HRW RELEASES REPORT FROM TRIPOLI AT LIVELY MEETING

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DE RUEHTRO #1021/01 3541450
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O P 201450Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5609
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0062
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1527
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0854
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0971
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0915
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1203
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0871
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6159

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 001021 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NEASA, LONDON/PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, LY 
SUBJECT: HRW RELEASES REPORT FROM TRIPOLI AT LIVELY MEETING 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, 
U.S. Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) 

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families of the 1996 Abu Salim prison riot on their way from

Benghazi to the event and denied visas for Washington Post and

New York Times journalists to attend the HRW's press conference.



3. (S//NF) A phone call from Muammar al-Qadhafi's staff putting

HRW on notice for a possible audience with the Libyan leader

thirty minutes before the scheduled start of the press

conference nearly caused a last-minute cancellation, but the

event began with only minor technical complications. The crowd

was twice as large as HRW expected, with approximately 80

journalists, diplomats, and government critics in the room. At

least four security agents took notes, photos, and film of the

proceedings; the primary cameraman had served as poloff's

assigned surveillant for nearly six months. HRW briefly

outlined its report, citing improvements on freedom of

expression and the increased willingness of some public

officials to accept and act on criticism. They acknowledged

that many of Libya's major cases stem from events many years

old, but that their concerns related to those cases would remain

until victims and their relatives were given full accounts of

and received justice for past violations. Thanking the QDF for

its facilitation of both their study tour in April and the

in-country launch of the report -- a fact that put Libya ahead

of many other Arab states -- they also took so-called reformers

to task for not doing enough to codify and institutionalize

progress on human rights that has so far been won with support

from Saif al-Islam and members of his inner circle.



4. (C) The short briefing and recommendations were followed by a

lively question-and-answer segment that quickly degenerated into

a litany of grievances against the Internal Security

Organization (ISO) for years of repression. A family member of

a victim of the Abu Salim riot, holding a photo of his dead

brother, described his brother's case in detail claiming the

family had taken food and clothing to the prison for 13 years,

until they received a death certificate this spring that lacked

a cause of death. A woman from Benghazi asked whether HRW would

apply pressure on the GOL to prosecute the director of an

orphanage accused of sexually abusing girls under his care.

Journalists and security agents swarmed those who spoke, some of

whom were flanked by known employees of the QDF.



5. (C) After several longer testimonies, a journalist from state

news agency JANA spoke, claiming to have accepted government

compensation for his brother's death at Abu Salim. He railed

against HRW and those continuing to petition the government for

justice on past abuses as "anti-Libyan" and denounced HRW for



TRIPOLI 00001021 002 OF 003





holding Libya to different standards than the rest of the world.

He asked how HRW's report could even be written when abuses

like "the war in Iraq, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo" went

unpunished. He defended Libya's actions as necessary to keep

the country safe, and noted that no attacks like 9/11 could

occur on Libyan soil due to these protections. HRW reiterated

its non-governmental and politically neutral status, and pointed

out that it had been the first organization to report on alleged

abuses at Abu Ghraib. While HRW's explanation appeared to calm

some in the audience, his statements ended what appeared to be a

carefully scripted piece of theater. The next speakers, only

some of whom seemed to be at the event at the invitation of the

QDF, made more vocal complaints on the deaths or disappearances

of relatives and made specific claims against the ISO.



6. (C) The event quickly evolved into an angry shouting match

between government supporters and a sizable group of Libyan

citizens urging the creation of compensation and truth

commissions. The pro-government crowd, taunted by members of

the audience as ISO agents, verbally attacked the HRW and their

detractors, causing several individuals from both sides to storm

out. After this public catharsis had endured for over 90

minutes and with no further questions about the content of the

report, HRW ended the press conference and spoke individually

with several government critics. (Notably, the actual events

differed from a Times of London report, which exaggerated the

details of the role of GOL security officials in "shutting down"

the press conference.) Watching from the parking lot, emboffs

observed several of the most vocal government critics entering a

large van with staff from the QDF unhindered by security agents.

Others, including a lawyer claiming to have represented Idriss

Bufayed, departed individually without apparent incident.



7. (C/NF) In a December 13 meeting, HRW staff told the

Ambassador that Saif al-Islam had personally intervened to allow

the group to launch the report from Tripoli and that his

influence had led to unprecedented access and openness from both

high-ranking Libyan officials and ordinary citizens. HRW moved

the planned launch from Cairo to Tripoli in mid-November at Saif

al-Islam's encouragement, and the QDF facilitated meetings and

visas for HRW. Contrasting their experience with their first

visit in 2005, they remarked that everyone from lawyers to ISO

director al-Tuhamy Khalid spoke more freely about Libya's human

rights culture and no longer "cited chapter and verse of the

Green Book." Malinowski assessed that a stalemate between

"law-and-order" officials like Justice Secretary Mustafa

Abduljalil and security officials like Khalid would make further

progress on human rights difficult. Recounting a two-hour

"philosophical debate" with Khalid, Malinowski said the ISO

Chief recognized he was operating his organization outside the

law by holding some 330 prisoners who had been acquitted or

served their sentences, but justified his inaction on the

grounds of national security and Libya's fight against terror.

Khalid ended his meeting with HRW by telling them, "There are

some criminals who don't deserve human rights. Other than that

you and I agree on everything."



8. (C/NF) HRW recommended that the U.S. support those elements

of Libyan society that sought to institutionalize human rights

protections. They see Abduljalil as a proud nationalist who

believes in the principles of justice and the primacy of law and

chalks up Libya's fitful march toward human rights legitimacy as

"birthing pains" of a nation that is just reentering

international society. Abduljalil told HRW that he would

continue to fight against the culture of corruption that allowed

security services to operate above the law. HRW sees the draft

criminal code -- written under the QDF umbrella -- as a key, yet

still insufficient part, of institutionalizing human rights

protections within the Libyan legal structure. They provided

post and the QDF with 30 pages of recommendations on the draft

law -- which has been circulating for at least three years --

that would bring Libya's penal code in line with international

human rights norms, and suggested that U.S. technical experts

play a role in finalizing the draft code, through the provision

of technical assistance. While they recognize that change will

come slowly in Libya's security organizations, HRW said that

U.S. security officials might be able to deliver messages to the

ESO and ISO on the long-term (in) effectiveness of aggressive

detention and questioning policies. To help insulate Libya's

fledgling progress from the whims of its personality-driven

political system, HRW advised that enshrining human rights



TRIPOLI 00001021 003 OF 003





protections into the law and its application will be fundamental

to real societal change.



9. (C) Comment: Press reports on the tensions between security

officers and regime critics at the HRW launch event were

overstated. Most of the proceedings, including some of the

back-and-forth between victims' families and security officials,

seemed to follow a script that exalted the work of Saif al-Islam

but remained carefully within the "red lines" that would cause

significant offense. Although known security agents

photographed and videotaped the event, and some families were

detained for a short time and ordered not to travel from

Benghazi to Tripoli, there are no reports that security

officials took punitive action against regime critics.



10. (C) Comment continued: This event -- the first-ever of its

kind in Libya -- helped solidify Saif al-Islam's reputation as a

"reformer" and also undoubtedly pushed the envelope with some

Old Guard elements. The draft criminal code strikes us as an

interesting opportunity for real reform in Libya. It is

encouraging that the Libyan Government is engaged in a dialogue

with HRW on the specifics of the draft legislation, and we

believe that HRW's suggestion that the USG consider providing

technical assistance merits further review. The draft criminal

code, including our providing the background to U.S.

jurisprudence handling of free speech, assembly, and criticism

of public officials, could be good topics of discussion for the

working groups that will be convened under the auspices of our

Human Rights Dialogue. End Comment.

CRETZ