MOFA ""ALLIANCE HANDS"" EXPRESS FRUSTRATION AT DPJ

S E C R E T TOKYO 002875 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/J DOD FOR OSD/APSA - GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/BASALLA/HAMM PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5 USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR JA SUBJECT: MOFA ""ALLIANCE HANDS"" EXPRESS FRUSTRATION AT DPJ GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF ""SECRET AGREEMENTS,"" FRF Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Deputy Chief of Mission; reasons 1.4 ( b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) Former U.S-Japan Alliance managers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) summoned back back to Tokyo to participate in the ministry's team investigating the so-called ""secret agreements"" on nuclear weapons being carried into Japan on U.S. Navy vessels, expressed considerable frustration at the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government's handling of Alliance issues during a December 10 meeting with poloffs. The officials did not have a good sense of the direction the DPJ government would take on USN operations in Japan in the long-term, but noted that in the near-term they would not be affected. They criticized strongly the Hatoyama government's approach on the issue of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and urged the U.S. Government to express its discontent publicly. They also cautioned that the Hatoyama government's approach to Alliance issues might indicate a trend that was not favorable to the Alliance, which raised concern as the most senior government bureaucrats were cut out of the decision-making process in the new government. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Poloffs met December 10 with Japanese Permanent Mission to the UN Political Counselor Yutaka Arima (PROTECT)(former Principal Deputy Director, MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division),former Japan-U.S. SOFA Division Principal Deputy Director Takashi Ariyoshi (PROTECT),and former Japan-U.S. SOFA Division Deputy Director Fukahori (PROTECT) to discuss a number of current Alliance issues under the Hatoyama government. -------------- ""SECRET AGREEMENT"" -------------- ¶3. (S) Ariyoshi noted that the MOFA ""secret agreements"" team had finished its search for relevant documents and awaited the ""Wise Men's"" expert panel (comprising Tokyo University Professor Shinichi Kitaoka and five other academics) to finish their review of the findings. The next step after the review is the drafting of a report, which will be authored by MOFA Minister's Secretariat Deputy Director General Kitano, Ariyoshi said. When asked whether the process would impact the additional deployment to Japan of two USN minesweeper vessels in the coming weeks, Ariyoshi responded that the report would not be completed until January or later and would not likely affect USN operations in the interim. He was reticent to predict, however, what longer-term impact the review could have on USN operations here, saying he had ""no idea"" which direction the current leadership would take. ¶4. (S) Arima, who was called back to MOFA from his current posting at the Japanese Permanent Mission to the UN (like Ariyoshi, who was called back from his posting at the OECD in Paris) to participate in the MOFA team searching through document files, questioned the usefulness of the project, terming it ""a waste of time."" He commented that the U.S. Government's approach of responding to public inquiries that the declassified documents ""speak for themselves"" was the logical way to respond to queries on the matter. -------------- CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND FRF -------------- ¶5. (C) All three MOFA officials expressed, in varying degrees, their displeasure toward the Hatoyama government's handling and politicization of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). Arima lamented that the issue had essentially tied both governments' hands to the point where other important, strategic bilateral initiatives for strengthening the Alliance have slowed or are not moving forward. They stressed that the USG ought not to be overly accommodating to the DPJ government on FRF or risk being misunderstood and appear willing to make concessions to the agreed roadmap. Ariyoshi asserted that the USG ought to, in some form, express its discontent toward the GOJ publicly. The MOFA contacts also concurred that even the most senior government bureaucrats were essentially cut out of the decision-making process and were unable to coordinate with the USG on public messaging to counter inaccurate depictions of both governments' positions and discussions. ¶6. (C) At the same time, while pressuring the GOJ to resolve the issue quickly might be effective, it also risked negative public backlash against the United States that would play directly into the hands of anti-Alliance factions among coalition parties and the left-wing elements of the DPJ. Fukahori pointed out that various elements of the DPJ government's approach might not make sense individually, unless viewed within the context of anti-Alliance objectives. A trend emerged from such perspective if the ""dots were connected,"" albeit one completely adverse to the interests of the Alliance, Fukahori said. This, he noted, was a concern, as the vast majority of the Japanese public did not understand security issues and the importance to Japan's security of moving forward with FRF. -------------- COMMENT and CONTEXT -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) The remarks by all three MOFA officials are striking, both in terms of their degree of candor, as well as the frustration shown toward their political leaders. Past anecdotal indications of frustrations from other MOFA and MOD contacts notwithstanding, this is a rare example in which experienced ""Alliance hands"" in the Japanese government express such clear concerns about the possible impact of the FRF and ""secret agreement"" discussions on the U.S.-Japan Alliance. All three interlocutors, who sought out the meeting to convey their views, share extensive, recent experience working on security-related matters in MOFA and are close contacts of the Embassy. Arima, in particular, has long been a key source of information and insight for the Embassy and is someone who views the United States in a very positive light. The son of a former MOFA North American Affairs Bureau Director General, Arima spent formative years in the DC area, speaks near-native English, and is a clear rising star among his peers at MOFA. That he stated repeatedly the DPJ members ""just didn't get it"" on security matters speaks volumes about how some talented career diplomats at MOFA view the Hatoyama Cabinet. ROOS