SE GRATION AND LIBYAN FM DISCUSS DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000874



SIPDIS



DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/C, AND S/USSES



E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/2019

TAGS: PREL, CD, SU, LY

SUBJECT: SE GRATION AND LIBYAN FM DISCUSS DARFUR



TRIPOLI 00000874 001.2 OF 002





CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,

Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa expressed

pleasure with U.S.-Libyan cooperation on the Darfur crisis and

encouraged Special Envoy Gration to apply pressure to

dis-unified factions of the Sudan Liberation Army. He cautioned

that without increased pressure from international actors, rebel

leaders in Addis Ababa, Tripoli, and other capitals would grow

comfortable in "five-star hotels" and seek to enhance their

personal image at the expense of unification and peace talks.

Kusa agreed with SE Gration's assessment that the humanitarian

situation and the upcoming national elections added urgency to

the resolution of the Darfur issue and that returns and

reconstruction would be impossible without lasting security.

Kusa characterized Justice and Equality Movement leader Khalil

Ibrahim as a Turabist and pledged Libya's continued support for

"capable and competent" nations' -- like the U.S. -- initiatives

for peace in Sudan. End Summary.



KUSA ENCOURAGES INCREASED PRESSURE FOR UNIFICATION



2. (C) In an October 8 meeting with Foreign Minister-equivalent

Musa Kusa, SE Gration outlined his overall strategy for Sudan

and thanked Kusa for Libya's interventions to find a political

resolution to the Chad-Sudan conflict and to unify splintered

factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). He said he

appreciated Kusa's assistance in facilitating the travel of

Addis Ababa-based SLA leaders to Tripoli in an effort to promote

their unification in advance of the re-launch of the Doha

process slated for October 28 (Note: This date has since

slipped to mid-November as the Joint-Chief Mediator announced

that he needed to be present at the African Union's Peace and

Security Council Meeting in Abuja, Nigeria schedule for the end

of October. End note.). Gration said his purpose in Libya was

three-fold: to ensure that Libya and the U.S. presented a united

position to the rebels, to work on facilitating the rebels'

participation in a unification conference, and to make sure no

new factions were created as a byproduct of SLA unification.



3. (C) Kusa expressed gratitude for SE Gration's attention to

the Darfur issue and his consultations with Libyan officials

handling the portfolio. As a neighboring country, Libya "feels

the depth" of the suffering caused by the Darfur conflict, and

appreciates the seriousness with which the U.S. has approached

the crisis. Other international actors, Kusa said, lacked the

capacity and the knowledge to achieve results. Kusa encouraged

SE Gration to push the "apathetic" faction leaders to quickly

resolve the conflict with Khartoum. He said that some,

including Ahmed Abdel Shafi, sought international sympathy and

attention and were more interested in staying in "five-star

hotels" and being shuttled from capital to capital. Unification

and peace talks, Kusa said, would end the benefits that some

rebel leaders have come to enjoy.



4. (C) Kusa expressed concern about the effect of Darfur's

lingering IDP and refugee problems on regional security, calling

for greater international monitoring and reporting. Without

internal security in Darfur, Kusa saw little opportunity for

Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and refugees to return to

their homes and resume their lives. This, in turn, exacerbated

regional security concerns and compounded the challenge of

humanitarian relief. Kusa was particularly concerned with the

smuggling, arms traffic, and extremism that was fed by the

instability in Darfur. Characterizing the the janjaweed as

Islamic extremists, Kusa reported that the Libyan External

Security Organization had interdicted several smuggling groups

with ties to Islamist groups in Algeria.



5. (C) SE Gration agreed that more attention needed to be paid

to the situation in IDP camps and preparations made for eventual

returns and reconstruction. Laying out the timetable of

important events -- the renewal of Doha talks and the November

start of voter registration in preparation for the national

elections in the spring of 2010 -- Gration cautioned that any

gains would be fragile. He asked that Libya continue to apply

pressure on JEM, Abdul Wahid Nur, and "anyone with technicals

and guns" to prevent spoilers from affecting the unification

process. Gration argued that the conditions were ripe for quick

unification: Sudan seemed increasingly serious about peace

talks while Chad President Idriss Deby was growing tired of

JEM's tactics. The unique window of opportunity, however,

should not lead to a rushed pact between groups that had no

roots and would dissolve before serious negotiations with

Khartoum could take place.



6. (C) Kusa and SE Gration agreed that Khalil Ibrahim had

designs of national leadership and would attempt to disrupt any

push for unity among SLA factions. Kusa assessed that Khalil

had the same mentality as Turabi and was essentially a member of



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the Muslim Brotherhood. Calling Khalil "unreliable," he

cautioned that he would turn away from any agreement he made

with either Khartoum or the International Community. Saying

that Libya had to give Khalil some aid to ensure he would

continue his relationship with the GOL, he said both Libya and

Deby would need to pressure him to cooperate.



7. (C) Kusa closed the meeting by reiterating Libya's gratitude

for the productive relationship with the U.S. on the Sudan

conflict. Kusa said he hoped to establish a broader dialogue

with the U.S. on a range of African issues, and would welcome

visits from other U.S. officials in this regard.



8. (U) SE Gration cleared this message.

CRETZ