Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TOKYO433
2009-02-26 00:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:
ICC WARRANT FOR PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR
how-toVZCZCXRO2702 OO RUEHTRO DE RUEHKO #0433 0570040 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 260040Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1050 INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRIORITY RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0018 RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0023 RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 2632 RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 4977 RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 6421 RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 3183 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3480 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3898
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000433
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL UNGA JA
SUBJECT: ICC WARRANT FOR PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR
REF: STATE 12900
Classified By: By M/C W. Michael Meserve for Reasons 1.4 (b, d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000433
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL UNGA JA
SUBJECT: ICC WARRANT FOR PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR
REF: STATE 12900
Classified By: By M/C W. Michael Meserve for Reasons 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C) According to Tetsuo Takagi, Deputy Director of MOFA's
United Nations Policy Division, Japan's approach to a
possible Security Council Article 16 Resolution to delay the
issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President
Al-Bashir will be based on three principles. "First we want
to maintain the unity, consistency, credibility, and
effectiveness of the Security Council. Second, we want to
keep in mind possible roles the Security Council may be asked
to play after Darfur. Third, in any Security Council action
we want to determine whether it contributes to the peace in
Darfur," Takagi explained.
2. (C) As such Japan is unlikely to support an Article 16
resolution (Japan agrees with the U.S. analysis that an
Article 16 resolution will not get the necessary votes),
Takagi continued. Furthermore, rather than "clearly state
that Japan will not support it," the Government of Japan
prefers to express as an interested third party its view that
it is better that the resolution not be introduced. Also the
government of Japan agrees with the U.S. desire for a low key
approach on this issue as well as the importance of having
all sides of the Darfur issue abide by the agreements they
have made, and allow UNAMID to carry out its mandate.
3. (C) In further elaborating upon the position of the
Government of Japan, Takagi stated "We think that this sort
of resolution would unnecessarily expose divisions within the
Security Council, and so we would prefer not to have it
brought forward." After the warrant for Al-Bashir is
actually issued, Tagaki mentioned the possibility of the
Security Council crafting some moderate statement emphasizing
a common stance that all of the members could agree upon. He
also mentioned the possibility that the Security Council
could carefully monitor the situation, and re-visit the issue
at some point in time, to see if internal reforms of Sudan's
justice system have been adequate enough to remove the need
for intervention by the ICC.
ZUMWALT
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL UNGA JA
SUBJECT: ICC WARRANT FOR PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR
REF: STATE 12900
Classified By: By M/C W. Michael Meserve for Reasons 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C) According to Tetsuo Takagi, Deputy Director of MOFA's
United Nations Policy Division, Japan's approach to a
possible Security Council Article 16 Resolution to delay the
issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President
Al-Bashir will be based on three principles. "First we want
to maintain the unity, consistency, credibility, and
effectiveness of the Security Council. Second, we want to
keep in mind possible roles the Security Council may be asked
to play after Darfur. Third, in any Security Council action
we want to determine whether it contributes to the peace in
Darfur," Takagi explained.
2. (C) As such Japan is unlikely to support an Article 16
resolution (Japan agrees with the U.S. analysis that an
Article 16 resolution will not get the necessary votes),
Takagi continued. Furthermore, rather than "clearly state
that Japan will not support it," the Government of Japan
prefers to express as an interested third party its view that
it is better that the resolution not be introduced. Also the
government of Japan agrees with the U.S. desire for a low key
approach on this issue as well as the importance of having
all sides of the Darfur issue abide by the agreements they
have made, and allow UNAMID to carry out its mandate.
3. (C) In further elaborating upon the position of the
Government of Japan, Takagi stated "We think that this sort
of resolution would unnecessarily expose divisions within the
Security Council, and so we would prefer not to have it
brought forward." After the warrant for Al-Bashir is
actually issued, Tagaki mentioned the possibility of the
Security Council crafting some moderate statement emphasizing
a common stance that all of the members could agree upon. He
also mentioned the possibility that the Security Council
could carefully monitor the situation, and re-visit the issue
at some point in time, to see if internal reforms of Sudan's
justice system have been adequate enough to remove the need
for intervention by the ICC.
ZUMWALT