MOVING FORWARD ON THE BILATERAL AGENDA WITH LIBYA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000599



NOFORN

SIPDIS



DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/CTR; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR PAUL BURKHEAD; ENERGY FOR

GINA ERICKSON



E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/27/2019

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, CVIS, ABLD, ETRD, MASS, PARM, UNGA, LY

SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON THE BILATERAL AGENDA WITH LIBYA



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CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,

Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: FM-equivalent Musa Kusa assured visiting

Acting A/S Feltman July 27 that the Government of Libya was

prepared to launch a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue; would sign

the HEU-LEU agreement in time to meet the September deadline to

transfer its nuclear spent fuel; was ready to move forward on

security cooperation, including signing the end-use monitoring

agreement; was prepared to take a second look at some kind of

participation in the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

(TSCTP); and was discussing a plan to expedite the visa approval

process for U.S. officials, business travelers, and technical

experts. On signing a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement

(TIFA),Kusa did not give a clear answer but stated that

strategic dialogue was possible in the international sphere.

Kusa confirmed that the GOL was planning to host a one-day AU

Summit meeting in Tripoli August 31 to discuss crisis spots in

Africa. Kusa also noted that counterterrorism and Darfur would

be on the Leader's agenda for any possible meeting with POTUS on

the margins of the upcoming UN General Assembly. Feltman

asserted that any potential meeting would be enhanced by Libyan

agreement to the several issues raised and that the Libyan side

would be well-advised to make efforts to temper Qadhafi's

rhetoric while in New York to the extent possible. End Summary.



2. (S/NF) During a July 27 visit to Tripoli, Acting A/S Feltman

(accompanied by Ambassador and Pol/Econ chief ) reviewed with

FM-equivalent Musa Kusa U.S. strategic goals for the NEA region

and specific areas for expanded bilateral engagement. Feltman

opened the nearly two-hour initial interaction between the two

with an overview of the priorities set out by POTUS during his

Cairo speech, emphasizing the need to build strategic

partnerships throughout the region. Kusa commented that the

current positions of the U.S. vis-a-vis the Arab world were

notably different than under the previous Administration and

noted that U.S. policy toward the region led to the rift in

U.S.-Libya relations. Kusa seized the opportunity to offer

advice, explaining that the U.S. must be "fair and equal" in

solving the problems of the Arab world. He said POTUS should

"forget about the kings" and deal directly with the people (a

clear allusion to Libya's "Jamahiriya" concept of direct

governance by the people). Terrorism, he warned, stems from the

people's grievances and can be controlled by shifting the

mentality of the people rather than working with governments.



3. (S/NF) Kusa noted that the U.S. must treat Libya differently

from other Arab nations, specifying that we could not treat

Colonel Qadhafi the same way we treat Ben Ali in Tunisia or

Mubarak in Egypt, given his unique background and experience.

He commented that a man of Qadhafi's "caliber" could not be

placed on equal footing with the King of Jordan or other

traditional Arab rulers. Kusa stated that leaders in Egypt,

Algeria, Turkey, and Pakistan could not rule without the support

of their military establishments and that while Qadhafi had

started out as a military figure, he had been able to change

into a political figure. Kusa advised that a deep, correct

understanding of Qadhafi's visions and aspirations would be of

more benefit to the U.S. regionally than would engagement with

other Arab statesmen.



4. (S/NF) Turning to bilateral issues, AA/S Feltman noted the

U.S. desire to press the relationship forward by establishing a

series of dialogues on human rights, political-military

relations, trade and investment, and civil-nuclear engagement.

Kusa commented that the U.S.-Libya relationship was at an

"acceptable" level but that the pace of engagement was a point

of concern. He reiterated the GOL's familiar refrain about the

criticism it has received for its decision to give up its WMD

program and, in its estimation, not having been adequately

compensated for that decision. However, he emphasized that

Libya had made the correct decision and had done so with

awareness and conviction. He acknowledged that giving up WMD

was the safest decision for Libya.



HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE



5. (S/NF) Kusa stated that the GOL had no objections to engaging

in the bilateral human rights dialogue, a proposal that had

previously been raised by the Ambassador, but he wanted to

ensure that both governments would be "on equal footing" within

the conduct of that dialogue. Confusing the goal of the

dialogue with the Congressionally-mandated annual human rights

report, he suggested that the GOL should be able to insert into

any report on Libya's human rights situation comments on U.S.



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human rights issues. The AA/S explained that the human rights

dialogue was designed to create a discreet bilateral forum for

discussion on a broad range of issues, including specific cases

of concern, which would be based on mutual respect. Kusa said

that the GOL would agree to host the initial team of experts

within the dialogue framework. He explained that the GOL did

not disagree with the concept of a dialogue but was concerned

about the manner in which the U.S. reported on human rights

issues in Libya. Kusa insisted that all discussion of human

rights issues should be done in diplomatic channels within the

framework of the human rights dialogue and noted his disapproval

of embassy attempts to collect information directly from the

public (i.e., human rights reporting). Feltman urged Kusa to

agree to a DRL-led interagency visit for one-day between August

10-20 to formally launch the dialogue. Kusa asked

A/S-equivalent for the MFA Americas Department Ahmed Fituri to

follow-up on scheduling.



SIGNING THE HEU-LEU AGREEMENT



6. (S/NF) Feltman urged the GOL to sign the HEU-LEU agreements

with the U.S. and Russia as soon as possible in order to meet

the September deadline for transfer of Libya's highly enriched

fuel to Russia and in order to remove an obstacle to future

cooperation in the civilian nuclear energy field. Kusa assured

the AA/S that the GOL had already made the decision and

indicated that meeting the September deadline would not be a

problem.



SECURITY COOPERATION - TSCTP and 505 END USE AGREEMENT



7. (S/NF) The AA/S explained that one way to address Libya's

requests for technical assistance was via the Trans Sahara

Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP),clarifying that TSCTP was

not a multilateral organization but rather a simple funding

mechanism. The AA/S also noted the need for GOL signing an

end-use monitoring agreement, which the GOL had been reviewing

for several months in order to move forward on our military and

security relationship. Kusa asked the embassy to provide

additional information via Fituri's office on TSCTP and to

follow-up directly with Fituri on the end-use monitoring

agreement.



VISAS AND EMBASSY TRIPOLI ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES



8. (S/NF) Highlighting that over 1000 U.S. visas had been issued

to Libyans by the embassy since it began full non-immigrant visa

services on April 2, Feltman urged Kusa to work with us to

improve the visa situation for American travelers and help

establish a more transparent Libyan system. Kusa agreed that

the visa issue needed to be addressed and assured the AA/S that

the GOL was developing a plan to offer special processing

services to U.S. officials, business travelers, and technical

experts. Feltman reiterated the importance of the GOL's

approval of a NEC site and for finalization of the deal to

compensate the USG for expropriated properties. Kusa advised us

to follow-up with Fituri.



Trade and Investment Framework Agreement



9. (S/NF) In response to Feltman's inquiry on GOL readiness to

move forward on signing a Trade and Investment Framework

Agreement, Kusa stated generally that the GOL was ready to

develop investment opportunities and mentioned the possibility

for strategic dialogue in the international arena.



ANOTHER AU SUMMIT: FOCUS ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA



10. (S/NF) Feltman highlighted that African issues represented

an intersection of interests between the U.S. and Libya. Kusa

said that Libya was planning to host a special one-day AU Summit

in Tripoli on August 31 that would focus on regional crises,

particularly in Darfur, Somalia, and Ethiopia-Eritrea. He

explained that the GOL was considering extending invitations to

a number of regional and European leaders and ministers, and

that an invitation may be forthcoming to Secretary Clinton. He

highlighted that U.S. participation as a regional partner would

be significant.



POSSIBLE POTUS-QADHAFI MEETING AT UNGA



11. (S/NF) On the possibility of a POTUS-Qadhafi meeting at



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UNGA, the AA/S said any meeting, if it were able to be arranged,

would be significantly enhanced by GOL progress in the above

areas, particularly on the launching of the bilateral human

rights dialogue and the signing of the HEU-LEU agreement, noting

that those two issues would provide substance and a reason for

the meeting to take place. Feltman also urged that the Leader

respect U.S. sensitivities during his remarks at UNGA,

specifically avoiding any provocative language about the events

of September 11. Kusa indicated his agreement that a potential

POTUS-Qadhafi meeting should be substantive, and he noted that

issues for discussion from the Libyan side might include

counterterrorism in the Sahel, the crises in Darfur and Somalia,

and Qadhafi's overall vision for Africa and peace in the Middle

East.



OTHER ISSUES - GUANTANAMO, WESTERN SAHARA



12. (S/NF) In responding to Feltman's assertion that the Libyan

side could raise any human rights concerns it had about U.S.

practices, Kusa mentioned that the embassy could work with the

Qadhafi Development Foundation to address any Guantanamo-related

issues.



13. (S/NF) The AA/S noted the U.S. interest in promoting greater

regional cooperation and asked for Kusa's thoughts on the

Western Sahara issue, especially how to improve relations

between Algeria and Morocco so as to promote Maghreb unity.

Kusa explained that Libya was trying to play a role in the

situation in order to maintain the integrity of the Maghreb

Union. Libya had spoken in detail with both Morocco and Algeria

and thought the 5+5 Group may be the best negotiating forum for

the issue. Kusa predicted that if the issue was not solved

under Algerian President Bouteflika, then it would not be solved.



14. (S/NF) Comment: The meeting with Musa Kusa was positive and

clearly signaled that the new administration was prepared to

deal seriously with the Libyans to continue the normalization

process. The GOL's agreement to participate actively in a

bilateral human rights dialogue represents a significant step

forward and will create a forum to address specific cases of

concern as well as to press Libya to meet its international

human rights commitments more broadly. Kusa clearly got the

point that any potential meeting between POTUS and Qadhafi at

UNGA would be enhanced greatly by agreement to the several

issues Feltman raised. He also understood the necessity of

finding a way to control Qadhafi's rhetoric while in New York;

however, he did not promise anything on that score. Post will

follow-up with the MFA on scheduling a one-day visit by a

DRL-led interagency team between August 10-20 to launch the

human rights dialogue; GOL's signing of the HEU-LEU agreement;

approval on TSCTP; approval of the 505 end-user agreement;

improvement of the bilateral visa situation; TIFA; and launching

a political-military dialogue. End Comment.



15. (U) Acting A/S Feltman did not have the opportunity to clear

this message prior to departure.

CRETZ