DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/25/09

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 TOKYO 000668

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TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA

SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/25/09

INDEX:

(1) Japan lags behind in competition over FTA; South Korea reaches
tentative accord with EU (Asahi)

(2) Greenhouse gas emissions cut: Government to propose five options
for mid-term goal: Final decision is to be reached in June (Nikkei)


(3) Government to purchase 40 million tons of carbon emissions
credit from Czech Republic (Nikkei)

(4) Should Ozawa continue to head the DPJ? (Nikkei)

(5) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of
his connections to general contractors (Part B) (Shukan Gendai)

(6) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of
his connections to general contractors (Part C) (Shukan Gendai)

(7) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of
his connections to general contractors (Part D) -- Conclusion
(Shukan Gendai)

(8) Ishigaki mayor sends letter to U.S. president, expressing
opposition to planned port call of U.S. warships (Ryukyu Shimpo)

(9) TOP HEADLINES

(10) EDITORIALS

(11) Prime Minister's schedule, March 24 (Nikkei)

ARTICLES:

(1) Japan lags behind in competition over FTA; South Korea reaches
tentative accord with EU

ASAHI (Page 3) (Full)
March 25, 2009

South Korea has reached a tentative agreement with the European
Union (EU) on concluding a free trade agreement (FTA). Once the
accord comes into effect, South Korea will become able to export
automobiles, home appliances, and other products duty-free to the
giant market of Europe that is larger than the U.S. market. In
contrast to South Korea's gathering momentum for FTAs, Japan's slow
moves are noticeable. Many in the Japanese government and industrial
circles are filled with alarm.

Export industries also being alarmed

A senior South Korean government official emphasized the importance
of the FTA with the EU, saying: "Under the FTA, each other's markets
will be unprecedentedly widely opened up, so there must be a major
impact. We naturally expect (South Korean firms to have) a
competitive edge over Japanese firms."

For South Korea, the EU is the second largest trade partner,
following China. The total value of its trade surplus with the EU in
2008 was 18.4 billion dollars (about 1.8 trillion yen). This figure
is larger than the 14.5 billion dollars in its trade surplus with

TOKYO 00000668 002 OF 012


China.

The EU has imposed tariffs of more than 10 PERCENT on autos, TV
sets, and other imports. But these tariffs will be totally removed
within five years under the FTA. Seoul expects that the accord will
give more advantages to South Korean manufacturers than Japanese
makers have, and surely add momentum to increasing their exports.
The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy estimated in
2006 that an FTA with the EU would add to the nation's gross
domestic product (GDP) by about 3 PERCENT over the long run.

An executive of a leading Japanese electric machinery company said:
"We will be at a disadvantage in competing with South Korean firms."
He fears that Japanese firms may suffer a serious blow as a result
of significantly losing price competitiveness regarding such home
appliances as slim TV sets, which are directly exported to the
European market. Meanwhile, Sony Corp., which assembles in Europe TV
panels procured from Samsung Electronics, has taken the South
Korea-EU accord calmly, an executive remarking: "We will not sustain
a serious disadvantage."

South Korea, where domestic demand is limited, has been actively
moving to launch negotiations to conclude FTAs. The nation concluded
FTA negotiations with the U.S. in 2007, but no prospects are in
sight for the FTA to come into effect because lawmakers on both
sides have yet to approve it. Even so, South Korea has completed
negotiations with India, which have received large volumes of
exports and investments from South Korean firms. Seoul also agreed
with Australia and New Zealand this month to start negotiations. It
has announced it would accelerate FTA talks with all Asian
countries.

A government official in charge of trade affairs has a strong sense
of alarm. Japan remains unable to even agree to launch governmental
negotiations with the EU and to explore effective measures. In 2007
and 2008, both sides' economic circles promoted joint research, but
their opinion paper just noted the tariff issue, the most important
issue in negotiations, "We have different views," underscoring a
wide gap existing between Japan and the EU.

Japan's tariffs on industrial products are already at a low level.
In addition, Japan is unlikely to significantly open up its
agricultural market. Given these factors, the EU cannot expect much
even if it concludes an FTA with Japan. A senior Foreign Ministry
official said: "The EU remains unresponsive" to Japan's approach.

Japan has already put in effect economic partnership agreements
(EPA) with nine countries and regions, including Southeast Asia. An
EPA includes services and other sectors to an FTA. Japan has also
signed EPAs with Vietnam and Switzerland. But regarding negotiations
with the U.S., Europe, and India, South Korea has leapt ahead of
Japan.

Unable to promote bilateral negotiations, Japan has placed high
expectations on the new round of World Trade Organization (WTO)
global trade talks (Doha Round),according to a senior Foreign
Ministry official. But with the U.S. and emerging countries
remaining at loggerheads, it seems difficult to conclude
negotiations this year.

(2) Greenhouse gas emissions cut: Government to propose five options
for mid-term goal: Final decision is to be reached in June

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NIKKEI (Page 5) (Almost Full)
March 25, 2009

Proposals for a mid-term goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions,
which the government is now looking into, have been revealed. The
government has proposed five options ranging from a 4 PERCENT
increase to a 25 PERCENT cut as of 2020, compared with the base
year of 1990. Each proposal incorporates possible impacts of such a
reduction on gross domestic products (GDP) and unemployment rates.
GDP would be pushed down by between 0 PERCENT -0.5 PERCENT or by up
to 5.6 PERCENT in annualized terms. GDP would be pushed down by up
to 5.6 PERCENT in terms of the amount accumulated by 2020. The
unemployment rate would rise by up to 1.3 PERCENT . The government
intends to set Japan's mid-term goal by June, while taking into
account those economic burdens and effects to prevent global
warming.

Final decision is to be made in June

The government will present on March 27 the five proposals at a
meeting of the Mid-Term Goal Review Committee chaired by former Bank
of Japan (BOJ) Governor Toshihiko Fukui reporting to the prime
minister, an informal round-table to discuss the global warming
issue.

The government will explain the importance of global warming
preventive measures and burdens entailed through town-hall meetings
between politicians and citizens. It will adopt a mid-term goal,
after hearing the views of the public.

The five proposals include a 4 PERCENT increase case (in comparison
with the 1990 level),premised on the continuation of the present
level of efforts to cut emissions, and a 7 PERCENT increase case
(in comparison with the 1990 level),premised on companies and
households in general purchasing state-of-the-art equipment, when
they replace existing ones. Another proposal is that the government
obligates companies and households to purchase state-of-the-art
energy-saving equipment. A 25 PERCENT reduction proposal would
achieve the largest amount of emissions cuts. The five options also
include a proposal for replacing almost all existing equipment with
state-of-the-art equipment. Under this proposal companies would be
asked to adjust production activities.

Since Japan is calling for changing the base year used for the
comparison of emissions cuts from the current 1990 as set under the
Kyoto Protocol, it also indicated figures compared with the 2005
level. Reduction levels in the five proposals range between a 4
PERCENT cut and a 30 PERCENT cut.

The possible impact of proposed mid-term goals is indicated in the
total amount accumulated between 2009 and 2020. The government
estimates that provided the future growth of GDP is between 1.3
PERCENT -1.6 PERCENT in annualized terms, the growth rate would be
pushed down by between 0 PERCENT and up to 5.6 PERCENT . This is
because companies would have to shoulder the costs. There would also
be an impact of production adjustment. These elements will work as
factors for putting dent in growth rates by between 0 PERCENT -0.5
PERCENT in annualized terms. In a case of achieving a 25 PERCENT
cut in 2020, compared with the 1990 level, power rates is estimated
to double. In a case of a 7 PERCENT cut, too, such rates are
estimated to rise by over 20 PERCENT .

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Before it reaches a final decision on a mid-term goal, the
government is now looking into a reduction level to be adopted with
focus on between 5 PERCENT -15 PERCENT cuts, compared with the 1990
level. In this case, Japan's GDP will be pushed down by between 0.1
PERCENT -0.2 PERCENT in annualized terms. As a result, an
employment rate as of 2020 would rise to between 0.2 PERCENT -0.5
PERCENT .

Options for goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions
(Unit: PERCENT , as of 2020)

Goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions Scope of GDP to be pushed
down Scope of unemployment rate to be pushed up
In comparison with the 1990 level. Figures in the parentheses
indicate comparison with the 2005 level. Accumulated total between
2009 and 2020 As of 2020
(1) Present effort to cut emissions is to be continued
4 (-4) 0 0
(2) All industrialized countries cut emissions by 25 PERCENT . Each
country is to shoulder costs equally
1 - -3
(-6 - -11) No estimation No estimation
(3) Companies and households purchase state-of-the-art energy-saving
equipment. (no government obligation)
-7 (-14) -0.5 - -0.6 0.2
(4) The government partially obligates introduction of
state-of-the-art energy saving equipment. Part of existing equipment
is to be replaced with such types.
-15 (-21) -1.3 - -2.1 0.5
(5) Almost all equipment is to be replaced with energy-saving
types.
-25 (-30) -2.8 - -5.6 1.3

(N.B.) Impacts on GDP and unemployment rates are calculated, based
on the case (1).

(3) Government to purchase 40 million tons of carbon emissions
credit from Czech Republic

NIKKEI (Page 4) (Full)
March 25, 2009

The government has undergone final coordination with the possibility
of purchasing 40 million tons of greenhouse gas emissions credits
from the government of the Czech Republic. If realized, it will have
achieved the goal of such purchases -- 100 million tons -- in order
to meet the mandated emissions cuts set under the Kyoto Protocol,
when combined with the amount set to be purchased from Ukraine. The
government has determined that since the prices of emissions credits
have significantly fallen due to the economic and financial crisis,
it would be possible to constrain the cost of such a purchase. It
intends to purchase a large amount of emissions credits, by speeding
up the plan.

The amount is largest ever as an emissions credit the Japanese
government purchases in a lump. An agreement will likely be reached
before the end of March. The government will unlikely reveal the
price of such a purchase. However, in view of market prices, it is
estimated to be around 50 billion yen. Japan will receive an
emissions quota over several years.


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The Kyoto Protocol mandates Japan to cut greenhouse gas emissions by
6 PERCENT , in comparison with the 1990 level, over five years
between 2008 and 2012. The government plans to achieve 0.6 PERCENT
of that goal with self-help efforts, such as energy-saving efforts
by companies, and 3.8 PERCENT with absorption by forests and 1.6
PERCENT through purchases of emissions credits from abroad.

(4) Should Ozawa continue to head the DPJ?

NIKKEI (Page 1) (Full)
March 25, 2009

By Mutsumi Nishida, editorial writer

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Ichiro Ozawa announced
yesterday at a press conference that he would remain in his
position. Earlier in the day, his first state-funded secretary was
indicted for receiving illegal donations from Nishimatsu
Construction Co. Ozawa said with tears in his eyes: "Bringing about
politics that will stand on the side of people by achieving a change
in government is my final task as politician."

Although the political impact of the arrest of Ozawa's secretary is
incalculable, both the investigations by the special investigation
squad of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office and Ozawa's
explanations raise questions.

Money from Nishimatsu's dummy political organizations has gone not
only to Ozawa's fund-management organization Rikuzankai but also to
politicians of other ruling and opposition parties. The money was
provided either as contributions or as payments for purchases of
fundraising-party tickets.

There is no way to predict how the investigation will turn out in
the future. If the special investigation squad indicts only Ozawa's
secretary alone, we can't help feeling that it was simply taking a
potshot at the DPJ. Even some former prosecutors have contended that
the investigation this time around is unprecedented.

There are many questionable points in Ozawa's explanation of the
donation scandal. Ozawa's secretary was indicted for falsely
reporting 35 million yen donated by the dummy political groups
during the period between 2003 and 2006. It has been discovered that
the Nishimatsu company donated a total of approximately 300 million
yen in a year or so, including a portion that became invalid.

It is hard to believe that the state-paid secretary and Ozawa did
not know about the names of the donors who had offered such huge
amounts of money.

Explaining that the purpose of the Political Funds Control Law is to
report the name of a political group that contributed money to his
fund-management body, Ozawa underscored differences between his and
the prosecutors' perceptions. Such an explanation lacks persuasion.


Ozawa has allegedly been involved in the rigging of bids for public
works projects in the Tohoku region, contracts for which Nishimatsu
received. A series of press reports have shed light on part of
Ozawa's method of collecting political funds, which has seriously
tarnished his image. The donation scandal reminds the public of the
old method that has continued since the days of Prime Minister

TOKYO 00000668 006 OF 012


Kakuei Tanaka, who collected money by taking advantage of his
influence over public works projects. Voters might be feeling strong
discomfort on learning this.

The question is how much the DPJ will be able to gain public support
in the next Lower House election under Ozawa's leadership. Unless
the largest opposition party sweeps away the "politics and money"
scandal, it won't be able to prevent a backlash in the general
election. The DPJ appears to have taken a bet in which it does not
have much hope of success.

At the press conference yesterday, Ozawa said: "Once we take the
reins of government, I will have no regrets about assuming the posts
of party leader and then, prime minister." He added: "I cannot judge
whether remaining in the party leader post is a plus or minus. That
depends on how the public gauges it."

Nevertheless, he has decided to continue serving as party leader. It
is extremely difficult for voters to know his real intention. The
question is whether the DPJ will give priority to changing the party
leadership or place important on assuming the political helm. In the
case of the former, Ozawa would have made a different decision. The
DPJ has accepted Ozawa's bid to continue serving as party leader,
giving priority to internal unity. In executive meetings last night,
former President Seiji Maehara and other executives raised
objections. Therefore, the DPJ is not necessarily united. Dark
clouds are already looming over Ozawa, despite his campaigning
skills. The DPJ's handling of the issue of politics and money will
be harshly questioned by the electorate.

(5) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of
his connections to general contractors (Part B)

SHUKAN GENDAI (Pp.20-23) (Excerpts)
April 4, 2009

By KENYA Matsuda, journalist

"Donations as protection money to yakuza"

There are many similarities between Ichiro Ozawa and (the late)
Kakuei Tanaka (prime minister in the early 1970s). Cozy ties to
general contractors are one of them.

General contractors have detailed large numbers of personnel to help
Ozawa's election campaigning and gubernatorial elections. The major
general contractor Kajima Corp. has served as the coordinator of
"general contractor elections" in Iwate Prefecture. Looking back, a
former Kajima executive said:

"With the approach of an election, representatives of general
contractors used to stay at hotels to classify constituencies.
Groups of three employees then visited the assigned electoral
districts. Their job was to show up at subcontractors responsible
for equipment, electric work, materials, and urge them to present
lists. Their visits alone were enough to apply pressure on the
subcontractors. The general contractors footed the bills for such
activities. Mr. Ozawa effectively took control of 80-90 PERCENT of
the construction, civil engineering and transport companies."

Another Kajima executive serving as a go-between with the political
community admitted that his company's former Tohoku branch chief had

TOKYO 00000668 007 OF 012


been questioned by (prosecutors). "It's strange that I haven't been
questioned," the executive said smiling wryly. He added:

"In the Tohoku region, bids have been rigged by general contractors
under coordination by Kajima and by regional construction companies
under coordination by Fukuda Corp. for which Ozawa's father-in-law
used to serve as honorary chairman."

"Construction companies have kept making donations to Ozawa to
prevent him from obstructing biddings rather than to expect him to
use his good offices. It was similar to vendors' protection money to
yakuza during a festival. It was an insurance premium for biddings,
so to speak"

A representative of an Iwate construction company used to say:
"Disobeying Ichiro Ozawa means you get no orders."

Above all, Ozawa reportedly exercised tremendous influence regarding
the Isawa Dam projects (Oshu City, Iwate Prefecture),ordered by the
Land, Infrastructure, Transport Ministry Regional Development
Bureau.

I heard the following comment from a representative of an Iwate
construction company:

"The Isawa Dam project was made possible by Mr. Ozawa. Anyone who
wants to win a contract must visit Mr. Ozawa's office with a 'gift.'
Without a visit to his office, it's impossible to join the
project."

The Isawa Dam is one of the country's largest rock-fill dams costing
240 billion yen.

In 2004, Kajima Corp. won a contract for the levees -- the dam's
heart -- for 20.349 billion yen, and in 2005, Taisei Corp won dam
materials collection work for 15.97 billion yen. Nishimatsu
Construction Co. won a flood-control project for 10.027 billion yen
in 2006.

Between 2002 and 2007, a total of 68 companies won contracts related
to the Isawa Dam. Of them, 16 companies made donations to the DPJ
Iwate Constituency No.4 headquarters headed by Ozawa.

Their donations totaled 26.25 million yen, and the orders they won
came to 4.78 billion yen. Furthermore, 11 Kajima or Nishimatsu
subcontractors also made donations to the Constituency No. 4
headquarters. The Nishimatsu scandal is merely the tip of the
iceberg.

To begin with, corporate donations were collected through
Rikuzan-kai, Ozawa's fund-management organization. Following the
amendment in 2000 to the Political Funds Control Law, donations were
funneled to the Constituency No. 4 branch instead of Rikuzan-kai, as
was discussed above.

The No. 4 branch's political funding reports list scores of
construction companies. Some 100 companies, mostly those in the
Tohoku region, made donations annually. In a four-year period
between 2004 and 2007, they donated over 200 million yen in total.

In addition, Ozawa is said to have used party tickets to collect
money from general contractors.

TOKYO 00000668 008 OF 012



(To be continued)

(6) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of
his connections to general contractors (Part C)

SHUKAN GENDAI (Pp.20-23) (Excerpts)
April 4, 2009

By KENYA Matsuda, journalist

Money came and went in the same room

Ichiro Ozawa has his own political group that he calls Seikei
Kenkyu-kai (Ichiro Ozawa Politics and Economics Study Group). Seikei
Kenkyu-kai held three or four political fund-raising parties
annually between 2004 and 2007 in the name of Ichiro Ozawa Keisei
forums. Sales of the tickets, sold for 20,000 yen apiece, netted
373.52 million yen in the four-year period.

It is clear from those organizations' expenditure columns that large
parts of their incomes were "donated" to one political organization:
Rikuzan-kai.

As was discussed earlier, Rikuzan-kai is Ozawa's fund-management
organization, to which corporate donations have been banned since

2000.

It appears that the money collected by the No. 4 branch and Seikei
Kenkyu-kai was directly funneled to Rikuzan-kai.

Hiroshi Kamiwaki, a professor of constitutional issues at Kobe
Gakuin University who also heads an ombudsman group examining
political funds, takes this view:

"The money flow tells us that Rikuzan-kai received donations from
construction companies via the No. 4 branch and the income from
selling party tickets via Seikei Kenkyu-kai. The system was designed
to funnel corporate donations to Rikuzan-kai via two
organizations."

Corporate donations to the No. 4 branch totaled 1.48 million yen in
1998 and 1.55 million yen in 1999. The amount jumped to 174.6
million yen in 2000 and 90.32 million yen in 2001. Rikuzan-kai also
began receiving "donations" in 2001. "Donations" to Rikuzan-kai
totaled 380 million yen between 2004 and 2007.

Seikei Kenkyu-kai also donated huge amounts of money to Rikuzan-kai.
Between 2004 and 2007, the total came to 220 million yen. The money
collected, including that of the No. 4 branch, topped 600 million
yen.

The Kenkyu-kai and Rikuzan-kai offices share the same condominium in
Tokyo's Akasaka district. Takanori Okubo, Ozawa's secretary who is
under arrest, has been responsible for accounting at Rikuzan-kai and
heads Kenkyu-kai.

That was not all. Kenkyu-kai made donations to Ozawa's supporter
association in Tokyo, as well, that also shares the same
condominium. The Tokyo supporter association and Rikuzan-kai donated
money to each other between 2004 and 2006. Okubo is also the
representative of the Tokyo supporter association.

TOKYO 00000668 009.2 OF 012



Money always ended up at Rikuzan-kai after going back and forth in
the same condominium. Why did Ozawa have to raise that much money
for Rikuzan-kai?

In 1994, Ozawa began buying condominiums in Tokyo and other areas
with Rikuzan-kai's political funds. According to its fiscal 2007
political funding report, Rikuzan-kai possessed real estate worth 1
billion yen. Although those assets were purchased with Rikuzan-kai
"office expenses," they were all in Ozawa's name.

In buying those assets, Ozawa borrowed money from banks with them as
collateral. Ozawa repeated the odd practice of loaning the money
from the banks to Rikuzan-kai.

(To be continued)

(7) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of
his connections to general contractors (Part D) -- Conclusion

SHUKAN GENDAI (Pp.20-23) (Excerpts)
April 4, 2009

By KENYA Matsuda, journalist

Ozawa's continued betrayal of the public

Interest payments to Ichiro Ozawa, who heads Rikuzan-kai, occupy a
large portion of the organization's "political activity expenses."
In 2004, Ozawa loaned 400 million yen to Rikuzan-kai. The
organization repaid it in two years. This suggests that Ozawa has
ample funds.

Nobuyoshi Tanabe, a former Supreme Public Prosecutors' Office
prosecutor, said:

"The special investigation team is reportedly aiming to build a
graft case (assen-ritoku) against the Ozawa side. Receiving
donations from Nishimatsu via dummy organizations would constitute
graft. Mr. Ozawa also has real estate bought with political funds.
If the team can prove that Mr. Ozawa acquired his personal assets
with political funds, that, too, would be graft."

In the wake of many money scandals, including Sagawa trucking
company's 500-million-yen contribution in 1992 to former Liberal
Democratic Party Vice President Shin Kanemaru and a 1993 corruption
case involving general contractors, Ozawa led the political reform
drive to introduce a political party subsidy system, while pulling
the strings of the Hosokawa coalition administration in 1993.

Back then, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa replied: "We are going
to ban corporate and organizational donations by introducing a
political party subsidy system."

Needless to say, Rikuzan-kai's political funds come partly from
taxes. It is not an exaggeration to say that in order to amass his
own assets, Ozawa has continued betraying the general public by
raking in taxpayer money via Rikuzan-kai and corporate donations at
the same time.

Furthermore, the DPJ vowed in its 2004 and 2005 manifestos that it
would totally ban political donations from corporations that have

TOKYO 00000668 010.2 OF 012


won orders for public works projects.

In other words, Ozawa himself has broken the DPJ's campaign pledges.
It is quite absurd that he should shamelessly call for a total ban
on corporate donations. It can be said that Ozawa committed triple
betrayal against the general public. Ozawa envisions establishing a
cloister government as a kingmaker, which would be a nightmare.

(8) Ishigaki mayor sends letter to U.S. president, expressing
opposition to planned port call of U.S. warships

RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 26) (Full)
March 25, 2009

(Ishigaki)

In a press conference yesterday, Ishigaki Mayor Nagateru Ohama
expressed opposition to the planned port call by the U.S. Navy's two
minesweepers at Ishigaki Port on April 3-5, saying: "I cannot
approve (of the port call),from the viewpoint of defending our
citizens' security." He also revealed that he had mailed a letter
under his signature as mayor to U.S. President Barack Obama, in
which he noted: "We would like you to understand that Ishigaki City
cannot welcome the port entry of any U.S. warships, and we ask you
to make a wise decision."

The U.S. Navy notified the Ishigaki Maritime Coast Guard Office on
March 17 of a plan to have its warships enter Ishigaki Port for the
purposes of the crewmembers' relaxation and promoting friendly
relations with citizens at 8:00 a.m. on April 3 and leave the port
at noon on April 5. It has been reported that 128 crewmembers are
scheduled to land at the port.

Mayor Ohama asserted:

"Ishigaki Port is overcrowded, so there is no room for a warship to
enter. In addition, it is a private port and is not designed to
accommodate warships. Since there is fear of an accident occurring,
we cannot allow warships to come into port, in view of port
administration. ... Recently, accidents and incidents involving U.S.
military personnel have been frequently reported. We cannot cope
with the landing of so many U.S. military personnel at the port."

The U.S. Navy had initially indicated a plan for a port call on
April 1-3, but the municipal government replied on March 13: "We
cannot approve of the plan." Later, the navy changed the schedule
into a call on April 3-5 and informed the said office of the new
schedule.

(9) TOP HEADLINES

Asahi:
Secretary of DPJ Ozawa indicted for falsified reporting of political
donations

Mainichi, Yomiuri, Sankei & Tokyo Shimbun:
Ozawa to stay on as DPJ head, despite secretary's indictment

Nikkei:
China plans network of 400,000 village shops to promote rural
consumption


TOKYO 00000668 011.2 OF 012


Akahata:
Hyogo Labor Bureau instructs Nippon Thompson to correct employment
conditions

(10) EDITORIALS

Asahi:
(1) Illegal donations from Nishimatsu: DPJ President Ozawa should
step down

Mainichi:
(1) Ozawa's news conference unconvincing
(2) Prosecutors should also investigate other suspected donation
recipients both in ruling, opposition parties

Yomiuri:
(1) Many hardships lie ahead for Ozawa
(2) Japan's WBC title energizing Japan

Nikkei:
(1) Will voters understand Ozawa's decision to stay on?
(2) WBC title defense moves us

Sankei:
(1) Ozawa's decision to remain as party president unacceptable

Tokyo Shimbun:
(1) Investigate Nishimatsu donation scandals involving ruling party
lawmakers, as well
(2) Taking responsibility for causing public distrust in politics,
Ozawa should resign at proper time

Akahata:
(1) Nishimatsu donation case: Indictment of Ozawa's secretary quite
serious

(11) Prime Minister's schedule, March 24

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
March 25, 2009

08:40
Attended an Ocean Policy Headquarters meeting held in the Diet
building.

09:01
Attended a cabinet meeting.

09:54
Met with Tokyo Gov. Ishihara at the Kantei.

10:26
Met with Bangladeshi Ambassador to Japan Ashraf-ud-Doula, in the
presence of Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
Nishimura. Afterward met with Iranian Ambassador to Japan
Al-Jumaily, in the presence of Japan-Iraq Friendship Parliamentarian
Group Chairman and former Defense Minister Kyuma.

13:02
Attended a Lower House plenary session.

14:17

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Met at the Kantei with Vice Foreign Minister Yabunaka and Asian and
Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General Saiki. Yabunaka stayed on.

15:08
Met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura, his deputies Matsumoto,
Konoike, and Uruma. Matsumoto stayed on.

16:05
Met with Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda.

17:06
Met with Akira Yanagisawa and others who had received the top boy
scout awards, followed by National Land Improvement Associations
Federation Deputy Chairman Suita.

18:34
Attended a Decentralization Promotion Headquarters meeting.
Afterward met with Foreign Minister Nakasone.

19:04
Dined at a Prince Park Tower Tokyo Japanese restaurant with LDP
Election Strategy Council Vice Chairman Suga, Deputy Secretary
General Yamaguchi, and others, joined by Matsumoto.
21:05 Returned to his official residence.

ZUMWALT