JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 000828 SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/SRAP, EAP/J, SCA/P, SCA/A E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID EFIN ECON MOPS AF JA SUBJECT: JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN REF: A. A) TOKYO 740 ¶B. B) 08 TOKYO 1397 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jim Zumwalt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Key Japanese politicians and bureaucrats recognize that Japan must engage in a meaningful way in Afghanistan and Pakistan, even while most Japanese see these countries as being a long way from Japan. While the public might question why it is in Japan's national interest to become heavily involved, policymakers believe that Japan has an interest in fostering stability to prevent the spread of violence and instability in the region. Moreover, Japan continues to view itself a major player on the world stage. Japanese elites know Tokyo cannot sit on the sidelines as others wrestle with problems facing the international community. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY (continued): For these reasons, Japan will seek to play a leading, or at least important role, in addressing the challenges facing Afghanistan and Pakistan. That said, Japan faces bureaucratic and political challenges that make it difficult to move forward with even uncontroversial policies and decisions impacting Japan's foreign relations. Another major limitation is Japan's constitutional prohibition against sending military forces abroad in all but circumscribed situations. Despite these obstacles, we believe Japan can be coaxed into playing an increasingly significant role in Afghanistan and Pakistan. END SUMMARY. -------------- WHY SHOULD JAPAN CARE? -------------- ¶3. (C) Why should Japan care what happens in distant and messy lands like Afghanistan or Pakistan? Unlike the countries of the Middle East, neither country provides Japan with needed resources or significant economic opportunities. So while the average Japanese politician or citizen might somewhat reluctantly understand why it's important for Japan to send forces or provide assistance to a country such as Iraq, many do not see the connection between Japan and Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly given current difficult economic circumstances. ¶4. (C) Fortunately, some leading politicians and most foreign policy bureaucrats do get it. They recognize what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan affects the broader regions of Asia and beyond. Instability can touch Japan. Prime Minister Taro Aso, while serving as Foreign Minister in 2006, spoke of the need for an ""Arc of Freedom and Prosperity"" that would traverse the South and Central Asian regions. Regarding the Middle East, then-Foreign Minister Aso insisted that maintaining stability in the region was ONE of Japan's key national interests. ¶5. (C) Japan considers itself a major player on the international scene. Obtaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council is ONE of its primary foreign policy goals. Foreign policy experts here realize Japan cannot hope to gain and maintain respect if it does not play a key role in international events that are of concern to the wider community of nations. A stinging refrain heard from allies here in Tokyo is how can Japan expect to sit on the Security Council and send citizens of other countries to fight and die if it is unwilling to send its own citizens as well. Japanese elites realize Tokyo cannot be seen to be sitting on the sidelines while others struggle with challenges facing the international community as a whole. ¶6. (C) For these reasons, Japan does and will continue to care about what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it will want to play a significant role in addressing these challenges. However, there are bureaucratic, political, and constitutional constraints to the role Japan can play, despite the best wishes of some of its leaders. -------------- BUREAUCRATIC HURDLES -------------- ¶7. (C) Japan agrees the problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably intertwined. Bureaucratically, however, the government is not set up in a way to foster an approach that deals with both countries in a unified way. At MOFA, Afghanistan and Pakistan are situated at the intersection of three distinct regional bureaus. Afghanistan lies at the eastern edge of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau's Second Middle East Division (which also is preoccupied with Iraq and Iran),while Pakistan is at the western frontier of the Southwest Asia Division of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau. The Central Asian states still belong to the European Affairs Bureau. Other MOFA bureaus with a major stake include the Foreign Policy Bureau and its National Security Division, which manages any deployment of military forces, and the International Cooperation Bureau, which sets policy for foreign assistance. To bring some centralized order to this situation, MOFA has appointed Ambassador Motohide Yoshikawa, reportedly a strong and assertive leader, as Japan's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, he is still winding down his previous assignment as Ambassador to Spain, and hence has yet to demonstrate his effectiveness. ¶8. (C) Other ministries and organization also have a stake in Japan's Af-Pak policy. For example, the Ministry of Defense would be involved in any decision to dispatch military personnel. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) implements Japan's foreign assistance programs and already has a modest number of employees in Afghanistan. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) has an interest in pursuing commercial and trade opportunities in Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) can be counted upon to be cautious about allocating funds for use abroad, believing past contributions to Pakistan were not effectively used. MOF has urged that it would be prudent to wait for Pakistan to demonstrate performance under the International Monetary Fund program. Overseeing it all is the Cabinet Office, which has its own internal political dynamics and spotty relations with the ministries and their leaders. Traditional stove-piping and long-standing suspicions and competitions between and even within these ministries will hinder smooth policymaking and implementation. -------------- POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS -------------- ¶9. (C) Times have changed markedly from when former Prime Minister Koizumi could unilaterally decide to send Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) personnel to Iraq. In contrast to Koizumi, who built a commanding majority in both the Upper and Lower Houses of the Japanese Diet, Prime Minister Taro Aso presides over a ruling coalition on the verge of collapse. His ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) no longer has a majority in the Upper House and, although the ruling coalition still has a two-thirds majority in the Lower House, this super-majority, and possibly even a simple majority, could be lost in elections which must take place no later than this fall. ¶10. (C) Meanwhile, the minority Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),newly empowered with a majority in the Upper House, is playing hardball politics on even the most straightforward legislative issues pertaining to Japan's foreign policies. The DPJ's goal is to do anything possible to weaken the LDP. As a result, even though public opinion and perhaps even a majority of DPJ lawmakers favor the continued deployment of Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) oilers to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the DPJ has now twice vociferously opposed the legislation necessary to keep the MSDF ships on station. In a political environment where already even routine decisions to deploy peacekeepers in single digits can be excruciatingly slow and drawn out, this ""broken Diet"" has made it next to impossible for Japan to even consider sending military or even civilian personnel to Afghanistan. -------------- CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS -------------- ¶11. (C) While U.S. and allied forces make the ultimate sacrifices in Afghanistan, Japan stands noticeably apart. This is because the current interpretation of the post-World War II constitution, which has never been amended, rules out the use of force in all but limited cases where Japan or Japanese come under direct attack. The Japanese do maintain extremely capable military forces, known as ""Self Defense Forces (SDF)."" ¶12. (C) Accordingly, decisions to send SDF personnel abroad, even in extremely small numbers to assist in stable peacekeeping operations, are excruciatingly slow and painful. The ability of former Prime Minister Koizumi to send ground forces to Iraq was probably an aberration not to be repeated anytime soon; the use of Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) in Kuwait and Iraq was less controversial, but still a stretch. And the extremely safe and non-confrontational use of MSDF ships to refuel coalition warships has become a political and legal hot potato. Our chances of convincing the Japanese to send military forces to Afghanistan are, accordingly, remote. -------------- ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶13. (U) Despite the limitations discussed above, Japan has endeavored to play a major role in addressing the problems of Afghanistan. Tokyo has pledged over $2 billion in assistance, nearly $1.8 billion of which has been disbursed. Japan views its assistance to Afghanistan as based on three pillars: enhancing security, supporting the political process and reconciliation, and promoting economic and human resource development. Activities embarked upon in pursuit of each are outlined below, but recent significant contributions made by Japan include the commitment to pay the salaries of all of Afghanistan's police officers for six months, the decision to assign MOFA diplomats to work with the Lithuanian PRT in Chaghcharan, and a recent $300 million contribution for: election support ($44 million),anti-terrorism and security support ($170 million, including payment of police salaries and a contribution to the NATO helicopter trust fund),and emergency food support ($86 million.) ¶14. (U) SECURITY ASSISTANCE: Japan was the leading supporter of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) processes, claiming to have disarmed and reintegrated 60,000 ex-combatants, disbanding 502 illegal militias, and gaining control of over 250,000 weapons. In addition to direct support for DDR and DIAG, Japan has also supported police reform and counter-narcotics programs by constructing a border police center, customs facilities, and by providing police training in Japan. This is in addition to the recent assistance with police salaries and the helicopter trust fund noted above. ¶15. (U) POLITICAL PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION: Japan has hosted a number of major international conferences dealing with Afghanistan, including the 2002 Tokyo Conference which signaled the start of the reconstruction process. Others include the 2003 DDR conference, the 2006 DIAG I and 2007 DIAG II conferences, and the 2008 Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) meeting. Japan has provided continual support for the election process since 2001, including the recent pledge of $44 million for the upcoming presidential and provincial elections in 2009. ¶16. (U) ECONOMIC AND HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: Japan has funded the construction of over 650 kilometers of roads and claims to be about to complete its long-overdue segment of the Ring Road, recently inaugurated the new terminal at the Kabul International Airport, and is working on the Master Plan for the Kabul Metropolitan City Development project. It has constructed over 500 schools, trained 10,000 teachers and provided literacy education for 300,000 adults. In the next three years it plans to construct an additional 200 schools and provide training to 20,000 more teachers. In the HEALTH sector, Japan has funded over 40 million vaccinations, and has constructed 50 HEALTH clinics, with 100 more planned in the next three years. ¶17. (U) REPLENISHMENT SUPPORT FOR OEF: In addition, Japan continues, despite the political difficulties described in paragraph 10, to provide at-sea refueling support to OEF coalition warships operating in the Indian Ocean. ¶18. (C) SUPPORT FOR PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: We and our international partners in Afghanistan have long urged Japan to become more involved with the PRTs. Ideally, we'd like to see them operate one, or at least dispatch personnel to PRTs operated by others. Japan is skittish about sending civilian or military personnel into what they consider to be dangerous or insecure environments. So while JICA has deployed approximately 50 employees to Afghanistan, the Japanese have yet to send anyone to a PRT. Tokyo has, however, sought to align its assistance priorities with the goals and projects of the PRTs, and to Qte has helped fund 48 grass roots projects identified by eleven PRTs. MOFA recently announced that it will send three diplomats to the Lithuanian-led PRT in Chaghcharan to act as a civil assistance team. We hope that their successful deployment will lead Japan to take a more forward-leaning approach. -------------- RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN -------------- ¶19. (C) Japan's relations with Pakistan are long-standing, but have only recently begun to take on major significance. While in the past, Tokyo always viewed Pakistan as ONE half of a hyphenated relQionship with India, in the last two years Japan has begun to view these two south Asian countries independently. Recently, mostly to align itself with our thinking and policy, the hyphen has returned, only this time the other party involved is Afghanistan. ¶20. (C) Japan views Pakistan as a front-line state in the struggle against terrorism and strongly believes development of a strong democracy and growing economy is key to preventing the spread of instability in an already volatile region. Tokyo's approach to Pakistan is best summarized by viewing former Foreign Minister Koumura's visit to Islamabad in May 2008 (Ref B). At that time, Koumura made clear Japan's view that the stability and development of Pakistan are directly linked to the peace and stability of the Asian region and of the international community as a whole. He said Japan was committed to providing Pakistan with its ""utmost support"" to fight terrorism, consolidate democracy and achieve sustainable economic growth, and he announced that Japan would double the amount of its previous yen loans to approximately $480 million. This assistance was to be used to fund power transmission lines, irrigation systems, the construction of rural roads, and for election support. ¶21. (C) Unlike its relations with Afghanistan, which have focused on reconstruction in light of developments since 2001, Japan's economic relations with and assistance to Pakistan have always taken a much more traditional commercial approach. As described in Ref A, Japan's aid to Pakistan has focused on human security and creating a favorable trade and investment climate. In 2007 and early 2008, prospects for increased trade with Pakistan seemed to be improving. But recently, perceptions among Japan's business people of a deteriorating trade and investment climate in Pakistanare undercutting the effect of Japanese aid programs, even while business leaders argue for increased aid as a means to further development. Nevertheless, Japan continues steadily to implement its official development assistance strategy toward Pakistan, which includes nearly $1 billion in yen loans since 2005, and seeks to underscore its role as a major contributor to Pakistan by hosting in Tokyo the April 17 Pakistan Donors Conference, along with the Friends of Democratic Pakistan Ministerial meeting. Tokyo has hinted it will make a very generous contribution to Pakistan at the Donors Conference. -------------- WHAT NEXT? -------------- ¶22. (C) Japan is committed to playing a significant and positive role with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, it will not, in the short term, be willing or able to commit military forces. Although we have asked Japan to deploy military airlift assets, such as C-130's (as they did in support of coalition forces in Iraq) or CH-47 heavy lift helicopters, it is unlikely Tokyo will do so given both their constitutional limitations on the deployment abroad of military forces and the current domestic political situation. Nevertheless, we should consider continuing to make it clear that Japanese forces would be appreciated, and that their contributions, no matter how generous, continue to fall short of the very real sacrifices on the ground being made by other countries. ¶23. (C) With regard to the deployment of civilian assets, we are witnessing a very cautious move to a more realistic approach. JICA President Sadako Ogata constantly reminds foreign visitors that JICA has people in Afghanistan, and MOFA's decision to send a few diplomatic officers to work in a PRT should be recognized, applauded, and encouraged. Building on these first steps, we should keep pushing Japan to send more qualified people to help in Afghanistan. The prohibition against military action does not preclude support for law enforcement and rule of law activities. We should continue to press Japan to support such programs. In addition, other requests for assistance should focus on their traditional areas of strength: education, agriculture, human resource development, and capacity building. ¶24. (C) In the meantime, Japan will make up for its inability or lingering unwillingness to send people by sending money or sponsoring international meetings. We shouldn't be shy about requesting their material support, but should do as a partner. Whenever possible, we should enlist the Afghans or Pakistanis to request assistance from the Japanese, who remain sensitive to the appearance/accusation that they are simply doing Washington's bidding or that Japan lacks its own, independent foreign policy. ZUMWALT