AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON TUNISIAN DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000722

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS TS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON TUNISIAN DEFENSE
MINISTER MORJANE

Classified by Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

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Summary
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1. (SBU) During the Ambassador's 29 September introductory
call with Tunisian Defense Minister Kamel Morjane, the
Minister assured the Ambassador that the close cooperation
between the U.S. and Tunisian militaries, and broader
cooperation between the two governments, would make the
Ambassador's job easy. The Minister also spoke of Tunisia's
support for the Maghreb Union and discussed his views on
opportunities for multilateral engagement, which he saw as
mainly limited to participation in peacekeeping operations.
End summary.


2. (SBU) Ambassador Gray paid a September 29 introductory
call on Defense Minister Kamel Morjane. Also in attendance
were on the Tunisian side, Colonel Major Mohamed Ghorbel, the
Defense Ministry's Director of Cooperation and International
Relations, and Captain Major Mohamed Khammassi, advisor to
the Minister of Defense for International Relations, as well
as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy,s Office of Security
Cooperation (notetaker).

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Bilateral Military Relations
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3. (SBU) Minister Morjane assured the Ambassador that the
Tunisian military enjoyed excellent relations and cooperation
with the U.S. military and that this was true of the two
governments as well. He pledged to continue the long history
of cooperation and "make the Ambassador's life easy,"
emphasizing that any difficulties between the two countries
were just "disagreements of the moment." He said the
attitude in Tunisia toward the U.S., both in the government
and from the people, had improved substantially since the
election of President Obama. Morjane thanked the Ambassador
for the recent delivery of 50 ground surveillance radars
(GSRs),which would help address the mutual U.S.-Tunisian
goals of providing border security, halting terrorism, and
thwarting extremism in general.


4. (C) Briefly addressing the terrorist threat in Tunisia,
Morjane pointed out the transnational nature of the threats
meant that threats could originate anywhere, saying it could
"from Djerba or even Bangladesh! Not just Libya and
Algeria." The Minister said the Tunisian military was
particularly concerned about maintaining a presence in the
desert and had to be constantly mobilized along the 1,400kms
(870 miles) of borders with Algeria and Libya.


5. (C) While the Ambassador agreed that Tunisia and the U.S.
have a long history of cooperation, he told Morjane that in
the current economic environment in the U.S., Congress would
give increased scrutiny to all budget requests. The Minister
or his subordinates should take every opportunity to explain
their needs to us, as it would help us explain the
requirements to Congress. As an example, the Ambassador
praised the recent approval for the SDO/DATT to travel to
Tunisia's southern desert, saying that the information
gathered during this trip would help the OSC better
understand Tunisia's requirements. Morjane in turn, used
this example to point out the unique relationship between the
two countries, saying that the south is a sensitive area and
approval of the U.S. SDO/DATT is an exception to normal
Tunisian policy ) one granted to no other attache. He
highlighted this approval as indicative of the trust they
placed not just in the US, but in the SDO/DATT personally.


6. (C) The Ambassador then asked Morjane to encourage his
subordinates to take advantage of the many other
opportunities offered by the U.S. Referring to the U.S. Chief
of Naval Operations' (CNO) desire to expand relations with
Tunisia, the Ambassador regretted that both the U.S. and
Tunisia had lost out by Tunisia's decision to not send its
CNO to the International Seapower Symposium in Washington.
Morjane quickly replied that this decision was not an
indication of lack of interest, but a question of
decision-making protocol within the MoD. For service
commanders, their travel schedule and a schedule of whom they
will invite for the entire year is determined before the year
begins. For example, he said that for next year, the
decision had already been made that the Air Force Commander
would attend the U.S. Joint Military Commission (JMC) in May,
while the Army and Navy service chiefs would attend JMCs in
France and Italy. Stating that the President does not like

to see his service chiefs travel too much, he said that the
CNO invitation simply arrived too late. (Comment: The
invitation arrived early enough for over 100 other CNOs to
agree to attend. End comment.) The Ambassador assured him of
a sustained U.S. commitment to engage and said that we would
continue to send invitations to events and training
opportunities in the hopes that the Tunisians would
participate in the future.


7. (C) Apparently having hit a nerve, the Defense Minister
defended Tunisia,s cooperation with the U.S., saying that
Tunisia participates in 12 JMCs each year, putting a real
strain on its ability to support every event. However,
Morjane did concede there were other issues with cooperating
with the U.S., saying that Tunisia must balance
"contradictory positions." He explained to the Ambassador
that while Tunisia wants to please its friends (the U.S.),it
didn,t want other "friends or brothers," to misinterpret
things. He seemed particularly concerned with President
Qadhafi, stating that the unpredictability of the Libyan
leader made normal relations difficult. Morjane recalled
that while President Ben Ali has had some success in
influencing Qadhafi in his 22 years in power, things were
completely different under President Bourguiba, when
relations were "a continuous war."

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The Arab Maghreb Union
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8. (C) The Defense Minister also discussed the Arab Maghreb
Union, bluntly acknowledging that it is not really unified,
but stressing "it is not our fault," and crediting President
Ben Ali with making every effort to make the Union succeed.
He rued that a successful union would be better for the
Maghreb's economies, particularly by increasing bargaining
power with the European Union, as well as improving the
region,s security. He had even hoped the Arab Maghreb Union
would provide the framework of discussion and political
discourse that could bring a solution to the Western Sahara
question. Instead, the current situation between Algeria and
Morocco makes unification unlikely. At one point he seemed
almost nostalgic for the French colonial period as he
reflected on how residents used to be able to take a train
from Tunis to Casablanca without passports. The Ambassador
said that Undersecretary Burns had hoped to meet with Arab
Maghreb Union foreign ministers on the margins of the United
Nations General Assembly meeting last week, but this had not
been possible due to the departure plans to attend the
African-American summit in Venezuela.

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Multilateral Relations
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9. (C) The Ambassador then asked Minister Morjane how he saw
Tunisia engaging in multilateral relations. Morjane said
that while they agree with multilateral approaches in
principal, in reality, it was a question of means for the
small military. He also pointed out that Tunisians thought
differently than Arabs in the Middle East and President Ben
Ali would not engage in diplomacy for diplomacy's sake, but
only when tangible results could be achieved. As an example,
he said that President Ben Ali had cancelled the 2004 Arab
League meeting in Tunis after becoming convinced that the
meeting would accomplish nothing.


10. (C) Morjane then turned the conversation on
multilateralism to peacekeeping. Even here, though, he made
clear Tunisia's concerns with international involvement,
particularly in any operation in which Tunisia might be seen
as biased. It was this fear of appearing biased that led to
Tunisia's decision to not support peacekeeping operations in
Darfur or Lebanon. While Tunisia did get involved in
MINURSO, it later regretted it, as it found itself caught
between Moroccan and Algerian interests. He did point out
Tunisia's support for operations in the Democratic Republic
of Congo and along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border.


11. (SBU) Briefly turning to relations with Israel, the
Minister pointed out that in 1965 under President Bourguiba,
Tunisia became the first Arab country to advocate for a
two-state solution and relations with Israel. This fact
gives Tunisia the right to look Israel in the eye when it
comes to building relations. However, this issue, as with
the Western Sahara issue, is broader than just two countries
and requires a global solution.


12. (SBU) As the meeting came to a close, the Ambassador
raised the issue of Secretary Gates'Senior Defense Official

(SDO) initiative. While the Ambassador acknowledged that the
initiative, which places both the Defense Attache Office
(DAO) and the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) under one
officer, was primarily an internal U.S. matter, he pointed
out that it would make things easier for the Minister, by
giving him one point of contact who could address any U.S.
military issues. The Ambassador also pointed out that it was
a testimony to the strong U.S.-Tunisian relations that
Tunisia was selected to be one of the first countries for
implementation of this initiative. After the Ambassador
explained to Morjane that the DAO and OSC were still two
separate offices and that the SDO was still under Chief of
Mission authority, the OSC Deputy Chief explained that the
biggest change for the Tunisians was that the SDO would now
be addressing issues for both offices, instead of just the
DAO. Morjane then said that he would have no problem working
with the SDO in any capacity. However, he did request that
the Ambassador send a diplomatic note to the Foreign Ministry
to explain the change in status.

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Comment
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13. (C) Defense Minister Morjane was generally pleasant, and
jovial at times, during the meeting and said all the right
things about military-to-military cooperation. However, we
have heard this line from him before and it is unlikely that
we will see any immediate effort toward expanding relations
with the U.S. End comment.
GRAY