EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY KURT CAMPBELL'S MEETING WITH DPJ DIET AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN KENJI YAMAOKA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002196

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, JA, PINR
SUBJECT: EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY KURT CAMPBELL'S MEETING
WITH DPJ DIET AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN KENJI YAMAOKA

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Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt, Reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. According to DJP Diet Affairs Committee
Chairman Kenji Yamaoka, the new DPJ government's primary goal
will be to strengthen the U.S. alliance despite tactical
differences with the previous government. Japan will not
extend Indian Ocean refueling missions but is open to other
ideas for how Japan could contribute to U.S. efforts in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Base relocation efforts in Okinawa
should proceed from a dialogue with the U.S. on how Japan
should fit into the overall U.S. strategic vision.
Opposition to the bases from local communities is real and
the GOJ must make the case for the U.S. bases as playing an
important role in the defense of Japan. However, simply
defending the status quo will weaken rather than strengthen
the alliance. There must be transparency concerning past
"secret agreements" on the introduction of nuclear weapons,
but these will not affect current practices regarding U.S.
declaration of nuclear weapons introductions or the kinds of
propulsion systems allowed in Japanese ports. Japan's three
anti-nuclear principles are unlikely to be enshrined in law.
Party General Secretary Ozawa is the strongest DPJ member and
will likely become even stronger after the next Upper House
election. Ozawa will maintain discipline among new party
members to prevent issues such as the nuclear principles from
damaging the alliance. END SUMMARY.

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USG Strategy for Engaging the New DPJ-Led Government
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2. (C) Over dinner with DPJ Diet Affairs Committee Chairman
Kenji Yamaoka, Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell laid out the
USG strategy for engaging the new DPJ-led government and
asked for advice on how best to proceed. He stressed that
the USG would be in listening mode, was willing to be
flexible in a number of areas, but in a limited number of
areas, had less flexibility requiring us to proceed with
caution. Through a series of high level engagements
culminating with the President's visit in November, our
overall goal will be to show that the alliance is moving
forward, focused on common interests and cooperation, and not
bogged down in disputes. In public we will support the DPJ's
stated goal of an equal partnership with the U.S. and
encourage a strong independent Japanese foreign policy
including better relations with the ROK and China. We will
also focus on preparations for the 50th anniversary of the
security alliance. A/S Campbell flagged as areas of concern
MOFA's announced intention to pursue historical issues
related to the so-called secret agreement on the introduction
of nuclear weapons into Japan, implementation of the base
realignment agreement in Okinawa/Guam, revisions to the SOFA
agreement, host nation support, and Japan's decision to
suspend the SDF's Indian Ocean refueling missions. A/S
Campbell noted Yamaoka's close relationship with DPJ General
Secretary Ozawa and said he hoped to develop a close
relationship with Ozawa going forward.

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Indian Ocean Re-Fueling
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3. (C) Yamaoka said due to political sensitivities, the
government could not extend the refueling missions beyond the
January 2010 expiration of legal authority. However, he
noted that he and others in the DPJ had long felt something
else could be done to assist U.S. led efforts in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. But whenever he proposed something, MOFA
bureaucrats opposed it because of perceived risks to the SDF.
That is why they favored the refueling mission, he said.
Yamaoka said both he and Ozawa felt that if the SDF was
unable to risk any casualties, they were useless. He said
Japan's contributions to the U.S. efforts to date had been

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largely empty for this reason. Yamaoka advocated in depth
discussions to develop alternatives for Japan's contribution,
which he hoped could be completed by the end of January when
the leagl authority expired. A/S Campbell noted it would be
far better if such discussions could lead to agreement in
advance of the President's visit. Yamaoka appeared somewhat
taken aback by this earlier timetable but he then said he
would try his best.

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Okinawa Base Issues
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4. (C) Commenting on the FRF implementation, Yamaoka said
that the anti-base sentiment in local communities was very
high and the best way to proceed was for the new government
to make clear to the Japanese public the vital role the U.S.
bases perform in defending Japan, and that they are not
forced on Japan. To maintain the full function of the bases,
Japan needs to clarify its own strategic role. To do so, the
U.S. and Japan should engage in a broad strategic discussion
where the U.S. lays out its overarching foreign and security
policy and explains how it sees Japan fitting into it.
Maintaining the status quo will damage our relationship and
lead to a slow decline in support for the alliance. We need
to adopt a new approach that will ultimately enhance the
U.S.-Japan alliance, he said. Although this approach may
seem difficult at first, ultimately, it is best for the
alliance.

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- -
Nuclear Secret Agreement and Japan's Three Non-Nuclear
Principles
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- -

5. (C) Yamaoka stated that the DPJ won the election because
it promised a change in the way the LDP conducted business.
Therefore, it is important to be transparent about the
"secret agreements" struck in the past. For political
reasons, some in the DPJ like Hatoyama and Okada might want
to take this a step further by enshrining Japan's three
non-nuclear principles into law. However, Yamaoka said, he
and Ozawa believe the goal should be to convince the public
to accept that the introduction of nuclear weapons may be
necessary from time to time. The DPJ has no intention of
allowing this issue to impact current declarative practices
or the choice of propulsion systems on U.S. vessels entering
Japanese ports, he said. Ozawa has the real power to control
the DPJ's course on this issue via his discipline over the
new members, he declared.

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China
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6. (C) Yamaoka said the DPJ had long cultivated good
relations with China, and that he had played a key role in
Ozawa's successful visit to China when Ozawa met Chinese
President Hu Jintao "and was treated like a future leader of
Japan." In contrast, he said, the USG had not accorded Ozawa
similar treatment and, had in fact, refused to arrange
meetings in the U.S. for him earlier this year. Ozawa thus
has not developed reliable channels of communication with the
USG. A/S Campbell promised to talk frequently with Ozawa and
invited him to visit Washington. Yamaoka also noted that the
DPJ has long-standing ties to the U.K. where Ozawa will visit
later this month. Yamaoka said he chaired the Japan-U.K
parliamentary league.

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Ozawa Still Smarting over Failed U.S. Visit
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7. (C) Confident of a DPJ victory in this summer's Lower
House election, Ozawa had hoped to engage U.S. leaders ahead
of the election in a broad strategic discussion foreign
policy priorities and possible new roles for Japan under a
DPJ government. That is why he agreed to meet Secretary
Clinton during her visit to Japan earlier this year, Yamaoka
said, and tried to follow up with a visit to the U.S.
However, that trip didn't materialize and Ozawa was forced to
resign as party president due to financial scandal. Yamaoka
claimed that the failure to be seen as engaging with the U.S.
at high levels may have contributed to pressure for Ozawa to
resign as party president.

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Ozawa's Role
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8. (C) According to Yamaoka, Ozawa is the most powerful
figure in the DPJ and will likely become even stronger if, as
expected, he engineers a DPJ victory in the next Upper House
election. There is a good possibility that Ozawa will return
as Prime Minister after Hatoyama. He would probably be PM
today had he not been forced to resign the Party presidency.
Now it will take some additional steps.

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The Style of DPJ's Leadership
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9. (C) Hatoyama and Okada have quite different
personalities and communication styles, which can make it
difficult to interpret their messages. Hatoyama tends to be
softer, while Okada can come across as stiff and will often
tersely say "I cannot answer that." Ozawa is informal and
values substance over form. He is not particularly rank
conscious as long as he is able to engage in productive
discussion. But he often has trouble communicating his ideas,
since he often jumps directly to his conclusions without
explaining his reasoning. I can often explain his ideas
better than he can, joked Yamaoka. All three are very
pro-U.S. and understand the critical role of the U.S.-Japan
alliance. Despite tactical differences with the former
government, there should be no doubt, Yamaoka said, our
intention is the same as yours--to strengthen the alliance.
Yamaoka said both he and Ozawa believe the problem with
Japanese diplomacy is that it was run by MOFA bureaucrats,
and there has been very little contact at the political level
between the U.S. and Japan regarding foreign policy.

10. (C) Participants:
Kenji Yamaoka
Yuka Uchida, DPJ International Division

Kurt Campbell
Jim Zumwalt, DCM
Kevin Maher, Japan Desk Director
Rob Luke, Political M/C
Mark Tesone, Special Assistant
Yumiko Miyazaki, interpreter

11. (U) This cable has been cleared by Assistant Secretary
Campbell.
ROOS