Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TOKYO433
2009-02-26 00:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

ICC WARRANT FOR PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR

Tags:  PREL UNGA JA 
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VZCZCXRO2702
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKO #0433 0570040
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260040Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1050
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRIORITY
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0018
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0023
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 2632
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 4977
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 6421
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 3183
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3480
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3898
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000433 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL UNGA JA
SUBJECT: ICC WARRANT FOR PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR

REF: STATE 12900

Classified By: By M/C W. Michael Meserve for Reasons 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000433 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 TAGS: PREL UNGA JA SUBJECT: ICC WARRANT FOR PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR REF: STATE 12900 Classified By: By M/C W. Michael Meserve for Reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) According to Tetsuo Takagi, Deputy Director of MOFA's United Nations Policy Division, Japan's approach to a possible Security Council Article 16 Resolution to delay the issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Al-Bashir will be based on three principles. "First we want to maintain the unity, consistency, credibility, and effectiveness of the Security Council. Second, we want to keep in mind possible roles the Security Council may be asked to play after Darfur. Third, in any Security Council action we want to determine whether it contributes to the peace in Darfur," Takagi explained. ¶2. (C) As such Japan is unlikely to support an Article 16 resolution (Japan agrees with the U.S. analysis that an Article 16 resolution will not get the necessary votes), Takagi continued. Furthermore, rather than "clearly state that Japan will not support it," the Government of Japan prefers to express as an interested third party its view that it is better that the resolution not be introduced. Also the government of Japan agrees with the U.S. desire for a low key approach on this issue as well as the importance of having all sides of the Darfur issue abide by the agreements they have made, and allow UNAMID to carry out its mandate. ¶3. (C) In further elaborating upon the position of the Government of Japan, Takagi stated "We think that this sort of resolution would unnecessarily expose divisions within the Security Council, and so we would prefer not to have it brought forward." After the warrant for Al-Bashir is actually issued, Tagaki mentioned the possibility of the Security Council crafting some moderate statement emphasizing a common stance that all of the members could agree upon. He also mentioned the possibility that the Security Council could carefully monitor the situation, and re-visit the issue at some point in time, to see if internal reforms of Sudan's justice system have been adequate enough to remove the need for intervention by the ICC. ZUMWALT

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