Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TOKYO603
2009-03-18 09:10:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPAN: CRITICAL FOREIGN DEPENDENCIES

Tags:  PTER PGOV ASEC EFIN ENRG KCIP JA 
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VZCZCXRO3311
PP RUEHCHI RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHPB RUEHRN
DE RUEHKO #0603/01 0770910
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 180910Z MAR 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1585
INFO RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION PRIORITY
RUEHSS/OECD POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 3036
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA PRIORITY 0798
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 5376
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 6828
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 3580
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000603 

C O R R E C T E D COPY - ADDED CAPTION

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR S/CT:SRCLARK, SGROBERTSON, EAP/J:MJACKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC EFIN ENRG KCIP JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN: CRITICAL FOREIGN DEPENDENCIES

REF: A. STATE 15113

B. STATE 6461

C. 08 TOKYO 727

TOKYO 00000603 001.4 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000603 C O R R E C T E D COPY - ADDED CAPTION SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR S/CT:SRCLARK, SGROBERTSON, EAP/J:MJACKSON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC EFIN ENRG KCIP JA SUBJECT: JAPAN: CRITICAL FOREIGN DEPENDENCIES REF: A. STATE 15113 ¶B. STATE 6461 ¶C. 08 TOKYO 727 TOKYO 00000603 001.4 OF 002 ¶1. (U) This is an action request, see para 6. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: Japan is deeply dependent on key infrastructure sectors and, given the depth of the U.S.-Japan economic and security relationships, a major disruption here would likely have immediate consequences in the U.S. Embassy Tokyo sees future areas where the U.S. and Japan could exchange views on critical infrastructure, possibly building on the annual event organized by Vanderbilt University's Jim Auer. With respect to ref A list of Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) in Japan, see Post comments below. End summary. Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources in Japan -------------- - ¶3. (SBU) Post concurs with the list contained in ref A for Japan and would note the following: -- ICT (Information and Communications Technology) Infrastructure: Post concurs with listing of undersea cable landings and, without approaching GOJ officials, offers no additional items. However, the focus on hard infrastructure neglects softer components critical to the functioning of the ICT grid. Other additional areas bearing on U.S. public or private interests include: cyber-security, information/data security and integrity, and public confidence in the Internet and the digital economy. -- Transportation Infrastructure: Post concurs with listing the ports of Kobe, Nagoya and Yokohama, but suggests striking Chiba (likely reference to port of Tokyo) and adding the ports of Tokyo and Osaka. Japan's major airports are also a critical link for cargo as well as passenger traffic, with Narita Airport handling more U.S.-Japan trade by value than any maritime port. We suggest adding Tokyo (Narita) and Kansai airports to the list. -- Industrial Inputs: Post has no basis to assess degree of dependence or criticality of industrial inputs. We suspect cross-dependencies between U.S. and Japanese industries are far more extensive than those items listed. Industry is in a better position, however, to identify and mitigate risks in these private sector processes. Post anticipates industry would be reluctant to openly discuss such vulnerabilities and suggests a more effective approach is to consider what (dis)incentives industry has to protect its own critical processes. -- Financial Infrastructure: Financial systems in Japan, the world's second largest economy, are also critical to U.S. interests as well as the function and integrity of international financial and payment systems. CI/KR Authority and Coordination -------------- ¶4. (U) Responsibility for critical infrastructure in Japan rests with the Prime Minister, with general coordination by the Disaster Management Office. Resources, authority, and expertise over infrastructure sectors in question, though, are held by relevant line ministries. Response assets belong to other entities, including Defense, police, and local authorities. ¶5. (SBU) Concerning risks to infrastructure and systems in Japan, Post offers a few observations. Japan is highly dependent on imports: the country imports roughly 96 percent of its energy needs and over 60 percent of its food. Between 1996 and 2005, 20.8 percent of the world's major earthquakes (magnitude 6.0 or greater) occurred in Japan, and Mount Fuji, located about an hour's drive from Tokyo, is considered active. Japan's concentrated urban populations and dependence on mass transit increase vulnerability to a potential pandemic, although excellent public sanitation and medical care mitigate the vulnerability, lower risk relative to other Asian countries. And while the current economic difficulties were triggered primarily by events in the U.S., Japan's exports and GDP have been far harder hit than those of the U.S. TOKYO 00000603 002.4 OF 002 ¶6. (SBU) Action Request: Post notes the point in last year's report regarding plans "to engage constructively with foreign governments to mitigate vulnerabilities." Post also notes the report listed Japan as Category 1 (countries with which the United States is currently, or has previously engaged in critical infrastructure protection programs not directly related to the critical asset/system or asset system's sector). Request Department clarify these programs or activities. Mission notes that a general exchange with Japan on critical infrastructure could be valuable, but should not be limited to security. ZUMWALT

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