U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL COORDINATION (MARCH 19) ON DPRK TD2 LAUNCH

S E C R E T TOKYO 000633





NOFORN



OSD/APSA FOR SEDNEY/HELVEY/BASALLA/GEIS

PACOM FOR J00/J01/J3/J5/FPA

JOINT STAFF FOR J3/J5

USFJ FOR J00/J01/J02/J2/J3/J5

CIA PASS ODNI



E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION

TAGS: PREL, PARM, MARR, PINR, KN, KS, JA



SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL COORDINATION (MARCH 19) ON

DPRK TD2 LAUNCH



REF: A. TOKYO 00445

B. TOKYO 00446

C. TOKYO 00579



Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 (

b/d)



1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The CDA and U.S. Forces, Japan Deputy

Commander joined Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs

Bessho in co-chairing on March 19 the first full meeting of

an informal interagency group to coordinate actions

associated with the anticipated DPRK launch of a Taepodong-2

missile. After an intelligence and operational update, the

two sides exchanged views on the mechanics of bilateral

coordination and the flow of information across policy,

military and intelligence channels. The Japanese side

acknowledged the need to lower public expectations that

ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) could intercept TD2

debris, but noted that countering media speculation is

hampered by the sensitivity of discussing BMD system

capabilities. Following a launch, senior-level bilateral

engagement, and perhaps trilateral if South Korea is

included, will be needed to show the public and international

community the close, ongoing coordination between allies.

The Cabinet Secretariat will have the lead on messaging,

which will include a condemnation and indication that the

DPRK is in violation of UNSCR 1718. It will be critically

important for the United States to provide quick and detailed

information to Japan on the status of the missile and payload

quickly after launch so Japan can deploy the appropriate

public affairs strategy, DVM Bessho noted. End summary.



2. (S/NF) CDA Zumwalt and USFJ Deputy Commander BGen Toolan

co-chaired with Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Koro

Bessho the first full meeting of an informal interagency

group gathered to coordinate bilaterally actions ahead of the

anticipated launch of a TD2 missile by North Korea. The U.S.

side included representation from various USFJ directorates

and the Embassy,s Political, Public Affairs, Defense

Attache, and National Geospatial Agency sections and the

Director for National Intelligence representative. The Japan

side included Director-General and General Officer

representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat (Foreign Affairs

and National Security/Crisis Management),Cabinet

Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO),Ministry of Foreign

Affairs (Foreign Policy, North American Affairs, Asian and

Oceanic Affairs, and Intelligence and Analysis Bureaus),

Ministry of Defense (Defense Policy Bureau),Joint Staff

Office (JSO) J3 (Operations) and the Japan Defense

Intelligence Headquarters (JDIH).



Intelligence and Operations Update

--------------



3. (S/NF) The Embassy's DNI Representative and an NGA

representative started off the meeting by using releasable to

Japan imagery slides to provide an overview of the DPRK's

launch preparation activities from the end of January to the

present.



4. (S/NF) JSO J3 Lt. General Kazuya Hayashi followed with a

very short, general operational brief on Japan Self Defense

Forces preparations. LTG Hayashi stated that Japan has three

Aegis ships, two with ballistic missile interceptors. Two

ships will be stationed in the Sea of Japan and one east of

Japan. BGen Toolan asked if the JSDF had any plans for PAC-3

deployment, to which LTG Hayashi answered that no decision

has been made. USFJ highlighted that U.S. assets deployed

for the TD2 launch will be focused on U.S. homeland defense.

U.S. forces will continue routine coordination with the JSDF

and will share BMD data as part of normal operations.



5. (S/NF) In contrast to LTG Hayashi's bare bones

presentation, the JSO has provided USFJ and PACOM

counterparts detailed plans on deployment locations of Aegis

vessels, deployment of PAC-3 firing units near the likely

missile flight path and other operational data. We assess

that LTG Hayashi and the JSDF and MOD were unwilling to

provide any operational information in front of the MOFA or

Cabinet Secretariat representatives.



Bilateral Policy Coordination Structure

--------------



6. (S/NF) Both sides agreed that routine bilateral military,

intelligence and policy coordination via existing channels

will continue. Specific to the DPRK missile launch, mil-mil

coordination will occur via informal Bilateral Coordination

Centers (BCC),to be activated on a 24/7 basis upon stacking

of the missile; U.S. forces will interact as needed with

other relevant Japanese ministries and agencies via the

peacetime Coordination Liaison Forum; and this informal

DG-level interagency group, sometimes referred to as the

"Azabudai Group," will engage in policy coordination.



Information Flows

--------------



7. (S/NF) MOD Defense Policy DG Nobushige Takamizawa

explained that MOD's Central Command Post would send

information immediately after a launch over an automated

messaging system to the Cabinet Secretariat, MOFA and select

other ministries and agencies. CIRO Director Hideshi Mitani

explained that the CIRO will set up a situation room for

interagency and bilateral intelligence sharing from 0900 on

April 4, two hours before the start of the DPRK-announced

launch window. This situation room will be part of the

Crisis Management Center (CMC) that the Cabinet Secretariat

will stand up at the Prime Minister's Official Residence

(Kantei). The CMC, where DVM Bessho said he will be

following the launch, will serve as the primary venue for

information sharing across Japanese government agencies.

USFJ provided the Japan side with USFJ's phone tree and plan

for notification to the Embassy and the JSO. BGen Toolan and

the DNI Representative emphasized the importance of using

secure communication and data systems to convey classified

information.



8. (S/NF) DVM Bessho noted that while more discussion is

needed on the exact information flows and points of contact

between MOFA and the Embassy, the key will be showing the

Japanese public and international community that the U.S. and

Japan are closely coordinating following a launch. Both

sides agreed to complete work on a bilateral point of contact

list for overall management, intelligence, political-military

issues, diplomatic coordination, public affairs, etc. as soon

as possible.



Handling the Media and Managing Public Expectations

-------------- --------------



9. (S/NF) The CDA asked about Japan's strategy for managing

public expectations, noting recent detailed news articles

quoting named and unnamed government officials about Japan's

plans to engage objects, whether an errant missile or debris,

heading for Japan. DVM Bessho expressed his concerns about

the "overheated" media coverage, asserting that government

officials are trying to convey low key and cautious messages

to discourage hyped stories. The government is in a

quandary, however, as it cannot discuss BMD capabilities

without getting into sensitive details. The government needs

to balance the need to protect such information while working

to reduce speculative media reporting



10. (S/NF) MOD DG Takamizawa assessed the media stories to

be based on the 2006 North Korean missile tests, augmented by

speculation. He noted that the Liberal Democratic Party

(LDP) Defense Caucus are genuinely worried about DPRK's

missile shot and are pressing for MOD to provide more

information on the launch, Japan's actions to prevent it and

sanctions that Japan will seek afterwards. The CDA pointed

out that it is not possible to bifurcate messages, as the

DPRK is also an audience of whatever Japan says to its

public. DVM Bessho agreed, noting that mentioning sanctions

could jeopardize other courses of action.



11. (S/NF) MOFA DG Umemoto said the Diet is in session and

the government is facing increasing numbers of questions

about how it plans to deal with the launch. He asked about

how much the United States would be able to discuss its

capabilities. BGen Toolan suggested that one way to manage

expectations is to note that BMD systems are designed

specifically to shoot down ballistic missiles, not debris.



U.S. Military Response to Media Flyovers

--------------



12. (S/NF) CIRO Director Mitani asked what the U.S.

military's response would be to Japanese media helicopters or

airplanes flying close to U.S. vessels in the Sea of Japan.

USFJ J3 Col. Zobrist said the U.S. Navy would adhere to all

International Civil Aviation Organization rules governing

aircraft and the open seas, but would also look to the

Government of Japan for guidance on how to prevent such an

occurrence.



Senior-Level Communication

--------------



13. (S/NF) It is important that the public sees the U.S. and

Japanese communicating, at the leadership and foreign

minister-level, very soon after the DPRK launch, DVM Bessho

stated. Japan supports the idea of including the Republic of

Korea into this process, but is still considering how.

Ambassador Fujisaki will also likely call on relevant senior

officials in Washington DC. It will also be important for

the U.S. Embassy to be seen engaged with the Japanese Cabinet

and relevant parts of the government, DVM Bessho noted. The

U.S. side noted USFJ leadership's readiness to participate in

meetings or events, if that would be beneficial to a public

response. DVM Bessho expressed appreciation and took it

under consideration.



Public Messaging

--------------



14. (S/NF) The Cabinet Secretariat will have the lead on

developing the public messages, DVM Bessho continued. Any

public message will include a condemnation and a legal

assessment that the DPRK is in violation UNSCR 1718, even if

the launch is an attempt to place a satellite into space. It

will be necessary to fine tune this message and to have

multiple versions, depending on when the launch occurred,

what was launched, whether it flew over Japan and

whether/where it impacts. Japan would soon provide some

draft press lines to the United States, DVM Bessho stated,

while noting that Japan would be looking to the United States

to quickly provide Japan with detailed information on the

missile and any satellite deployment. DVM Bessho said

advance coordination is necessary so Tokyo, Washington and

Seoul convey the same message. The CDA agreed, adding that

the message should also highlight how the respective

Alliances responded, perhaps by highlighting cooperation in

areas like information sharing.



Retrieving the Booster

--------------



15. (S/NF) CIRO Director Mitani asked if there would be

interest in recovering the TD2's first stage to study it for

insight into DPRK's missile program. The group decided this

would be something to think about.



16. (S/NF) NOTE: The meeting was held in a secure, shielded

controlled access conference room in the basement of MOFA's

"New Building" where the MOFA Intelligence and Analysis

Service is located. According to MOFA interlocutors, this

was the first time for foreign government representatives,

and apparently many of the Japanese participants to be

allowed access to the facility. MOFA counterparts said the

facility included an operation center with computers and

other equipment to allow cross-bureau work when there is a

crisis.



17. (S/NF) This message was cleared by USFJ, the Embassy's

DNI Representative, and the Defense Attache.

ZUMWALT





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