GOJ FEEDBACK ON REALIGNMENT ENHANCEMENTS PACKAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002782 SIPDIS STATE PLEASE PASS TO OSD JAPAN DESK E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL JA SUBJECT: GOJ FEEDBACK ON REALIGNMENT ENHANCEMENTS PACKAGE Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JAMES P. ZUMWALT, REASONS 1.4(B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Schiffer presented U.S. proposals for enhancements to the Realignment Roadmap to MOFA North American Affairs Bureau Director General Umemoto in a December 4 senior officials-level meeting of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) Working Group. Schiffer emphasized that the United States is only willing to discuss these adjustments after Prime Minister Hatoyama's clear endorsement of the Realignment Roadmap, including the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). While OSD Director for Japan Basalla explained each of the U.S. proposals in detail, the Japanese side focused primarily on the environmental and aviation training relocation portions. The U.S. side also provided feedback on Japanese proposals to accelerate certain Marine units' moves to Guam and an earlier move of KC-130s to Iwakuni. End summary. -------------- Environmental Initiative -------------- ¶2. (C) In a December 4 senior officials-level meeting of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) Working Group, MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director Funakoshi said Japan was ""basically comfortable"" with the U.S. proposal, but wondered whether the United States would be willing to consider a special measures agreement focused on environmental issues. Japan may misunderstand the environment-related agreements that the United States has with Korea and Germany, Basalla noted, adding that the United States specifically excluded environmental issues when negotiating the U.S.-Korea SOFA. DASD Schiffer said there was some flexibility on environmental measures, but stressed the United States is unwilling to open the U.S.-Japan SOFA for negotiations. Moreover, Schiffer pointed out, Japan must first commit to implementing the realignment roadmap before the United States would be willing to discuss any details on an environmental agreement. ¶3. (C) DG Umemoto suggested the United States consider an additional environmental agreement to accompany the SOFA, and seemed unwilling to delegate the responsibility on this matter to a Joint Committee agreement. ""Form is more important than substance"" for this government, he emphasized, noting that Japan's current political leadership knows that renegotiating the SOFA (a DPJ campaign promise) is a bridge too far and sees the achievement of an environmental agreement as a good compromise. Regardless of any details that the United States and Japan negotiate, the most essential element to the agreement is that it tells a ""good political story,"" Umemoto added. -------------- Aviation Training Relocation -------------- ¶4. (C) Basalla emphasized that the United States sees significant potential to expand the existing Aviation Training Relocation (ATR) program in partnership with the Japanese government. She noted, however, that ATR expansion should be discussed within the framework of the existing Alliance Transformation Working Group (ATAWG-T) in order to avoid setting expectations on the part of Okinawans that the United States might not be able to meet. DG Umemoto welcomed the U.S. proposal and stressed the need for any plan to have clear ""political symbolism"" in order for it to succeed. -------------- Okinawa-Guam Move Timing and Composition -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to the Japanese proposal for a possible acceleration of the movement of some Marine units from Okinawa to Guam, Basalla said that while the political value of the 2014 target completion date is clear, the United States has been very frank with Japan that the date is increasingly unrealistic. The U.S. side looks forward to discussing with Japan ways in which to best manage ""beyond 2014"" messaging. In addition, the United States is not prepared to make proposals on the composition of units that will move to Guam for a number of reasons, but the U.S. is looking at future posture in the QDR and may eventually have specific ideas to discuss with Japan. EAP/J Director Maher added that an early move would be impossible as the United States cannot obtain funding for the Guam move until the Senate Appropriations Committee is convinced that FRF plans are moving forward. -------------- Early KC-130 Move to Iwakuni -------------- ¶6. (C) The United States is not in a position to commit to the Japanese proposal for an accelerated move of KC-130s to Iwakuni, given that the Iwakuni Master Plan is incomplete and real progress on FRF remains stalled, Basalla said. She added, however, that the U.S. side would be open to discussing this later in the context of future aviation plans for Okinawa. USFJ J5 COL Wiltse added that the biggest obstacle to an earlier move of KC-130s is that the United States does not yet have clarity on Japanese plans for land purchase to support Iwakuni housing requirements. -------------- Meeting Participants -------------- ¶7. (SBU) U.S. -------------- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Schiffer Embassy Tokyo Deputy Chief of Mission Jim Zumwalt Embassy Tokyo Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Rob Luke Department of State Japan Desk Director Kevin Maher OSD Country Director for Japan Suzanne Basalla Embassy Tokyo Political-Military Affairs Unit Chief Joe Young U.S. Forces Japan J5 COL Jeff Wiltse Japan -------------- MOFA North American Affairs Bureau Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto MOD Defense Policy Bureau Director General Nobushige Takamizawa MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director Takahiro Funakoshi MOD Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division Director Kiyoshi Serizawa Senior Advisor to Prime Minister Kiyoshi Sugawa ROOS