MANAGING THE VISIT OF IRAN SUPREME COUNCIL FOR

S E C R E T TOKYO 002904

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/IR AND EAP/J

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PHUM ETRD JA IR
SUBJECT: MANAGING THE VISIT OF IRAN SUPREME COUNCIL FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETARY GENERAL JALILI

REF: STATE 129240 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt per reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (S) DCM met December 17 with Deputy Foreign Minister
Kenichiro Sasae to deliver reftel demarche urging that the
GOJ make clear to Iranian Supreme Council for National
Security Secretary General Saeed Jalili during his December
20-24 Japan visit that Iran must comply with its UN Security
Council and IAEA obligations, and that Iran should understand
the international community's willingness to increase
pressure if Iran does not resolve those concerns.


2. (S) DFM Sasae noted that Jalili's trip was part of the
GOJ's continuing engagement with Iran. Jalili, who has not
traveled to Japan previously, requested the visit. Sasae
said that rather than say no, the GOJ had decided it would be
more productive to speak with him, noting that since Jalili
had sought the visit, the GOJ was interested in what Jalili
would say -- particularly regarding Iran's uranium enrichment
activities. Sasae agreed that Iran's window of opportunity to
deal constructively on the nuclear issue remained open but
that time was limited. He said that the GOJ would press Iran
to response positively to the P5 plus 1 proposal and urge
Iran to return to the negotiating table.


3. (S) Regarding the possibility of further sanctions against
Iran if it continued to defy UN Security Council and IAEA
demands, Sasae suggested that the GOJ would be likely to
support such steps should there be agreement to do so,
noting, however, that Japan would continue to deal with
humanitarian issues in Iran as necessary. Sasae stressed
that Japan remained committed to helping convince Iran to
meet its obligations to address international concerns
regarding its nuclear activities.


4. (S) Sasae also expressed interest in any information the
U.S. might have regarding the previously secret facility near
Qum. He opined that the activities there reflected Iran's
reaction to international pressure, and its apparent
determination to maintain its program. Sasae also noted that
domestic Iranian politics is playing a role in the Iranian
government's management of the nuclear issue, saying that
Ahmadinejad and Jalili were under attack from both
hard-liners as well as reformers for their efforts. He
suggested that this domestic criticism was in part
responsible for the regime's backsliding on the October P5
plus 1 proposal.


5. (S) Sasae was visibly sensitive regarding U.S. disapproval
of Jalili's visit to a Japanese nuclear plant, quickly
responding that the plant visit had been Jalili's request.
MOFA Iran Chief Junichi Sumi confirmed that such a visit will
take place. Regarding the question of long and medium term
credits, Sumi said that the GOJ had ended long and medium
term credits in 2006 and that only some short-term credits
(two years or less) had been provided since then. He
asserted that the Japan Bank for International Cooperation
(JBIC) had endeQhort-term credits in 2006.
ROOS