POSITIVE REACTION TO GUAM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000458 OSD/APSA FOR SEDNEY/BASALLA; SECNAV FOR ASN PENN, PASS JGPO FOR BICE/HICKS; PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5; USFJ FOR J00/J01/J02/J4/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV JA SUBJECT: POSITIVE REACTION TO GUAM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT REF: A. 08 TOKYO 3457 ¶B. 08 TOKYO 3458 Classified By: CDA James Zumwalt; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The reaction in Japan to Secretary of State Clinton's February 17 signing of the Guam International Agreement (GIA) with the Japanese Foreign Minister has been overwhelmingly positive. The media has characterized the GIA, and the Secretary's strong message on realignment, as a clear affirmation of the Obama Administration's intent to implement the May 1, 2006 Roadmap. Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima and Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro, whose city will host the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF),immediately embraced the GIA as a tangible step towards completing the Roadmap. Nakaima told a confidante that, in the wake of the GIA, he and Shimabukuro have decided to focus their attention on the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) review process to allow landfill work to begin on the FRF as soon as possible. The Secretary's strong endorsement of the GIA and support expressed by the Okinawa leadership has wrong-footed both the usually skeptical Okinawa media and opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Some officials express concern, however, that the successful roll-out of the GIA may tempt the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to extend Diet ratification deliberations in order to cause stress on the disunited DPJ. The Japanese government is now turning its attention to working with the Okinawa leadership to accelerate work on the FRF. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Initial political and media reaction to Secretary Clinton's signing of the Guam International Agreement (GIA) in Tokyo and Okinawa has surpassed even the most optimistic estimates of local observers. The GIA was endorsed by the Japanese Cabinet on February 24 and is expected to be formally submitted for Diet ratification shortly after Lower House passage of the JFY2009 budget (which includes USD336 million for Guam-related facilities) on February 27. As a treaty, the GIA does not require Upper House approval and is automatically ratified 30 days after Lower House passage. Okinawa Reaction: 100 Points -------------- ¶3. (C) MOFA North American Affairs Bureau Director-General Kazuyoshi Umemoto characterized the Okinawa reaction to the GIA as "100 points." Both Governor Nakaima and Nago Mayor Shimabukuro, whose formal approval of the landfill permit for the FRF is crucial to the success of the realignment package, immediately embraced the GIA as a visible step towards meeting the Okinawan people's long-term desire to reduce the base burden on the island. Nakaima confided to one informal advisor, Takushoku University Professor Takashi Kawakami, that the GIA signing marked a major turning point in the implementation process. Kawakami related that Nakaima and Shimabukuro agreed that they should back away from their efforts to revise the FRF and instead seek to accelerate implementation of the construction plan. Shimabukuro in particular is concerned that if he and the Governor fumble negotiations with Tokyo and lose the FRF, it would alienate the politically-powerful construction industry that both need for re-election. ¶4. (C) Japanese officials note that the decision of Nakaima and Shimabukuro to support the GIA have completely altered the political and media dynamics both in Tokyo and Okinawa. The local LDP chapter and ruling coalition Diet members, which had been sitting on the fence over the realignment package, took their cue from the Governor and echoed support for the GIA. While initial Okinawa media reports condemned the agreement as a move by Tokyo and Washington to railroad the realignment plan over the heads of the locals, they immediately tempered their coverage after seeing that Okinawa political reaction was split. The national media also changed the tone of reporting after the Secretary's visit. References to the "stalled" FRF and Guam relocation plans that had become standard in Japanese media reports have disappeared since the Secretary's visit. MOFA Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Division Director Takehiro Funakoshi said that many reporters have commented to MOFA that the Secretary outlined many policies that the Obama Administration would review during her February 17 visit, making her firm recommitment to the Realignment Roadmap all the more remarkable. DPJ in a Bind -------------- ¶5. (C) The GIA signing and positive Okinawa response has also impacted the DPJ's approach to the realignment package. Before the Secretary's visit, the party was divided into three broad camps. The left wing has been generally critical, reflecting the views of reformist political forces in Okinawa. Influential members on the right, such as party Vice President Seiji Maehara, have advocated implementing the plan but with revisions such as canceling the FRF and moving the Marine air wing to Kadena Air Base. The party leadership had leaned leftwards, but has indicated privately that the DPJ does not want the realignment issue to become a bone of contention between the U.S. and Japan if the DPJ were to come to power. ¶6. (C) DPJ divisions have only deepened since the visit of Secretary of State Clinton, who highlighted the Obama Administration's commitment to realignment directly with DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa. Both in that meeting and subsequent media events, Ozawa has studiously avoided stating his party's position on the GIA or broader realignment package. The DPJ has canceled its regular twice-weekly security affairs committee meetings since the Secretary's visit, reportedly due to divisions over how to respond to the GIA. ¶7. (C) Most Japanese officials expect the DPJ to ultimately vote against GIA ratification in order to maintain party cohesion, but to do so in a way that will allow them to implement the deal if they come to power. DPJ Lower House Diet member Jun Azumi said on a TV news program that, on policies like the Guam realignment, a DPJ government would have no choice but to implement the international obligations made by past governments. DPJ Shadow Defense Minister Keiichiro Asao told Japanese officials that voting against GIA ratification would simply signal that a future DPJ government would not automatically accept cost estimates provided by the U.S. government for Japanese-funded projects on Guam (Comment: this is no change from the current government's approach. End Comment). DPJ-allied People's New Party Okinawa-elected legislator Mikio Shimoji, who has been the most vocal among opposition advocates of shifting the Marine air wing to Kadena Air Base, announced on February 24 that it is pointless to advocate for a Kadena solution after the GIA signing. Too Much of a Good Thing? -------------- ¶8. (C) While the DPJ cannot muster the votes to block the GIA, some Japanese officials are concerned that the LDP may yet jeopardize ratification by extending deliberations longer than necessary. The Japanese government's original intent was to slip the GIA through the Diet as quickly and quietly as possible, assuming a much more negative media and political reaction. Ministry of Finance (MOF) Deputy Director General for International Affairs Daikichi Monma warned the Embassy that senior LDP leaders now think that by extending GIA deliberations, the DPJ will be forced to openly display the depth of its internal divisions on security policy. He expressed concern that if the Aso Cabinet trips up on other issues and is forced to call an early election, the GIA's ratification will be put at risk. Moving Towards the End Game -------------- ¶9. (C) MOFA's Funakoshi said that senior officials in his ministry will press the LDP to move the GIA forward as fast as possible in order to shift the government's attention to the end game on FRF implementation. The EIA for the FRF is scheduled to be released on or about April 1, and quiet negotiations are underway with the Okinawa Governor, including at the Prime Minister level, to accelerate the review period necessary before Nakaima can sign the FRF landfill permit. In this context, Funakoshi requested the U.S. and Japan start to consider face-saving measures to help the Governor resist local criticism over cooperating on the FRF. On Tokyo's part, Funakoshi said that Japan is considering a range of incentives, including a year-by-year extension of the soon-to-expire Northern Okinawa Development Program, announcement of a new second runway at Naha Airport, and selection of Okinawa to host the 2010 APEC Tourism Ministerial. He urged the U.S. to accelerate bilateral consultations towards public release of the Okinawa Consolidation Master Plan. Funakoshi also requested that any local "positive gestures" the U.S. may be considering, such as the return of training ranges, be delayed until the Governor is ready to sign the FRF permit to achieve maximum PR value. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The high-profile GIA signing has given new momentum to realignment implementation. The decision of local leaders in Okinawa to endorse the agreement has deprived critics in the media and opposition the opportunity to claim that the realignment package is being implemented against the will of the Okinawan people. Secretary of State Clinton's unambiguous message of continuity on realignment has also dashed expectations for major revisions to the package and made implementation a litmus test for alliance management. These factors, together with the JFY2009 USD 1.33 billion realignment budget and Treaty-level force the GIA will have in Japan, should provide ample room for the leadership of a future DPJ government to stay the course on realignment regardless of how the party votes on the GIA in opposition. ZUMWALT