DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/10/09

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 001819

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA

SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/10/09

INDEX:

(1) Roos confirmed as U.S. ambassador to Japan: The key is
cooperation with new administration [Nikkei]
(2) Approaches of LDP, DPJ to Japan-U.S. alliance outlined in
manifestos [Nikkei]
(3) Joint coast guard to be established to cover three countries,
including Palau: Japan, U.S., Australia to take part in
establishment meeting [Tokyo Shimbun]
(4) DPJ revises campaign pledges on Japan-U.S. FTA, growth strategy,
decentralization of power [Asahi]
(5) DPJ blueprint for new administration calls for immediate
creation of National Strategy Bureau, cutting supplementary budget
by 3 trillion yen [Asahi]
(6) New adviser to defense minister, Takushoku University Professor
Satoshi Morimoto: Impossible to cut defense spending [Yomiuri]
(7) Editorial: Future of ODA - Budget increase necessary [Mainichi]

(8) Interview with former Komeito Secretary General Yuichi Ichikawa
on secret pact on nuclear introduction: "Historic verification"
imperative [Nikkei]
(9) TOP HEADLINES
(10) EDITORIALS 9
(11) Prime Minister's schedule

ARTICLES:

(1) Roos confirmed as U.S. ambassador to Japan: The key is
cooperation with new administration

NIKKEI (Page 5) (Full)
August 9, 2009

Hiroshi Maruya, Washington

John Roos, 54, has been confirmed as the U.S. ambassador to Japan.
Roos, who is a long-time supporter of the Democratic Party and who
has personal links with President Barack Obama, will be coming to
Japan in the middle of a general election in which the voters will
make their choice of administration. The first task of the new
ambassador will be to build a relationship with the "new
administration."

"Ever since I served as an intern in the White House while in law
school," Roos said during the Senate confirmation hearing, "I have
dreamed of one day re-entering public service and giving something
back to my country." His remark was indicative of his great
enthusiasm for the job of ambassador to Japan. Even before the
confirmation hearing, Roos had been receiving "lectures" from
experts and scholars on Japan to prepare himself.

Measured by traditional yardsticks, Roos, who has no experience in
diplomacy and public service, raises concerns in Japan. But a senior
Japanese government official says, "What we want most from the new
ambassador is the ability to talk directly to the White House." This
is because the more complicated the issues are, the more important
are the decisions of the President and his close aides.

The Obama administration is keeping the conduct of diplomacy under
the direct control of the White House. Senior Adviser David Axelrod,
White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, and others are involved in
all foreign and domestic policy issues. In the present situation,

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making contact [with the White House] through traditional diplomatic
channels would be difficult.

There are many pending issues between Japan and America, including
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and dealing with the North
Korean nuclear issue, that will ultimately require decisions at the
political level. If the ambassador has a personal relationship with
the President, it will be easier to contact the nerve center of the
White House.

Japan will be experiencing a period of political upheaval between
the House of Representatives election on August 30 and the House of
Councillors election in the summer of 2010. President Obama is
scheduled to visit Japan in November. The new ambassador's role in
mediating between the new administration in Japan and the U.S.
government will be very important.

But there is the example of Junichiro Koizumi. The former prime
minister had virtually no diplomatic experience and did not know any
Japan experts in the U.S. Nevertheless, he was instrumental in
building with former President George Bush what is described as the
best Japan-U.S. relationship after World War II. Japan pins its
hopes on Roos's ability.

(2) Approaches of LDP, DPJ to Japan-U.S. alliance outlined in
manifestos

NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full)
August 8, 2009

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) both define the Japan-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of the
nation's foreign policy in their campaign pledges (manifestos) for
the upcoming House of Representatives election. When it comes to how
they are going to manage the alliance, however, there is a
significant difference.

The DPJ's manifesto includes such goals as "an equal Japan-U.S.
alliance" and "an active diplomatic strategy." It takes the stance
of distancing itself from the U.S. to some extent while maintaining
the alliance. Criticizing the diplomatic stance of the government
and the ruling coalition as "blindly following the U.S.", the
manifesto underscores differences in the two sides' diplomatic
stances.

The DPJ calls for reviewing the U.S. force realignment plan agreed
on between Japan and the U.S., including a plan to relocate the U.S.
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa
Prefecture). Their manifesto suggests that the facility should be
transferred to somewhere outside the prefecture. It also proposes a
revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. But the U.S.
is unlikely to accept these proposals. In the earlier Diet session
under the Aso administration, Japan endorsed an accord requiring
Japan to steadily implement the U.S. force realignment agreement.
Taking advantage of this accord, the U.S. intends to ask Japan to
implement the realignment plan, showing no signs of responding to a
call for reviewing the agreement.

But with an eye on seizing political power, the DPJ manifesto also
lays out pragmatic plans, such as the inspection of cargo on ships
traveling to and from North Korea and anti-piracy measures in waters
off Somalia. The DPJ, however, stops short of mentioning the

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Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean,
which it once criticized as violating the Constitution. The party
intends to approve the mission until its expiration next January,
but not beyond that.

Meanwhile, the LDP's manifesto pledges to strengthen the Japan-U.S.
alliance. It includes measures to promote the ballistic missile
defense (BMD) system and steadily implement the U.S. force
realignment plan. Bearing in mind even the possibility of allowing
the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to invoke the right to collective
self-defense, the manifesto also includes measures to enable the SDF
to intercept ballistic missiles heading toward the U.S. and to
defend U.S. warships. It also calls for permanent legislation to
enable the dispatch of SDF personnel overseas as needed.

The LDP, however, gives no specifics on how to implement these
measures. A huge amount of money will be needed to promote the BMD
system. For SDF overseas operations, new equipment and training will
become necessary. The nation's defense budget has been on the
decline. To carry out these measures, securing fiscal resources is
vital.

Although the LDP in its draft manifesto proposed a review of the
government's interpretation of the Constitution to enable the SDF to
invoke the right to collective self-defense, the party deleted the
proposal in the final version, reflecting cautious views in its
coalition partner, the New Komeito.

(3) Joint coast guard to be established to cover three countries,
including Palau: Japan, U.S., Australia to take part in
establishment meeting

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Top Play) (Full)
Evening, August 8, 2009

It has been decided that a meeting will be held to discuss the
establishment of a coast guard covering three Pacific-Micronesian
countries. This is in response to the formal inclusion of a request
to hold a meeting on the matter in the joint statement of the three
nations' summit in July. The U.S. will likely join the move to
assist the three nations establish a coast guard. It is unusual to
set up a coast guard under the initiative of the private sector.
This is also the first attempt for several countries to set up a
joint coast guard in cooperation.

This area is a key water route connecting the Lombok Strait in
Indonesia, used when Malacca Strait cannot be used, to Japan. It can
be said that this strait is the second lifeline for East Asian
countries, following the Malacca Strait.

The planned joint coast guard will be established by the Federated
States of Micronesia, the Republic of Marshall Islands, and the
Republic of Palau.

The Tokyo-based Sasakawa Peace Foundation, which is promoting the
dissemination of satellite-based remote teaching in various Pacific
nations, will press ahead with the plan as private-sector led
diplomacy at the request of the three countries made last year.

The foundation carried out a field survey of poaching by foreign
vessels and marine pollution and compiled a report on such
challenges as establishing a coast guard and shortages of fuel and

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waste disposal facilities. Former deputy vice minister for the Land,
Infrastructure and Transport Ministry Jiro Habu, the Chairman of the
federation, then visited Australia, which will assist those
countries with coast guard vessels, and the U.S., to which they will
relegate national defense, and explained the need and requested
support for the establishment of a coast guard.

The U.S. Department of State reportedly praised the plan, noting
that it would become the first case of government-private sector
partnership, which Secretary Clinton advocates.

In a joint statement issued at the 9th Micronesia Summit, the
presidents of the three countries stated that they will recommend
the Sasakawa Peace Federation hold a meeting of the three countries
and supporting countries - Japan, the U.S., and Australia.

The federation will set the agenda items for the meeting and then
confer on a specific program for setting up the coast guard,
involving the U.S. Coast Guard, the Foreign Ministry, and other
experts. The Japan Coast Guard will also cooperate on the project.

Chairman Habu said, "The meaning of the establishment of a coast
guard in an area that connects Lombok Strait to East Asia is great
in terms of securing maritime safety."

(4) DPJ revises campaign pledges on Japan-U.S. FTA, growth strategy,
decentralization of power

ASAHI (Top play) (Excerpts)
August 8, 2009

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) announced on August 7 a revision
to its pledge in its manifesto (campaign pledges) for the House of
Representatives election about the Japan-U.S. free trade agreement
(FTA). It is changing the wording from "concluding" a FTA to
"promote negotiations" for a FTA. This is for the sake of protecting
domestic agriculture and the livestock industry. It will also
redefine the policies included in the manifesto and make substantial
revisions to the passages on economic growth strategy in response to
criticism of its "lack of enthusiasm" for economic growth. A
decision on the "final version" of the manifesto reflecting the
above revisions will be made as soon as early next week.

In addition to the two pledges above, the DPJ will add a policy on
creating a "venue of consultation" between the national and local
governments for decentralization of power in response to a request
from prefectural governors.

The DPJ, which is campaigning to take over the reins of government,
published its manifesto on July 27, but there has been strong
reaction to some of its policies. Partly due to inadequate consensus
building in the party, the DPJ is now forced to revise its manifesto
before the official declaration of candidacy (August 18).

Deputy President Naoto Kan announced the revision on the issue of
Japan-U.S. FTA at an ad hoc news conference on August 7. In addition
to deleting the word "conclusion" of a FTA, the DPJ will add that it
"will not adopt any measure that will undermine the safety and
stable supply of food, the improvement of food self-sufficiency
rate, and the development of domestic agriculture and rural
villages."


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Regarding the party's policy on the balance between market
liberalization and protection of agriculture, Kan claimed that "the
promotion of FTA negotiations is the party's longstanding policy."
However, he also said that "tariffs will not be reduced or
abolished" for major agricultural products.

The original manifesto has a pledge on "concluding a FTA with the
U.S. and promoting the liberalization of trade and investment" under
the foreign policy section on "building a close and equal Japan-U.S.
relationship." However, the relation of this to agricultural policy
is ambiguous, and Liberal Democratic Party Diet members specializing
in agricultural issues claim that tariff will be abolished for
agricultural and livestock products, and that this will lead to the
"collapse of Japan's agriculture.

Revisions will also be made in the "final version" of the manifesto
to enumerate policies on economic growth strategy, which has not
been clarified in the original version. The proposals on child
allowance, abolition of the temporary gasoline tax rates, and toll
free expressways will be redefined in the context of policies to
"expand domestic demand through increasing disposable income" as the
party's growth strategy.

(5) DPJ blueprint for new administration calls for immediate
creation of National Strategy Bureau, cutting supplementary budget
by 3 trillion yen

ASAHI (Page 1) (Excerpts)
August 8, 2009

Under its blueprint for a new government, the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ) has firmed up its basic policies for managing its
administration if it becomes the ruling party after the upcoming
general election. After the prime minister is elected by the Diet,
the "National Strategy Bureau," reporting directly to the prime
minister, will be created immediately through a cabinet order and
work on the formulation of the FY2010 budget. An extraordinary Diet
session would be convened subsequently to reduce by 3 trillion yen
the FY09 supplementary budget that now totals some 14 trillion yen
for use next fiscal year.

With regard to the FY10 budget, the DPJ plans to scrap the budget
request ceilings already decided by the Aso cabinet, which
constitute the outline of the budget, and formulate a new budget
from scratch.

In Diet affairs management, the special Diet session will adjourn
after electing the prime minister and appointing other Diet
officials. An extraordinary Diet session will be convened as early
as October. A new supplementary budget bill will be submitted to cut
back by around 3 trillion yen the 4.4 trillion yen allocated to 46
funds for use by public welfare corporations and other bodies in the
FY09 supplementary budget. Some 5 trillion yen will be pooled from
surpluses and such other "hidden treasures."

The DPJ will use the money to fund its high-profile policies,
including the resumption of additional allowance for single mother
families, FY10 child allowance, toll free expressways, and free high
school education.

In the case of the Hosokawa cabinet which took over [from the LDP
administration] in 1993, the enactment of the FY94 budget bill was

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delayed from the usual March to June. The DPJ wants to formulate the
budget before the end of 2009. Therefore, it will create the
National Strategy Bureau -- which will engage in a division of labor
with the Ministry of Finance -- as soon as possible, in order to
work on budget formulation.

(6) New adviser to defense minister, Takushoku University Professor
Satoshi Morimoto: Impossible to cut defense spending

YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full)
August 9, 2009

We interviewed Takushoku University Professor Satoshi Morimoto, who
has been appointed to the new position of adviser to the defense
minister as of August 1.

"In the past, the bureau chiefs doubled as 'counselors' to the
defense minister, so they did not have enough time. National defense
requires not only expertise, but also the ability to make
appropriate decisions quickly when missiles are fired at Japan or
suspicious ships violate Japanese waters. That is the purpose of the
adviser system.

"The regular tasks include the drafting of the National Defense
Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program. The
question is whether the new administration's thinking can be
incorporated in a short period of time and what to do about defense
spending. The defense budget has contracted for seven consecutive
years. However, the present situation in Northeast Asia does not
allow the reduction of defense spending.

"The immediate task is the Japan-U.S. summit meeting scheduled for
November. There are a number of bilateral-alliance issues, including
whether the Self-Defense Forces operations in the Indian Ocean and
Somalia will continue, the relocation of the Futenma base, and host
nation support. Meanwhile, a change of leadership in North Korea is
very likely to occur during the next Japanese administration. This
will require important crisis management on the part of Japan.
Cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea will also be put
to test.

"Even if there is a change of ruling parties after the House of
Representatives election, it is impossible for the goals of national
defense and for threats to change suddenly. The continuity of
defense policy should be maintained."

(Interviewer: Yoshikazu Shirakawa)

(7) Editorial: Future of ODA - Budget increase necessary

MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full)
August 10, 2009

The International Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA),which is in charge of official development
assistance (ODA),has been reorganized. The previous setup of
dividing the bureau into separate sections in charge of repayable
aid (yen loans),grants-in-aid, and technical cooperation has been
revamped into sections in charge of different regions of the world.
This is a reform aimed at the comprehensive assessment of whether a
country needs yen loans, grants, or technical cooperation, and what
sort of combination is best.

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Last October, the execution of ODA, except for some grants, was
unified under the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),
which merged with the yen loan division of the Japan Bank for
International Cooperation (JBIC). In light of this, loans, grants,
and technical cooperation for a specific country will now be handled
together. As a result of this change, a streamlined process of the
MOFA taking charge of ODA planning, with JICA taking charge of
implementation, is now in place.

Japanese ODA is at a critical crossroads. The increase in aid to
African and Asian countries pledged by previous prime ministers will
have to be executed. Japan has also made commitments to provide
funding and technical cooperation for global warming prevention,
which is a critical component of environmental measures.

However, the budget for foreign aid has been shrinking in the
process of fiscal revenue and spending reforms. Japan has fallen
from being the top aid donor to the fifth in the world. The ratio of
ODA to gross national income (GNI) is the lowest among the
industrialized countries, on a par with the United States.

So far, Japan has undoubtedly used foreign aid as a major diplomatic
tool. However, the aid budget has been contracting continuously
under the general fiscal appropriations. The government is trying to
meet its international commitments by expanding yen loans in order
to maintain the overall volume of aid, but this method has its
limits. Grants make up the lion's share of poverty reduction
measures.

The identification of projects based on local conditions by JICA or
MOFA, prompt investigation and aid decisions, and speedy execution
are indispensable reforms to make Japan's ODA visible to the
recipient countries. However, this alone will not make Japanese aid
function as soft power. Something is missing.

First, without adequate funding, aid projects will be meaningless.
Neither the ruling nor the opposition parties have made their
positions clear on this. The ODA budget should be increased, but
there are many fiscal constraints. The planning of aid projects
should make use of both JBIC funds and private capital. Second,
while strategic goals for aid are inevitable to a certain extent as
a diplomatic tool, it should not be forgotten that the fundamental
objective of aid is poverty reduction and breaking away from
underdevelopment.

Policies tend to be inward-looking during a period of economic
recession. Rolling out an ODA strategy is necessary precisely at a
time like this.

(8) Interview with former Komeito Secretary General Yuichi Ichikawa
on secret pact on nuclear introduction: "Historic verification"
imperative

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
August 7, 2009

-- The question of whether Japan had concluded a secret pact with
the U.S. whereby the latter could bring nuclear arms into Japan has
long been discussed in the Diet.

Ichikawa: In 1981, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer

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testified that a secret pact existed. It was a great shock [to the
Japanese people]. The public worried the pact would violate the
nation's three nonnuclear principles and wondered whether it should
not be subject to prior consultation under the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty.

In pursuing this issue in the Diet, I examined the minutes of
discussions on the Security Treaty in a Diet session in 1960. I
found the government had used tactful language concerning the
passage of warships carrying nuclear arms through Japanese waters.
So I had the impression Japan's and America's awareness [of the
issue] differed, but Reischauer made it clear that the two countries
had concluded a secret accord.

-- The government has persistently denied the existence of the
secret pact.

Ichikawa: The government has asserted that (1) as long as the U.S.
does not seek prior consultations, there is no need to hold such
talks, and (2) it is impossible to disclose whether warships are
carrying nuclear weapons, because such information is top secret.
The government's reply was that the U.S. will decide whether to hold
prior talks. When we asked about the existence of the secret pact,
the government replied, "There are no prior consultations." There
was no room for discussion.

-- We imagine the opposition camp received considerable information
from the government under the 1955 structure.

Ichikawa: There were cases in which the government asked us what
kind of questions we were going to ask, but there was no
behind-the-scenes maneuvering. (At the time) the Komeito, which was
attempting to raise the banner of an opposition party, could not
resort to honeyed words. We relentlessly pursued the issue in the
Diet.

I asked (former Social Democratic Party chairman) Masatsugu
Ishibashi, a polemicist for the party, whether the Social Democrats
would be able to seize the reins of government if it continues to
take the stance that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is
unconstitutional and calls for scrapping the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty. I was surprised by his response. "Revolution can be achieved
overnight," he said. "Once you assume political power, you can make
changes." The party was perhaps not terribly concerned about the
contents of the secret accord. And so it came to pass that the
Murayama cabinet recognize the SDF as constitutional.

-- The government has denied the existence of the secret agreement.

Ichikawa: Prime Minister Taro Aso denied the existence of a secret
agreement. It would be make more sense to recognize the existence of
the accord and discuss the issue. A secret pact is an inseparable
part of foreign policy. So I think there is no choice but to make it
a principle to disclose such accords 25 years or 30 years after
their conclusion. In such cases, important political decisions that
were unavoidably embodied in secret accords will not easily leak
out. If such accords are subject to historic verification afterward,
it will help revive democracy.

What do you think about the recent debates on the Japan-U.S.
security arrangements?


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Ichikawa: Some point out that the extent of Japan-U.S. cooperation
has expanded from the Far East to the [entire] world, but I think
the strategic significance of this cooperation should be discussed
more in the Diet. This point has not been explicitly discussed in
the Diet.

(9) TOP HEADLINES

Asahi, Yomiuri & Tokyo Shimbun:
Nine groups give severe assessments of LDP, DPJ policy platforms

Mainichi:
Mayor urges nuclear powers to visit Nagasaki

Nikkei:
Mitsubishi Chemical to acquire Mitsubishi Rayon

Sankei:
Politics and money: Common sense in Nagata-cho absurd

Akahata:
Government urged to stop shameful deeds and to realize "nuclear-free
Japan"

(10) EDITORIALS

Asahi:
(1) Hiroshima, Nagasaki & Okinawa: Seek ways to resolve dilemma in
pursuit of peace

Mainichi:
(1) Economic growth & environment in Lower House election campaign:
Well-balanced response needed
(2) Increased budget necessary for ODA

Yomiuri:
(1) "Anime hall of fame:" Thoroughly discuss culture policies
(2) Popular actress arrested for taking stimulant drugs

Nikkei:
(1) LDP, DPJ urged to present vision-based road administrative
reform policies
(2) Hurriedly prepare necessary measures in two years before start
of terrestrial digital broadcasting

Sankei:
(1) Education pledges: Will political neutralization be observed?
(2) Vaccine against new strains of flu: Reveal order of priority

Tokyo Shimbun:
(1) We expect LDP, DPJ to conduct debate on how to reconstruct
economy
(2) Iranian President must do his best to dispel nuclear-development
doubts

Akahata:
(1) World Conference for Prohibition of Atom and Hydrogen Bombs: Let
us move toward nuclear-free world

(11) Prime Minister's schedule, August 8

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)

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August 9, 2009

10:34
Took a walk on the grounds of the official residence

13:50
Gave a stump speech at a plaza in front of the Karasuyama Civic
Center in Minami-Karasuyama, followed by a visit to the Karasuyama
shopping district near the railway station.

15:12
Stump speech at the north exit of the JR Nakano Station, followed by
a visit to the Nakano Sun Mall.

16:42
Stump speech in front of the office of a prospective candidate for
the Lower House election.

17:35
Stump speech in front of the Metropolitan Shinjuku Line Funabori
Station.

18:06
Met with Special Adviser to the LDP president Shimamura at Tower
Hall Funabori, an event hall in Funabori.

18:55
Gave a speech at the Hotel East 21 Tokyo in Toyo.

20:00
Arrived at the official residence.

Prime Minister's schedule, August 9

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
August 10, 2009

08:12
Left Haneda Airport by JAL 1841.

09:38
Arrived at Nagasaki Airport.

10:34
Nagasaki Atomic Bomb victims Memorial Peace Prayer to commemorate
the 64th anniversary of the atomic bombing at Peace Park in Nagasaki
City. In the speech he spoke of "wounds that can't be healed,"
[mis]reading the word "kizuato" [wounds] as "shoseki."

12:32
Press conference at Best Westin Premium Hotel Nagasaki. Then met
with a representative of an organization of A-bomb victims. Health,
Labor and Welfare (MHLW) Minister Masuzoe, MHLW Health Service
Bureau Director General Ueda and Foreign Ministry Disarmament,
Non-proliferation and Science Department Director Sano were
present.

13:42
Visited the Megumi-no-Oka Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Victims' Home
accompanied by Masuzoe.

15:28

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Left Nagasaki Airport by JAL 1850.

16:55
Arrived at Haneda Airport.

17:26
Got a haircut at Barber Sato in Hotel Pacific Tokyo in Takanawa.

18:47
Organized papers at Imperial Hotel.

21:41
Arrived at the official residence.

ZUMWALT