JMSDF DEPARTS ON ANTI-PIRACY MISSION - WHAT'S NEXT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000610 SIPDIS STATE PM FOR AMBASSADOR MULL STATE PM/PPA FOR GLANCY, HOPKINS, FOSTER, AND O'KEEFE STATE PM/ISO FOR FREDERICK STATE EEB/TRA FOR JOHN BYERLY AND STEPHEN MILLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2019 TAGS: ELTN EWWT MOPS PBTS PGOV PHSA PINR PREL PTER JA SUBJECT: JMSDF DEPARTS ON ANTI-PIRACY MISSION - WHAT'S NEXT? REF: A. 16 MAR 2009 EMBASSY TOKYO DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT ¶B. 08 TOKYO 3535 ¶C. 13 MAR 2009 EMBASSY TOKYO DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT ¶D. 5 MAR 2009 EMBASSY TOKYO DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT ¶E. 08 TOKYO 3405 ¶F. TOKYO 0472 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, a.i. JAMES P. ZUMWALT, REASONS 1.4(B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Two Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) destroyers departed Japan on March 14 bound for the Horn of Africa (HOA) region on an anti-piracy mission. The vessels will operate independently from CTF-151 and other multi-national efforts in the region, but will interact closely with other navies on logisitics and communications. Although initially bound to protect only Japanese vessels or ships carrying Japanese goods, strong public support for the mission bodes well for passage of a new law broadening the JMSDF's mission. While operations experts continue to finalize logistical in-theater arrangements for the deployment, JMSDF vessels steam towards what is one of their most significant operations since their establishment. End Summary. -------------- -- Ships Depart, Strong Public Support For Mission -------------- -- ¶2. (C) At a 14 March ceremony prior to the departure of two JMSDF destroyers bound for a Horn of Africa anti-piracy mission, PM Aso told the sailors that the task before them was "unprecedented" and said he was "confident" that the mission would help solve the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia (ref A). The destroyers are expected to make a brief port call in Singapore on 21 March and hope to arrive in the HOA region on approximately 29 March, commencing escorting operations on 30 March. Significantly, each of the JMSDF vessels also embarked four crewmembers from the Japan Coast Guard, a first for Japan. ¶3. (C) Recent public opinion surveys indicate significant support among Japanese citizens for anti-piracy operations, potentially facilitating rapid passage of the new bill. More than 63 percent of the Japanese public support Self-Defense Forces participation in anti-piracy operations, according to a government survey conducted in January 2009. The survey showed even higher support for anti-piracy missions among citizens in their 20s, with more than 71 percent saying they believe the SDF should take part. With approximately 1800 responses, the survey also indicated strong support for the SDF in general, with nearly 81 percent saying they have a "good impression" of the Japanese armed services. -------------- New Legislation and JMSDF Rules of Engagment TOKYO 00000610 002 OF 004 -------------- ¶4. (C) Japan does not currently have a domestic law specifically outlawing piracy (ref B) and, as such, the destroyers will initially be operating under the legal authority of the Martime Security Operations of Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces law. As such, the JMSDF will be limited to protecting ships either owned by Japanese firms or with Japanese interests on board, i.e., Japanese citizens or cargo bound for Japan. (Note: While the JMSDF will be initially limited to securing Japanese interests and will operate independently from CTF-151, MOFA and MOD contacts say that Japan will/will be able to share information on pirate activities with other naval vessels operating in the region. End note.) PM Aso, in his speech at the departure ceremony, vowed to expand the role of the destroyers by speeding passage of anti-piracy legislation, which was approved by the Cabinet on 13 March (ref C) and is expected to be submitted to the Diet by the end of March. The most significant element of the new law would authorize the JMSDF to protect third country commercial vessels in addition to Japanese ships. ¶5. (C) Ministry of Defense (MOD) interlocutors note that while the new legislation would relax the rules under which the recently dispatched destroyers will operate, they emphasize that there will still be some significant limitations even if the new law passes. Under the current rules of engagement, the JMSDF is authorized to shoot at suspected pirate ships that do not obey initial orders to cease an approach or attack on a commercial vessel. The new legislation will maintain this authorization but not permit the JMSDF to fire directly at pirates themselves (ref D), potentially limiting the effectiveness of JMSDF interdiction activities. ¶6. (C) Other parts of the new legislation identify the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) as the primary anti-piracy agency, although the JMSDF can be dispatched on the authority of the Prime Minister if the situation warrants it. JCG and JMSDF officers say that because of the JMSDF's greater operational capability, any mission significantly far from Japan or requiring naval firepower will almost certainly require the JMSDF's leadership. Without the addition of more powerful, long-range vessels, the JCG's international anti-piracy interaction will likely be limited to the training it conducts with coast guards from Indonesia, Yemen, and elswhere. ¶7. (C) While passage of the new legislation is far from certain given Japan's continuing political turmoil and the resitance within some opposition parties to any overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces, strong public support of the mission and the acknowledged need to contribute (ref E) bode well for the bill's chances. Moreover, the bill enjoys the support of defense experts within the main opposition TOKYO 00000610 003 OF 004 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),three members of which attended the 14 March departure ceremony. Confusion surrounding corruption allegations against DPJ leader Ozawa may further limit the intensity of opposition that the DPJ can muster. -------------- Logistical Issues Still Being Worked Out -------------- ¶8. (C) Japanese vessels are en route to the HOA region, but many of the logistical issues to support the ships are still being worked out, Joint Staff Office (JSO) International Cooperation Office Chief Colonel Mitsuhiko Horikiri said in a recent brief to Embassy Tokyo. As an example, Horikiri noted that while it would be ideal for the destroyers to receive fuel from JMSDF tankers operating in the region supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),Horikiri said he was concerned whether this would be contrary to the tankers' mission and, as such, violate Japan's anti-terror law. Japan "still has a lot of homework," Horikiri emphasized, adding that he and his staff were also deeply engaged in solving the challenges of Japan's proposed dispatch of P-3 aircraft to Djibouti (ref F) as well as what actions to take if and when Japan should arrest and take pirates into custody. -------------- Comment: Significance to Japan -------------- ¶9. (C) Japan's departure for the Horn of Africa region is significant not so much for the actual contribution that two destroyers (and potentially one or two P-3s in a few months) will make toward interdicting pirates, but rather for the number of "firsts" that this mission represents. This is the first mission in the history of the Self-Defense Forces where Japanese military will be working side-by-side with Japan Coast Guard officials, a scenario that many of our contacts doubted would be feasible even two months ago. In addition, should plans for dispatch of P-3s to the region prove to be successful, MOD contacts say they envision possible joint operations with the JGSDF in a force protection role. Interaction and communication between the historically stovepiped services is often very limited, making joint operations of this nature rare. It is also a first for the JMSDF to conduct extensive operations so far from Japan's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. ¶10. (C) Initially limited by current legislation in its ability to protect other nations' commercial vessels, the anti-piracy mission presents opportunities for the JMSDF to interact with navies from around the world that is unprecedented in its scale. Sharing information and coordinating logistical interactions in a large-scale, multi-national environment will provide the JMSDF with invaluable experience that heretofore has been difficult, if TOKYO 00000610 004 OF 004 not impossible, for Japan to realize. The mission has also, perhaps unintentionally, created a situation that will benefit the JMSDF (and the rest of the Self-Defense Forces) in future operations. Success in anti-piracy operations will not, in itself, lead directly to an SDF presence in more dangerous ground operations nor to a long-overdue debate on collective self-defense. It is, however, a significant step for Japan's international contributions and should be viewed first and foremost in this light. ZUMWALT