LIBYAN MFA BRIEFED ON HEU SECURITY CONCERNS

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000943 NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (KELLY CUMMINS AND SARAH DICKERSON). E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC PARM PINR RS KGIC KNNP KRAD ENRG LY SUBJECT: LIBYAN MFA BRIEFED ON HEU SECURITY CONCERNS REF: A) TRIPOLI 938, B) TRIPOLI 941 CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief met MFA Americas Acting A/S-equivalent XXXXXXXXXXXX December 1 to convey our serious concerns about the security of the seven HEU-filled casks at the Tajoura Nuclear Facility. XXXXXXXXXXXX dismissed U.S. concerns, stating there was "no one sophisticated enough" in Libya to be able to do anything with the casks and that the chances of anything happening were very low. He mentioned the IAEA seals as evidence that the fuel was protected (Ref A). Pol/Econ Chief underscored that the GOL should be concerned about the situation, as the casks were easily transportable and Tajoura was a poorly protected facility. U.S. DOE specialists had recommended an increased security guard presence -- armed if possible -- around Tajoura and the disengagement of the crane inside the facility. Pol/Econ Chief emphasized that the casks were easily transportable, and advised him not to be too dismissive of the security risks involved in keeping the casks unprotected. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he would meet with Foreign Minister Musa Kusa today to relay our concerns. ¶2. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief also described the environmental disaster that could take place if we did not ship the casks to Russia for disposal within a month. The U.S. needed a decision from the Libyan side as soon as possible on the shipment, as it would take time to reschedule the travel of the specialized Russian plane, including overflight permits, landing permits, and negotiating with the Russian MFA to cancel other scheduled stops. XXXXXXXXXXXX was not aware of how complicated it would be to schedule a return visit of the plane, although he understood that only a few such planes exist in the world. He said he agreed that a decision needed to be passed to us within a few weeks. ¶3. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX was not aware that Dr. Gashut claimed to have prepared a document for senior regime officials listing all of the environmental dangers associated with holding the shipment back. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Gashut probably gave the paper to Prime Mininster-equivalent al-Baghdad al-Mahmoudi (Gashut's boss) but did not think it had been passed to the MFA. (XXXXXXXXXXXX may well have been unaware of any communications between Gashut and Kusa on this issue.) XXXXXXXXXXXX promised to call us after he had briefed Kusa. ¶4. (S/NF) We also are seeking a meeting with Saif al-Islam al-Qadhaif's aide Mohamed Ismail Ahmed to relay the same information, in hopes of ensuring that senior Libyan officials understand the grave security and safety risks posed by the halted shipment. POLASCHIK