FORMER JAPANESE OFFICIAL'S VIEWS ON NPT REVIEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000512 SENSITIVE SIPDIS ISN/MNSA FOR SCOTT DAVIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019 TAGS: AORC KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV UNGA IAEA NPT JA SUBJECT: FORMER JAPANESE OFFICIAL'S VIEWS ON NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE ISSUES REF: STATE 6970 Classified By: CDA James P. Zumwalt, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Econoff met March 4 with Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe, head of the MOFA-affiliated Center for the Promotion of Nonproliferation and Disarmament (CPNPD) to discuss Japan's position on the 2010 NPT review conference. Abe said Japan understands "nothing gets accomplished at the conferences" and noted Japan's main goal is to avoid an appearance of failure that would negatively affect non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in other fora. In a wide ranging discussion, Abe provided thoughts on the questions posed in ref, as well as suggestions for ways to overcome previous NPT conference problems. These included sending a more senior level representative to address non-weapons state skepticism, strengthening safeguards funding to maintain IAEA capabilities, and helping developing countries with civil nuclear energy, in order to reduce incentives and excuses for those countries to develop indigenous fuel cycles. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Japan Wants Good Atmosphere but No Specific Goals for NPT Revcon -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Econoff met March 4 with Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe, head of the MOFA-affiliated Center for the Promotion of Nonproliferation and Disarmament (CPNPD) to discuss Japan's position on the 2010 NPT review conference. Abe is a former MOFA Director General for Disarmament who, in addition to directing the CPNPD, is a member of the board advising the Australia-Japan International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament and a special assistant to the Foreign Minister. While not the authoritative statement of the GOJ positions, Abe's comments, given the influence of former officials in Japan, likely reflect the thinking at senior levels of the GOJ. ¶3. (C) According to Abe, the most important outcome for the conference is to avoid the appearance of failure. He noted while "everyone knows nothing gets accomplished at the conferences", the resulting feeling of success or failure has implications for disarmament and non-proliferation efforts conducted in other venues. ¶4. (C) Abe discussed how to avoid the difficulties experienced at the 2005 Conference, specifically the gap 
between the weapons and non-weapons states on the relative importance of disarmament versus non-proliferation and Egypt's dissent relating to the Middle East situation. Abe stated progress on disarmament should be "paid back" by progress on non-proliferation. However, he wondered whether such progress could actually be achieved. He noted Japan ultimately wants to see progress on both issues, but progress does not have to happen in the review conference. It could happen independently between Washington and Moscow, or in Geneva related to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Thus, Japan has no specific goals for the NPT Conference, other than to support progress in these other arenas. ¶5. (C) Abe expects the weapon states will want to make a clear, strong statement confirming their commitment under Article 6. However, because they have done this several times previously, it likely will not hold as much weight with the non-weapons states. Abe noted a U.S. assistant secretary usually makes the USG presentation at the Conference and suggested that for the U.S. to be taken seriously, a more senior, political official should attend, perhaps the Secretary herself. Such a step would, in Abe's view, help improve the atmosphere between the weapon states and non-weapon states. ¶6. (C) Abe also discussed possible actions for some of the sub-committees that are to be established. Regarding the Verifications and Safeguards Committee, he suggested that given increased demands on the IAEA safeguards mission, it is important parties agree to strengthen safeguards to maintain existing competence levels. Abe noted since some countries object to the idea of strengthening safeguards beyond current levels, this action may have to be couched in different terms, perhaps along the lines of "maintaining" adequate safeguards capability. The Peaceful Use Committee should discuss the multilateral fuel cycle idea; the creation of a successful but still voluntary program in this area would help identify and single out those "problem countries" still determined to create their own fuel cycles. -------------- Response to Questions in Ref -------------- ¶7. (C) On the issue of parties violating and withdrawing from the treaty, the idea of an extraordinary session in case of withdrawal is worth pursuing, as it is a shame, Amb. Abe said, that review conferences can occur as if nothing happened in the time between their occurrence. ¶8. (C) Regarding universality, Abe said parties must continue to try to get India, Israel, and Pakistan to join the NPT, but this has been made even more difficult by the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation deal, as India has no reason left to consider joining the NPT. The real question is what to do about Israel. Egypt will remain dissatisfied with the lack of a UNSC resolution on a nuclear free zone in the Middle East and, absent any progress on such a resolution, will likely create problems. ¶9. (C) Abe said a Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol (AP) should be made mandatory, but doing so will not be easy because the non-aligned movement will be determined to object. In this context, it may be useful to reverse NAM tactics and ask those states when they would be prepared to accept the AP as a standard. ¶10. (C) The issue of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities is tied to that of the multilateral approach to the fuel cycle, Abe stated. Some countries resent the multinational approach as a challenge to the "inalienable rights" to peaceful nuclear energy stated in the NPT. But, Abe suggested, the NPT does not specify that those rights apply to enrichment, merely to the benefits of nuclear energy, which might be made obtainable from a multilateral fuel cycle. Certainly, work towards a national fuel cycle should not be used to hide hidden intentions related to weapons development. To address this issue, developed countries, Abe continued, should facilitate developing countries access to the benefits of nuclear energy, including medical applications, so that they have less incentive to make this argument. The effort should include support with the safety and security aspects of nuclear power. ¶11. (C) On obligations under the treaty to pursue negotiations related to disarmament, Abe said non-weapons states can "make noises" on this issue, but the onus is on weapons states to deliver. There is resistance from Russia on the inclusion of non-strategic weapons in any disarmament regime because of the difficulty in verifying non-strategic arms reductions. However, Abe believes this issue must be overcome because China sees little difference between strategic and non-strategic weapons, and will not be willing to move on disarmament if non-strategic weapons are not addressed. ¶12. (C) Abe believes entry into force of the CTBT would have a positive impact on disarmament efforts, not so much perhaps in regards to the U.S. and Russia, which no longer need testing, but on China, India, and Pakistan, which would be affected more by the ban. Similarly, Abe suggested, FMCT negotiations would also strongly affect China, India, and Pakistan, especially if parties could declare a moratorium on fissile material production during the negotiations period. ¶13. (C) Abe said transparency in forces and policies is not an issue for the conference. The NAM countries and possibly Russia will ask for disarmament with verification. But China will remain difficult on transparency, as it continues to see ambiguity as benefiting the weaker state. On the issue of a no-first use policy, Japan cannot accept a requirement of no-first use, because Japan's defense depends on strategic ambiguity on the part of the U.S. on this issue. Abe questioned whether China's no-first use policy really had any meaning and suggested it might be useful to ask China if it could demonstrate in any meaningful physical way how that policy is enforced. ¶14. (SBU) Econoff also posed the questions in ref to MOFA officials, who replied that they will respond when the GOJ has completed its official policy paper on the subject. Post will relay official comments from MOFA as soon as they become available. ZUMWALT