AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG VISIT: MOD OFFICIAL ASSURES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001994 SIPDIS DOD FOR OSD/APSA- GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/HAMM PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5 USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PARM KN JA SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG VISIT: MOD OFFICIAL ASSURES STRICT UNSCR 1874 IMPLEMENTATION, STRESSES NEED FOR CHINA'S COOPERATION TOKYO 00001994 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 25 meeting, a senior Ministry of Defense official told Ambassador PhilipGoldberg, Coordinator for Implementation of UNSCR 1874, that policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1874 will not change after the August 30 elections even if the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) should come to power. The official also emphasized the critical importance of China's understanding and cooperation in the resolution's implementation. Ambassador Goldberg welcomed the news of continuity in Japan's implementation of the resolution, but cautioned that the DPRK may seek other avenues to disguise shipments in a bid to earn hard currency. END SUMMARY -------------- CONTINUITY ASSURED -------------- ¶2. (C) "Even if the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) takes power (after the August 30 elections),the party is in line with our government stance and will steadfastly implement UNSCR 1874," Ministry of Defense (MOD) Defense Policy Deputy Director Tetsuro Kuroe told visiting Coordinator for Implementation of UNSCR 1874 Ambassador Philip Goldberg in an August 25 discussion. (Note: Kuroe's remarks suggest that Ministry officials have held policy discussions with DPJ officials.) Kuroe pointed out, however, that because trade between Japan and the DPRK is "almost zero," there is little likelihood that Japan will have the opportunity to inspect a ship within Japan's territorial waters. It is possible that such inspections could take place on the high seas, in which case the Japanese Coast Guard would take the lead, tracking any suspicious vessels and carrying out on-board inspections if necessary, he added. ¶3. (C) A more likely role for Japan is that of data collection, said Kuroe. He believes there is a role for Self Defense Forces (SDF) ships and aircraft in monitoring ship movements and in sharing collected information with Japan's allies. Kuroe remarked that while the SDF has had no opportunity to assist in these operations, there are active communication channels between the SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan. Japan is prepared "with open arms" to share information with its U.S. counterparts and to develop whatever additional communication channels are necessary for this effort. Donald Leathem, a DOD member of Ambassador Goldberg's delegation, noted that the offered cooperation in air surveillance and information sharing would be valuable. ¶4. (C) Ambassador Goldberg welcomed Kuroe's assurances of continuity in policy TOKYO 00001994 002.2 OF 003 and emphasized that it is not the intent of the resolution to disrupt legitimate cargo. He also stressed that it is important for signatories to not provide "bunkering" (i.e. supplies and services) to suspected ships. -------------- KANG NAM 1 CASE SHOWS INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE -------------- ¶5. (C) While emphasizing that use of force is not on the table, Ambassador Goldberg noted that several key provisions of UNSCR 1874, if properly implemented, would impede the DPRK's ability to advance its nuclear and missile programs. One such provision governed the critical role of surveillance and another focused on the denial of ports and inspection of ships as necessary. Specifically, he pointed out many countries' efforts to convince the Burmese government not to allow itself to become a "free port" for DPRK vessels. In the case of the Kang Nam 1, Ambassador Goldberg told Kuroe that initial surveillance was provided by U.S. assets and that the U.S. worked with other countries in the region through both military-to-military and diplomatic channels once the ship was under surveillance. As it became likely that the ship was headed toward the straits of Malacca and onward to Burma, efforts focused on that region. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Goldberg continued that discussion at the time centered on a possible "hail and query" of the Kang Nam, although no response was anticipated. If that had occurred, paragraph 13 of UNSCR 1874, which would require the flag State to direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by local authorities, would have come into force. That too might have been ignored. He said that the U.S. suspected that the DPRK came to realize that no port would accept the ship, or that if one did, it would be inspected. This realization could explain the ship's sudden about-face. There is some thought that the ship was actually a "decoy" with no cargo and was simply meant to test international resolve in enforcing sanctions. -------------- CHINA'S COOPERATION KEY -------------- ¶7. (C) Kuroe expressed surprise at Burma's possible cooperation, and he noted that he considers China's efforts to be key to successful implementation of UNSCR ¶1874. He believes that China has made a "political decision" to cooperate, but continues to question the level of "practical efforts" it will actually extend. He argued that the most critical issue is China's willingness to control its land border with the DPRK. Ambassador Goldberg agreed, noting that it appears China has taken certain financial measures to indicate its seriousness to the DPRK, but that "the jury is still out," regarding their overall effort. Ambassador Goldberg went TOKYO 00001994 003.2 OF 003 on to say that while he could not characterize the Chinese as "enthusiastic proponents" of 1874 implementation, he believes that the PRC, along with Russia and a number of ASEAN countries, made similar representations to the Burmese government that led to a positive resolution of the Kang Nam 1 case. He also took as a positive sign indications that the Chinese are in fact working to tighten their land border with the DPRK. -------------- CONCERN OVER FUTURE DPRK TACTICS -------------- ¶8. (C) In response to a query about the possibility of DPRK efforts to skirt current sanctions, Ambassador Goldberg emphasized that there are no licit avenues for the DPRK to sell weapons on the international market. He also alluded to the case at the UN Sanctions Committee of a North Korean weapons shipment found aboard a ship in a UAE port that appeared to be destined for Iran. The ship was Australian owned, Bahamian flagged and controlled by an Italian shipping company based in Hong Kong. This incident, Ambassador Goldberg said, indicated the lengths to which the DPRK would go to attempt to camouflage illicit shipments of arms. He added that, as we clamp down on maritime shipping, the DPRK will likely work even harder to disguise its shipments and could use airborne cargo shipments to circumvent the total ban on military exports. ¶9. (U) Ambassador Goldberg cleared this cable. ROOS