DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/10/09

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 001819 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/10/09 INDEX: (1) Roos confirmed as U.S. ambassador to Japan: The key is cooperation with new administration [Nikkei] (2) Approaches of LDP, DPJ to Japan-U.S. alliance outlined in manifestos [Nikkei] (3) Joint coast guard to be established to cover three countries, including Palau: Japan, U.S., Australia to take part in establishment meeting [Tokyo Shimbun] (4) DPJ revises campaign pledges on Japan-U.S. FTA, growth strategy, decentralization of power [Asahi] (5) DPJ blueprint for new administration calls for immediate creation of National Strategy Bureau, cutting supplementary budget by 3 trillion yen [Asahi] (6) New adviser to defense minister, Takushoku University Professor Satoshi Morimoto: Impossible to cut defense spending [Yomiuri] (7) Editorial: Future of ODA - Budget increase necessary [Mainichi] (8) Interview with former Komeito Secretary General Yuichi Ichikawa on secret pact on nuclear introduction: "Historic verification" imperative [Nikkei] (9) TOP HEADLINES (10) EDITORIALS 9 (11) Prime Minister's schedule ARTICLES: (1) Roos confirmed as U.S. ambassador to Japan: The key is cooperation with new administration NIKKEI (Page 5) (Full) August 9, 2009 Hiroshi Maruya, Washington John Roos, 54, has been confirmed as the U.S. ambassador to Japan. Roos, who is a long-time supporter of the Democratic Party and who has personal links with President Barack Obama, will be coming to Japan in the middle of a general election in which the voters will make their choice of administration. The first task of the new ambassador will be to build a relationship with the "new administration." "Ever since I served as an intern in the White House while in law school," Roos said during the Senate confirmation hearing, "I have dreamed of one day re-entering public service and giving something back to my country." His remark was indicative of his great enthusiasm for the job of ambassador to Japan. Even before the confirmation hearing, Roos had been receiving "lectures" from experts and scholars on Japan to prepare himself. Measured by traditional yardsticks, Roos, who has no experience in diplomacy and public service, raises concerns in Japan. But a senior Japanese government official says, "What we want most from the new ambassador is the ability to talk directly to the White House." This is because the more complicated the issues are, the more important are the decisions of the President and his close aides. The Obama administration is keeping the conduct of diplomacy under the direct control of the White House. Senior Adviser David Axelrod, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, and others are involved in all foreign and domestic policy issues. In the present situation, TOKYO 00001819 002 OF 011 making contact [with the White House] through traditional diplomatic channels would be difficult. There are many pending issues between Japan and America, including realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, that will ultimately require decisions at the political level. If the ambassador has a personal relationship with the President, it will be easier to contact the nerve center of the White House. Japan will be experiencing a period of political upheaval between the House of Representatives election on August 30 and the House of Councillors election in the summer of 2010. President Obama is scheduled to visit Japan in November. The new ambassador's role in mediating between the new administration in Japan and the U.S. government will be very important. But there is the example of Junichiro Koizumi. The former prime minister had virtually no diplomatic experience and did not know any Japan experts in the U.S. Nevertheless, he was instrumental in building with former President George Bush what is described as the best Japan-U.S. relationship after World War II. Japan pins its hopes on Roos's ability. (2) Approaches of LDP, DPJ to Japan-U.S. alliance outlined in manifestos NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full) August 8, 2009 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) both define the Japan-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of the nation's foreign policy in their campaign pledges (manifestos) for the upcoming House of Representatives election. When it comes to how they are going to manage the alliance, however, there is a significant difference. The DPJ's manifesto includes such goals as "an equal Japan-U.S. alliance" and "an active diplomatic strategy." It takes the stance of distancing itself from the U.S. to some extent while maintaining the alliance. Criticizing the diplomatic stance of the government and the ruling coalition as "blindly following the U.S.", the manifesto underscores differences in the two sides' diplomatic stances. The DPJ calls for reviewing the U.S. force realignment plan agreed on between Japan and the U.S., including a plan to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture). Their manifesto suggests that the facility should be transferred to somewhere outside the prefecture. It also proposes a revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. But the U.S. is unlikely to accept these proposals. In the earlier Diet session under the Aso administration, Japan endorsed an accord requiring Japan to steadily implement the U.S. force realignment agreement. Taking advantage of this accord, the U.S. intends to ask Japan to implement the realignment plan, showing no signs of responding to a call for reviewing the agreement. But with an eye on seizing political power, the DPJ manifesto also lays out pragmatic plans, such as the inspection of cargo on ships traveling to and from North Korea and anti-piracy measures in waters off Somalia. The DPJ, however, stops short of mentioning the TOKYO 00001819 003 OF 011 Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, which it once criticized as violating the Constitution. The party intends to approve the mission until its expiration next January, but not beyond that. Meanwhile, the LDP's manifesto pledges to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. It includes measures to promote the ballistic missile defense (BMD) system and steadily implement the U.S. force realignment plan. Bearing in mind even the possibility of allowing the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to invoke the right to collective self-defense, the manifesto also includes measures to enable the SDF to intercept ballistic missiles heading toward the U.S. and to defend U.S. warships. It also calls for permanent legislation to enable the dispatch of SDF personnel overseas as needed. The LDP, however, gives no specifics on how to implement these measures. A huge amount of money will be needed to promote the BMD system. For SDF overseas operations, new equipment and training will become necessary. The nation's defense budget has been on the decline. To carry out these measures, securing fiscal resources is vital. Although the LDP in its draft manifesto proposed a review of the government's interpretation of the Constitution to enable the SDF to invoke the right to collective self-defense, the party deleted the proposal in the final version, reflecting cautious views in its coalition partner, the New Komeito. (3) Joint coast guard to be established to cover three countries, including Palau: Japan, U.S., Australia to take part in establishment meeting TOKYO SHIMBUN (Top Play) (Full) Evening, August 8, 2009 It has been decided that a meeting will be held to discuss the establishment of a coast guard covering three Pacific-Micronesian countries. This is in response to the formal inclusion of a request to hold a meeting on the matter in the joint statement of the three nations' summit in July. The U.S. will likely join the move to assist the three nations establish a coast guard. It is unusual to set up a coast guard under the initiative of the private sector. This is also the first attempt for several countries to set up a joint coast guard in cooperation. This area is a key water route connecting the Lombok Strait in Indonesia, used when Malacca Strait cannot be used, to Japan. It can be said that this strait is the second lifeline for East Asian countries, following the Malacca Strait. The planned joint coast guard will be established by the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. The Tokyo-based Sasakawa Peace Foundation, which is promoting the dissemination of satellite-based remote teaching in various Pacific nations, will press ahead with the plan as private-sector led diplomacy at the request of the three countries made last year. The foundation carried out a field survey of poaching by foreign vessels and marine pollution and compiled a report on such challenges as establishing a coast guard and shortages of fuel and TOKYO 00001819 004 OF 011 waste disposal facilities. Former deputy vice minister for the Land, Infrastructure and Transport Ministry Jiro Habu, the Chairman of the federation, then visited Australia, which will assist those countries with coast guard vessels, and the U.S., to which they will relegate national defense, and explained the need and requested support for the establishment of a coast guard. The U.S. Department of State reportedly praised the plan, noting that it would become the first case of government-private sector partnership, which Secretary Clinton advocates. In a joint statement issued at the 9th Micronesia Summit, the presidents of the three countries stated that they will recommend the Sasakawa Peace Federation hold a meeting of the three countries and supporting countries - Japan, the U.S., and Australia. The federation will set the agenda items for the meeting and then confer on a specific program for setting up the coast guard, involving the U.S. Coast Guard, the Foreign Ministry, and other experts. The Japan Coast Guard will also cooperate on the project. Chairman Habu said, "The meaning of the establishment of a coast guard in an area that connects Lombok Strait to East Asia is great in terms of securing maritime safety." (4) DPJ revises campaign pledges on Japan-U.S. FTA, growth strategy, decentralization of power ASAHI (Top play) (Excerpts) August 8, 2009 The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) announced on August 7 a revision to its pledge in its manifesto (campaign pledges) for the House of Representatives election about the Japan-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA). It is changing the wording from "concluding" a FTA to "promote negotiations" for a FTA. This is for the sake of protecting domestic agriculture and the livestock industry. It will also redefine the policies included in the manifesto and make substantial revisions to the passages on economic growth strategy in response to criticism of its "lack of enthusiasm" for economic growth. A decision on the "final version" of the manifesto reflecting the above revisions will be made as soon as early next week. In addition to the two pledges above, the DPJ will add a policy on creating a "venue of consultation" between the national and local governments for decentralization of power in response to a request from prefectural governors. The DPJ, which is campaigning to take over the reins of government, published its manifesto on July 27, but there has been strong reaction to some of its policies. Partly due to inadequate consensus building in the party, the DPJ is now forced to revise its manifesto before the official declaration of candidacy (August 18). Deputy President Naoto Kan announced the revision on the issue of Japan-U.S. FTA at an ad hoc news conference on August 7. In addition to deleting the word "conclusion" of a FTA, the DPJ will add that it "will not adopt any measure that will undermine the safety and stable supply of food, the improvement of food self-sufficiency rate, and the development of domestic agriculture and rural villages." TOKYO 00001819 005 OF 011 Regarding the party's policy on the balance between market liberalization and protection of agriculture, Kan claimed that "the promotion of FTA negotiations is the party's longstanding policy." However, he also said that "tariffs will not be reduced or abolished" for major agricultural products. The original manifesto has a pledge on "concluding a FTA with the U.S. and promoting the liberalization of trade and investment" under the foreign policy section on "building a close and equal Japan-U.S. relationship." However, the relation of this to agricultural policy is ambiguous, and Liberal Democratic Party Diet members specializing in agricultural issues claim that tariff will be abolished for agricultural and livestock products, and that this will lead to the "collapse of Japan's agriculture. Revisions will also be made in the "final version" of the manifesto to enumerate policies on economic growth strategy, which has not been clarified in the original version. The proposals on child allowance, abolition of the temporary gasoline tax rates, and toll free expressways will be redefined in the context of policies to "expand domestic demand through increasing disposable income" as the party's growth strategy. (5) DPJ blueprint for new administration calls for immediate creation of National Strategy Bureau, cutting supplementary budget by 3 trillion yen ASAHI (Page 1) (Excerpts) August 8, 2009 Under its blueprint for a new government, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has firmed up its basic policies for managing its administration if it becomes the ruling party after the upcoming general election. After the prime minister is elected by the Diet, the "National Strategy Bureau," reporting directly to the prime minister, will be created immediately through a cabinet order and work on the formulation of the FY2010 budget. An extraordinary Diet session would be convened subsequently to reduce by 3 trillion yen the FY09 supplementary budget that now totals some 14 trillion yen for use next fiscal year. With regard to the FY10 budget, the DPJ plans to scrap the budget request ceilings already decided by the Aso cabinet, which constitute the outline of the budget, and formulate a new budget from scratch. In Diet affairs management, the special Diet session will adjourn after electing the prime minister and appointing other Diet officials. An extraordinary Diet session will be convened as early as October. A new supplementary budget bill will be submitted to cut back by around 3 trillion yen the 4.4 trillion yen allocated to 46 funds for use by public welfare corporations and other bodies in the FY09 supplementary budget. Some 5 trillion yen will be pooled from surpluses and such other "hidden treasures." The DPJ will use the money to fund its high-profile policies, including the resumption of additional allowance for single mother families, FY10 child allowance, toll free expressways, and free high school education. In the case of the Hosokawa cabinet which took over [from the LDP administration] in 1993, the enactment of the FY94 budget bill was TOKYO 00001819 006 OF 011 delayed from the usual March to June. The DPJ wants to formulate the budget before the end of 2009. Therefore, it will create the National Strategy Bureau -- which will engage in a division of labor with the Ministry of Finance -- as soon as possible, in order to work on budget formulation. (6) New adviser to defense minister, Takushoku University Professor Satoshi Morimoto: Impossible to cut defense spending YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) August 9, 2009 We interviewed Takushoku University Professor Satoshi Morimoto, who has been appointed to the new position of adviser to the defense minister as of August 1. "In the past, the bureau chiefs doubled as 'counselors' to the defense minister, so they did not have enough time. National defense requires not only expertise, but also the ability to make appropriate decisions quickly when missiles are fired at Japan or suspicious ships violate Japanese waters. That is the purpose of the adviser system. "The regular tasks include the drafting of the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program. The question is whether the new administration's thinking can be incorporated in a short period of time and what to do about defense spending. The defense budget has contracted for seven consecutive years. However, the present situation in Northeast Asia does not allow the reduction of defense spending. "The immediate task is the Japan-U.S. summit meeting scheduled for November. There are a number of bilateral-alliance issues, including whether the Self-Defense Forces operations in the Indian Ocean and Somalia will continue, the relocation of the Futenma base, and host nation support. Meanwhile, a change of leadership in North Korea is very likely to occur during the next Japanese administration. This will require important crisis management on the part of Japan. Cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea will also be put to test. "Even if there is a change of ruling parties after the House of Representatives election, it is impossible for the goals of national defense and for threats to change suddenly. The continuity of defense policy should be maintained." (Interviewer: Yoshikazu Shirakawa) (7) Editorial: Future of ODA - Budget increase necessary MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) August 10, 2009 The International Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA),which is in charge of official development assistance (ODA),has been reorganized. The previous setup of dividing the bureau into separate sections in charge of repayable aid (yen loans),grants-in-aid, and technical cooperation has been revamped into sections in charge of different regions of the world. This is a reform aimed at the comprehensive assessment of whether a country needs yen loans, grants, or technical cooperation, and what sort of combination is best. TOKYO 00001819 007 OF 011 Last October, the execution of ODA, except for some grants, was unified under the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which merged with the yen loan division of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). In light of this, loans, grants, and technical cooperation for a specific country will now be handled together. As a result of this change, a streamlined process of the MOFA taking charge of ODA planning, with JICA taking charge of implementation, is now in place. Japanese ODA is at a critical crossroads. The increase in aid to African and Asian countries pledged by previous prime ministers will have to be executed. Japan has also made commitments to provide funding and technical cooperation for global warming prevention, which is a critical component of environmental measures. However, the budget for foreign aid has been shrinking in the process of fiscal revenue and spending reforms. Japan has fallen from being the top aid donor to the fifth in the world. The ratio of ODA to gross national income (GNI) is the lowest among the industrialized countries, on a par with the United States. So far, Japan has undoubtedly used foreign aid as a major diplomatic tool. However, the aid budget has been contracting continuously under the general fiscal appropriations. The government is trying to meet its international commitments by expanding yen loans in order to maintain the overall volume of aid, but this method has its limits. Grants make up the lion's share of poverty reduction measures. The identification of projects based on local conditions by JICA or MOFA, prompt investigation and aid decisions, and speedy execution are indispensable reforms to make Japan's ODA visible to the recipient countries. However, this alone will not make Japanese aid function as soft power. Something is missing. First, without adequate funding, aid projects will be meaningless. Neither the ruling nor the opposition parties have made their positions clear on this. The ODA budget should be increased, but there are many fiscal constraints. The planning of aid projects should make use of both JBIC funds and private capital. Second, while strategic goals for aid are inevitable to a certain extent as a diplomatic tool, it should not be forgotten that the fundamental objective of aid is poverty reduction and breaking away from underdevelopment. Policies tend to be inward-looking during a period of economic recession. Rolling out an ODA strategy is necessary precisely at a time like this. (8) Interview with former Komeito Secretary General Yuichi Ichikawa on secret pact on nuclear introduction: "Historic verification" imperative NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) August 7, 2009 -- The question of whether Japan had concluded a secret pact with the U.S. whereby the latter could bring nuclear arms into Japan has long been discussed in the Diet. Ichikawa: In 1981, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer TOKYO 00001819 008 OF 011 testified that a secret pact existed. It was a great shock [to the Japanese people]. The public worried the pact would violate the nation's three nonnuclear principles and wondered whether it should not be subject to prior consultation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In pursuing this issue in the Diet, I examined the minutes of discussions on the Security Treaty in a Diet session in 1960. I found the government had used tactful language concerning the passage of warships carrying nuclear arms through Japanese waters. So I had the impression Japan's and America's awareness [of the issue] differed, but Reischauer made it clear that the two countries had concluded a secret accord. -- The government has persistently denied the existence of the secret pact. Ichikawa: The government has asserted that (1) as long as the U.S. does not seek prior consultations, there is no need to hold such talks, and (2) it is impossible to disclose whether warships are carrying nuclear weapons, because such information is top secret. The government's reply was that the U.S. will decide whether to hold prior talks. When we asked about the existence of the secret pact, the government replied, "There are no prior consultations." There was no room for discussion. -- We imagine the opposition camp received considerable information from the government under the 1955 structure. Ichikawa: There were cases in which the government asked us what kind of questions we were going to ask, but there was no behind-the-scenes maneuvering. (At the time) the Komeito, which was attempting to raise the banner of an opposition party, could not resort to honeyed words. We relentlessly pursued the issue in the Diet. I asked (former Social Democratic Party chairman) Masatsugu Ishibashi, a polemicist for the party, whether the Social Democrats would be able to seize the reins of government if it continues to take the stance that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is unconstitutional and calls for scrapping the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. I was surprised by his response. "Revolution can be achieved overnight," he said. "Once you assume political power, you can make changes." The party was perhaps not terribly concerned about the contents of the secret accord. And so it came to pass that the Murayama cabinet recognize the SDF as constitutional. -- The government has denied the existence of the secret agreement. Ichikawa: Prime Minister Taro Aso denied the existence of a secret agreement. It would be make more sense to recognize the existence of the accord and discuss the issue. A secret pact is an inseparable part of foreign policy. So I think there is no choice but to make it a principle to disclose such accords 25 years or 30 years after their conclusion. In such cases, important political decisions that were unavoidably embodied in secret accords will not easily leak out. If such accords are subject to historic verification afterward, it will help revive democracy. What do you think about the recent debates on the Japan-U.S. security arrangements? TOKYO 00001819 009 OF 011 Ichikawa: Some point out that the extent of Japan-U.S. cooperation has expanded from the Far East to the [entire] world, but I think the strategic significance of this cooperation should be discussed more in the Diet. This point has not been explicitly discussed in the Diet. (9) TOP HEADLINES Asahi, Yomiuri & Tokyo Shimbun: Nine groups give severe assessments of LDP, DPJ policy platforms Mainichi: Mayor urges nuclear powers to visit Nagasaki Nikkei: Mitsubishi Chemical to acquire Mitsubishi Rayon Sankei: Politics and money: Common sense in Nagata-cho absurd Akahata: Government urged to stop shameful deeds and to realize "nuclear-free Japan" (10) EDITORIALS Asahi: (1) Hiroshima, Nagasaki & Okinawa: Seek ways to resolve dilemma in pursuit of peace Mainichi: (1) Economic growth & environment in Lower House election campaign: Well-balanced response needed (2) Increased budget necessary for ODA Yomiuri: (1) "Anime hall of fame:" Thoroughly discuss culture policies (2) Popular actress arrested for taking stimulant drugs Nikkei: (1) LDP, DPJ urged to present vision-based road administrative reform policies (2) Hurriedly prepare necessary measures in two years before start of terrestrial digital broadcasting Sankei: (1) Education pledges: Will political neutralization be observed? (2) Vaccine against new strains of flu: Reveal order of priority Tokyo Shimbun: (1) We expect LDP, DPJ to conduct debate on how to reconstruct economy (2) Iranian President must do his best to dispel nuclear-development doubts Akahata: (1) World Conference for Prohibition of Atom and Hydrogen Bombs: Let us move toward nuclear-free world (11) Prime Minister's schedule, August 8 NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) TOKYO 00001819 010 OF 011 August 9, 2009 10:34 Took a walk on the grounds of the official residence 13:50 Gave a stump speech at a plaza in front of the Karasuyama Civic Center in Minami-Karasuyama, followed by a visit to the Karasuyama shopping district near the railway station. 15:12 Stump speech at the north exit of the JR Nakano Station, followed by a visit to the Nakano Sun Mall. 16:42 Stump speech in front of the office of a prospective candidate for the Lower House election. 17:35 Stump speech in front of the Metropolitan Shinjuku Line Funabori Station. 18:06 Met with Special Adviser to the LDP president Shimamura at Tower Hall Funabori, an event hall in Funabori. 18:55 Gave a speech at the Hotel East 21 Tokyo in Toyo. 20:00 Arrived at the official residence. Prime Minister's schedule, August 9 NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) August 10, 2009 08:12 Left Haneda Airport by JAL 1841. 09:38 Arrived at Nagasaki Airport. 10:34 Nagasaki Atomic Bomb victims Memorial Peace Prayer to commemorate the 64th anniversary of the atomic bombing at Peace Park in Nagasaki City. In the speech he spoke of "wounds that can't be healed," [mis]reading the word "kizuato" [wounds] as "shoseki." 12:32 Press conference at Best Westin Premium Hotel Nagasaki. Then met with a representative of an organization of A-bomb victims. Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) Minister Masuzoe, MHLW Health Service Bureau Director General Ueda and Foreign Ministry Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department Director Sano were present. 13:42 Visited the Megumi-no-Oka Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Victims' Home accompanied by Masuzoe. 15:28 TOKYO 00001819 011 OF 011 Left Nagasaki Airport by JAL 1850. 16:55 Arrived at Haneda Airport. 17:26 Got a haircut at Barber Sato in Hotel Pacific Tokyo in Takanawa. 18:47 Organized papers at Imperial Hotel. 21:41 Arrived at the official residence. ZUMWALT