U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL COORDINATION (APRIL 2) ON

S E C R E T TOKYO 000747 NOFORN OSD/APSA FOR SEDNEY/HELVEY/BASALLA/GEIS; PACOM FOR J00/J01/J3/J5/FPA JOINT STAFF FOR J3/35 USFJ FOR J00/J01/J02/J2/J3/J5 CIA PASS ODNI E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PARM MARR KN KS JA SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL COORDINATION (APRIL 2) ON DPRK TD2 LAUNCH REF: A. TOKYO 00445 ¶B. TOKYO 00446 ¶C. TOKYO 00579 ¶D. TOKYO 00633 ¶E. DCINTRON MARCH 26 E-MAIL TO STATE/EAP/J KELLEY AND OSD/APSA/J BASALLA ¶F. STATE 29932 ¶G. TOKYO 00724 Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 ( b/d) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The CDA and U.S. Forces, Japan Commander joined Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Bessho in co-chairing an April 2 meeting of the informal bilateral interagency group to coordinate actions associated with the anticipated DPRK launch of a Taepodong-2 missile. DVM Bessho opened the third meeting of this group by noting the good meeting between the Secretary and FM Nakasone in The Hague. Bessho said that following the DPRK's launch of a missile, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura will ask the CDA to meet at the PM's Official Residence. FM Nakasone will also place calls to the Secretary and the ROK FM, in addition to the FM's of the other P-5 members, Mexico (as the UNSC President) and friendly nations like Australia. Whether Prime Minister attempts to call the President will "depend on the situation." ¶2. (S/NF) Summary continued: DVM Bessho reported that Japan had made some changes to its public messaging following the U.S. comments (Ref F),but still plans to demarche the DPRK Embassy in Beijing, to call the launch inconsistent with the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and to indicate Japan will continue examining its own measures towards North Korea. Regarding the U.S. post-launch press guidance (Ref G),and specifically regarding UN actions, DVM Bessho asked that the Embassy respond to press inquiries with language that includes that the launch is a violation of UNSCR 1718, that the United States believes the UNSC should move quickly to send a strong message to the international community and that the United States will continue to work with Japan on these efforts. MOD Defense Policy DG Takamizawa used the meeting to provide a positive readout of the SecDef-Defense Minister Hamada call, characterizing the SecDef as "better prepared" than Hamada. End Summary. ¶3. (S/NF) On April 2, CDA Zumwalt and USFJ Commander Lt. Gen. Rice co-chaired with Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Koro Bessho the third meeting of an informal interagency group gathered to bilaterally coordinate actions ahead of the anticipated launch of a TD2 missile by North Korea. The U.S. side included the Deputy USFJ Commander and representation from USFJ directorates and the Embassy's Political, Public Affairs, Defense Attache, and National Geospatial Agency sections and the Director for National Intelligence representative. The Japan side included Director-General and General Officer representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat (Foreign Policy and National Security/Crisis Management), Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO),Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Policy, North American Affairs, Asian and Oceanic Affairs, International Legal Affairs, and Intelligence and Analysis Bureaus),Ministry of Defense (Defense Policy and Operational Policy Bureaus) and Joint Staff Office (JSO) J5 (Plans and Policy) Department. ¶4. (S) DVM Bessho opened by thanking the United States for arranging a meeting between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Nakasone on the margins of the Afghanistan conference in The Hague. This meeting, which showed the solidarity between the Unites States and Japan on the DPRK's missile launch and other issues, along with FM Nakasone's good meeting with his South Korean counterpart, is a prelude to coordination that will occur before and after the TD2 launch. Intelligence and Operations Update -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) The Embassy's DNI Representative and the senior NGA representative used Rel-Japan imagery slides to provide an overview of the DPRK's recent launch preparation activities, including the placement of the payload and movement of fueling assets. The weather will in general be favorable during the April 4-8 window, hence making it likely the DPRK will try to use the first opportunity to launch. ¶6. (S/NF) DVM Bessho asked if the CNN report that the rocket had been fueled is correct and if there is any intelligence about a second missile being readied for launch, as a Sankei newspaper article stated. The DNI Representative responded that there is no indication to date that the rocket has been fueled or of the DPRK making preparations to launch additional missiles from other locations. CIRO Director Hideshi Mitani said the author of the Sankei article has no missile expertise and was likely just speculating. ¶7. (S/NF) JSO J5 RADM Hiroo Hatanaka followed with an operational brief on Japan Self Defense Forces preparations. Two Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense destroyers with SM-3 interceptors are on station in the Sea of Japan and one Aegis destroyer is on station in the Pacific east of Japan to track and gather information on the flight. Patriot PAC-3 firing units are deployed to JSDF bases around Tokyo and to bases in Iwate and Akita along the expected TD-2 flight path. JMSDF and Japan Air Self Defense airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets are flying to gather data. If a missile, debris or other object is deemed to be heading toward Japan, the JSDF will attempt to intercept it with SM-3 or PAC-3 missiles. JSO and USFJ have exchanged LNO's and activated Bilateral Crisis Action Teams, in lieu of standing up the official Bilateral Coordination Centers. The USFJ Deputy Commander provided an overview on the location of U.S. Aegis BMD assets around Japan. Post Launch Action by the Government of Japan -------------- ¶8. (S) Turning to steps to be taken following a launch, DVM Bessho said the Government of Japan is planning to ask the CDA to meet Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura at the Prime Minister's Official Residence a "couple of hours" after launch. This would occur prior to the National Security Council meeting, which will happen about two and half hours after launch. Bessho noted that, barring some unforeseen circumstances, Japan would not ask the USFJ Commander to accompany the CDA. FM Nakasone will try to place calls to the Secretary and the ROK Foreign Minister, with perhaps the first contact being with the ROK due to being in the same time zone. He will then reach out to FM's of the other UN Security Council P-5 members, Mexico, which holds the UNSC presidency, and friendly nations like Australia. Japan's mission to the UN has already been in contact with the Mexican mission, passing the word that Japan will ask Mexico to call an extraordinary UNSC session. ¶9. (S) As for Prime Minister Aso calling President Obama, this will "depend on the circumstances," DVM Bessho said. MOFA recognizes that the President and the Secretary will be in Europe and has instructed their embassies in appropriate capitals to be ready to help to arrange the call. ¶10. (S) DVM Bessho said Japan had taken note that the United States believes demarching the DPRK Embassy in Beijing will be "counterproductive." However, Japan believes this is something it needs to do, even though the DPRK Embassy may not accept the demarche request (or even "answer the telephone8). Japan's Post-Launch Messaging -------------- ¶11. (S) DVM Bessho reported that in principle the Chief Cabinet Secretary will be the only one authorized to make official statements about the launch. However, the FM Nakasone and Defense Minister Hamada will also need to respond to questions from the media. Turning to the tone of the pre- and post-launch messages, DVM Bessho said the United States, Japan and ROK should be firm without being provocative. CCS Kawamura's statement on March 27 that the likelihood of something falling on Japan is low served to calm the media and the public a bit. As for the U.S. comments to Japan's message themes (Ref F),DVM Bessho reported most translation issues had been handled. (NOTE: The updated version of the message themes still showed the "Inconsistent with the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks," but "Contrary to efforts..." had replaced "Negative effect on...") Japan will include the statement that it continues to examine its measures towards North Korea. ¶12. (S/NF) MOD Defense Policy DG Takamizawa noted the need to have the results of the launch as soon as possible so that Japan can reflect this in the messaging. The DNI Representative said the assessment could take several hours and a determination will need to be made on what is releasable to the public. Comments on U.S. Post-Launch Messaging -------------- ¶13. (S) Turning to the U.S. post-launch press points (Ref G), and specifically the response to questions regarding UN actions, DVM Bessho asked that, in responding to press inquiries on action at the UN, the Embassy go beyond just stating the United States considers the launch a violation of UNSCR 1718. MOFA would like the Embassy to also state that the United States believes the UNSC should move quickly to send a strong message to the international community and that the United States will continue to work with Japan on these efforts. The CDA told DVM Bessho that this request would be reported to Washington. SecDef Gates-Defense Minister Hamada Call -------------- ¶14. (S) DG Takamizawa reported that the call between Secretary of Defense Gates and DM Hamada went very well, with Secretary Gates being "better prepared" than DM Hamada. DG Takamizawa said Secretary Gates made the following points: -- A launch would be a violation on UNSCR 1718. -- Japan and the United States should protect their populations. (DG Takamizawa took this as a reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to protect Japan in this situation.) -- The UNSC should respond strongly to a launch with a resolution and perhaps sanctions. Even if the UNSC does not approve additional sanctions, the United States and Japan should discuss and consider bilateral sanctions. -- It is important to have flexibility in our response and Kawamura's comments were helpful in this regard. -- This situation presents a good opportunity for our two nations to increase BMD cooperation and interoperability. -- He is concerned about leaks in the United States and Japan. DG Takamizawa reported that DM Hamada agreed with all of the points and noted the importance of information security. Secretary Gates and DM Hamada agreed to continue close cooperation and work towards DM Hamada visiting the United States before the end of April. ¶15. (U) This message was cleared by the Embassy's DNI Representative and USFJ. ZUMWALT