NPT: GOJ SEES DISARMAMENT ON TRACK; ACADEMIC WARNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002034

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/J, ISN/MNSA (SCOTT DAVIS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2019
TAGS: PARM NPT CDG KNNP JA
SUBJECT: NPT: GOJ SEES DISARMAMENT ON TRACK; ACADEMIC WARNS
OF FUTURE CHALLENGES

REF: A. STATE 83600

B. TOKYO 981

C. TOKYO 512

D. STATE 06970

Classified By: Ambassador John V. Roos for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 21.


2. (C) Summary: The Government of Japan wants a successful
2010 Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (RevCon),and
believes the current momentum towards disarmament should help
achieve a positive outcome, according to a Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) official. While the GOJ has yet to
define its specific goals for the RevCon, Japan's basic
policy of seeking realistic steps towards disarmament is
unlikely to change. According to the official, the change of
government in Japan following the August 30 election will not
affect disarmament policy since both major parties share
common goals on the issue. The official believes a balance
between disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use
of nuclear energy will be necessary to obtain a successful
NPT outcome. MOFA hopes continued U.S.-Japan cooperation can
help achieve this balance, and would welcome continued
exchanges with the U.S. as we approach the RevCon.


3. (C) One academic, speaking as an observer and member of
the disarmament movement in Japan, concurred with the
assessment that current progress should produce a positive
RevCon outcome, but said the Democratic Party of Japan may
push harder for disarmament in the future. He also warned
the rise of nationalist elements in Japan could challenge
Japan's future support for disarmament. End Summary.

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NPT Policy within the GOJ
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4. (C) Achieving success at the 2010 RevCon is a top
priority for Japan, but the GOJ has not yet settled on
particular goals for the conference, according to MOFA Arms
Control and Disarmament Director Shigeru Umetsu. Umetsu told
Econoff in an August 27 meeting the GOJ is beginning
bilateral consultations to discuss what outcomes can be
achieved at the RevCon. Regardless of the specifics decided
for the RevCon, Umetsu asserted Japan's basic approach to
disarmament, i.e. taking realistic steps, will not change.


5. (C) Umetsu noted the 13 Steps agreed in 2000 should be
referenced at the upcoming RevCon, and suggested some of
those steps will need to be updated. Specifically, Japan
puts a high priority on the early entry into force of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),and the commencement of
negotiations for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).
These goals, he asserted, should be included in any agreement
made at the RevCon. Additionally, taking into account
developments between 2000 and the present, some new steps may
be needed; Umetsu had no suggestions for what those should
be. Finally, Umetsu highlighted the 11 benchmarks for
disarmament proposed by Foreign Minister Nakasone in April
(reported ref B),and said Japan would seek to include those
at the RevCon. These benchmarks, Umetsu said, include all
the measures for disarmament and nonproliferation upon which
Japan places high importance.


6. (C) In addition to his 11 benchmarks, Nakasone also
proposed that a conference on disarmament be held in Japan
before the RevCon, with the hopes that the conference could
contribute to a positive outcome for the RevCon. (Note: It
is currently unclear how this proposal will be affected by
the recent change in power in the GOJ. End note.)


7. (C) Umetsu noted MOFA formulates GOJ disarmament policy
in consultation with other agencies like the Ministry of
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) on issues such as the
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Within MOFA, his division,
the Arms Control and Disarmament Division under Director
Hideo Suzuki, has primary responsibility, and
Director-General Toshio Sano of the Disarmament,
Non-proliferation, and Science Department is the most senior
official directly responsible for disarmament policy. MOFA
Divisions responsible for the U.S.-Japan relationship also
play a coordinating role.

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Outside the government
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8. (C) Asked about the importance of NGOs and academia,
Umetsu noted that disarmament NGOs continue to be very active
in Japan. MOFA, according to Umetsu, attaches importance to
civil society outreach and thus tries to maintain close
contact with the NGOs. These disarmament groups and others
welcomed President Obama's speech in Prague, which has
"intensified" their expectations of progress towards a
nuclear free world. However, Umetsu noted "other segments"
of the population remain cautious because Japan is
"surrounded" by nuclear armed China and North Korea.


9. (C) Takao Takahara, Assistant Dean and Professor of
International Politics and Peace Research at Meiji Gakuin
University provided an slightly different perspective on
disarmament issues in Japan. Takahara, a staunch advocate of
peace and disarmament and a commentator on the NPT process,
began his meeting with econoff by commenting that "we should
close the U.S. nuclear umbrella, because it is no longer
raining."


10. (C) Takahara agrees with MOFA that the President's
Speech had heightened expectations, but expressed some
reservation these may be too high in some circles. He cited
as an example the Hiroshima 2020 campaign, which seeks a
nuclear free world by 2020 and has gone as far as to invoke
the President's name as part of its "Obamajority" slogan.
Takahara admitted that 2020 was an unrealistic date for such
a goal, and suggested instead that a convention outlawing
nuclear weapons and creating a path to their abolition would
be a more realistic target. High expectations aside,
Takahara said he saw the increasing number and seriousness of
proposals from Japanese NGOs as a positive sign that Japan's
disarmament movement was strong and healthy.


11. (C) Asked about the ability of the NGOs to affect
government policy, Takahara said they have done so in the
past, but suggested future achievements will depend on the
openness of the government. He cited as an example the third
non-nuclear principle (of not permitting nuclear weapons onto
Japanese territory),which he said was included as a result
of public opinion. But he contrasted this with what he
suggested was the willingness by past governments to secretly
violate the principle and permit nuclear weapons in Japan.

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Comments on U.S.-Russia initiatives
--------------


12. (C) Umetsu said Japan welcomes USG initiatives with
Russia to negotiate a successor treaty to START I. At the
same time, Japan understands the conditions that make
progress on this issue difficult. The GOJ hopes that
whatever is achieved in this context before the end of the
year can be presented to the international community in a way
that is perceived as real progress.


13. (C) Japan's NGOs strongly welcome U.S.-Russian
disarmament progress, according to Takahara. They had been
concerned initially that the crisis in Georgia would derail
U.S.-Russian progress. The general public, he suggested,
pays attention to the efforts via the news, but is poorly
informed on the specifics.

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International Organizations
--------------


14. (C) Japan sees all International Organizations (IOs) as
important, according to Umetsu. However, he singled out the
International Monitoring System (IMS) as particularly
important because the GOJ feels a reliable monitoring system
will be necessary for the USG to persuade U.S. constituencies
to accept the CTBT. He also acknowledged the election of
Amano as Director General of the IAEA may increase Japan's
focus on that organization.


15. (C) Regarding the UN, Japan intends to introduce its
traditional yearly resolution on disarmament in the UN
General Assembly First Committee. Umetsu said now that U.S.
policy on CTBT has changed, the GOJ hopes the USG will be
able to support the resolution this year.


16. (C) Professor Takahara agreed Japan places great
importance on the use of IOs, which he suggested was the
result of the post-war period in which Japan's international
status was low, and needed to use the IOs to gain legitimacy.
Takahara contrasted this with what he asserted was Japan's
lack of direct international support for its goals, claiming
that "Japan doesn't have good friends." He suggested that
"as the U.S. declines," Japan will become simply one
important country among many "oligarchs."

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Japanese policy in the future
--------------


17. (C) Regarding the August 30 election in Japan, which
swept the opposition DPJ into power for the first time in the
party's history, Umetsu asserted that the basics of Japanese
disarmament policy would not change. Because of the change
in government, the GOJ may be unable to cite the "11
Benchmarks" proposed by Nakasone, but the use of those
benchmarks as policy objectives likely will change little
since they are supported by both the LDP and DPJ. (Note:
Although econoff's meeting with Umetsu occurred shortly
before the August 30 election, Umetsu spoke with the
expectation of a DPJ victory. End note.)


18. (C) Takahara agreed both parties would support
disarmament measures like the CTBT and FMCT, though he
cautioned that average politicians are not well versed on the
specifics of disarmament issues. Regarding DPJ Secretary
General and now possible Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada,
Takahara noted Okada "doesn't like nukes" and suggested Okada
would push hard for disarmament as well as for relying less
on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Okada said publicly in July
that if he became Foreign Minister, he would order the GOJ to
release any documents related to a secret agreement between
the U.S. and Japan to allow nuclear weapons to enter Japan.
The first step of a DPJ administration, Takahara suggested,
would be to make a very clear statement of support for
Japan's three non-nuclear principles. Renouncing the U.S.
nuclear umbrella, he said, would be an unrealistic option for
the party, given the situation in Asia.


19. (C) Takahara's main concern about the future of
disarmament support in Japan was not immediate shifts in GOJ
policy, but instead longer term threats to Japanese pacifism
coming from increased nationalism and militarism. Takahara
said he and his colleagues are seeing an increase in the
numbers of outspoken "rightist students" in their classes.
He cited nationalistic textbooks and political cartoons from
Kobayashi Yoshinori as symptoms of, and contributors to, this
trend. While Takahara admitted this was a longer term trend
unlikely to affect the 2010 RevCon, he warned that rightist
elements may challenge Japanese pacifism in the future. In
his words, peaceful post-war nationalism is being threatened
by traditional nationalism.

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What the GOJ wants from the U.S.
--------------


20. (C) Umetsu noted that Japan understands that a balance
between disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear energy is
essential to success of the NPT system. He said MOFA hopes
continued U.S.-Japan cooperation can help achieve this
result, and would welcome continued exchanges with the U.S.
as we approach the RevCon. He specifically requested
information on the following topics:


A. How flexible is the U.S. on issues related to the DPRK,
Iranian, and Syrian nuclear programs?

B. What is the U.S. position on a Middle East resolution?

C. What is the U.S. position on nuclear fuel assurances as
it relates to NPT?

D. What is the U.S. position on the issue of NPT
withdrawal?

E. Are there any redlines for the U.S. at the RevCon, and
what issues are "bargainable"?


21. (SBU) Action request: Post would welcome any information
on U.S. positions related to the 2010 RevCon, including the
issues listed above, as well as information on the
President's Nuclear Security Summit, to be shared with the
GOJ.
ROOS