DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/26/09

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 14 TOKYO 001966 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/26/09 INDEX: (1) Two ways to turn around economy - growth strategy: Overview of manifestos; LDP - increase wages through companies; DPJ - direct assistance for household budgets (Yomiuri) (2) Strategy needed for deadlocked Japan-DPRK relations (Yomiuri) (3) Defense buildup against the "nuclear threat" (Yomiuri) (4) 2009 Lower House election: My views on foreign and security policies: The Japan-U.S. alliance must be strengthened (Mainichi) (5) 2009 Lower House election: My views on foreign and security policies: Japan must keep appropriate distance from U.S. and China (Mainichi) (6) Symposium on "Obama administration and Japan-U.S. relations" (Asahi) (7) Japan asked U.S. to keep documents on nuclear-related secret pact classified in 1999 (Asahi) (8) Editorial: Political parties should keep in mind retreat of postal reforms will bring about major loss (Nikkei) (9) Four wise men behind Obama's Prague speech in April on "world without nuclear weapons" (Gaiko Forum) ARTICLES: (1) Two ways to turn around economy - growth strategy: Overview of manifestos; LDP - increase wages through companies; DPJ - direct assistance for household budgets YOMIURI (Page 3) (Excerpts) August 26, 2009 One focus of the Lower House election is what kind of growth strategy each political party is envisioning for the Japanese economy. Judging from the manifestos issued by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), differences between the two parties are clear - the LDP aims to expand the economy based on the premise that corporate business performance will pick up, and the DPJ intends to boost consumption through direct cash handouts for household budgets. Discussion on future burden of social security indispensable The challenge of efforts to put the Japanese economy on the full-fledged growth track is how to strike a balance between social benefit handouts and financial burden. Social security expenses continue to increase at the rate of 1 trillion yen a year. The proportion of the number of people aged 65 or older is expected to grow from about 20 percent in 2005 to about 30 percent by 2025 and about 40 percent by 2050. Payments of the basic portion of pensions to baby boomers will begin in 2012. Japan's sales tax rate of 5 percent is lower than the levels of European countries, where such rates are around 20 percent. Japan is now a country with medium welfare and low burden in terms of welfare size and burden level. The outstanding balance of long-term debts combining those held by TOKYO 00001966 002 OF 014 the central and local governments reached 816 trillion yen or approximately 170 percent against the GDP at the end of fiscal 2009. This is the highest level among industrialized countries. The amount of the issuance of new government bonds will likely exceed tax revenues in fiscal 2009. This is an abnormal situation caused by Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-led administrations. The LDP incorporated a goal of achieving medium welfare and medium burden in its manifesto. It says that it will implement drastic reform of the tax code, including a hike in the sales tax, without delay after the economy turns around and necessary legal steps are taken by fiscal 2011. However, the manifesto does not mention the rate or timeframe for the hike. The DPJ calls for substantially improving social security by establishing such benefits as child allowances and a pension system that guarantees a minimum payout of 70,000 yen per month. In the meantime, the party has pledged that it will not raise the sales tax for the next four years. It has determined that in order to obtain understanding from the public, wasteful spending must be reduced first. Same goal Prime Minister Aso in a speech given in Sendai City on the 25th underscored that the GDP in the April-June quarter marked positive growth with an annualized growth rate of 3.7 percent in real terms for the first time in a year and three months. He proudly said that the economic decline, which kicked in last fall, has stopped due to economic stimulus measures costing roughly 132 trillion yen, including a boost to public works and financial assistance to small and medium-size businesses. DPJ President Hatoyama in a speech given on the 25th said, "We want to turn around the economy, by improving family budgets." He thus indicated his party's stance that directly stimulating household budgets by providing child allowances or making highways toll-free is a shortcut to shoring up the economy. The pillar of the LDP's stimulus measures is company-driven growth measures based on the idea that backing corporate activities will raise wages, which will in turn boost personal consumption. The DPJ will aim to provide direct assistance by household budget-type measures, in other words, boosting consumption by directly increasing households' after-tax income with payouts of various allowances. The LDP and the DPJ share the same goal but their approaches to attain that goal are totally different. Sluggish growth The LDP's scenario is to materialize annualized 2 percent of growth by the second half of fiscal 2010, by continuing the stimulus package and put the economy on the full-fledged growth track with domestic and foreign demands starting in fiscal 2011.The party incorporated the goal of raising per-capita national income to the highest level in the world, by boosting each household's after-tax income by 1 million yen in 10 years. Its manifesto also incorporates such strategies as strengthening competitiveness using environment-related technology and bringing in Asian markets' vitality. However, they all lack details. Unknown effects TOKYO 00001966 003 OF 014 The DPJ advocates that it will shift the Japanese economy to a domestic demand-led type by expanding consumption with a boosted disposal income in the household budget. It has also indicated readiness to assist the development and dissemination of state-of-the-art technologies, such as biotechnology or nanotechnology with President Hatoyama noting, "There is a sufficient possibility of finding industrial areas that can be developed into blue-chip industries worldwide. Such industrial sectors include agriculture, marine resources, development and the aerospace industry." However, to what extent assistance for the household budget will boost domestic demand is not known. The Daiichi Life Research Institute has estimated that the consumption-boosting effect of measures incorporated in the DPJ manifesto, such as the introduction of child allowances and the abolition of provisional tax rates, including the gas tax, will be no more than 0.4 percent in the next fiscal year. Japan's unemployment rate is on at its worst-ever level. Employment uncertainty and a decline in wages continue. The party has proposed raising the minimum wage to 1,000 yen with the aim of increasing after-tax income of workers. However, if workers' wages are raised, companies will just hold back on hiring more workers. Chief economist Toshihiro Nagahama takes this view: "As long as employment uncertainty remains, personal consumption will continue to be sluggish, because cash handouts in the form of child allowances, etc, will be channeled to savings." (2) Strategy needed for deadlocked Japan-DPRK relations Hitoshi Tanaka, former deputy minister of foreign affairs, senior fellow at Japan Center for International Exchange YOMIURI (Page 11) (Full) August 26, 2009 The situation in North Korea presents a serious threat to Japan's security. It is a strange neighbor who would suddenly begins a dialogue right after it heightened tensions by conducting missile launches and nuclear tests. However, all the political parties have not presented any concrete policies toward North Korea in the election campaign and the point of contention has been unclear. What are the essential issues in North Korea policy? (Editorial staff member Ichiro Ue spoke with two experts - Hitoshi Tanaka and Hideshi Takesada - and summarized their comments. Tanaka's comments appear below; Takesada's are found in the following article.) North Korea fired ballistic missiles in April and conducted a nuclear test in May, but accepted a visit by former U.S. President Bill Clinton in early August and dispatched a delegation to the late South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's funeral - doing a complex zigzag between a tough and soft stance. However, this is a calculated strategy on the part of the DPRK. Japan will need to respond accordingly. North Korea has long been carrying out two parallel policies. One is the vigorous development of nuclear weapons to acquire a military capability that will discourage any attack from foreign countries. TOKYO 00001966 004 OF 014 The other is economic reconstruction, because the development of nuclear arms alone will not be adequate to maintain the political regime and will cause increasing discontent among the people. However, the DPRK cannot accomplish economic reconstruction alone. It is talking a tough line as leverage to obtain cooperation from other countries. North Korea has formulated a policy for survival relying on the strategic manipulation of a tough stance and pursuit of dialogue. The change of administration in the United States is also a factor. The North Koreans have been thinking about where to start negotiations with the new administration. They have fired missiles and conducted a nuclear test before the Obama administration and its policies were consolidated. They probably intended to send the message "don't take us lightly." The DPRK has yet to complete development of a nuclear weapon. However, once it has developed a weapon, the country will not be easily persuaded to abandon it. This means that we do not have much time. But the same holds true for North Korea. If it fails to deal with its economic problems, the regime may collapse from within. President Clinton's visit to North Korea will probably become a turning point that will lead to dialogue, even if not immediately. Against this background, one thing needs to be borne in mind. The neighboring countries should be solidly united and continue to send the message that North Korea cannot obtain aid from the international community if it continues possess nuclear weapons. On the part of Japan, it needs to collaborate with other countries based on this principle and apply pressure on the DPRK while implementing the UN Security Council sanction resolution. At some point it will have to be prepared for the worst and plunge into negotiations that will produce results. Both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) are saying that North Korea's possession of nuclear arms is unacceptable, and they both pledge to work for a comprehensive solution to the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues. However, no concrete policies have been presented. They must bear in mind that talking only about pressure or dialogue but not producing any results is meaningless. The North Korea issue is a litmus test for Japan's foreign policy. Foreign countries see Japan as an important party in the North Korea issue. Yet, it has not played the role of a concerned party. The Japan-DPRK relationship has been at a stalemate since Koizumi's two visits to North Korea, which resulted in the return of five abductees and their families. North Korea will not be moved only by cries for the return of abduction victims. A strategy for a comprehensive solution to the abduction and security issues and the normalization of diplomatic relations are necessary. In order to break the deadlock, the political leadership needs to take the responsibility to design an unwavering negotiation strategy. It will need a framework and the determination to implement this strategy. For this purpose, a framework across ministerial boundaries, such as the national security council proposed by the LDP in its manifesto or the national strategy bureau the DPJ plans to create, is needed. North Korea is not a point of contention in the general election. TOKYO 00001966 005 OF 014 Actually, it is undesirable to make this a point of contention without an adequate strategy, thus binding the hands of the new administration. In any case, whatever the composition of the new administration, this is an urgent issue that needs to be debated at an early date. (3) Defense buildup against the "nuclear threat" YOMIURI (Page 11) (Full) August 26, 2009 Hideshi Takesada, chief researcher at the National Institute of Defense Studies North Korea's actions since this spring suggest a clear strategy. It is seeking bilateral talks with the United States by showing the international community that its development of nuclear weapons will become a threat in the near future. North Korea wants to interact with the U.S. on an equal footing as much as possible. For this purpose, it needs to complete the miniaturization of its nuclear warheads. On top of that, it is looking to sign a mutual non-aggression treaty or replace the armistice agreement for the Korean War with a peace agreement, building good relations with the U.S., and ultimately realizing the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. For this reason, it has no intention to give up its nuclear weapons. It is noteworthy that its goal is to possess nuclear missiles that can reach New York or Washington to prevent U.S. intervention if a military conflict for the unification of the two Koreas, like the Korean War of 1950, occurs in the future. The DPRK has declared that it will not return to the Six Party Talks in order to concentrate on U.S.-DPRK dialogue. It has eliminated other venues for negotiating the nuclear issue and is focusing on the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. Japan's relations with North Korea are in a stalemate under such circumstances not because there was any problem on the Japanese side or that it has made any diplomatic mistakes. This is the consequence of North Korea's strategy for U.S.-DPRK talks, and Japan's only option is to watch closely developments in these bilateral talks. However, as long as Japan is exposed to the threat of North Korean missiles, how it deals with the DPRK is very important. In terms of equipment, missiles capable of interception at high altitude and Japan's own early warning satellites with improved capability to detect the launching of ballistic missiles instantly with ultrared rays are needed for missile defense. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has discussed this issue repeatedly at its subcommittee on defense policy and formulated a policy direction, while the thinking of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) on foreign and defense policies remains unclear. The DPJ talks about playing a role in East Asia or Asia and the Pacific and a close and equal relationship with the U.S., but it has no concrete policies. This is probably due to the constraint of the plan to form a coalition with the Social Democratic Party and other parties after the election. A concrete strategy is indispensable for strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance from an independent standpoint and for Japan to become a respected country in East Asia. TOKYO 00001966 006 OF 014 Along with equipment, various legislative measures for defense will be important. Will Japan be able to intercept North Korean missiles apparently targeting the U.S.? Whether the LDP or the DPJ (is in power),strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance will require tackling the legal issues in order not to lose the United States' trust. The question is how to deal with the government's current negative interpretation of the right of collective self-defense, which is related to this issue. Concrete and thoroughgoing discussions are necessary. The abduction of Japanese citizens by the DPRK is an important issue bearing on human rights and the people's safety. Although the LDP talks about "staking the national prestige on realizing the return of all abductees," while the DPJ says it will "make every effort for a solution to this issue," they are not even sure how many people have been abducted or how many of them are still alive. While it will be a very tall order, the new administration formed after the election needs to have the determination and the wisdom to realize the start of a joint investigative body of the Japanese and DPRK governments. It needs to be prepared to go to Pyongyang to negotiate directly if needed. (4) 2009 Lower House election: My views on foreign and security policies: The Japan-U.S. alliance must be strengthened Satoshi Morimoto MAINICHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) August 25, 2009 Japan's foreign and security policies based on the Japan-U.S. alliance have been called into question. Growing tensions in East Asia because of North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and the rise of newly industrializing countries, such as China, are likely to shake Japan's position in the international community. With next year marking the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, there are strong calls for a revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),which covers the handling of U.S. service members in Japan, centering on Okinawa. What foreign and security policies should Japan, which take has been enjoying prosperity under America's nuclear umbrella, pursue? (The Mainichi posed this question to two experts on defense and security issues, Satoshi Morimoto, a professor at Takushoku University Graduate School, and Jitsuro Terashima, honorary chairman of Japan Research Institute. Morimoto's comments appear below; Terashima's are found in the following article) The future of East Asia is opaque. North Korea is saddled with the question of a possible change of its leader as well as nuclear and missile issues. China's hegemonic tendency could potentially undermine the stability of the region. The Japan-U.S. alliance must be strengthened to play a greater role for the stability of Asia and the international community. The new administration to be launched after the House of Representatives election need not dwell on precedent. Much can be expected from policy debate from a fresh perspective TOKYO 00001966 007 OF 014 But if it formulates a policy that damages the credibility of the bilateral alliance, the overall Japan-U.S. relationship will suffer. As for the question of revising the SOFA, I think the United States will respond to Japan's call for frank talks about the agreement following reexamination of problems associated with it. I do not think the United States will agree to negotiations if Japan simply asks for revision of the agreement. In an "equal relationship" one side should not make complaints. Foregoing complaining will help forge a sound bilateral relationship. At the same time, the continuation of the present foreign policy will not strengthen the alliance. Japan is risk averse, for which reason it does not amend the Constitution such that it could make genuine contributions to the international community. In the run-up to Lower House election, debate has centered on such livelihood issues as pensions, nursing care, and roads. The people must not choose a party to take the reins of government without conducting serious discussions on how Japan should deal with the North Korean nuclear issue and China. Discussion of bread-and-butter issues is entirely different from discussion of the fate of the state. A state cannot be saved by that discussion alone. (5) 2009 Lower House election: My views on foreign and security policies: Japan must keep appropriate distance from U.S. and China Jitsuro Terashima MAINICHI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) August 25, 2009 It goes without saying that the Japan-U.S. alliance is the foundation of Japan's foreign policy. But current Japan-U.S. relations are excessively skewed toward military affairs. The new administration to be launched after the (Aug. 30) House of Representatives election is obliged to redesign the Japan-U.S. relationship, the foundation of Japan's foreign policy, according to the international situation of multi-polarization and non-polarization at the beginning of the 21st century. Because domestic politics became unstable in the 1990s, Japan was not able to redesign its relationship with U.S. before the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the rise of China. Japan opted for a policy of reinforcing its military ties with the United States and confronting China. Its rationale was that there was no other option than follow the U.S. lead. The country still adheres to this policy. The United States is now oriented toward "constructive involvement" rather than "confrontation" with China. Therefore, in dealing with the United States, it is essential for Japan to win the trust of other Asian countries including China. Rather than enhance the defense relationship Japan should keep an appropriate distance from both the United States and China while clearly asserting its position. That requires Japan to present a framework for the gradual reduction of U.S. bases in Japan and to revise the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement while not creating a military vacuum in Northeast Asia. TOKYO 00001966 008 OF 014 The Cold War structure has collapsed, and 64 years have elapsed since the end of WWII. We must return to the common-sense view that the continued stationing of foreign troops in Japan is an abnormal situation. (6) Symposium on "Obama administration and Japan-U.S. relations" ASAHI (Page 37) (Full) August 26, 2009 Following the appointments of high-level officials in the state and defense ministries in charge of Asian affairs, new U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos has arrived at his post. With Roos's arrival in his post, the lineup of the Obama administration's Japan policy team has now been formed. President Barack Obama is expected to visit Japan in November. In order to look ahead in the Japan-U.S. relationship, the Asahi Shimbun will invite to a symposium Daniel Okimoto, expert in Japanese politics and economy and a professor emeritus at Stanford University, who has close ties to Roos. Date and time: Sept. 17 (Thursday) 14:00 - 17:00 Place: Hamarikyu Asahi Hall in Tsukiji, Tokyo Host: Yoichi Funabashi, chief editor of Asahi Shimbun Application: Asahi com symposium page (http://www.asahi.com/sympo/) Free of charge Maximum capacity: 200 Closing day: Sept. 4 If there are a larger number of applicants than the application spot, a lottery will be drawn. The result of the lottery will be informed by mail. (7) Japan asked U.S. to keep documents on nuclear-related secret pact classified in 1999 ASAHI (Top play) (Abridged slightly) August 26, 2009 Nanae Kurashige In 1999 the United States declassified documents pertaining to the fundamental part of a "secret nuclear pact" with Japan, and Tokyo subsequently asked Washington to retract the declassification. The documents indicate that the two countries confirmed that Japan had agreed to allow U.S. warships and aircrafts carrying nuclear weapons to stop over in Japan without prior consultations. The U.S. Department of State relabeled the documents as classified soon after receiving the request from Japan. A source connected with the government at the time spoke of the sequence of events on the condition of anonymity. The fact that Japan asked the U.S. to keep the declassified documents under cover shows that Tokyo tried to keep the existence of the covert agreement a secret from the general public. From the perspective of information disclosure, it is certain that the government's consistent explanation that the secret nuclear pact does not exist will collapse and draw criticism. Included in the documents were "records of discussions on the Security Treaty" from 1959 in which Japan and the United States confirmed that Japan would continue to allow U.S. warships and aircrafts carrying nuclear weapons to stop over in and pass through TOKYO 00001966 009 OF 014 Japan as before ahead of the conclusion of the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. These records were included in the documents that were prepared in June 1960 by the State Department Northeast Asian affairs department for the purpose of briefing Congress. They were believed to be prepared for then Secretary of State Christian Herter to use in answering questions when asking Congress for approval of the ratification of the revised security treaty. In principle, official U.S. documents must be declassified after 25 years. The "set of documents" was declassified and their full text was open to the public until the fall of 1999. But on Dec. 13, 1999, only the secret pact-related part, including the "records on discussions," was re-categorized as classified supposedly because confidential security information was included in it. "As soon as (the government) became aware of the declassification of the documents, it asked the United States to retract it," the source connected with the government at the time said. He also said that the United States' decision to make documents public was lax, indicating that the circumstances in Japan were not taken into consideration in disclosing the documents. The request was made via diplomatic channels, according to the source. Meanwhile, a research fellow of the National Security Archive, an American independent non-governmental research institute pursuing information disclosure, made copies of the documents at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in November 1999, shortly before the documents were removed from the public disclosure records. The Asahi Shimbun obtained them and reported on the whole picture in August 2000. If it had not been for the copies, the contents of the documents would still have been in concealment today. "I am not in a position to comment," Yutaka Kawashima, grand chamberlain of Japan, said about the secret pact in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun last month. Kawashima was serving as administrative vice-foreign minister under Foreign Minister Yohei Kono in the Obuchi cabinet in December 1999. Comment by Masaaki Gabe, professor at the University of the Ryukyus: It is rare for diplomatic documents that were opened to the public in accordance with the State Department's proper procedures to be re-categorized as classified. Reports on the involvement of the Japanese government did not surprise me. Records on talks in 1963 between then Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer, too, were moved out of the public eye after being declassified temporarily. There are other cases in which the Japanese government's involvement is also suspected. In principle, the United States discloses all official documents, whereas Japan selectively makes government documents public. Vital parts of the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, and Japan-U.S. defense cooperation have not been disclosed. As researchers, we can learn about what took place during U.S.-Japan talks through documents that were disclosed in the United States. What has been preventing Japan from disclosing (the secret pact) all this time? If the government is going to continue denying the existence of the pact, why does that part not exist in Japan? The government must demonstrate its accountability. (8) Editorial: Political parties should keep in mind retreat of TOKYO 00001966 010 OF 014 postal reforms will bring about major loss NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) August 26, 2009 The government's postal reform plans, which obtained public support in the House of Representatives election four years ago, are likely to be revised significantly after the upcoming Lower House election. If the reform momentum wanes and if the bureaucracy-controlled financial system is preserved, Japan will find it more difficult to improve the conditions of its economy, now faced with such issues as the rapidly aging society and intense global competition. In the previous postal-reform-centered Lower House election, (the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by) then prime minister Junichiro Koizumi won an overwhelming victory. After this election, the government began to offer privatized postal services in October 2007 under a system of four companies placed under Japan Post Holdings Co. The four businesses are Kampo Life Insurance Company, Postal Savings Company, Mail Delivery Company, and OTC Services Company. But in the campaigning for the upcoming election, the ruling and opposition parties have vowed to revise their initial stances to one degree or another. With an eye on taking over the reins of government, the DPJ promises in its policy manifesto to sweepingly revise the nation's postal services. The party proposes to offer postal, savings and insurance services in an integrated manner by freezing such plans as listing stocks of Postal Savings Co. and Kamp Life Insurance Co. planned on the market in fiscal 2010 and selling the government's shares in these two companies and Japan Post. The DPJ made the proposals in response to public criticism of the planned abolition of post offices and mail-delivery service degradation. In addition, the party apparently gave priority to garnering votes linked to the postal business through election cooperation with the People's New Party (PNP),which has opposed the privatization of postal services, and to forming a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and the PNP. Given that there is a group in favor of postal privatization within the party, a senior party member said: "We will not turn the businesses into state-run or public corporations again. But the party has yet to present a clear post-reform vision about what business form they will take. If a government led by the DPJ is inaugurated and if the planned sales of its shares in the companies are delayed from late September 2017, it means the government's involvement in the businesses will be prolonged and will eventually undermine the postal reform's principle of shifting the flow of money from the government to the private sector. The LDP's manifesto specifies that the party will maintain the four-company system but notes: "We will take measures to secure offering postal, savings and insurance services in an integrated manner." The party thus indicates a willingness to revise its conventional policy. Some party members have taken action while bearing in mind the recent trend of postal service-related votes leaving from the LDP, for instance, Internal Affairs & Communications Minister Tsutomu Sato's reference to a review of the four-business system. The LDP's scenario for postal privatization is also extremely unclear. TOKYO 00001966 011 OF 014 Steadily privatizing postal services is indispensable for sustainable economic growth. The bureaucracy-controlled financial system, under which huge funds collected with the backing of the government are injected into ineffective projects and public investment, has shown its limitation. It is necessary to give consideration to local users of postal services, but the burden on the people will never be reduced without efforts to effectuate the services. Under the current situation, large portions of the postal savings and Kamp insurance premiums have been used to float government bonds. Unless this situation is altered, the structure of the Japanese economy will never be improved. The LDP and the DPJ should keep in mind that the retreat of postal reform will bring about a major loss to Japan in the future (9) Four wise men behind Obama's Prague speech in April on "world without nuclear weapons" GAIKO FORUM (Pages 42-44) (Slightly abridged) August 2009 Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Nihon Keizai Shimbun editorial staff The road to "a world without nuclear weapons" - Behind this grand strategy proposed by President Barack Obama, leader of the only country that has used a nuclear bomb, the United States, is the notion of U.S. experts that nuclear bombs are inhuman and should not be used from a moral standpoint. How did this notion come to the attention of the President and become a concrete policy goal? We examined this process based on testimonies from parties involved with this affair. Legacy of Reykjavik In September 2006, three foreign policy and security experts were having dinner in a corner of the Stanford University campus in northern California. They were George Schultz, known as the heavyweight secretary of state during the Reagan administration, William Perry, secretary of defense during the Clinton administration, and Sidney Drell, a physicist turned expert on nuclear disarmament and arms management. Just when everyone was having a good time at the dinner, Schultz suddenly noted: "This year marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S.-Soviet summit in Reykjavik. Can we not examine the 'significance' of that summit on this occasion?" Schultz, who was present at the Reykjavik Summit, remembered clearly that Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev used the words "eradication of nuclear arms." He was wondering if such a possibility should not be pursued once again in the 21st Century. Perry and Drell, who thought that Schultz's proposal was a great idea, immediately suggested holding a workshop of experts at Stanford University. After the small workshop ended, Perry put forward two goals for the future: hold a similar workshop one year later and publish the points discussed at the workshop. Here, Schultz set a further condition to Perry's proposal. Among the TOKYO 00001966 012 OF 014 many participants in the workshop, there were many "dyed-in-the-wool Democrats" (in Perry's words),including former Democratic senator Sam Nunn, who was responsible for passing the Nunn-Lugar Act supporting the safe management of the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. Schultz was the only Republican. Schultz wanted the position paper to be produced by the workshop to be "bipartisan," so he invited former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was known to have studied issues relating to nuclear capability since his days at Harvard University, to join the group. Schultz, Perry, Nunn, and Kissinger later came to be known as the "four wise men" who drew up a scenario for the complete eradication of nuclear arms. Encounter with Obama An op ed signed by the four was published in the U.S. paper Wall Street Journal in early 2007. In this appeal entitled "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," Schultz, Perry, et al enumerated the following specific policy goals: (1) drastic cuts in the nuclear capability of the nuclear powers; (2) eliminate tactical nuclear weapons in the allies and friends of the United States and Russia; (3) U.S. ratification of the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty); and (4) complete stop in the production of fissile materials used in weapons. As expected by Perry and his group, there was a deluge of positive response from all over the world to this article dealing with the momentous subject of "eradication of nuclear arms." Groups modeled after the American workshop were launched in the UK, Germany, Russia, and India, and they all asked for cooperation from Perry's group. Needless to say, the proposal of the four wise men also became a great sensation in the United States. Amid the heated debate on the pros and cons, Perry noticed that one senator stood out in his positive response. His name was Barack Obama. Obama, who had already decided at that time to run in the 2008 U.S. presidential election, called Perry's office several times subsequently to seek his advice on drawing up a blueprint for the eradication of nuclear arms. Perry made the following promise to Obama: "Senator, I am an old man over 80 years of age. On condition that even if you get elected, I will not assume an important government position, I am willing to help in whatever way I can." Perry left the job of briefing Republican presidential candidate John McCain to Schultz, and was exchanging views frequently with the Obama camp's foreign policy and security advisers, including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Eventually, Obama's campaign advisers began drafting concrete "ideas for a comprehensive policy to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime" (in the words of an Obama administration official) based on the four wise men's paper. Bipartisan committee launched At about the same time, an idea emerged in the U.S. Congress that a bipartisan committee should be formed to discuss the nuclear issues. Perry, who became the chair of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, devoted himself to drawing up a concrete strategy for a nuclear-free world, dividing his time TOKYO 00001966 013 OF 014 between the group of four wise men and the Congressional commission. Perry is a mathematician by training and is known for his promotion of the development of stealth fighters. His approach was based on a realistic geopolitical viewpoint. He called this "lead and hedge." To reach the "distant summit" (in the words of Perry) of eradication of all nuclear weapons, a base camp needs to be built, and "two paths" consisting of: (1) the maintenance of deterrence; and (2) reinforcing arms management and the non-proliferation regime, will be built from this base camp toward the reduction of nuclear arms. This "base camp concept" came to be supported by a certain measure of consensus at the bipartisan Congressional commission. It will be difficult to achieve the elimination of all nuclear weapons without a dramatic geopolitical change on earth. It is necessary to maintain nuclear deterrence not only for America, but expanded deterrence (nuclear umbrella) will also have to be maintained for allies and friendly countries. The "strategic ambiguity" on the "first use of nuclear weapons" will have to be maintained for the time being. The recommendations in the final report issued by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States on May 6, 2009 point to the fact that there will be many twists and turns and difficult problems on the path to a "nuclear-free world." Prague speech One month before Perry and his group submitted their final report, Obama, the 44th president of the United States was in Prague, capital of the Czech Republic in East Europe, on April 6. There, he gave a policy speech on realizing "a world without nuclear weapons," a policy he had been advocating since the presidential election campaign, and called on the world for cooperation. He cited specifically the ratification of the CTBT, which the Clinton and Bush administrations had given up on, and negotiations for a new treaty on ending the production of fissile materials for weapon use, declaring that the U.S. will exert utmost efforts for the eradication of nuclear arms. Furthermore, Obama became the first U.S. president to talk about the "moral responsibility of the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon" because the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. Obama stated the above unequivocally even after receiving reports that some 8,000 kilometers from Prague, North Korea had fired its long-range ballistic missile "Taepodong-2" into the Pacific Ocean. His resolute stance came as a "pleasant surprise" even to Perry, who had advised Obama on the path to "a world without nuclear weapons." About a week before the Prague speech, Perry visited Moscow with the other three wise men. During their meeting with President Dmitriy Medvedev at the Kremlin, they were bombarded with enthusiastic questions from the president on their vision of a "nuclear-free world." Perry and his partners sensed Medvedev's sincerity when he stated forcefully that he would like to realize START (Strategic Arms TOKYO 00001966 014 OF 014 Reduction Treaty) III with the U.S. A few hours later, Kissinger had a separate meeting with the "real power holder in Russia" Premier Vladimir Putin. He whispered to Perry later: "Putin is also positive. I think we can safely conclude that there are no contradictions or differences between Medvedev and Putin on this issue (nuclear disarmament)." Top priority issue On May 19, 2009, Obama invited the four wise men to his office in the White House to seek their advice on policies for achieving "a world without nuclear weapons." Obama, who was then facing an unprecedented economic crisis, with the symbol of American manufacturing industries General Motors filing for bankruptcy protection, but he devoted 90 minutes to his meeting with the four wise men despite his extremely tight schedule. Seeing that Obama did not use any notes at all and expressed his thoughts eloquently in his own words, Perry felt once again that "this president is serious." The four wise men, who are planning to visit Beijing to meet President Hu Jintao and other Chinese leaders this fall through Kissinger's mediation, made two policy recommendations to Obama at the meeting on what needs to be done for now, namely: "comprehensive strategic dialogue" with Russia, including on nuclear disarmament, and the maintenance of expanded deterrence (nuclear umbrella) for Japan and other allies. "The United States will cooperate with Russia and other countries to play a leading role in eliminating the nuclear threat." After stressing to reporters his determination to achieve "a world without nuclear weapons" in the above terms, based on the advice of Perry and his group, Obama related his conviction to the four wise men: "This issue is one of my top four priorities." ROOS