prominent opposition parties, Tajdid and the Progressive Development Party (PDP),had been feuding. Tajdid leaders criticized the PDP for the ever-shifting alliances of its leader, Najib Chebbi, while local PDP activists also accused Tajdid of playing both sides of the political fence. Although he claimed to support the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (FDTL),he admitted that the FDTL had no real presence in the city. Kilani stated that stories of internal fighting within the local RCD regarding the composition of the party's 2009 elections legislative list had leaked, but as expected, were not reported in the press. Kilani received several calls from unidentified GOT personnel asking about the purpose and content of his meeting with poloff. Kilani told Poloff this was a "normal occurrence" for civil society activists in the region and said such harassment had been on the increase in the advent of the October 25 elections. ¶6. (C) Tajdid member Moncef Wouhabi cancelled his planned meeting with Poloff, reportedly due to government harassment. Wouhabi informed Poloff through an intermediary that plain clothes police followed him to the agreed-upon meeting location, but concerned for his security, he decided to leave and postpone the meeting. -------------- Sidi Bou Zid: Jobs Before Politics -------------- ¶7. (C) In Sidi Bou Zid, public ambivalence toward the elections, was also evident. Atia Athmounsi, local member of the PDP and head of the PDP list for legislative elections in the region, told Poloff that the party's list in the region was summarily rejected with no official explanation provided. According to Athmounsi and several other private citizens who crowded the small storefront where they met, the economic situation, rather than the elections, was of primary concern to local citizens. Earlier in 2008, residents had officially requested that the GOT attract manufacturing investments, and set up a university in the region, but nothing had materialized. ¶8. (C) Interlocutors claimed there were approximately 4,000 unemployed university grads who had returned to Sidi Bou Zid after their studies but could not find employment. The lack of economic opportunity facilitated recruitment into the ruling party according to Athmounsi and local residents, since the prospects of employment that accompanied ruling party membership were more attractive options than civil society activism and unemployment. ¶9. (C) Athmounsi claimed that in Sidi Bou Zid, RCD militants and residents were regularly enlisted to do the party's "dirty work." He referenced the incident earlier in the year, where PDP members led by Maya Jribi were attacked by the public in the presence of police in Sidi Bou Zid. The GOT also applied economic pressure against militants to deter political activism, since the only sustainable and lucrative employment in the city were government jobs doled out by the RCD. Athmounsi also stated that civil society was regularly denied access to public halls for meetings, and landlords were pressured by the government no to rent venues for civil society activities. So far in 2009, Athmounsi claimed, the PDP along with Tajdid had tried to rent halls for independent meetings four times and had been denied. -------------- -------------- Sbeitla: Of Roman Ruins and Nonexistent Civil Society -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Sbeitla offered similar challenges for civil society activists: heavy and repressive government oversight of NGO activities, public disinterest in the elections, and paralyzing disputes among local opposition activists. Poloff met with Ammar Hamdi, head of the PDP's legislative list in the Governorate of Kasserine, who stated that all civil society in Sbeitla was stifled by the GOT. Activists were constantly monitored by plain clothes police and colleagues loyal to the ruling party regularly reported on civil society members, he believed. Hamdi claimed that he had applied to be principal at his school on four separate occasions, and thought, as the most senior teacher, he was well qualified, but believed he had been repeatedly rejected due to his political activism. ¶11. (C) Hamdi said Sbeitla civil society meetings were mostly held out of town for security reasons. Hamdi claimed that the FDTL had barely any presence in Sbeitla nor were students active or present in the political discourse. Citizens in Sbeitla had access to the PDP's opposition newspaper, Al-Mawkef, but distribution remained low. Hamdi stated that local residents were more concerned with tourism money and as long as they believed the GOT was facilitating the tourism trade, elections and general political participation remained a non-issue. Local residents expected no surprises in the elections (i.e. Ben Ali would win by a landslide),and the legislative elections were even of less interest to the local citizenry. The relationship between the PDP and Tajdid (for the same reasons as in Kairouan) was also tense in Sbeitla. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) In all of our recent pre-election travel outside of Tunis, public ambivelance has been the principal theme. The government's effective monopolization of political space, its marginalization of the opposition, and its solid lock on the electoral process, were also evident. Disunity and an absence of new ideas further weakened the cause of civil society activists. We saw no signs of public interest in political participation and activism to spur the government into addressing the region's poverty and unemployment. Instead, public ambivalence has facilitated the RCD's continued dominance and local authorities' "business as usual" attitude. End comment. GRAY