AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S AUGUST 25 MEETING WITH MOFA NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR GENERAL UMEMOTO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001996



SIPDIS



DOD FOR OSD/APSA- GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/HAMM

PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5

USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5



E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PARM, UNSC, KN, JA

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S AUGUST 25 MEETING WITH MOFA

NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR GENERAL UMEMOTO



TOKYO 00001996 001.2 OF 002





Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt per 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: UN Security Council Resolution 1874

Implementation Coordinator Philip Goldberg in an August 25

meeting with MOFA North American Affairs Director General

Kazuyoshi Umemoto, stressed the continued need to implement

UNSCR 1874 even while urging that North Korea return to the

Six Party Talks. Although consensus among the other five

parties was holding at the moment, further conciliatory steps

by North Korea could weaken that resolve, he said, adding

that China's role remains critical to maintaining pressure on

North Korea. Umemoto agreed, saying that North Korea must be

made to "feel pain" for its nuclear test and missile launches

and that sufficient time was needed for UNSCR 1874 sanctions

to have an impact.



2. (C) Summary, cont'd: Umemoto noted that Japan was

committed to UNSCR 1874 and that while the Aso Administration

had sought new powers in the Diet to inspect cargos, the

legislation had stalled. More broadly, should North Korea

develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems capable of

striking the United States, such a development could

undermine confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella and impact

the U.S.-Japan alliance. Ambassador Goldberg reaffirmed the

role of our alliance in confronting the North Korea issue,

adding that tension-reducing steps by North Korea were

welcome but not enough and that the North must take specific

actions on denuclearization. Following the August 30 Diet

Lower House election, Umemoto predicted continuity on

fundamental policy positions but allowed that new Diet

members would go through a learning process and that some

"hiccups" were likely. Close U.S.-Japan consultation through

the transition would help mitigate uneven patches, he said.

End Summary.



3. (C) Ambassador Goldberg emphasized the importance of

implementing the terms of UNSCR 1874 even as efforts continue

to reconvene the Six Party Talks. While the U.S., Japan,

Russia, China and South Korea have maintained a reasonably

unified front in dealing with North Korea's provocations,

cracks in that five party solidarity might appear should

North Korea continue its recent peace feelers, he said. The

U.S. and Japan agreed that UNSCR 1874 implementation was

necessary not only to maintain the pressure on North Korea,

but to impede the North's nuclear and missile programs.



4. (C) Ambassador Goldberg underscored the importance of

China's role both in maintaining support for UNSCR 1874

implementation and in pressuring North Korea, and that the

consensus on UNSCR implementation had been strong. Having

also meet with Singapore and Thai officials on this current

trip, he noted that he had asked his Thai counterparts to

urge Burma to act very cautiously in dealing with North Korea.



5. (C) Umemoto agreed that any steps North Korea might be

taking to reduce tensions should not impede UNSCR 1874

implementation. Following its nuclear test and missile

launches, North Korea must "feel pain," which would take

time. A few months would be insufficient in that regard, he

said. Although the GOJ had not abandoned hope for peaceful

resolution of these issues, based on past North Korean

behavior, no settlement appeared to be immediately

forthcoming, Umemoto added. Nonetheless, with respect to

North Korea's recent steps toward tension reduction (e.g.,

the release of U.S. journalists, reported invitation to

Special Envoy Bosworth),the parties should resist the

temptation to seize North Korean overtures prematurely, they

agreed.



6. (C) During the just-concluded Diet session, the Aso

Administration had submitted to the Diet a ship inspection

bill that would bolster the GOJ's UNSCR 1874 implementation.

While it had passed the Lower House, the Upper House had not



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completed action, he noted. Although the GOJ would have

preferred to have greater latitude to act on ship

inspections, Umemoto stressed that the GOJ would do all it

could within existing authorities.



7. (C) Should North Korea successfully develop a missile

capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the United States,

it could have implications for the U.S.-Japan security

relationship, Umemoto said. In that event, the Japanese

public could begin to question the reliability and commitment

of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. That is, if North Korea was

able to directly attack the continental United States, "would

the United States trade one its cities for a Japanese one in

the event of a Japan-DPRK conflict," Umemoto asked

rhetorically. Notwithstanding this, Umemoto reiterated GOJ

confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent and noted that the

GOJ had begun a dialogue with the Department of Defense on

the topic. Ambassador Goldberg's travel in the region sent a

message of regional solidarity regarding UNSCR 1874 and

helped maintain the pressure on North Korea, he added.



8. (C) Ambassador Goldberg agreed that the U.S.-Japan

alliance played a key role in deterrence and in maintaining

the pressure on North Korea. While the door remained open to

discussion with North Korea, Ambassador Goldberg stressed

that his more limited responsibilities focused on promoting

the implementation of the terms of UNSCR 1874. The text was

very clear on the conditions that triggered the resolution,

the measures that countries could take to implement it, and

the steps that North Korea must take. Merely reducing

tensions is insufficient -- North Korea must take the

specific steps outlined in UNSCR 1874 as well as UNSCR 1718,

adopted following North Korea's October 2006 nuclear test.



9. (C) Umemoto said that while the opposition Democratic

Party of Japan (DPJ) was likely to take control of the

Japanese government following the August 30 Diet Lower House

election, he foresaw no fundamental change in GOJ policy

toward North Korea. In general, the DPJ attached great

importance to the U.S.-Japan relationship. That said, he

noted there could be varying opinions on some topics and that

many first-time Diet members would likely go through a

familiarization process on key issues. Some "hiccups" might

be possible during this learning process, he said, stressing

the need for continued close consultations.





10. (U) Ambassador Goldberg cleared this cable.

ROOS