PRE-COORDINATION WITH JAPAN ON POSSIBLE DPRK TD2

S E C R E T TOKYO 000579 NOFORN OSD/APSA FOR SEDNEU/HELVEY/BASALLA/GEIS PACOM FOR J00/J01/J3/J5/FPA JOINT STAFF FOR J3/J5 USFJ FOR J00/J01/J02/J2/J3/J5 CIA PASS ODNI E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PARM MARR KN KS JA SUBJECT: PRE-COORDINATION WITH JAPAN ON POSSIBLE DPRK TD2 LAUNCH REF: A. TOKYO 00445 ¶B. TOKYO 00446 Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 ( b/d) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The CDA and the U.S. Forces Japan Deputy Commander met on March 12 with Directors-General from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense as well as General/Flag Officers from the Japan Joint Staff Office and agreed on the need for bilateral coordination, information sharing and security, and coordinated public messaging ahead of an announced missile launch by the DPRK. The MOD Directors-General explained that Japan would attempt to intercept any object destined for Japan that would cause damage, but did not have the legal or physical capability to intercept anything overflying Japan. MOFA DG Umemoto noted the ""standing request"" Japan has for the United States to intercept objects from space that would hit Japan and asked about U.S. intentions. USFJ noted the current assessment is that the launch would involve a TD-2 test or space vehicle launch, not a missile directed against Japan. Patriot batteries in Japan, not Aegis BMD ships with SM-3 interceptors, would be most capable of dealing with debris. Both sides agreed to hold weekly bilateral DG-level interagency policy coordination meetings beginning on March ¶19. End summary. ¶2. (S) The CDA, joined by the U.S. Forces, Japan, (USFJ) Deputy Commander and members of the Country Team, met on March 12 with Directors-General (DG) from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Defense (MOD),as well as General/Flag Officers from the Japan Joint Staff Office (JSO),to discuss the modalities of bilateral coordination, information sharing, responses to various scenarios and the necessity for coordinated public messaging in preparation for a possible Taepodong-2 (TD-2) or other rocket launch by the DPRK. Bilateral Coordination Structure -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) After reviewing the formal Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM) and the entities within that structure, both sides agreed that the expected upcoming DPRK missile launch appears to not warrant a formal declaration of a Situation in the Area Surrounding Japan (SIASJ) or an attack on Japan that would trigger formal standing up the BCM. Both sides also agreed, however, on the need for mil-mil coordination, interaction with other relevant ministries and agencies on technical issues, and policy coordination. ¶4. (S/NF) The Deputy Commander of USFJ noted that routine mil-mil coordination continues as U.S. forces and JSDF monitor and share information on DPRK preparation activities. If the DPRK stacks a missile on the launch pad, USFJ will set-up a round-the-clock entity to monitor the situation. USFJ will invite JSO liaison officers to that entity and expects to send officers to a similar JSO entity. USFJ and JSO have already begun cross training liaison officers to ensure efficient communication and information sharing. USFJ proposed using the existing peacetime Coordination Liaison Forum to engage with relevant Japanese ministries and agencies on technical issues, such as air space access or frequency allocation, as necessary. ¶5. (S/NF) MOFA North American Affairs DG Kazuyoshi Umemoto noted the importance of policy and public message coordination, which will require timely and accurate operational and intelligence information sharing, both bilaterally and within the Government of Japan. MOFA Foreign Policy Deputy Director General Masafumi Ishii proposed having weekly bilateral DG-level interagency policy coordination meetings that would include representatives from at least MOFA, MOD, the Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) and JSO. The CDA and USFJ Commander would lead the U.S. side, which would include relevant Embassy and USFJ representatives. The meetings would be informal and, if discovered by the media, would be described as routine bilateral discussions on issues of mutual interest. The two sides agreed to have the first meeting on March 19. ¶6. (S/NF) While noting that bilateral information sharing had improved, DG Umemoto expressed frustration that bilateral coordination deficiencies identified after the 2006 DPRK missile tests still remained and suggested that the bilateral Roles, Missions and Capabilities Working Group work to rectify those deficiencies. Embassy Political Minister-Counselor noted the progress on information sharing on missile defense, while pointing out that Japan was still not able to come to the aid of U.S. ships engaged in the defense of Japan and suggested that this too needs more bilateral engagement. Information Flow and Security -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) USFJ Deputy Commander described the secure data communication and voice links between USFJ and JSO, as well as between USFJ and the Embassy, that USFJ would use to convey information on a launch. A representative from the Embassy's Director for National Intelligence (DNI)office described how intelligence and analysis would flow in intelligence channels among the DNI Representative Office, the Defense Attache, the Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters and CIRO. Both USFJ and the DNI representative stated the importance of protecting the classified information by only using secure communication lines. The U.S. side also pointed out the importance of information from the military and intelligence agencies flowing quickly and accurately to policy makers across the government and up to senior levels. DG Umemoto lamented that MOFA still lacks the ability to communicate securely outside of its building and is looking forward to receiving in April the secure telecommunication equipment it purchased from the United States. Both sides agreed to exchange issue-focused primary and secondary points of contact by the next meeting on March ¶19. Response to a DPRK Launch -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) MOFA DG Umemoto noted that, different from 2006 -- when Japan was only able to monitor a DRPK launch -- Japan now has a ballistic missile defense system. This presents new challenges and Japan needs to have processes in place to deal with the launch as well as the questioning that will occur afterwards. MOD Defense Policy DG Nobushige Takamizawa explained that if a missile, debris or other object is heading for Japanese territory, the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) will attempt to intercept it. MOD does not currently assess that North Korea will launch medium-range Nodong or intermediate-range Musudon missiles and is currently only preparing to deploy maritime assets to monitor the TD-2 and try to deal with any debris that might hit Japan in the event of a launch failure. Japan does not have the legal authority or capability to intercept a successful DPRK space launch. Some political leaders believe Japan should intercept objects flying over Japan and do not understand that the BMD system Japan deploys does not have this capability, according to DG Takamizawa. ¶9. (S/NF) MOD Defense Operations DG Tokuchi presented the legal basis for JSDF to act against an object heading towards Japan. Article 76 (Defense Operations) of the Self Defense Law calls for the Prime Minister to issue a Defense Operations Order to the JSDF when Japan is identified to be under or imminently under attack. Article 82-2(1) calls for the Minister of Defense to issue a Destruct Order upon approval of the Prime Minister when a nation is preparing to or stated it will launch a ballistic missile, but has not indicated its exact intentions. In this case, Japan would not consider itself under attack but would still have the legal basis to deploy the SDF to intercept. MOD does not assess the current situation to match those scenarios and hence these parts of the SDF Law would not apply. ¶10. (S/NF) However, Article 82-2(3) allows that when an object, not specifically identified as a ballistic missile, might fly over or fall on Japan, the Defense Minister may issue a Destruct Order in advance, DG Tokuchi continued. This order, in accordance with the Emergency Response Procedure approved by the Prime Minister, would provide the JSDF Air Defense Commander, responsible for BMD in Japan, with the authority to issue an intercept order. Implementation of Article 76 and Article 82-2(1) requires the Cabinet to meet and notify the public, while issuing of a time-limited destruct order under Article 82-2(3) does not require notification to the public. MOD DG Takamizawa noted that the government, however, is not prohibited from informing the public and may find it necessary to show the public the deployment of the JSDF's BMD assets. MOFA DG Umemoto suggested the message should be that SDF assets are monitoring and ready to intercept, if necessary. ¶11. (S/NF) DG Umemoto asked what the United States plans to do to monitor the launch and to deal with debris headed toward Japan, as well as how U.S. forces would be coordinating such action with the JSDF. USFJ stated that according to current intelligence, the U.S. is assessing the launch to be a TD-2 test or space vehicle launch, not a missile directed against Japan. USFJ noted that SM-3's on Aegis BMD ships would likely not be capable of engaging debris or an out of control object heading for Japan and that it would be up to Patriot systems at the terminal stage to deal with the falling object. MOD DG Takamizawa acknowledged this but noted that international and domestic political sensitivities to deploying Patriot units outside of Japan Air Self Defense Force bases. DG Umemoto reminded the meeting participants that United States has a ""standing request"" from Japan to explain US policy on intercepting objects from space heading for Japan. (NOTE: This is a reference to a note verbale Japan provided the United States in 2005 when the United States started deploying BMD assets to Japan. Embassy Tokyo's files no longer have a copy of the note. End note.) Public Messaging and Agenda for Next Meeting -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) Both sides agreed on the need to coordinate on public messaging in particular because there will be heavy Japanese public scrutiny on what actions Japan takes, or does not take, and on the extent of coordination with the United States. Discussion on this, along with an operations and intelligence update, review of policy issues and continued examination of scenarios and responses, will be on the agenda for the inaugural bilateral interagency informal coordination meeting on March 19, the two sides concluded. ZUMWALT