DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/18/09

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 002900 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/18/09 INDEX: (1) Why haven't U.S. bases in Japan been reduced? (Asahi) (2) Postponement of Futenma conclusion makes goal of reducing burden on Okinawa even more distant (Yomiuri) (3) Situation of Futenma relocation issue after 13 years of drifting (Part 2): Improvising Prime Minister, resembling the shogunate's handling of the arrival of the black ships (Mainichi) (4) U.S. Embassy dismayed by newspaper reports on Futenma issue referring to alleged "crisis" in Japan-U.S. alliance (Shukan Bunshun) (5) Rift in Japan-U.S. relations (Part 2): Prime Minister Hatoyama should explain to public the importance of national security (Yomiuri) (6) What the "equal alliance" theory lacks (Sankei) ARTICLES: (1) Why haven't U.S. bases in Japan been reduced? ASAHI (Page 3) (Excerpts) December 18, 2009 Kuniichi Tanida, senior writer; Hirotsugu Mochizuki in Washington Alarmed by North Korea, China-Taiwan relations in post-Cold War era It has been three and a half years since the governments of Japan and the United States reached an agreement focusing on plans to reduce the burden on Okinawa. The core plan to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan) has hit a snag. In its manifesto (campaign pledges),the Hatoyama administration pledged to review the modalities of the U.S. bases in Japan. This pledge is now faced with the harsh reality of the situation. Why are there still so many U.S. bases in Japan today, 20 years after the end of the Cold War? This article discusses how the position of the U.S. bases in Japan might change under the Obama administration's new military strategy. At present, there are U.S. military bases/installations in 85 places in Japan with 36,000 troops. Their total area is generally equivalent to half the size of the 23 wards in Tokyo. Of them, there are 33 bases/installations in Okinawa. Their total area comes to 229 square kilometers, or 75 percent of all U.S. bases in Japan. ;In 1990, just after the end of the Cold War, there were 105 bases/installations (325 square kilometers),including 43 in Okinawa (242 square kilometers). This means the number has decreased somewhat but not dramatically. What is more, these facilities are used solely by the U.S. military. In addition, the U.S. military has been jointly using the Self-Defense Forces' training ranges and other places since the 1980s. Today the U.S. military uses land area totaling 1,027 square kilometers (134 places),which is twice the size of 484 square kilometers (120 places) in 1980. TOKYO 00002900 002 OF 010 One of the reasons why U.S. bases are concentrated in Okinawa is because the number of bases on mainland Japan has dropped by 60 percent since 1972, the year Okinawa was returned to Japan, compared to Okinawa's 20 percent. The numbers of troops and bases in Europe have drastically decreased since the end of the Cold War. Why not in Japan? Military commentator Shoji Fukuyoshi explained it this way: "The United States wanted to deploy its forces in the Asia-Pacific using Japan as a base, and Japan was aiming for a cheap security system heavily relying on the U.S. forces. Since their interests matched, they did not make efforts to reduce the presence of U.S. forces in Japan." Throughout the Cold War era, U.S. bases in Japan were improved as bases to replenish military supplies such as ammunition and fuel to contain the Soviet Union. The United States has attached importance to the bases in Japan largely because the U.S. forces withdrew from the Clark and Subic bases in the Philippines following a major volcanic eruption and the Philippine Senate's rejection of renewing a treaty in 1991. The new situation in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era is another factor. North Korea's suspected nuclear programs and the tensions between China and Taiwan prompted the United States to keep its troops in the area surrounding Japan. In 1996 Tokyo and Washington shared the view that the Japan-U.S. security arrangements were essential for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The two countries issued a joint security declaration and confirmed to maintain 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia. "U.S. Forces Japan has now become, both in name and reality, the base supporting the U.S. forces deployed globally," Fukuyoshi said. A schoolgirl rape incident occurred in Okinawa in 1995, triggering a furious anti-base movement. This prompted Japan and the United States to set up the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to aim at the realignment and reduction of U.S. bases. But the planned reversion of the bases has made very little progress because the majority of them have relocation as a condition. Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. forces have shifted their focus to the war against terrorism in such countries as Afghanistan and Iraq. Even so, the United States has not changed its stance of attaching importance to the bases in Japan. In the realignment of U.S. forces that started in 2002, the Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture) and Kadena (Okinawa Prefecture) bases have been positioned as the Main Operating Bases (MOBs) overseas. Okinawa still essential for Marine Corps The hollowing out of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa has long been pointed out in the post-Cold War period. That is because the Marine Division composed of core units, such as the infantry and the artillery, has only a small number of regular troops, with many coming from the continental United States on a rotational basis. Some 12,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Okinawa. Of them, the 2,000-strong 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which conducts maritime surveillance aboard assault ships along with helicopters, is the only unit that is ready to be mobilized in actual warfare. Many TOKYO 00002900 003 OF 010 experts take the view that the regular troops in Okinawa only have the ability to rescue U.S. citizens in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait and to carry out rescue operations following a major disaster. Around 1990, a plan was discussed to totally withdraw the U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Hawaii amid the trend of reducing the presence of U.S. forces in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Blocked by the relocation cost, the plan did not materialize. Since then, the idea of withdrawing the U.S. Marines from Okinawa and a theory denouncing the permanent presence of troops have been discussed repeatedly. In connection with the planned relocation of Futenma Air Station, there have been calls from the coalition parties and local governments for the total shift of the base functions to Guam. Takushoku University Professor Takashi Kawakami, who is knowledgeable the U.S. Marine Corps, thinks the theory denouncing the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa might resurface. This is because chances of a Taiwan Strait contingency are diminishing due to the honeymoon-like relationship between Beijing and Taipei. "If the Obama administration, which attaches importance to China, stops regarding China as a threat, the meaning of their (the U.S. Marine Corps) presence (in Okinawa) might be lost," Kawakami said. According to a former senior Marine Corps officer who has served in Japan, there is the deep-seated view in U.S. forces that the Army, Navy, and Air troops in Japan can sufficiently serve as a deterrent against China and other countries without the Marine Corps. But it seems that it would not be easy for the United States to leave Okinawa, where its troops have stationed for more than 60 years. The Marine Corps is becoming visibly discontent over the relocation of Marine Corps command personnel to Guam which goes hand in hand with the Futenma relocation plan. Before the Senate Armed Services Committee this past June, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway hinted at the need to modify the existing plan, saying there are problems with building training areas on Guam and the area surrounding it. On Okinawa, huge jungle training and urban warfare facilities have been constructed over a long period of time. It would be difficult to build similar facilities on Guam in a short period of time. "It appears that some in the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa are regarding the developments in Japan as a chance to maintain their presence in the prefecture," Kawakami said. (2) Postponement of Futenma conclusion makes goal of reducing burden on Okinawa even more distant YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) December 17, 2009 "Of course, relocating the facility out of the prefecture or the nation is the best option. But I wonder if there is any place that will accept a new facility." Kenei Yamashiro, 70, grumbled when he saw a headline in a newspaper saying that "possible relocation sites other than Henoko will be explored" at a community hall near his residence. His house is located right under the flight path of aircraft heading to and from the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture. TOKYO 00002900 004 OF 010 The return of the land to Japan that has been used by the Futenma airfield is a long-held desire for local residents, because they have been suffering from the noise of helicopters and transport planes, as well as the danger of accidents. When Japan and the U.S. officially agreed to construct an alternative facility for the Futenma airfield in the Henoko district in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture, the words, "congratulations on the return of the airfield," were printed on the pamphlets that were distributed at a regular general meeting. But the Hatoyama administration has pushed the existing plan back to square one. Yamashiro expressed his anxiety, grumbling: "Will any progress be made on the Futenma issue during my lifetime?" In addition to the Futenma plan, the 2006 bilateral accord on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan also includes measures to transfer 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and to return U.S. military bases in the southern part of Okinawa to Japan. The accord gives priority to maintaining the current level of deterrence by stepping up Japan-U.S. joint training and to reducing the excessive burden on Okinawa. The Futenma relocation plan, which took more than ten years to arrive at after many twists and turns, is the core in the accord. Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima and Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro approved the existing plan on the condition that the planned construction site be moved further offshore. Following their approval, the central government's negotiations on the plan with the prefectural and municipal governments were about to enter the final stage. The Hatoyama administration, however, began to indicate that the government would try to find ways to move the facility out of the prefecture or even the nation. This stance has rekindled the once abated argument against the relocation of the facility within the prefecture. Ginowan Mayor Yoichi Iha, who is strongly opposed to the existing plan, has said that he welcomes the government's policy stance, remarking: "The Futenma issue has begun to move forward toward a new solution. But this means that there is no other option available for the Ginowan mayor. He seemed aloof when he told reporters at the prefectural government building yesterday: "I will just sit and watch the situation until the spring. The government can take its time to look for a possible replacement site." If the government's conclusion is delayed further, the reduction of the burden on Okinawa will be delayed further, and the Futenma base might become a permanent fixture as a result. The U.S. forces have dealt with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, as well as such threats as terrorism. If the overall plan for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is delayed, it could have an adverse effect on Japan's national security. The Hatoyama administration, however, has little sense of crisis. Hatoyama has only repeated the words "the feelings of the people in Okinawa." Some officials at the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry have criticized the prime minister's stance as trying to justify the postponement of the issue by highlighting only the aspects of the feelings of the people in Okinawa that are convenient for him. TOKYO 00002900 005 OF 010 How does Hatoyama intend to ensure Japan's national security and reduce the burden on Okinawa simultaneously, in light of national interests? He has yet to lay out a roadmap. (3) Situation of Futenma relocation issue after 13 years of drifting (Part 2): Improvising Prime Minister, resembling the shogunate's handling of the arrival of the black ships MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) December 17, 2009 Takahiro Hirata, Yasushi Sengoku The discussion papers presented by the U.S. side to the Japanese side during the bilateral U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment talks in autumn 2004 proposed to "relocate the U.S. Marines' air corps from the Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa) to Kadena Air Base (KAB) (straddling the towns of Kadena and Chatan and Okinawa City in Okinawa),return Futenma to Japan, and scrap the plan to relocate the Futenma base to northern Okinawa under the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement." These documents also included other proposals, including: relocating the U.S. Marines' air corps from the Iwakuni base (in Yamaguchi Prefecture) to KAB; relocating the Marines' housing and troops from Camp Zukeran (in Okinawa) and Camp Kuwae (also in Okinawa) to KAB; and relocating one squadron of the U.S. Air Force on Kadena to Guam. It was evident that the U.S. side wanted to concentrate the Marines' functions on the KAB, while reducing the Air Force's fighters, in order to reduce the burden on Kadena. However, this "Kadena integration plan," like the one Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada proposed recently, failed in the face of the opposition of the municipalities adjacent to KAB, which had long suffered from KAB's noise. The USFJ realignment talks started as part of the U.S. forces' transformation on a global scale. While the deadline set in the 1996 SACO agreement for the return of Futenma "in five to seven years" had lapsed, the plan to construct a replacement facility in waters off Henoko in Nago City in northern Okinawa (adopted by a cabinet resolution in 2002) was going nowhere. Then Director General Fukushiro Nukaga of the Defense Agency described this situation as "not even one pile could be driven into the seabed for a survey due to the actions of the opponents to building this base." In February 2005, Japan and the U.S. identified a number of "common strategic goals" that they would work together for, including dealing with international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the subsequent realignment talks, the U.S. shifted to the so-called "Nago lite" option, which would require only reclamation of the shoals on a smaller scale, while the (then) Defense Agency, which feared that construction work could not proceed due to the protest actions at sea, advocated a land-based facility in Camp Schwab (in Nago City). In May 2006, Japan and the U.S. reached agreement on a realignment road map which included building two V-shaped runways in the coastal area of Camp Schwab as Futenma's replacement facility, the relocation of some 8,000 Marines in Okinawa to Guam, and the return of U.S. bases south of the KAB. Looking back on the negotiations, former Vice Defense Minister TOKYO 00002900 006 OF 010 Takemasa Moriya said: "Talking about reducing the burden on Okinawa, the U.S. would only brush us aside unless we talked about the strategic issue of what to do with the role and capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)." The Hatoyama administration came to power while prospects for starting the construction work under this agreement remained uncertain due to difficulties in coordinating with the local communities. With Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama deciding on Dec. 15 to reconsider the relocation site, it is now possible that the process for Futenma's return may go back to square one. A source involved with the Japan-U.S. negotiations expressed grave concern about the Prime Minister's improvising by deferring a decision. "This resembles closely the Edo shogunate's handling of the arrival of the black ships." The fact that plans for reinforcing cooperation in the military aspect, such as the consideration of joint operational plans, have not been discussed along with Henoko relocation is also a source of frustration on the U.S. side. Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless, who was responsible for the USFJ realignment talks on the U.S. side, has been involved with the study of the Japan-U.S. alliance at a think tank in Washington after leaving his post. He wrote a report in November recommending that there should be no excessive expectations for Japan in such areas as the SDF's overseas missions, but the SDF should take responsibility for Japan's defense. This paper, which openly admits the U.S.'s disappointment with the bilateral alliance, has created a stir among Japanese officials concerned with foreign affairs and defense. The troop structure of the USFJ may change and options for Futenma relocation may broaden depending on the SDF's role. Officials concerned about the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance all agree that "the only way forward is to start anew from strategic discussions." Yet, the Hatoyama administration's security strategy remains a mystery. (part two of three-part series) (4) U.S. Embassy dismayed by newspaper reports on Futenma issue referring to alleged "crisis" in Japan-U.S. alliance SHUKAN BUNSHUN (Page 48) (Full) December 24, 2009 Sankei Shimbun says: "U.S. Ambassador flies into a rage"; Yomiuri Shimbun reports: "U.S. postpones talks on alliance"; and Asahi Shimbun claims: "Futenma issue deadlocked, casts shadow on alliance." Both leftist and rightist newspapers toe the same line in claiming that "the alliance is in peril" in their reporting on the issue of the relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma Air Station. However, the U.S. Embassy is dismayed by such reporting. A U.S. Embassy official says: "Sankei sensationally wrote 'U.S. Ambassador flies into a rage,' but that is absolutely untrue. We are diplomats." According to a U.S. diplomatic source, American diplomats are strictly prohibited from criticizing other countries, so nothing TOKYO 00002900 007 OF 010 like that could have happened. The same source says: "As for the report that the alliance talks were postponed, no schedule had been drawn up in the first place. It's impossible to postpone something that has not been scheduled. The Japanese newspapers seem to want to stir up a crisis, but the alliance relationship is broad and wide. The Futenma issue has no impact at all on the alliance, and there is no crisis. This would be quite clear if they would ask the U.S. side..." A U.S. expert on the bilateral relationship also laughs about it, saying "reports by the Japanese newspapers on the U.S.in general, not only on the Futenma issue, are full of mistakes, so I am not surprised." It is said that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has repeatedly pointed out discrepancies with the facts at news conferences. However, according to a MOFA official, "We have not seen any corrections. As a result, the mistakes are being circulated as facts." What does the United States think of the present state of the alliance relationship? Prominent international political scientist Patrick Cronin, senior advisor at the think tank, the Center for a New American Security, says: "During a time of major political change, there is bound to be an agonizing review of policy and a period of uncertainty. However, a time like this is an excellent opportunity to reinforce the alliance with the broad support of public opinion. Fortunately for Japan, President Obama understands the situation in Japan and has said that 'the U.S. government should not create a source of a crisis' and 'should be patient'." While the Japanese newspapers really like President Obama, they are getting in his way in this case. A Japanese expert on diplomacy expresses his concern: "I hope that a real crisis will not come about as a result of such sensational reporting..." (5) Rift in Japan-U.S. relations (Part 2): Prime Minister Hatoyama should explain to public the importance of national security YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) December 17, 2009 Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should have resolved the issue of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station before the end of the year, by persuading the Social Democratic Party (SDP). I understand that the Prime Minister has been undergoing hard times in allying with the SDP. However, he must not make any concessions on national security. He must be tough in carrying out foreign policy. In order to keep faith with the United States, the current administration should follow and implement the previous government's policy. The administration needs to show its consistent position at home and abroad, through thorough discussions in the ruling parties. TOKYO 00002900 008 OF 010 Former Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, the grandfather of Yukio Hatoyama, clearly displayed his government's policy course to the public and fought against militarists. He had a strong ideological faith. However, Yukio Hatoyama's management of the coalition government seems like "soft serve ice cream." The Prime Minister said to U.S. President Barack Obama in their meeting in November, "I want you to trust me," with the aim of strengthening Japan-U.S. ties. The President must have completely trusted the Prime Minister's words. But the U.S. side found there was inconsistency between his words and actions. I cannot see the Hatoyama administration's attitude toward national basic policies, including the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The administration has bowed to the international situation and people's opinion. I cannot see its clear stance to preserve the basis of national security. It is impermissible for the government to make its position unclear toward fundamental national policies under the pretext of the coalition government. Going back to the time when he was an opposition party member, the Prime Minister appears to have thought that the LDP governments' U.S. policy and security policy excessively relied on the United States. However, such thinking was the "wishful thinking" of an opposition party member. In reality, politics is inseparable from military affairs. The Prime Minister fails to understand that. At the time when I formed my cabinet, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of the previous government stated, "The Japan-U.S. alliance has no militaristic meaning." His comment stained the Japan-U.S. relationship. So, I clearly said in the United States, "The Japan-U.S. alliance is a military alliance." The papers front-paged my comment. I think this awakened the whole Japan regarding the U.S. Japan Security Treaty, and the Japanese people recognized the significance and role of security. Next year is a historic year to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the reversion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It is an important year for the Hatoyama government to clarify its basic attitude toward the security treaty. Amid the changing international situation, the government should examine how the bilateral security treaty has contributed to Japan and stability in Asia and its importance and merits and demerits. The government can then let the public know how it will manage and determine Japan's security. It should issue a formal statement at the beginning of next year. For the government, issuing a statement would be an important and adequate task for the 50th anniversary. I hope Prime Minister Hatoyama comes up with a clear basic security policy through an in-depth discussion in the cabinet of the coalition government. If the cabinet fails to unite, Japan would be unable to respond to a contingency situation. (6) What the "equal alliance" theory lacks SANKEI (Page 7) (Abridged) December 16, 2009 Masamori Sase, Professor Emeritus, National Defense Academy Although no one has pointed it out, the Democratic Party of Japan's TOKYO 00002900 009 OF 010 theory to build a "close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance" has an interesting feature. Because this relationship is called an "alliance," it is clear that Japan and the United States are tied together by the bilateral security treaty. But one would be hard-pressed to find any mention of the "Japan-U.S. Security Treaty" in DPJ documents or comments by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada. The prime minister's policy speech that discussed his intention to build a close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance and the foreign minister's speech before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that discussed his determination to forge a strong Japan-U.S. relationship that can be sustained for the next 50 years are no exception. It seems almost as if the two ministers are trying to keep the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty under cover. Under the treaty, the United States is required to defend Japan, but Japan is not required to defend the United States. As such, some people call the treaty one-sided. I, however, call it asymmetrically bilateral because Japan is required to provide the United States with military bases. In any case, Japan and the United States are not required to perform the same kind of duties, so they can hardly be called equal under the treaty. Is the idea of shifting the one-sided or asymmetrically bilateral system to a purely bilateral setup compatible with the equal Japan-U.S. alliance theory? Of course it's compatible. In order to realize an equal Japan-U.S. alliance, the Hatoyama administration must consider specific ways to achieve it. Japan and the United States concluded the security treaty 50 years ago when there was a huge difference between them in terms of national strength, and that can explain to some extent why the pact had to be asymmetrically bilateral. Japan grew into a major economic power during the mid-1970s, and Japan's position of being a "free-rider" in the security treaty became an issue between the two countries. Taking that seriously, many Japanese controversialists pointed out the need to turn the one-sided security treaty into one that is purely bilateral, creating a considerable impact on the government and the Liberal Democratic Party. However, the government did not take a step toward a constitutional revision even though the matter was closely connected to the Constitution. The constitutional revision argument eventually sank into oblivion. This was followed by the emergence in the 1980s of the world's incredulity at the second largest economy heavily relying on the largest economy in terms of national security. But there were few people in Japan who raised questions about such a fact. The DPJ recently criticized the former LDP administration as being subservient to the United States, declaring that the party will say what it needs to say to Washington. I do not think that Japan's diplomacy blindly followed in America's footsteps, as seen in the fact that Tokyo succeeded in making Washington accept the ex post facto interpretation of the right to collective self-defense. In any event, the point is that Japan should have made independent efforts for its own security even under the one-sided treaty but that was difficult due to the constitutional interpretation and as a result that made Japan appear to be subservient to the United States. Saying what must be said is good in the context of an equal Japan-U.S. alliance. The question is, what do the prime minister and the foreign minister think about making independent efforts? TOKYO 00002900 010 OF 010 Exemplified by calls for revising the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement and Okada's statement before becoming foreign minister urging the United States to abandon the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, DPJ lawmakers have been sticking to the motto of saying what they have to say. If Japan makes independent efforts even under the one-sided pact, that will help reduce the country's dependence on the United States for its national security, pushing it closer to an equal alliance with the United States. But neither the prime minister nor the foreign minister has expressed their resolve to do so - not even once. The previous LDP administration had at least a sense of guilt about the one-sidedness of the existing security treaty with the United States. But today, for the prime minister and the foreign minister, it is like a vested interest They are taking it for granted. It is questionable whether the Japan-U.S. alliance can be sustained over the next 50 years and can be strengthened further. Just between the security treaty concluded in 1951 and the existing one of 1960, then Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama declared in his policy speech that the government's basic defense policy was to swiftly establish an autonomous national defense system to realize the early withdrawal of the occupation forces, while maintaining the policy of a close and cooperative relationship with the United States, taken by the previous Yoshida administration. He attached importance to both the alliance and independent efforts for national defense. I would like to tell the prime minister, who loves and respects his grandfather, that the equal Japan-U.S. alliance theory with no regard to independent efforts is a sloppy idea that is disrespectful toward his grandfather. ROOS