DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09/22/09

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 19 TOKYO 002208 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09/22/09 INDEX: (1) Editorial: Prime Minister's visit to the U.S.: Consider revision of campaign pledges to maintain the alliance (Sankei) (2) Many obstacles to "rebuilding the Japan-U.S. relationship" (Mainichi) (3) PM Hatoyama hopeful, excited about playing leading role in achieving "world without nuclear weapons" (Mainichi) (4) The Hatoyama administration's foreign, security policies: How to rebuild the Japan-U.S. relationship (Nikkei) (5) Interview with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada - I will say what must be said (Mainichi) (6) Editorial: Investigation into Japan-U.S. secret accords; Take advantage of change of government (Mainichi) (7) Work to uncover secret pacts moves into full swing: Investigative team to be launched on the 25th (Tokyo Shimbun) (8) Editorial: Russia should respond to U.S. scrapping of missile defense deployment (Nikkei) (9) Editorial: Countries should use U.S. decision to suspend deploying MD system in Eastern Europe as a springboard for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Asahi) (10) Profiles of new senior vice ministers (Nikkei) (11) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Yomiuri) (12) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Mainichi) ARTICLES: (1) Editorial: Prime Minister's visit to the U.S.: Consider revision of campaign pledges to maintain the alliance SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) September 22, 2009 Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is visiting the U.S. to attend the UN General Assembly and participate in other meetings, thus kicking off the new administration's diplomacy. In New York he will be meeting U.S. President Barack Obama after meeting Chinese President Hu Jintao. Although the prime minister has stated that his main focus in the Japan-U.S. summit meeting is to build a relationship of trust, a stronger relationship of trust will not be possible without concrete measures. We hope that the two countries will identify common interests and continue the basic policy line of maintaining the alliance. The prime minister must not forget that partly due to the publication of his article interpreted by some to be "anti-American," the U.S. administration attaches great importance to this summit meeting. There are three pending issues between the two countries. One of them is the refueling support provided by Japan's Maritime TOKYO 00002208 002 OF 019 Self-Defense Force in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. regards this as an "important contribution to the war against terrorism" and strongly desires the continuation of the mission after the expiration of its authorization in January 2010. The prime minister says Japan "will not simply extend (the mission)." If that is the case, he should propose other activities on par with the refueling support. Does he have any good ideas? The new administration has also made demands regarding the final agreement reached between the two governments three years ago on the relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma base. Prime Minister Hatoyama is demanding a review of the plan, saying, "the relocation of U.S. military bases overseas is most desirable, or at least, they should be relocated out of Okinawa." The revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) included in the coalition accord among the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People's New Party is probably also a cause of concern for the U.S. government. Both are issues critical for Japan's peace and security. Prime Minister Hatoyama needs to modify his party's campaign pledges that may harm the Japan-U.S. alliance. We would also like to ask Foreign Minister Okada to reconsider from a realistic standpoint his long-standing proposal to demand a declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons from the U.S. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Hatoyama is advocating the building of an "East Asian community" ahead of his meeting with President Hu Jintao. While the community would aim at regional cooperation in trade and other wide-ranging areas, this concept will also require close coordination with the U.S. government. The main sticking point between Japan and China is the development of gas fields in the East China Sea. While the two countries agreed in June 2008 on the participation of Japanese companies in the development of gas fields that the Chinese side had already started drilling, negotiations have stagnated since then. We must realize that China's strategy to expand its maritime interests is backed by the buildup of its military capability through an increase in its defense spending for 21 consecutive years. There are reports that China is building its first aircraft carrier, and the advantage enjoyed by Japan and the U.S.in terms of security in seas near Japan is being threatened. Prime Minister Hatoyama should frankly convey the above concerns to China. A "mutually beneficial strategic partnership" cannot be built with mere diplomatic rhetoric. (2) Many obstacles to "rebuilding the Japan-U.S. relationship" MAINICHI (Pages 1, 3) (Excerpts) September 20, 2009 Nakae Ueno, Takashi Sudo; Yoso Furumoto in Washington Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has started his first full-fledged diplomatic tour by embarking on a visit to the United States on September 21. In early September, when the position of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as the ruling party was guaranteed by its winning 308 TOKYO 00002208 003 OF 019 seats in the House of Representatives election, a Diet member close to Hatoyama made secret contacts with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. This was a move made in light of Hatoyama's wish to achieve a soft landing for the difficult issues in diplomacy toward the U.S. and build a new era in the bilateral relationship. The main purpose was to give an explanation on Hatoyama's article published in a magazine reported to be anti-American and to sound out U.S. concerns about the discontinuation of the refueling mission. The U.S. side said that "Japan-U.S. relations will not deteriorate as a result of the discontinuation," but stressed that "we would like you to think about aid measures for Afghanistan (in place of the refueling mission)." This confidant of the prime minister merely responded with "we will think of alternative plans, including humanitarian aid." On September 9 U.S. Department of Defense spokesman Geoffrey Morrell voiced a strong demand for Japan to continue the refueling mission. This reflected the frustration in the U.S. government with the difficulties in mopping up terrorism in Afghanistan. However, Prime Minister Hatoyama, who has just taken over the reins of government, will not be able to abandon the DPJ's campaign pledge that easily. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell came to Japan and met with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada on September 18. At a subsequent news conference, Campbell said: "The year 2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. We should not only look back on past achievements, but should also think about how to cooperate in the future." This echoed Hatoyama's advocacy of a new era in the bilateral relationship. On the other hand, Campbell also stressed that "Japan should think of how it can contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan." It is believed that he asked for alternative proposals before President Obama's visit in November. Meanwhile, the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment issues, including Futenma relocation, constitute a thorn in the bilateral relationship. Since the DPJ has the Social Democratic Party (SDP) as a coalition partner, trouble is inevitable in the review of Futenma's relocation site. Okada has designated USFJ realignment as "one of the issues that have to be resolved in the first 100 days (of the administration)." A "plan for deepening Japan-U.S. relations" (tentative name) - consisting of the USFJ issues, support for President Obama's "world without nuclear weapons," and Japan-U.S. collaboration for the revival of the world economy - is being considered as a package of policies toward the U.S. to accelerate discussions. At their meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on September 18, Campbell said, "Basically, we stick to the existing agreement," while Okada told him that "(the ruling party Diet members) elected from the four single-seat districts in Okinawa have all expressed clear opposition to relocation to Henoko." Even though the two are old acquaintances, tension ran high when the discussion moved to the relocation of the USFJ's Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa). In the Japan-U.S. summit that will take place less than 10 days after the inauguration of the new administration, if the prime minister goes back on his previous policy, he is sure to be criticized at home for "following the U.S. blindly." On the other hand, if he declares his intention to work for relocation outside TOKYO 00002208 004 OF 019 Okinawa, this will come across as a clear "anti-American" message, since the U.S. has already informed Japan that it will uphold the previous agreement. Mindful of this situation, Campbell reportedly told Okada at their meeting that "we are allies, so let's discuss all the issues. There is nothing (in USFJ realignment) that we cannot talk about (with Japan)." Some MOFA officials advocate postponing these issues. One senior official says that "there is no need for Japan to bring up specific issues." However, deferring the issues will only offer very temporary relief. USFJ realignment, the refueling mission, and other issues are already expected to be discussed at the Japan-U.S. foreign ministerial meeting on September 21. A source on Japan-U.S. relations says: "President Obama's visit to Japan in mid-November is the time limit. It will not do for Japan to say that they are still under consideration." At his first news conference after taking office on September 17, Okada said that, "(SOFA revision) is the next step after solutions are found for USFJ realignment and Afghanistan," clearly indicating that SOFA revision will be deferred. This could be taken as a message that this issue will not be taken up at the upcoming Japan-U.S. summit, nor during President Obama's visit. Compared with Futenma and the refueling mission, the U.S. position on SOFA revision is that there is no need for revision and problems can be dealt with through improvement of operations. Japan's demand for SOFA revision touches on the most sensitive issues for the U.S., including the issue of the human rights of U.S. soldiers stationed abroad. In a sense, this a more profound question than the specific issues relating to Futenma and the refueling mission. Hatoyama's article carried on The New York Times online edition before the Lower House election became controversial not because of its specific criticism of U.S. market fundamentalism or globalization but because the article as a whole was interpreted as anti-American or breaking away from the U.S. The U.S. tends to be very wary of Japan going in a different direction on issues bearing on fundamental U.S. values, including the market economy and human rights. Hatoyama's concept of an East Asian community may come to have a different meaning depending on how he handles relations with Asian giant China, which embraces different values. The main purpose of Hatoyama's U.S. visit is to strengthen the relationship of trust between leaders. The U.S. side will be closely watching his thinking as reflected in his words and actions. (3) PM Hatoyama hopeful, excited about playing leading role in achieving "world without nuclear weapons" MAINICHI (Page 3) (Excerpts) September 22, 2009 Nakae Ueno, Takayasu Ogura (New York) "Playing a positive role" Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama will talk about the elimination of nuclear arms at the UN Security Council (UNSC) high level meeting on TOKYO 00002208 005 OF 019 nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in New York on September 24 and at the General Debate of the UN General Assembly following that. On the evening of September 8, before Hatoyama became prime minister, he met Chairman Jitsuro Terashima of the Japan Research Institute, his foreign policy adviser, at a Chinese restaurant in Akasaka, Tokyo. He explained that, "I received advice (from Mr Terashima) on my speech at the UN General Assembly and on the Japan-U.S. summit." The U.S. President, the most important diplomatic partner of the Japanese prime minister, has sent out a message on a "world without nuclear weapons." How should Japan offer its support as an atomic-bombed country? Based on advice from Terashima and Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka, Hatoyama is expected to touch on the following three points in his speech: (1) The world is exposed to the threat of nuclear proliferation. The risk of nuclear terrorism is approaching a critical stage with the nuclear threat from Iran and North Korea and the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist organizations; (2) Japan, as the only atomic-bombed nation, will enhance the effectiveness of the peaceful use of atomic energy through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and support President Obama's plan for a "world without nuclear weapons"; (3) Japan will propose a denuclearization treaty for Northeast Asia in order to guarantee denuclearization in Asia and play a positive role in promoting denuclearization in the world. The above reflects the prime minister's hopes and excitement about Japan and the U.S. leading the efforts toward nuclear disarmament. First time in history for U.S. president to chair UNSC In early July, about 45 days before the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won 308 seats in the House of Representatives election and the Liberal Democratic Party administration collapsed, Japan's UN mission was notified by the U.S. government that, "We would like to put nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on the agenda for the UNSC summit meeting in September. President Obama will preside over the meeting." A Japanese diplomatic source observes that: "This would have been unthinkable during the previous (Bush) administration. It must have been a major decision on the part of the President." This is the first time in history for a U.S. president to chair the UNSC. A UN source notes that, "The U.S. cannot afford to fail." By putting the nuclear issue on the agenda, the U.S. has shown that it is making this a pragmatic policy issue. Hatoyama is also very conscious of the President's great enthusiasm. The gap between Japanese and U.S. policies on the nuclear issue is narrowing. The U.S. has not only decided to participate in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),which the previous Bush administration refused to attend, but has discreetly conveyed its decision to TOKYO 00002208 006 OF 019 support the Japan-sponsored UN General Assembly resolution on the elimination of nuclear arms, also opposed by the former administration. The conditions are becoming ripe for Japan and the U.S. to cooperate in multilateral negotiations on the nuclear issue. On the other hand, there is no denying that subtle differences remain in the two countries' positions. The above UN source explains that: "While Japan gives the same importance to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the U.S. focus is on non-proliferation. Disarmament is a means for non-proliferation." The draft resolution drawn up by the U.S. is also called the "draft resolution on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament," with "non-proliferation" preceding "disarmament." The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is at risk of collapsing with North Korea conducting its nuclear tests following the examples of India and Pakistan. And since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with nuclear arms and nuclear-related materials falling into the hands of terrorists becoming a real possibility, the U.S. has judged that the only way to avert the nuclear threat is to realize a nuclear-free world. It has set nuclear non-proliferation as a pragmatic policy for its own national interest. On the other hand, Japan, which has promoted nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at multilateral diplomatic venues, but has constantly affirmed the "nuclear umbrella" in its bilateral relations with the U.S., has not actually designated nuclear disarmament as a pragmatic policy goal. How will nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, on which the Obama administration has shown great enthusiasm in multilateral diplomacy, affect bilateral relations? Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada will need to examine the issues very carefully. (4) The Hatoyama administration's foreign, security policies: How to rebuild the Japan-U.S. relationship NIKKEI (Page 1) (Full) September 19, 2009 Hiroyuki Akita, editorial staff member On the eve of his election as prime minister in early September, Yukio Hatoyama took time out from his extremely hectic schedule to prepare for diplomacy. He met Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka twice and Deputy Foreign Minister Yoichi and other officials once for one hour at a time and listened carefully to their briefings on urgent issues. Repeating the word "trust" During the first meeting, the focus was on his visit to the U.S. from September 21, while the second meeting was about issues in the Japan-U.S., Japan-China, and Japan-ROK relationships. The subject of the third meeting was how to handle the G-20 financial summit in Pittsburgh on September 24-25. In all these meetings, the rebuilding of the Japan-U.S. relationship was a top priority. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) stood for a "close and equal Japan-U.S. relationship" during the House of Representatives election and called for a review of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). Hatoyama's TOKYO 00002208 007 OF 019 article (in the New York Times) had also been reported by the U.S. media to be anti-American, so there was both anxiety and expectation in the U.S. about the new administration. One Obama administration official noted that the misunderstanding arising from the Hatoyama article has been resolved. "We will closely observe what Prime Minister Hatoyama's true view of the U.S. is." The Japan-U.S. summit on September 23 will be a litmus test. Perhaps in recognition of the U.S.'s anxiety, Hatoyama struck a conciliatory tone at his news conference on September 16. "The first step is to build a relationship of trust with President Obama," he said. He repeated the word "trust" four times during the news conference. For the immediate future the Hatoyama administration intends to emphasize "continuity" rather than change in foreign and security policies. Now that he has access to confidential information, unlike when he was an opposition politician, Hatoyama's plan is to look over such information, make an overall assessment, and come up with a new strategy, according to his aides. However, the U.S. may not necessarily be willing to wait for the Hatoyama administration to finish its "test drive." At her first meeting with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada on September 21, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will reportedly "draw the line" on USFJ realignment, Afghanistan, and other pending issues. The U.S. may possibly convey the message that it will be difficult to review SOFA and USFJ realignment. One U.S. government source says that "it is better to let the Hatoyama administration know our principles before it starts to review its policy toward the U.S." The Hatoyama administration's emphasis on Asian diplomacy is another variable in the potentially stormy Japan-U.S. relationship. At his news conference held in the early hours of September 17, Minister of Finance Hirohisa Fujii said that the plan for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) is "one of the important issues," indicating a strong desire to realize the AMF. While it is quite natural for Japan to have closer relations with the Asian countries, with whom it is increasingly strengthening economic ties, if this is interpreted as a move to "quit America and join Asia," it may give rise to conflict between Japan and the U.S. China, Russia hopeful China and Russia are also hoping to draw Japan closer. The first foreign leader to call Hatoyama after he took office was Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev. At the height of the Cold War, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama signed the Japan-Russia joint communiqu in 1956 despite U.S. reservations. Since Yukio is his grandson, Russian diplomats openly voice expectations for the new administration's policy toward Russia. In late August, when the likelihood of a landslide victory for the DPJ became strong, China discreetly sounded out Japan on its participation in a trilateral summit with China and the ROK in early October. This was a sign of its desire to consolidate Japan-China collaboration before Obama's expected visit to Japan in November. Hatoyama, who is keen on building an "East Asian community," asked TOKYO 00002208 008 OF 019 Italian President Georgio Napolitano at their meeting on September 18 about the secret of the success of the European Union (EU) and was told "patience and hard work are important." It takes years for diplomacy to bear fruit. The Hatoyama administration should not decide on a new strategy hastily. It should remain patient and start with efforts to strengthen the unity between Japan and the U.S. (5) Interview with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada - I will say what must be said MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full) September 20, 2009 -- What is the order of priority among the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, a revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, and the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station (Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture)? Okada: A shift in foreign policy resulting from a change of government requires us to look at matters from a higher perspective. We should conduct in-depth discussions with our partner. -- You said that the government will not simply extend the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Does that mean you might not withdraw the Maritime Self-Defense troops? Are you going to seek alternative legislation on the grounds that the refueling mission is a violation of the Constitution? Okada: Not making a simple extension means not to extend the mission simply. I have no intention of elaborating on it any further. Earlier when Ichiro Ozawa was president, he described the refueling mission as a violation of the Constitution, but the party has not said it is a violation of the Constitution. -- President Yukio Hatoyama vowed to move Futenma Air Station at least out of Okinawa. Okada: We want to relocate it outside the prefecture. Nevertheless, talks will not proceed smoothly if the range of options is narrowed down from the beginning. -- You have now taken power. How will that shift Japan's foreign policy? Okada: During the Bush administration, (then Prime Minister Junichiro) Koizumi said Japan should simply follow the United States. Since Barack Obama became the President, the Japanese administration has admired the idea of a world without nuclear weapons. The Japanese administration has always tried to fall in step with (the U.S. government) without taking a firm stance. Those days are over. We will seek the best solution by saying what must be said and by making compromises when necessary. -- A declaration to abandon the preemptive use of nuclear weapons will weaken the United States' nuclear umbrella over Japan. Okada: If the preemptive use of nuclear weapons is allowed, such an argument can be engaged in. However, (the U.S. government) has said that it will aim at the elimination of nuclear weapons. The two perspectives do not mesh. TOKYO 00002208 009 OF 019 -- In the upcoming Japan-U.S. talks, are you going to tell (your counterpart) that (the United States) should declare the abandonment of the preemptive use of nuclear weapons? Okada: I want to avoid the mistake of urging the United States to make a declaration unilaterally. Even so, I cannot understand the view supporting the preemptive use of inhumane (nuclear) weapons in this day and age when the use of other weapons of mass destruction is said to be illegal. -- Is the nuclear umbrella necessary? Okada: I am not opposed to retaliation in response to a nuclear attack. -- Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is eager to settle the Northern Territories issue. Okada: It is a matter of great interest to the Prime Minister, so I want to listen to his view. -- How are you going to deal with the North Korean issue? Okada: In principle, the matter must be discussed in the framework of the Six-Party Talks. Holding separate (talks) might work favorably for North Korea. In other words, U.S.-DPRK talks should be held as necessary to break the gridlock. -- You ordered investigations into the secret pacts on your first day in office. What is your aim? Okada: The change of government provides a good opportunity. Past prime ministers and foreign ministers have denied the existence of secret agreements, so bureaucrats could not say that such agreements existed in reality. Government officials should consider this to be a good opportunity. -- If such pacts exist, who should be blamed? Okada: Basically the (past) prime ministers and foreign ministers are to blame. -- What if it becomes clear that the documents on the secret pacts have been destroyed? Okada: Too much thinking might spoil the efforts to investigate the facts. We should first concentrate on investigating the agreements thoroughly and disclosing them to the public. (Interview by Takenori Noguchi) (6) Editorial: Investigation into Japan-U.S. secret accords; Take advantage of change of government MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) September 18, 2009 Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada instructed ministry officials to examine documents on secret pacts on security cooperation between Japan and the U.S. and to issue a report on the results of the investigation by the end of November. The secret pact issue has TOKYO 00002208 010 OF 019 heightened public distrust in diplomacy. The Foreign Ministry should carry out a thorough investigation to dispel such distrust, taking advantage of the change of government. Okada listed four secret accords for investigation: (1) a pact made when the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was revised in 1960 allowing stopovers in Japanese territory by U.S. military aircraft and vessels carrying nuclear weapons; (2) a pact on combat operations in emergency situations on the Korean Peninsula; (3) a pact made at the time of Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972 allowing the U.S. military to bring nuclear weapons into Japan in emergency situations; and (4) a pact concerning Japan's payment of fees for restoring sites vacated by the U.S. military to their original state. The revised treaty stipulates the need for Washington to hold prior consultations with Tokyo before bringing nuclear weapons into Japan. On the other hand, Japan and the U.S. reached a secret agreement under which Tokyo would tacitly allow U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons to call on Japanese ports and pass through Japanese territorial waters without requiring prior consultation. The two countries also signed an agreement in which Japan would allow U.S. forces based in Japan to conduct sorties without consultations in emergency situations on the Korean Peninsula. The existence of these secret accords has been revealed by official documents that have been kept by the U.S. government. On the alleged secret pact on warships carrying nuclear weapons, former administrative vice minister Ryohei Murata said that he took charge of the document (from his predecessor) when he assumed the vice ministerial post and then later passed it on to his successor. On the accord to allow the U.S. forces to bring nuclear arms into Okinawa in emergency situations, the then Japanese prime minister reached an agreement with his U.S. counterpart, according to information disclosed in a book by former Kyoto Sangyo University professor Kei Wakaizumi. Wakaizumi was engaged in negotiations with the U.S. government as an emissary of then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. Former Foreign Ministry's American Affairs Bureau Director General Bunroku Yoshino acknowledged the existence of the secret accord concerning Japan's payment of fees for restoring sites vacated by the U.S. military to their original state. Foreign Minister Okada said that there are about 2,700 volumes of materials related to the Japan-US. Security Treaty and about 570 volumes of data related to the return of Okinawa to Japan. Given this, Okada is considering the possibility of temporarily calling staff members of diplomatic missions abroad back to Japan to have them examine these related documents. The ministry also plans to set up a third-party committee after the investigation has made a certain extent of progress and listen to the views of ex-ministry officials. Okada also plans to also carry out an investigation in the U.S. When these secret accords were entered into, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were hostile toward each other, but with the collapse of the Cold-War structure, the international situation has changed significantly. There is no rational reason for the Foreign Ministry to continue to deny the existence of the secret accords. Okada has also said that "the secret accord issue is increasing public distrust (in the nation's diplomacy)." The Foreign Ministry should realize that making diplomatic affairs more transparent will allow TOKYO 00002208 011 OF 019 the ministry to develop diplomacy backed by the people for the first time, and the ministry should actively cooperate in the investigation. Once the government admits the existence of the secret pacts based on the results of the investigation, the issue of compatibility will emerge between the secret accords and Japan's advocacy of the three nonnuclear principles while depending on U.S. deterrence to secure its national security, centering on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The government also should prepare an explanation to respond to this question. (7) Work to uncover secret pacts moves into full swing: Investigative team to be launched on the 25th TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 1) (Excerpts) September 22, 2009 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) will launch a full investigation into the so-called secret pacts between Japan and the U.S. on permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country and the reversion of Okinawa. A set of such pacts have already been disclosed through the U.S. archives. However, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration and the LDP itself denied the existence of such agreements. The capability of the new Hatoyama administration will now be tested in terms of whether it can do away with the secretive nature of the bureaucracy and promote new diplomatic and security policies. Shortly after the launch of the new administration, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada ordered Vice Minister Mitoji Yabunaka to launch an investigation into the secret agreements and report on the survey results by around the end of November. MOFA will also launch a team of about 15 officials on Sept. 25. MOFA will also set up a committee of experts from the private sector in late October and conduct an interview survey of senior MOFA officials. (8) Editorial: Russia should respond to U.S. scrapping of missile defense deployment NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) September 20, 2009 The Obama administration of the United States has announced the scrapping of a plan to deploy a missile defense (MD) system in Eastern Europe. This was probably a concession to Russia, which is opposed to the deployment, in order to give priority to confidence building between the two countries. It is now Russia's turn to cooperate with the U.S. on nuclear disarmament and Iran's nuclear issue and fulfill its responsibility as a major nuclear power. The plan to deploy an MD system was a project of the former Bush administration. It consists of setting up a missile interception base in Poland and building a radar facility in the Czech Republic, aiming at synchronized operations by 2012. The United States' purpose was to protect Europe from the threat of nuclear and missile attacks by Iran, but Russia has opposed this on the grounds it would weaken Russia's nuclear deterrence. This issue, along with the eastern expansion of NATO, has been a major factor in the chilling of U.S.-Russia relations. TOKYO 00002208 012 OF 019 Naturally, an attempt to reduce defense spending is one reason why the Obama administration reconsidered deploying an MD system in Eastern Europe, but more importantly, the cancellation of the deployment is meant to promote cooperation with Russia in nuclear disarmament. The U.S. and Russia are in the process of negotiating a new nuclear disarmament treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) before the end of 2009. If these two countries, which possess over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, are able to agree on a substantial reduction in nuclear arms, this will be a major step toward realizing President Obama's goal of a "world without nuclear weapons." U.S.-Russia cooperation is also important in solving the issue of Iran's nuclear program. Talks among the six parties, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) plus Germany, are scheduled to resume on October 1, but Iran stands firm on continuing its enrichment of uranium. The cooperation of Russia, which has close relations with Iran, is indispensable for preventing the development of nuclear arms. Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev has welcomed the discontinuation of the MD deployment plan in Eastern Europe as a "responsible approach." However, Russia should not stop at mere welcome; it has the responsibility to make sincere efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the world. We hope that the U.S.-Russia nuclear-disarmament talks will aim for the conclusion of a strict treaty containing measures for mutual verification, as well as indicate the future course for nuclear weapon reduction. A U.S.-Russia summit will be held on September 23 and the UNSC's high-level meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament will be held on September 24. The U.S. and Russia need to set an example, if only to prod China and the other nuclear powers toward nuclear disarmament and realize thorough nuclear non-proliferation. Russia also needs to play an active role in preventing the development of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea. If negotiations produce no results, Russia should also cooperate in taking strict measures, including imposing stronger sanctions. Russia is suspected of supplying Iran with ground-to-air missiles in secret. It goes without saying that it should stop exporting weapons related to the development of nuclear arms to Iran. (9) Editorial: Countries should use U.S. decision to suspend deploying MD system in Eastern Europe as a springboard for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) September 19, 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama has made a significant diplomatic decision in an effort to turn his call for a world free of nuclear weapons into action. The decision is to suspend the planned deployment of the missile defense (MD) system in Czechoslovakia and Poland in Eastern Europe. The Obama administration has decided to review the MD plan for Europe promoted by the previous Bush administration. Russia has strongly reacted to the planned deployment of the MD TOKYO 00002208 013 OF 019 system in Eastern Europe, claiming that the system would neutralize its nuclear arms. By dispelling such Russian apprehension, Obama has urged that nation, in a sense, to make a concession on drawing up a treaty to be adopted after the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 1). The U.S. is aiming to reach a conclusion in the negotiations by the end of this year. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a statement welcoming the U.S. decision as "a responsible approach" and calling on the U.S. to jointly cope with the threat of missile expansion. Britain and France have also welcomed the decision. President Obama put an end to former president George Bush's strategy of preventing nuclear proliferation by resorting to both the MD system and preemptive strikes. We hope that the U.S. will present a vision of further efforts for nuclear arms reduction after the introduction of the new treaty succeeding START 1. The new U.S. decision will be discussed first at the U.S.-Russia summit meeting slated for Sept. 23 in New York and the upcoming summit of the UN Security Council, which Obama will chair. The purpose of the MD system in Eastern Europe was to defend the region from possible nuclear and missile attacks from Iran. But the previous Bush administration attempted to use the deployment plan as a lever to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the East. Czechoslovakia and Poland also seem to have aimed to apply pressure on Russia by agreeing to deploy the MD system despite the opposition of their peoples. In countering the U.S. move to deploy the MD system in Eastern Europe, Russia also brandished a public threat, as then president Vladimir Putin said: "Countries that agree to deploy the MD system will be exposed to the threat of nuclear attack." Russia is also showing signs of selling its anti-air missiles to Iran. Moscow should, of course, cancel such a plan now that Washington has shown it consideration. The Obama administration intends to deploy in stages a system centering on the Standard Missile 3 (MS3) carried on Aegis ships to replace the current MD deployment plan. The administration, while emphasizing the flexibility of its new plan, intends to carefully observe Iran's response. On Oct. 1, six countries -- the five UN Security Council members and Germany - and the Iranian government will discuss the nuclear issue. The meeting will be crucial for the Obama administration, which has asked Iran for dialogue. If Russia favorably responds to the new U.S. approach and if the U.S. and Russia adopt a cooperative policy, there will be major effects in terms of nuclear arms reduction and nuclear and missile nonproliferation. In order to deter nuclear and missile development by North Korea, we expect more visible results to be produced (from the U.S. decision to cancel the deployment of the MD system in Eastern Europe). (10) Profiles of new senior vice ministers NIKKEI (Page 4) (Full) September 19, 2009 TOKYO 00002208 014 OF 019 Cabinet Office Atsushi Oshima Graduated from Waseda University; former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Diet affairs committee vice chairman, former House of Representatives economy, trade and industry committee member; Lower House Saitama No. 6 district; fourth term; 52 (Yukio Hatoyama group in the DPJ) Motohisa Furukawa University of Tokyo; former DPJ tax research committee vice chairman, former DPJ pension research committee chairman; Lower House Aichi No. 2 district; fifth term; 43 (Seiji Maehara group) Kohei Otsuka Waseda University Graduate School; former DPJ executive office deputy chief, former DPJ policy research committee vice chairman; Upper House Aichi constituency; second term; 49 Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry Shu Watanabe Waseda University; former DPJ deputy secretary general, former DPJ tax research committee vice chairman; Lower House Shizuoka No. 6 district; fifth term; 47 (Maehara group) Masamitsu Naito University of Tokyo Graduate School; former DPJ election campaign committee deputy chairman, former Upper House internal affairs and communications committee chairman; Upper House proportional representation segment; second term; 45 (Noto Kan group) Justice Ministry Koichi Kato Sophia University; former DPJ Diet affairs committee deputy chairman, former DPJ deputy secretary general; Lower House Tokyo No. 20 district; fourth term; 45 (Kan group) Foreign Ministry Koichi Takemasa Keio University; former DPJ election campaign committee deputy chairman, former Lower House foreign affairs committee member; Lower House Saitama No. 1 district; fourth term; 48 (Yoshihiko Noda group) Tetsuro Fukuyama Kyoto University Graduate School; former DPJ policy research committee deputy chief; Upper House Kyoto constituency; second term; 52 (Maehara group) Finance Ministry Yoshihiko Noda Waseda University; former DPJ deputy secretary general, former DPJ Diet affairs committee chairman; Lower House Chiba No. 4 district; fifth term; 52 (Noda group) Naoki Minezaki Hitotsubashi University Graduate School; former Upper House TOKYO 00002208 015 OF 019 financial affairs committee chairman, former DPJ tax research committee chairman; Upper House Hokkaido constituency; third term; 64 (Maehara group) Education, Culture, Sports, and Science and Technology Ministry Harumasa Nakagawa Georgetown University; former Lower House financial affairs committee member, former budget committee member; Lower House Mie No. 2 district; 59 Kan Suzuki University of Tokyo; former Upper House political ethics, election system special committee chairman and former judicial affairs committee member; Upper House Tokyo constituency; second term; 45 (Hatoyama group) Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry Ritsuo Hosokawa Meiji University; former Lower House environment committee chairman, former judicial affairs committee member; Lower House Saitama No. 3 district; seventh term; 66 (Social Democratic Party) Hiroyuki Nagahama Waseda University; former Upper House land, infrastructure, and transport committee member; Upper House Chiba constituency; first term (four terms in Lower House); 50 (Noda group) Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry Masahiko Yamada Waseda University; former Lower House judicial affairs committee member, former health, labor and welfare committee member; Lower House Nagasaki No. 3 district; fifth term; 67 (Ozawa group) Akira Gunji Left Meiji Gakuin University in mid-course; former Upper House agriculture, forestry and fisheries committee chairman, former Upper House Diet affairs committee chairman; Upper House Ibaraki constituency; second term; 59 Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry Tadahiro Matsushita Kyoto University; former cabinet office senior vice minister, former Lower House cabinet committee chairman; Kagoshima No. 3 district; fifth term; 70 (People's New Party) Teruhiko Mashiko Waseda University; former Upper House economy, trade and industry committee member, former security special committee member; Upper House Fukushima constituency; first term (three terms in Lower House); 61 (Hatoyama group) Land, Infrastructure and Transport Ministry Kiyomi Tsujimoto Waseda University; former Social Democratic Party policy chief, former Diet affairs committee head; Lower House Osaka No. 10 district; fourth term; 49 (Social Democratic Party) TOKYO 00002208 016 OF 019 Sumio Mabuchi Yokohama National University; former DPJ policy research committee deputy chairman, former Diet affairs committee deputy chairman; Lower House Nara No. 1 district; third term; 49 Environment Ministry Issei Tajima Doshisha University Graduate School; former DPJ policy research committee deputy chairman, former Lower House environment committee member; Lower House Shiga No. 2 district; third term; 47 (DPJ group affiliated with former Japan Socialist Party) Defense Ministry Kazuya Shinba Otterbein College (U.S.A.); former Upper House foreign affairs and defense committee chairman; Upper House Shizuoka constituency; second term; 42 (DPJ group affiliated with former Japan Socialist Party) (11) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties YOMIURI (Page 24) (Abridged) September 18, 2009 Questions & Answers (Figures shown in percentage) Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet? Yes 75 No 17 Other answers (O/A) 2 No answer (N/A) 6 Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the foregoing question) Pick only one from among the following reasons for your approval of the Hatoyama cabinet. Something can be expected of its policy measures 29 The prime minister is aiming to make policy decisions at the initiative of politicians 24 The prime minister has leadership ability 5 There's something stable about the prime minister 3 His cabinet's lineup is good 8 Because it's a non-Liberal Democratic Party government 25 O/A 0 N/A 5 Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the foregoing question) Pick only one from among the following reasons for your disapproval of the Hatoyama cabinet. Nothing can be expected of its policy measures 40 Nothing can be expected of its policy decisions made at the initiative of politicians 10 The prime minister lacks leadership ability 9 There's nothing stable about the prime minister 9 His cabinet's lineup is not good 12 Because it's a non-Liberal Democratic Party government 14 O/A 1 TOKYO 00002208 017 OF 019 N/A 5 Q: Which political party do you support now? Pick only one. Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 51 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 19 New Komeito (NK) 2 Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2 Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 2 Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 1 People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 Other political parties 0 None 20 N/A 2 Q: The Hatoyama cabinet is a tripartite coalition government of the DPJ, SDP, and PNP. Do you approve of this combination of political parties in office? Yes 49 No 39 N/A 13 Q: Mr. Naoto Kan has been appointed to the post of minister for the "National Strategy Bureau," which outlines the state budget and makes other decisions. Do you approve of this appointment? Yes 68 No 18 N/A 14 Q: Mr. Shizuka Kamei has been appointed to the post of minister for financial services and postal issues. Do you approve of this appointment? Yes 41 No 43 N/A 16 Q: The Hatoyama cabinet is going to make policy decisions at the political initiative of about 100 lawmakers in government posts. Do you approve of this decision-making process? Yes 71 No 16 N/A 13 Q: The Hatoyama cabinet plans to end the Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling activities in the Indian Ocean by January next year when the antiterror special measures law expires. Do you support this policy decision? Yes 44 No 39 N/A 17 Q: The Hatoyama cabinet has decided to cut Japan's greenhouse gas emissions by 25 PERCENT from 1990 levels by 2020 in order to prevent global warming. Do you support this policy decision? TOKYO 00002208 018 OF 019 Yes 74 No 15 N/A 10 Polling methodology: The survey was conducted from the evening of Sept. 16 through Sept. 17 across the nation on a computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. Households with one or more eligible voters totaled 1,820. Valid answers were obtained from 1,087 persons (60 PERCENT ). (Note) In some cases, the total percentage does not add up to 100 PERCENT due to rounding. (12) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties MAINICHI (Page 5) (Abridged) September 18, 2009 Questions & Answers (T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female) Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet? T P M F Yes 77 (20) 84 74 No 13 (60) 9 15 Not interested 9 (18) 6 10 Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why? T P M F Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 3 3 4 Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 4 4 4 Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policy measures 15 15 15 Because the nature of politics is likely to change 77 77 77 Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why? T P M F Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 8 15 6 Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 9 5 11 Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policy measures 58 68 55 Because the nature of politics is unlikely to change 23 8 27 Q: Which political party do you support? T P M F Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 45 (39) 51 42 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or Jiminto) 12 (20) 15 11 New Komeito (NK) 4 (5) 2 5 Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (4) 5 2 Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 2 (1) 2 3 People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (0) 0 0 Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 3 (2) 2 3 New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) -- 1 TOKYO 00002208 019 OF 019 Other political parties 1 (1) 1 1 None 27 (26) 21 30 Q: Do you think public life will improve or worsen with the DPJ running the government? T P M F Improve 47 57 43 Worsen 6 5 7 Remain unchanged 44 36 48 Q: When you look at the cabinet lineup, do you have expectations for the Hatoyama cabinet? T P M F Yes 68 76 64 No 28 20 32 Q: The DPJ has set forth a policy of reducing Japan's greenhouse gas emissions by 25 PERCENT from 1990 levels by 2020. The Aso cabinet's goal was to reduce emissions by 8 PERCENT . Do you support the 25 PERCENT reduction? T P M F Yes 69 72 68 No 25 24 26 Q: The DPJ falls short of a majority in the House of Councillors, so the DPJ has formed a coalition government with the SDP and the PNP. Would you like to see the DPJ form a single-party government after next summer's election for the House of Councillors? T P M F A single-party DPJ government 33 42 28 A DPJ coalition with the SDP and the PNP 34 33 35 A DPJ coalition with other political parties 25 20 27 Q: The LDP has become an opposition party as a result of this summer's election for the House of Representatives. Would you like the LDP to reconstruct itself? T P M F Yes 56 58 55 No 41 40 41 (Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that the figure was below 0.5 PERCENT . "--" denotes that no respondents answered. "No answer" omitted. Figures in parentheses denote the results of the last survey conducted Aug. 26-27. The cabinet support rate in parentheses is for the Aso cabinet from the last survey. Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Sept. 16-17 over the telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis. A total of 1,650 households with one or more eligible voters were sampled. Answers were obtained from 1,014 persons (61 PERCENT ). ROOS