LIBYAN HEU SHIPMENT SECURE; NO DECISION YET REGARDING NEXT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000950 NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/7/2019 TAGS: PREL MNUC PARM PINR RS KGIC KNNP KRAD ENRG LY SUBJECT: LIBYAN HEU SHIPMENT SECURE; NO DECISION YET REGARDING NEXT STEPS REF: A) TRIPOLI 938; B) TRIPOLI 941 CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6 that the Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to increase the security of the seven casks of HEU, and that the contents -- and IAEA seals -- remained unchanged since the shipment was halted November 25. The Libyan Government has not yet provided guidance to its nuclear scientists regarding next steps on the shipment, but Libyan scientists are developing contingency plans to remove the HEU from the casks in Libya in the event the casks must be returned empty to Russia. DOE experts estimate that Libyan approval must be received by December 10 in order for the shipment to be completed by the end of December. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX We continue to underscore with Libyan officials the need to resolve this issue. End summary. HEU CASKS SECURE, UNCHANGED ¶2. (S/NF) Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6 that the Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to increase security at the Tajura Nuclear Facility, and that the seven casks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) appeared to have remained unchanged since the planned shipment to Russia was halted on November 25 (ref a). The DOE experts reported a visible increase in the number of armed guards surrounding the facility. They also confirmed that Tajura staff had disengaged the crane within the facility and had assured the team that a new, unassembled crane would not be built until after the shipment had taken place. DOE's measurements of the spent fuel within the casks determined that the content had remained unchanged. Likewise, the IAEA seals on each cask remained in place and uncompromised. NO DECISIONS ¶3. (S/NF) The DOE team also reported that Libyan technical specialists at Tajura had not yet received guidance from the Libyan Government on next steps regarding the shipment. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX The team also reported that although the Libyan Government had sent the Russian Government a diplomatic note confirming that the GOL would complete its contract to return the casks to Russia by the end of the calendar year, the note did not specify whether the casks would be returned empty or with the HEU spent fuel shipment. The DOE team assessed the diplomatic note as an attempt to mollify Russian demands that the casks be returned. POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS ¶4. (S/NF) The DOE team estimated that the GOL must give its approval to move forward on the shipment by December 10 in order for the shipment to take place by the end of December. The DOE experts emphasized that significant lead time is required in order set up the necessary logistical arrangements, permits and overflight clearances for the specialized Russian plane to return to Tripoli and transport the HEU to Russia. ¶5. (S/NF) The DOE team reported that Russian engineers had begun to design a remote-controlled grapple to be used in the event that the HEU spent fuel must be off-loaded from the casks in Libya. XXXXXXXXXXXXtold the DOE experts that, if GOL approval for the shipment was not forthcoming by December 10, XXXXXXXXXXXX planned to start training on how to use the grapple to off-load the casks. (According to DOE experts, spent nuclear fuel has never been removed from casks for restorage; the removal of the spent fuel in Libya would be an unprecedented initiative.) DOE experts also commented that the return of the empty casks to Russia, if necessary, would be best done by boat and said they are developing contingency plans for that scenario. POSITIVE FEEDBACK FROM THE SECRETARY'S CALL ¶6. (S/NF) Separately, emboffs have attempted to seek clarification of the Libyan Government's next steps regarding the HEU shipment. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX told Pol/Econ Chief that the Secretary's December 3 call to Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa had expressed the statement of commitment requested by Saif during TRIPOLI 00000950 002 OF 002 his recent meeting with the Ambassador (ref b),and that Kusa had passed the message to the "highest levels" of the Libyan Government. XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that Saif had made a "commitment" to the Ambassador to ensure that the HEU shipment would be approved by the Libyan Government, and "Saif will follow-through on that commitment." XXXXXXXXXXXX said Kusa intended to call the Secretary within the "coming days" in order to personally assure her that the GOL had approved the shipment. Emboffs also briefed Ahmed and MFA officials on the requisite timeline and lengthy logistical preparations needed to ensure the spent fuel's transfer to Russia by the end of the year. COMMENT ¶7. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX comments indicate that the Secretary's message to Kusa was positively received. A flurry of phone calls between DOE and Libyan experts today also indicated that working-level Libyan officials are seeking more time to resolve the issue, as the Libyans successfully convinced the DOE experts to extend the deadline for a Libyan decision by two days, to December 10 (the initial deadline proposed by DOE was December 8). At this point, we are interpreting the Libyan experts' technical preparations for a possible unloading of the casks in Libya as the contingency planning required to address the very real safety and security concerns raised by the halted shipment. We will reassess that view on December 10, and will continue to underscore with Libyan officials the need for a resolution of the issue this week. POLASCHIK