EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY KURT CAMPBELL'S MEETING WITH DPJ DIET AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN KENJI YAMAOKA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002196



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, JA, PINR

SUBJECT: EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY KURT CAMPBELL'S MEETING

WITH DPJ DIET AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN KENJI YAMAOKA



TOKYO 00002196 001.2 OF 003





Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt, Reasons 1.4 (b

) and (d)



1. (C) SUMMARY. According to DJP Diet Affairs Committee

Chairman Kenji Yamaoka, the new DPJ government's primary goal

will be to strengthen the U.S. alliance despite tactical

differences with the previous government. Japan will not

extend Indian Ocean refueling missions but is open to other

ideas for how Japan could contribute to U.S. efforts in

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Base relocation efforts in Okinawa

should proceed from a dialogue with the U.S. on how Japan

should fit into the overall U.S. strategic vision.

Opposition to the bases from local communities is real and

the GOJ must make the case for the U.S. bases as playing an

important role in the defense of Japan. However, simply

defending the status quo will weaken rather than strengthen

the alliance. There must be transparency concerning past

"secret agreements" on the introduction of nuclear weapons,

but these will not affect current practices regarding U.S.

declaration of nuclear weapons introductions or the kinds of

propulsion systems allowed in Japanese ports. Japan's three

anti-nuclear principles are unlikely to be enshrined in law.

Party General Secretary Ozawa is the strongest DPJ member and

will likely become even stronger after the next Upper House

election. Ozawa will maintain discipline among new party

members to prevent issues such as the nuclear principles from

damaging the alliance. END SUMMARY.



- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

USG Strategy for Engaging the New DPJ-Led Government

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -



2. (C) Over dinner with DPJ Diet Affairs Committee Chairman

Kenji Yamaoka, Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell laid out the

USG strategy for engaging the new DPJ-led government and

asked for advice on how best to proceed. He stressed that

the USG would be in listening mode, was willing to be

flexible in a number of areas, but in a limited number of

areas, had less flexibility requiring us to proceed with

caution. Through a series of high level engagements

culminating with the President's visit in November, our

overall goal will be to show that the alliance is moving

forward, focused on common interests and cooperation, and not

bogged down in disputes. In public we will support the DPJ's

stated goal of an equal partnership with the U.S. and

encourage a strong independent Japanese foreign policy

including better relations with the ROK and China. We will

also focus on preparations for the 50th anniversary of the

security alliance. A/S Campbell flagged as areas of concern

MOFA's announced intention to pursue historical issues

related to the so-called secret agreement on the introduction

of nuclear weapons into Japan, implementation of the base

realignment agreement in Okinawa/Guam, revisions to the SOFA

agreement, host nation support, and Japan's decision to

suspend the SDF's Indian Ocean refueling missions. A/S

Campbell noted Yamaoka's close relationship with DPJ General

Secretary Ozawa and said he hoped to develop a close

relationship with Ozawa going forward.



- - - - - - - - - - - -

Indian Ocean Re-Fueling

- - - - - - - - - - - -



3. (C) Yamaoka said due to political sensitivities, the

government could not extend the refueling missions beyond the

January 2010 expiration of legal authority. However, he

noted that he and others in the DPJ had long felt something

else could be done to assist U.S. led efforts in Afghanistan

and Pakistan. But whenever he proposed something, MOFA

bureaucrats opposed it because of perceived risks to the SDF.

That is why they favored the refueling mission, he said.

Yamaoka said both he and Ozawa felt that if the SDF was

unable to risk any casualties, they were useless. He said

Japan's contributions to the U.S. efforts to date had been



TOKYO 00002196 002.2 OF 003





largely empty for this reason. Yamaoka advocated in depth

discussions to develop alternatives for Japan's contribution,

which he hoped could be completed by the end of January when

the leagl authority expired. A/S Campbell noted it would be

far better if such discussions could lead to agreement in

advance of the President's visit. Yamaoka appeared somewhat

taken aback by this earlier timetable but he then said he

would try his best.



- - - - - - - - - -

Okinawa Base Issues

- - - - - - - - - -



4. (C) Commenting on the FRF implementation, Yamaoka said

that the anti-base sentiment in local communities was very

high and the best way to proceed was for the new government

to make clear to the Japanese public the vital role the U.S.

bases perform in defending Japan, and that they are not

forced on Japan. To maintain the full function of the bases,

Japan needs to clarify its own strategic role. To do so, the

U.S. and Japan should engage in a broad strategic discussion

where the U.S. lays out its overarching foreign and security

policy and explains how it sees Japan fitting into it.

Maintaining the status quo will damage our relationship and

lead to a slow decline in support for the alliance. We need

to adopt a new approach that will ultimately enhance the

U.S.-Japan alliance, he said. Although this approach may

seem difficult at first, ultimately, it is best for the

alliance.



- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- -

Nuclear Secret Agreement and Japan's Three Non-Nuclear

Principles

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- -



5. (C) Yamaoka stated that the DPJ won the election because

it promised a change in the way the LDP conducted business.

Therefore, it is important to be transparent about the

"secret agreements" struck in the past. For political

reasons, some in the DPJ like Hatoyama and Okada might want

to take this a step further by enshrining Japan's three

non-nuclear principles into law. However, Yamaoka said, he

and Ozawa believe the goal should be to convince the public

to accept that the introduction of nuclear weapons may be

necessary from time to time. The DPJ has no intention of

allowing this issue to impact current declarative practices

or the choice of propulsion systems on U.S. vessels entering

Japanese ports, he said. Ozawa has the real power to control

the DPJ's course on this issue via his discipline over the

new members, he declared.



- - -

China

- - -



6. (C) Yamaoka said the DPJ had long cultivated good

relations with China, and that he had played a key role in

Ozawa's successful visit to China when Ozawa met Chinese

President Hu Jintao "and was treated like a future leader of

Japan." In contrast, he said, the USG had not accorded Ozawa

similar treatment and, had in fact, refused to arrange

meetings in the U.S. for him earlier this year. Ozawa thus

has not developed reliable channels of communication with the

USG. A/S Campbell promised to talk frequently with Ozawa and

invited him to visit Washington. Yamaoka also noted that the

DPJ has long-standing ties to the U.K. where Ozawa will visit

later this month. Yamaoka said he chaired the Japan-U.K

parliamentary league.



- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Ozawa Still Smarting over Failed U.S. Visit

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -



TOKYO 00002196 003.2 OF 003







7. (C) Confident of a DPJ victory in this summer's Lower

House election, Ozawa had hoped to engage U.S. leaders ahead

of the election in a broad strategic discussion foreign

policy priorities and possible new roles for Japan under a

DPJ government. That is why he agreed to meet Secretary

Clinton during her visit to Japan earlier this year, Yamaoka

said, and tried to follow up with a visit to the U.S.

However, that trip didn't materialize and Ozawa was forced to

resign as party president due to financial scandal. Yamaoka

claimed that the failure to be seen as engaging with the U.S.

at high levels may have contributed to pressure for Ozawa to

resign as party president.



- - - - - - -

Ozawa's Role

- - - - - - -



8. (C) According to Yamaoka, Ozawa is the most powerful

figure in the DPJ and will likely become even stronger if, as

expected, he engineers a DPJ victory in the next Upper House

election. There is a good possibility that Ozawa will return

as Prime Minister after Hatoyama. He would probably be PM

today had he not been forced to resign the Party presidency.

Now it will take some additional steps.



- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The Style of DPJ's Leadership

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -



9. (C) Hatoyama and Okada have quite different

personalities and communication styles, which can make it

difficult to interpret their messages. Hatoyama tends to be

softer, while Okada can come across as stiff and will often

tersely say "I cannot answer that." Ozawa is informal and

values substance over form. He is not particularly rank

conscious as long as he is able to engage in productive

discussion. But he often has trouble communicating his ideas,

since he often jumps directly to his conclusions without

explaining his reasoning. I can often explain his ideas

better than he can, joked Yamaoka. All three are very

pro-U.S. and understand the critical role of the U.S.-Japan

alliance. Despite tactical differences with the former

government, there should be no doubt, Yamaoka said, our

intention is the same as yours--to strengthen the alliance.

Yamaoka said both he and Ozawa believe the problem with

Japanese diplomacy is that it was run by MOFA bureaucrats,

and there has been very little contact at the political level

between the U.S. and Japan regarding foreign policy.



10. (C) Participants:

Kenji Yamaoka

Yuka Uchida, DPJ International Division



Kurt Campbell

Jim Zumwalt, DCM

Kevin Maher, Japan Desk Director

Rob Luke, Political M/C

Mark Tesone, Special Assistant

Yumiko Miyazaki, interpreter



11. (U) This cable has been cleared by Assistant Secretary

Campbell.

ROOS