AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG VISIT: MOD OFFICIAL ASSURES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001994

SIPDIS

DOD FOR OSD/APSA- GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/HAMM
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PARM KN JA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG VISIT: MOD OFFICIAL ASSURES
STRICT UNSCR 1874 IMPLEMENTATION, STRESSES NEED FOR CHINA'S
COOPERATION

TOKYO 00001994 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In an August 25 meeting, a senior Ministry
of Defense
official told Ambassador PhilipGoldberg, Coordinator for
Implementation
of UNSCR 1874, that policy on the implementation of UNSCR
1874 will not
change after the August 30 elections even if the opposition
Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) should come to power. The official also
emphasized
the critical importance of China's understanding and
cooperation in the
resolution's implementation. Ambassador Goldberg welcomed
the news of
continuity in Japan's implementation of the resolution, but
cautioned that
the DPRK may seek other avenues to disguise shipments in a
bid to earn hard
currency. END SUMMARY

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CONTINUITY ASSURED
--------------


2. (C) "Even if the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) takes
power (after
the August 30 elections),the party is in line with our
government stance
and will steadfastly implement UNSCR 1874," Ministry of
Defense (MOD)
Defense Policy Deputy Director Tetsuro Kuroe told visiting
Coordinator for
Implementation of UNSCR 1874 Ambassador Philip Goldberg in an
August 25
discussion. (Note: Kuroe's remarks suggest that Ministry
officials have held
policy discussions with DPJ officials.) Kuroe pointed out,
however, that
because trade between Japan and the DPRK is "almost zero,"
there is little
likelihood that Japan will have the opportunity to inspect a
ship within
Japan's territorial waters. It is possible that such
inspections could take
place on the high seas, in which case the Japanese Coast
Guard would take the
lead, tracking any suspicious vessels and carrying out
on-board inspections
if necessary, he added.


3. (C) A more likely role for Japan is that of data
collection, said Kuroe.
He believes there is a role for Self Defense Forces (SDF)
ships and aircraft
in monitoring ship movements and in sharing collected
information with Japan's
allies. Kuroe remarked that while the SDF has had no
opportunity to assist in
these operations, there are active communication channels
between the SDF and
U.S. Forces in Japan. Japan is prepared "with open arms" to
share information
with its U.S. counterparts and to develop whatever additional
communication
channels are necessary for this effort. Donald Leathem, a
DOD member of
Ambassador Goldberg's delegation, noted that the offered
cooperation in air
surveillance and information sharing would be valuable.


4. (C) Ambassador Goldberg welcomed Kuroe's assurances of
continuity in policy

TOKYO 00001994 002.2 OF 003


and emphasized that it is not the intent of the resolution to
disrupt legitimate
cargo. He also stressed that it is important for signatories
to not provide
"bunkering" (i.e. supplies and services) to suspected ships.

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KANG NAM 1 CASE SHOWS INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE
--------------


5. (C) While emphasizing that use of force is not on the
table, Ambassador
Goldberg noted that several key provisions of UNSCR 1874, if
properly implemented,
would impede the DPRK's ability to advance its nuclear and
missile programs. One
such provision governed the critical role of surveillance and
another focused on
the denial of ports and inspection of ships as necessary.
Specifically, he
pointed out many countries' efforts to convince the Burmese
government not to
allow itself to become a "free port" for DPRK vessels. In
the case of the Kang
Nam 1, Ambassador Goldberg told Kuroe that initial
surveillance was provided by
U.S. assets and that the U.S. worked with other countries in
the region through
both military-to-military and diplomatic channels once the
ship was under
surveillance. As it became likely that the ship was headed
toward the straits of
Malacca and onward to Burma, efforts focused on that region.


6. (C) Ambassador Goldberg continued that discussion at the
time centered on a
possible "hail and query" of the Kang Nam, although no
response was anticipated.
If that had occurred, paragraph 13 of UNSCR 1874, which would
require the flag
State to direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and
convenient port for
the required inspection by local authorities, would have come
into force. That
too might have been ignored. He said that the U.S. suspected
that the DPRK came
to realize that no port would accept the ship, or that if one
did, it would be
inspected. This realization could explain the ship's sudden
about-face. There
is some thought that the ship was actually a "decoy" with no
cargo and was simply
meant to test international resolve in enforcing sanctions.

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CHINA'S COOPERATION KEY
--------------


7. (C) Kuroe expressed surprise at Burma's possible
cooperation, and he noted
that he considers China's efforts to be key to successful
implementation of UNSCR

1874. He believes that China has made a "political decision"
to cooperate, but
continues to question the level of "practical efforts" it
will actually extend.
He argued that the most critical issue is China's willingness
to control its land
border with the DPRK. Ambassador Goldberg agreed, noting
that it appears China has
taken certain financial measures to indicate its seriousness
to the DPRK, but that
"the jury is still out," regarding their overall effort.
Ambassador Goldberg went

TOKYO 00001994 003.2 OF 003


on to say that while he could not characterize the Chinese as
"enthusiastic proponents"
of 1874 implementation, he believes that the PRC, along with
Russia and a number of
ASEAN countries, made similar representations to the Burmese
government that led to a
positive resolution of the Kang Nam 1 case. He also took as
a positive sign
indications that the Chinese are in fact working to tighten
their land border with the
DPRK.

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CONCERN OVER FUTURE DPRK TACTICS
--------------


8. (C) In response to a query about the possibility of DPRK
efforts to skirt current
sanctions, Ambassador Goldberg emphasized that there are no
licit avenues for the DPRK
to sell weapons on the international market. He also alluded
to the case at the UN
Sanctions Committee of a North Korean weapons shipment found
aboard a ship in a UAE port
that appeared to be destined for Iran. The ship was
Australian owned, Bahamian flagged
and controlled by an Italian shipping company based in Hong
Kong. This incident,
Ambassador Goldberg said, indicated the lengths to which the
DPRK would go to attempt to
camouflage illicit shipments of arms. He added that, as we
clamp down on maritime
shipping, the DPRK will likely work even harder to disguise
its shipments and could use
airborne cargo shipments to circumvent the total ban on
military exports.


9. (U) Ambassador Goldberg cleared this cable.
ROOS