DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/13/09

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 000066 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/13/09 INDEX: (1) Comments on Ambassador Schieffer's interview by editorial writer Tsuyoshi Sunohara (Nikkei) (2) New Obama administration and Japan-U.S. alliance (Sankei) (3) Shaky alliance-5 years on the battlefield (Part 4): SDF depends on U.S. military for emergency rescue (Yomiuri) (4) Lineup of Asia policymaking team in Obama administration reflects strong expectations of Japan (Part 3) (Asahi) (5) Rescuing foreign ships by MSDF impossible under existing law (Asahi) (6) Koichi Kato's third force vision deadlocked (Sankei) (7) Editorial: Doubts about cash-benefit plan deepening (Mainichi) (8) TOP HEADLINES (9) EDITORIALS (10) Prime Minister's schedule, January 11 (Nikkei) ARTICLES: (1) Comments on Ambassador Schieffer's interview by editorial writer Tsuyoshi Sunohara NIKKEI (Page 9) (Full) January 10, 2009 He has had no career in Washington politics like such VIP ambassadors as Mansfield and Foley. He did not have academic experience like Reischauer, nor did he have the backing of the bureaucracy like Armacost. The only one he could rely on was a friend who happened to be the top leader of the land, the U.S. president. Among all the many U.S. ambassadors to Japan to have appeared on scene in the postwar period, there has never been one with such a unique presence like Thomas Schieffer. From that fact alone, the Schieffer era should be subject to study with great interest by future generations of historians. His tenure overlapped with the end of U.S. unipolar world, set off by the Iraq war, as well as with the period of political paralysis in Japan. At times, he reputedly acted as a kind of crisis-management control tower, according to a senior State Department official. The important mission of this ambassador without doubt was greater than any predecessor before him. Despite such unfavorable circumstances, Ambassador Schieffer continued to play an active role in "institutionalizing" the alliance. He took on as his own mission the building of a bilateral relationship that did not rely on such personal ties as those between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (Ron-Yasu) or between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi. In such a relationship, the axis of cooperation and trust would be sharply in focus, no matter who was seated at the center of power. Even now, during the final days of the Bush administration, how TOKYO 00000066 002 OF 010 ironic it is that Ambassador Schieffer still serves as the sole anchor on the American side to prevent the alliance from drifting. "I don't want the U.S.-Japan alliance to become a political issue." That was the last message that Ambassador Schieffer left behind, his aim always being to have "an alliance relationship of the highest quality." How will Japanese politicians - their eyes focused only on politics and elections - actually take this message? (2) New Obama administration and Japan-U.S. alliance SANKEI (Page 13) (Excerpts) January 13, 2009 By Toshio Watanabe, president of Takushoku University U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will soon launch his administration, but his administration's Asia policy remains unclear. What bothers me is the Democratic Party's platform, issued during the presidential race. Although the platform showed the party's determination to firmly maintain U.S. ties with such allies as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, it also revealed the party's intention to create a new multilateral framework in Asia that would go beyond the current bilateral agreements. If this new multilateral framework means turning the six-party talks on North Korea announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice into a new security framework, the Japan-U.S. alliance, the bedrock of Japan's foreign policy, might suffer. If the Japan-U.S. alliance weakens in the increasingly tense geopolitical atmosphere surrounding the Far East, evidenced by China's growing military buildup, North Korea's nuclear testing, and South Korea's conciliatory policy toward the North, I fear that Japan, aided by an already inward-looking public opinion, might be cast adrift in a global sea. Japan should deal with matters based on an awareness that alliances rest on common interests and cannot survive once such interests disappear. In the ever changing international situation, there is no alliance that lasts forever. The Washington System was launched as a result of coordination of interests among world powers at the Washington Conference that took place two years after the Paris Peace Conference following the end of World War I. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance significantly contributed for the following two decades to Japan's security. These fell by the wayside in exchange for a treaty among Japan, Britain, the United States and France. An alliance does not exist between countries with no shared interests. It is also a hegemonic state's behavioral pattern to force even an alliance between third countries that conflicts with its interests to be scrapped. We must keep in mind that this behavioral pattern still holds true for a hegemonic state today. Following the collapse of the Cold War structure, where mutual interests lie between Japan and the United States have become clear. It was fortunate that Japan has opened the door for logistical support and the overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces on reconstruction assistance missions in the wake of 9/11 terrorist TOKYO 00000066 003 OF 010 attacks on the United States. But the matter's crux lies in the government's reluctance to change its unique interpretation that although Japan has the right to collective self-defense, it is not allowed to exercise it. There are no legal restrictions on the use of the right. The government's insistence that Japan is not allowed to use the right must come from its policy intent rather than its legal intent. The government's interpretation can be changed, but the problem is that Japanese political leaders have no mettle to do so. The Council for Rebuilding the Legal Foundation for National Defense, established under the former ABE administration, presented its final report to former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in June last year. The report has been put aside indefinitely. Many Japanese people cannot conceal their dislike toward the United States for the delisting of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, which was followed by the U.S.-originated financial crisis. Voices critical of the United States are growing in Japan. But before criticizing its ally, Japan should do first what it should do. (3) Shaky alliance-5 years on the battlefield (Part 4): SDF depends on U.S. military for emergency rescue YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) December 23, 2008 The Air Self-Defense Force has now wound up its airlift mission in Iraq. The ASDF mission there is particularly notable as the Self-Defense Forces' first-ever backup of international security operations. The SDF's international cooperation began with the Maritime Self-Defense Force's dispatch of a minesweeping squadron to the Persian Gulf in 1991, and the SDF used to be tasked with activities for postwar settlement or reconstruction assistance. However, the SDF's activities this time have left new footprints in its overseas missions. All ASDF members boarding C-130 cargo planes in Iraq were called in to the headquarters of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) at Yokota in Tokyo before their departure from Japan. In Iraq, an ASDF C-130 transport in flight could come under attack from an armed group and would have to make an emergency landing. In that eventuality, the ASDF, which cannot rescue its C-130 crew, has no choice but to ask the U.S. military for their rescue. The ASDF procured U.S. military satellite rescue radio systems, and its Iraq mission crew received training from U.S. military personnel for emergency responses, such as how to identify friends and foes. There is a radio manual for the multinational forces in Iraq. The ASDF crew had to master the radio manual, or they could not fly over Iraq. For example, if one of an ASDF C-130's crew improperly emits radio waves in the event of an emergency landing, their whereabouts can be located by armed insurgents. In that case, the C-130 could fall into the hands of insurgents. Moreover, the ASDF crew there could be attacked. The ASDF had anticipated even such a situation. "We prepared guidelines for how to act until the U.S. military comes to rescue," one ASDF staff officer confessed. After the Iraq dispatch, U.S. military information available through the multinational forces' headquarters became the lifeline for the TOKYO 00000066 004 OF 010 ASDF's activities in Iraq. The U.S. military clearly sorted out its information that was only for British and Australian forces, which have been acting in concert with U.S. forces, and not for other multinational force members. Japan is not treated favorably there just because Japan is an ally of the United States. The multinational forces' activities in Iraq are affected by human relations and a sense of solidarity, so Japan and all other countries participating in the multinational forces have sent a number of echelon officers to the headquarters for information. One ASDF staff officer said: "If not for information about security and mop-up operations, we can't set even a flight route. This means we can do nothing over there." Last October, the U.S. military suddenly stopped providing information to the ASDF about military operations in Baghdad and its environs. What lies behind this-according to a senior official of the Defense Ministry-is that the MSDF was going to be recalled from the Indian Ocean because the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law could not be extended. It was obviously the United States' retaliation, as the official noted. The ASDF made a protest to the U.S. Defense Department. At the same time, the ASDF decided to suspend its airlift services for a week. The ASDF C-130 planes in Iraq were almost always operational. U.S. military and other multinational force transport planes were less operational due to repair or for some other reasons. The U.S. military soon gave up to the ASDF that went on strike. "As a result," an ASDF staff officer recalled, "they figured out the ASDF's high reliability again." Iraq is where the ASDF backed up the multinational forces for the first time, and the ASDF carried out its given task there almost perfectly. In Afghanistan, the war on terror is going on. The ASDF will likely be asked again to airlift supplies there. "Even though you are in a noncombat area, you can never be safe. It's dangerous. That's why the Self-Defense Forces will be sent there. I want the government to explain this, and we want the government to get public understanding and support." With this, Lt. Gen. Kunio Orita, who has commanded the ASDF's Iraq mission, concluded the five years. (4) Lineup of Asia policymaking team in Obama administration reflects strong expectations of Japan (Part 3) ASAHI (Page 2) (Full) January 9, 2009 (Yoichi Kato, Washington) U.S. expects Japan to play supplementary role What policy will the incoming Obama administration take toward Japan and how will it different from the policy of the Bush administration? Sources related to the incoming administration explained what will change and what will not change as followed. What is expected to remain unchanged is the stance of giving priority to the Japan-U.S. alliance. An informed source emphasized that the Obama administration will not take a stance of prioritizing China and treating Japan lightly as the Clinton administration had. TOKYO 00000066 005 OF 010 The source meant that since the U.S. would find it difficult to effectively carry out its Asia diplomacy without Japan, it would have to be patient, despite the chaotic state of Japanese politics. It seems unlikely that major changes will take place in alliance management for the time being. Some have said that the incoming administration intends to move forward with the plans agreed on between the U.S. and Japanese governments to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa and to transfer Marines in Okinawa to Guam. Meanwhile, the U.S.' current foreign policy that focuses only on military power is expected to change into a policy that taps a variety of diplomatic tools. This is in line with the argument by Joseph Nye for a change to "smart power," a combination of military power and soft power as a diplomatic tool. In an essay Nye contributed to the Asahi Shimbun last June, he gave this explanation about what approach (then presidential candidate) Obama might take to security relations with Japan: "He would like to further deepen and widen the U.S.-Japan relationship, going beyond the current framework of bilateral security arrangements." Nye added that Japan and the U.S. might take the lead in forming a new multinational framework. What the U.S. then seems to be considering is a plan to create a framework for multilevel dialogue in various regions of the world. The Bush administration's approach to environmental issues also is expected to significantly change. The U.S. would then urge Japan to play a leading role, as Nye has noted: "We would expect Japan to play a global coordinating role regarding the use of international public assets (such as stable international relations and open economic frameworks)." The Obama administration as a whole expects Japan to have the confidence to come up with ideas that the U.S. had not thought of, and to play a role that the U.S. would not be able to perform. They apparently expect Japan to emerge from being a lesser ally and become a partner on an equal footing so that the two countries would be able to build a complementary, effective relationship. (5) Rescuing foreign ships by MSDF impossible under existing law ASAHI (Page 2) (Excerpts) January 8, 2009 What would happen should the government decide to dispatch Maritime Self-Defense Force warships (to waters off Somalia as part of anti-piracy efforts)? Under one scenario, a British commercial freighter was attacked by pirates in waters off Somalia at midnight in March 2009. A MSDF escort vessel that was navigating near the spot in response to an order for maritime patrol action was asked by radio to help its crew members. But the captain of the escort ship, upon confirming that no Japanese citizens or goods were on board, replied: "Regrettably, our ship cannot render any assistance. Under a provision for maritime patrols in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Force Law, SDF troops are not allowed to take action against pirates attacking foreign commercial freighters. The purpose of the provision is to protect the lives and assets of Japanese nationals. TOKYO 00000066 006 OF 010 A government source explained: "If the existing law is applied for the time being, such a situation would be unavoidable. The presence of Japanese naval vessels should work as a deterrent." But an ex-defense minister voiced concern: "If our troops do not take action to protect foreign ships, Japan will inevitably be criticized. I wonder if such action can be defined as an international contribution." Even if a new law is enacted for SDF troops to protect foreign ships, the issue of use of weapons by SDF troops is expected to trigger controversy. In August 2009, a MSDF escort vessel was accompanying a Japanese commercial freighter in waters off Somalia. An unidentified ship suddenly approached them. The escort vessel made an inquiry by radio, but the unidentified ship made no response and suddenly fired a shell. The escort vessel responded to the attack with machine gun fire that caused an explosion and the ship to sink, killing 20 pirates. The Constitution prohibits Japan from war with other nations and the use of armed force. The government takes the view that cracking down on piracy is categorized as police action and does not fall under the use of armed force. In maritime security patrols, the police and Japan Coast Guard are allowed to fire warning shops and to return fire only in such cases as legitimate self-defense and emergency evacuation. Under the new legislation, firing of weapons is allowed as necessary to stop attacks by pirates. This is because the pirates will be heavily armed with rocket launchers and machine guns. SDF troops assigned overseas, however, have never killed any foreigner with weapons. If the government decides to allow the use of force, some might pose questions about the compatibility with Article 9 of the Constitution, which allows the right of self-defense to the minimum necessary level. Mistaking a Thai fishing boat as a pirate ship off Somalia, the Indian Navy fired at it and sank the boat. Similar cases might occur in the future. However, it is necessary to ensure the safety of SDF troops, so introducing clear-cut weapon-use rules is absolutely necessary. (6) Koichi Kato's third force vision deadlocked SANKEI (Page 5) (Abridged) January 12, 2009 Shigeyuki Mizuuchi Former Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General Koichi Kato has toned down his attempt to trigger political realignment. That is because the Aso cabinet's support ratings have plummeted recently and also because it has become difficult to realize his plan to launch a third force to topple the power structures of the LDP and the Democratic Party of Japan prior to the next Lower House election. Even former LDP Vice President Taku Yamasaki, a close friend of Kato, has begun to admit that it may take a number of Lower House elections before political realignment is possible. Kato seems unable to determine when to make his move to trigger (political realignment). TOKYO 00000066 007 OF 010 On Jan. 10, Kato attended a New Year party in Sakata, Yamagata Prefecture, held by his support group. In the party, Kato criticized the DPJ for the first time in a long time, saying: "The DPJ consists of former Japan Socialist Party and LDP members and new candidates who could not join the LDP. The DPJ is like an LDP reflector (always opposing its policies) rather than a party that can do anything. Next year, there might be simultaneous elections for both chambers of the Diet. The political world may be realigned after a couple of Lower House elections over the next two or three years." The hall was void of posters of the LDP or Prime Minister Taro Aso. This reflects Kato's view that since Prime Minister SHINZO ABE and his successor Yasuo Fukuda have walked off the job, the LDP's loss of ability to govern has become apparent and that supporters' view toward the party has become severe. Hearing Kato's critical comment on the DPJ, an attendant said to himself: "Has the wind shifted?" Rejecting a request to support Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Kaoru Yosano in last September's LDP presidential election, Kato's stance indicated that he was not willing to prolong the life of the LDP. Frequently in contact with liberal members of the LDP and opposition parties, Kato has explored ways to break up the LDP and the DPJ by forming a third force. In mid-December, Kato, Yamasaki, DPJ Deputy President Naoto Kan, and the People's New Party Deputy Representative Shizuka Kamei frequently appeared on television programs as if to pave the way for political realignment. A liberal LDP lawmaker said, "Last fall, I was asked by Mr. Kamei, who shared Mr. Kato's wishes, to join the envisaged new party." But Kato has become cautious now that support rates for the Aso cabinet have nosedived. The DPJ has become upbeat, and President Ichiro Ozawa has urged anti-Aso LDP members to bolt the party to join the DPJ. Although former Administrative Reform Minister Yoshimi Watanabe is expected to leave the LDP, most party members remain cautious about bolting the party before the next Lower House election. A former cabinet minister predicted: "No one will follow Kato and Yamasaki, neither of whom left the party following the so-called Kato rebellion in 2000." Yamasaki, while attending a New Year's party of lawmakers from Kyushu on the night of Jan. 6, said: "I have had a change of heart and will work hard under the leadership of Prime Minister Taro Aso." Keeping a low profile before the next Lower House election, Kato for the time being plans to study post-election options for political realignment in cooperation with Yamasaki. (7) Editorial: Doubts about cash-benefit plan deepening MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) TOKYO 00000066 008 OF 010 January 9, 2009 As we expected, doubts are welling up about the government's cash-handout plan. Diet debate has moved into full swing with interpellations underway in the House of Representatives Budget Committee on the second supplementary budget for fiscal 2008. Prime Minister Taro Aso, in explaining the purpose of the flat-sum cash-payout plan included in the budget, said that in order to stimulate the economy, high-income earners should also receive the handouts and spend the cash. He avoided clarifying whether he himself would take the handout, even though he previously said that he would not. Since the prime minister, who is responsible for the plan, cannot even make his position clear, how can he explain the need for it to the public? The ruling parties intend to reject the opposition's request to remove the cash-payout plan from the supplementary budget. If the ruling coalition ends up forcing a vote on the budget, chaos will reign in the Diet, sidetracking debate on a package of economic measures. It goes without saying that the situation is critical. We had to tilt our head in doubt when Aso answered questions by Naoto Kan, deputy president of the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Citing the economic situation as a reason, Aso argued that the cash-handout program is needed now more than ever to stimulate consumption. He also stated that it would be desirable for high-income owners to receive the cash-payments, although he previously had been critical of such. The Aso administration cannot seem to decide whether the cash-payout program is part of its social security policy or an economic-stimulating measure. In addition, the administration has dumped the issue of whether to place income restrictions on the laps of local governments to decide. Aso's assertion that the cash-benefit plan is aimed to stimulate the economy indicates that the cash-benefit plan is half-baked. Since he has changed the purpose of the program, he should scrap the plan to dump the income matter on local governments. What we simply cannot understand, more than anything is Aso's refusal to answer the question whether he will receive a cash-payment, saying that he will make a decision after the budget clears the Diet. Although he underscored that decisions should be made by individuals, he is in a position different from other individuals as the prime minister who dreamed up the program. He is the one who once proudly expressed his intention to refuse a cash-handout, even before presenting the budget to the Diet. He has altered his position on the cash-benefit program because Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda urged the government to unify views so that lawmakers will be able to receive cash-handouts and because Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura then sided with Hosoda. Aso said: "The economic situation has substantially changed." But the government and ruling coalition have only shifted their response. Debate on the key issue of jobs has yet to move forward. Although the House of Councillors unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the government and businesses to keep people on the payrolls, such a measure is ineffective. Moreover, it was preceded by horse-trading between the ruling and opposition camps over the wording. It goes TOKYO 00000066 009 OF 010 without saying that such political maneuvering is quite different from the alarm that the public feels. The ruling camp aims to get the second supplementary budget through the Lower House on Jan. 13. If the opposition is ignored, the Diet will fall into confusion, and this will hurt deliberations on the state budget for fiscal 2009. In order to prevent further distrust in politics, Prime Minister Aso should accept the opposition's proposal of excluding the cash-payout program from the second extra budget for fiscal 2008. (8) TOP HEADLINES Asahi: Nishimura Construction suspected of giving 200 million yen to ex-Bangkok official Mainichi: Aso, Lee meet in Seoul, seek "new era" for relations Yomiuri, Sankei and Tokyo Shimbun: Aso, Lee agree to enhance cooperation between Japan, South Korea, U.S. to address North Korea issues; Cooperation on financial crisis also confirmed Nikkei: Market upheaval driving individuals back to bank deposits; Balance of time deposits increased 5.6 PERCENT from last year Akahata: "Dispatch-worker village" executive committee urges government, corporations to fulfill their responsibilities (9) EDITORIALS Asahi: (1) Japan and South Korea: Greater cooperation in international scene urged (2) New civil servant system essential Mainichi: (1) Japan-South Korea summit: Mature relationship vital (2) International Year of Astronomy 2009 Yomiuri: (1) Japan, South Korea must strengthen ties (2) Brain science requires basic research Nikkei: (1) Employment to test Obama administration's ability (2) A new era for Japan-South Korea relations Sankei: (1) Solid partnership essential for Japan, South Korea (2) Diabetics need improved diet and physical exercises Tokyo Shimbun: (1) Green New Deal requires specific strategy (2) Victims should be allowed to be called to the witness stand Akahata: (1) Children and education: JCP determined to make year 2009 a year TOKYO 00000066 010 OF 010 to question politics and bring hope to public (10) Prime Minister's schedule, January 11 NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) January 12, 2009 09:29 Departed for Seoul to hold meeting with South Korea President Lee Myung Bak. Noon Arrived at ROK Air Force base in Seoul. Offered flowers at the national cemetery. Attended luncheon party-hosted by four South Korean economic organizations. Afternoon Visited Hangyang University's fusion technology center. Took part in gathering of Japanese and South Korean high-school students and exchanged views with them. Night Held informal talks with President Lee at Blue House (presidential office). Held along with Lee with business leaders from two countries. Attended dinner party hosted by Lee. Stated at Lotte Hotel. Prime Minister's schedule, January 12 NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) January 13, 2009 Morning Held summit meeting with President Lee at Blue House. Held joint press conference. Met at Lotte Hotel with ROK-Japan Parliamentarians' League Chairman Lee Sang Duk. Afternoon Left ROK Air Force base in Seoul. 15:27 Arrived at Haneda Airport. 15:34 Met with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto and Cabinet Public Relations Secretary Ogawa. 16:53 Appeared on Fuji TV program. 18:24 Signed in to report his return at Imperial Palace. 18:40 Met with Matsumoto at Okura Hotel. 20:50 Returned to his private residence Kamiyama-cho. SCHIEFFER