SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO JAPAN OF DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002322 SIPDIS OSD FOR JASON HAMM AND SUZANNE BASALLA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019 TAGS: MARR PGOV PINR PREL SENV KGHG JA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO JAPAN OF DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, a.i. JAMES P. ZUMWALT, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 1.(C) Begin text of Scenesetter: Dear Mr. Secretary, The U.S.-Japan Alliance remains strong and Japan will continue to be a close friend and partner, but the relationship will face challenges over the next several years as Japan works through a political transition and continuing economic and social challenges. The Democratic Party of Japan,s (DPJ) landslide victory in the August 30 Lower House election has dramatically altered Japan,s political landscape as the former ruling Liberal Democratic Party,s (LDP) virtually uninterrupted 54-year rule of Japan has ended. New Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and the DPJ have laid out an ambitious domestic agenda as well as a foreign policy vision aimed at a &more equal8 relationship with the United States and a greater emphasis on Asia. Nonetheless, the DPJ,s victory was less a full-throated endorsement of the DPJ,s philosophy by Japan,s electorate than it was a rejection of the LDP. Disappointed with years of economic stagnation, growing job insecurity, and cracks in the social safety net, including the loss of millions of pension records, Japanese voters turned to the DPJ, which had promised "change" and solutions to these problems. In contrast, the LDP faces an existential crisis. A power vacuum at its most senior levels, combined with widespread uncertainty about its political identity, pose direct and fundamental challenges. Although demoralized and facing seemingly insurmountable challenges during this post-election period, the LDP may yet win back some of the public's favor in the coming months. To do so, however, it must quickly redefine itself as a party that understands the public,s dissatisfaction and is capable of running the nation, especially if the DPJ fails to live up to voters' expectations. Among Prime Minister Hatoyama,s top priorities is establishing a close relationship with the United States and President Obama. How the new administration handles sensitive issues such as the SOFA, Host Nation Support, Japan's non-nuclear principles, and U.S. force re-alignment could have significant operational ramifications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance. You will be the most senior USG visitor since the 
inauguration of the new government. As such, your visit will be an excellent opportunity to underline for senior government officials key areas of policy interest. During your meetings, it would be useful for you to: -- Stress the fundamental importance of the Alliance within U.S. foreign policy; -- Urge the GOJ to accept the U.S. base realignment roadmap; -- Seek GOJ thinking on contributions to Afghanistan and Pakistan, thanking them for financial and other contributions to date but pressing for additional concrete contributions in the event of an end to OEF refueling. I have attached a list of issues and background material for your reference. We look forward to seeing you in Tokyo. James P. Zumwalt Charge d'Affaires, a.i. ¶2. (C) Begin text of checklist: -------------- Domestic Politics -------------- New Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and his DPJ-led administration are expected to focus on domestic policy issues, consistent with the DPJ campaign manifesto. To project an image of competence, stability, and experience while quelling concerns about the party's ability to govern, the new 17-member Cabinet is stacked with current and former DPJ leaders and senior officials, former cabinet ministers under previous Liberal Democratic Party governments, and veteran politicians. The lineup represents the DPJ's wide ideological spectrum, from progressive to the far right, and the leaders of the DPJ's two coalition partners, the Social Democratic Party,s (SDP) Mizuho Fukushima and the People,s National Party,s (PNP) Shizuka Kamei, are also included. While the Cabinet has a number of allies of the DPJ's powerful Secretary General, Ichiro Ozawa, there are also some new Cabinet members antagonistic to him. Hatoyama succeeded Ozawa as DPJ President in the spring in the wake of a financial scandal involving an Ozawa aide and it remains to be seen to what extent Ozawa wields behind-the-scenes power in Hatoyama,s government. Similarly, the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) role in opposition is an open question. The DPJ has moved to strengthen the administration,s role in budget and policy formulation. Former DPJ President Naoto Kan heads a new National Strategy Bureau (NSB),which will be responsible for formulating a framework for the budget and creating a broad domestic policy vision. The DPJ wants the NSB to become the primary organ for political supervision of the policy process in order to shift decision-making from bureaucrats to elected politicians. It appears the NSB will focus on several of the more budget-rich, pork-laden &domestic" bureaucracies, with only limited attention to foreign and national security agencies. -------------- Bilateral and Security Issues -------------- -- Support for the Alliance: The U.S.-Japan Alliance figured to some extent in the recent election campaign, and we are engaging the new DPJ Administration on its policy approach to security relations. On one hand, Prime Minister Hatoyama has publicly acknowledged that the Alliance remains the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy. On the other, DPJ politicians during the campaign called for changes to components of defense cooperation, including: revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); reductions in Host Nation Support (HNS); the termination of Japan's Indian Ocean refueling mission in support of OEF; and, a reexamination of U.S. posture realignment (the Defense Policy Review Initiative, DPRI). Regarding realignment, DPJ politicians have proposed altering plans to relocate base facilities in Okinawa, a move that would unravel a plan that took years to negotiate. We aim to use upcoming visits by the President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and PACOM leadership, as well as your trip, to secure the DPJ Administration's reaffirmation of Japan's commitment to realignment and other bilateral defense initiatives. This effort will dovetail with discussions on measures to strengthen the Alliance in the context of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 2010. -- &Secret8 Nuclear Agreement: Reporting of the existence of a "secret" agreement between the United States and Japan dating from the 1960s has caused mild media interest focused on Japan's "three non-nuclear principles" of not producing, possessing allowing introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Former Vice Foreign Minister Ryohei Murata, who served as VFM from 1987-89, disclosed to local press the existence of the agreement between the U.S. and Japan (declassified in the U.S. in 1999 and available publicly), that allowed nuclear-armed U.S. vessels and aircraft into Japan. Although Japanese bureaucrats still deny the existence of the agreement, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has vowed to discuss the issue with the United States. Foreign Minister Okada on September 16 ordered MOFA officials to begin an investigation into this and other purported &secret8 U.S.-Japan agreements. MOFA has started a document review at MOFA headquarters and the Japanese embassy in Washington D.C. to find Japanese documentary evidence of the agreement. Foreign Minister Okada ordered a report on the findings by the end of November. -- Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: The GOJ has welcomed the President,s initiatives on disarmament, beginning with his speech in Prague. Former Foreign Minister Nakasone gave his own speech in April in response, outlining 11 benchmarks for disarmament (ref TOKYO 00981). Foreign Ministry counterparts have told us that Japan would attempt to push these steps for adoption in some form at the 2010 RevCon, but it is unclear if the new DPJ government will follow the previous administration,s plan. The Japanese disarmament community, centered around several NGOs and the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has enthusiastically welcomed the President,s disarmament initiatives. Several contacts have admitted that the Japanese disarmament community has excessive expectations that will need to be moderated, given the difficulty of progress on disarmament. -- Information Security: The October 1 plenary session of the Bilateral Information Security Task Force (BISTF) in Washington, as well as two reciprocal security visits under the U.S.-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA),have helped keep Japanese officials' focus on improving information security cooperation as they brief and inform their new political leaders. The DPJ-led government's position on information security remains unclear, likely due to the slow, deliberate approach by bureaucrats on briefing the new government on the issues. Your meetings with senior Japanese officials will be a good opportunity to remind them that the U.S. Government continues to place importance on enhancing our ability to protect and share classified information as part of the overall goal of strengthening the Alliance. -- SOFA: During the election campaign, PM Hatoyama said he would seek to make changes to the SOFA. While he and others in the party did not clarify exactly what changes he intended to ask for, Hatoyama did say that he would like to add a section to the existing agreement that addresses environmental issues. Since the election, however, rhetoric on SOFA changes has nearly disappeared, with the government's focus shifting to the realignment package. -- Host Nation Support: A three-year comprehensive review of Host Nation Support (HNS CR) is currently under way. HNS, which defines bilateral cost-sharing for U.S. Forces stationed in Japan, totaled USD 4.3 billion in FY 2008, but has declined 15 percent since 1997. Despite our own fiscal constraints, we are meeting our commitments to Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty undiminished. With the upcoming 50th anniversary of the signing of the security treaty in 2010, The upcoming HNS CR is an ideal opportunity to redefine HNS in ways that will benefit the Alliance both in cost sharing and political sustainability for the future. -------------- Foreign Relations -------------- -- Afghanistan-Pakistan: Japan has been a generous contributor to international efforts in Afghanistan and has already contributed $2 billion for rule of law and other reconstruction needs. Most significantly, this year Japan paid the salaries of 80,000 Afghan National Police for six months. However, the DPJ,s policy towards Afghanistan remains unclear. The new government has pledged to increase development assistance, but has also vowed to pursue a more &equal8 relationship with the United States, and may be reluctant to continue what is perceived to be the previous government,s policies in Afghanistan. Additionally, Prime Minister Hatoyama,s government has promised to end the Indian Ocean refueling mission in January 2010 when legal authorities expire, although the party,s stance on this issue in public fora has been less than unified. In the April Friends of Democratic Pakistan conference, Japan pledged $1 billion in assistance to Pakistan. We are waiting for a clearer understanding of the DPJ,s aid priorities. The DPJ,s leadership has said it will favor projects in Pakistan with a &human focus,8 such as education, health, and small farmer agriculture, rather than infrastructure and promotion of economic growth. Ultimate decisions on the focus of its Pakistan aid package could also portend broader shifts in Japan's global aid priorities under a DPJ-led government. We look for the new government to demonstrate leadership in contributing to the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan -- Iraq: Japan is the second largest contributor to Iraqi reconstruction and is moving to establish an office in Erbil. In January the two countries signed a "Comprehensive Partnership" agreement. -- Iran: Japan maintains a "normal" relationship with Iran and sees itself as a possible intermediary between Iran and the United States. Deputy Foreign Minister Sasae traveled to Tehran September 5-6 and agreed to carry a message urging that Iran take the opportunity presented by the P5 plus 1 offer and resolve all outstanding cases regarding American citizens missing and detained in Iran. Sasae also expressed concerns about freedom of expression and human rights in the aftermath of the June Presidential election. MOFA contacts called Iran,s September 9 response to the P5 plus 1 disappointing and have stressed that any new sanctions against Iran must be implemented effectively by China and India to have any meaning. -- Middle East Peace Process: Japan plays a role in supporting the Middle East Peace Process and is broadly supportive of U.S. efforts to restart negotiations. In that context, MOFA has sounded out Southeast Asian countries, in particular Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, about a Japan-led initiative to build international support for Peace Process discussions, particularly among Southeast Asian countries. Japan,s Special Middle East Envoy Iimura traveled to Southeast Asia recently to discuss the proposal, receiving cautious but interested responses. While Japan has traditionally focused on development assistance to the Palestinians, we have continued to encourage the GOJ to consider budget support to the Palestinian Authority. The GOJ has continued to say that it is considering budget support but has offered no definitive reply. -- China: Japan's relations with its other immediate neighbors are generally stable, although problems persist just beneath the surface. Prime Minister Hatoyama will look to continue the efforts of Former Prime Minister Aso, who had been successful in defusing the sharp conflicts over history that damaged relations with China during the Koizumi years. Aso led the first Trilateral Dialogue with Japan-China-Korea and won agreement from Beijing to re-start Japan's version of the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) after a long hiatus. Hatoyama will participate in the second Trilateral Dialogue scheduled for October 10 in Beijing. While Japanese acknowledge that good U.S.-China relations are in Japan's interest, they also fear that the United States will discount Japan's interests in pursuit of more robust relations with China. Japan has been sensitive to recent Chinese actions around the disputed Senkakus and has sought explicit U.S. reassurance on our commitment to aid Japan in the case of an attack on the islands. Japan has also opposed China,s apparently unilateral exploration of oil and gas fields in the East China Sea the two countries have pledged to jointly develop. Japan also has been wary of falling behind China in securing access to natural resources. -- North Korea: Discussions on the situation in North Korea and the status of the Six-Party Talks will be a constant theme during your visit and will draw widespread press attention. Japan remains exceedingly uneasy about the DPRK. You will be expected to express concern for the fate of Japanese citizens abducted by the DPRK, and your words will be parsed carefully for any clues to potential changes in our approach. -- South Korea: Territorial disputes over the Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Tokdo) and history issues remain an irritant to relations with South Korea, but both sides have expressed a desire to build a Japan-ROK relationship that is "different from the relationship up until now." Under the administration of former Prime Minister Aso, the pace of "shuttle diplomacy" picked up markedly. On the defense and security side, your meetings with the ROK and Japanese defense ministers, as well as the trilateral defense ministerial on the margins of the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, provided much-needed momentum for the U.S.-Japan-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks. All three countries cooperated closely in the events leading up to the DPRK nuclear and missile tests earlier in the year. The South Korean and Japanese governments have considerable interest in each other's respective realignment initiatives with the United States, as well their anti-piracy operations. -- Climate Change/Energy Security: Hatoyama's September 7 announcement that the GOJ would target a 25 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, from 1990 levels, by 2020 is far more ambitious than the cuts proposed by Aso. A substantial part of these cuts will have to come in the form of carbon credits from developing countries, most likely through vastly expanded Japanese ODA for clean energy projects, especially in Asia. The new targets were set with little or no consultation with Japanese ministries and are likely to provoke a pushback from the bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Japanese businesses and the opposition LDP will also almost certainly ramp up their resistance as the DPJ moves toward implementation of the targets. The DPJ, like its predecessor, has also emphasized diversification of Japan,s energy supply and stable relations with a broad range of natural resource suppliers. -------------- The Economy -------------- Japan's second quarter GDP increased by an annualized rate of 2.3 percent after falling by 15.2 percent in the first quarter of 2009 -- the largest fall in 60 years. Growth, however, was export-led and does not appear to be sustainable. As the world's second largest economy, second largest source of R&D spending, and significant financial supporter of international organizations and activities, a strong and vibrant Japan is important to the United State. Its efforts to date to support stabilizing and reviving the global financial and trading systems, as evidenced by its engagement in the G7 and G20 fora, the IMF, as well as the government's domestic stimulus and overseas assistance programs, dovetail in many respects with similar efforts being undertaken by the U.S. to facilitate economic recovery. The DPJ's focus on domestic demand-led growth is also consistent with the necessary rebalancing of global growth. But a debt-to-GDP ratio approaching 200 percent and a shrinking population and tax base are fueling tremendous pressures to cut spending, particularly in areas the DPJ considers former LDP "vote machine" sectors ) among them Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT),Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW),and Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) ) as well as defense procurement. The August Lower House election was as much about anti-LDP sentiment as it was about the economy. PM Hatoyama and the DPJ made the economy a focal point of their election rhetoric and economic stimulus is a top priority, as is implementing economic, social, and fiscal reform measures to strengthen the domestic economy and improve the welfare of the average Japanese citizen. Minister Naoto Kan and Finance Minister Fujii are set to re-allocate funds from former PM Aso's $154 billion supplemental budget in government expenditures to support the DPJ's election promises of providing cash subsidies to families with children. The DPJ's priorities, which are equivalent to tax cuts, should have a positive net effect on consumer consumption and thus boost GDP in the short to medium-term. The questions remain, however, whether the Party's programs are sustainable given existing high debt levels and whether it will implement policies to improve worker productivity to increase long-term GDP growth, and thus overall economic well-being. ZUMWALT