DPJ ADVISOR DISCUSSES PARTY'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001706 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL JA SUBJECT: DPJ ADVISOR DISCUSSES PARTY'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY PLANS REF: JULY 24 2009 EMBASSY TOKYO DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT TOKYO 00001706 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES a.i., JAMES P. ZUMWALT, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The DPJ wants to work closely with the U.S. and resolve any differences through dialogue, DPJ Policy Affairs Chief Kiyoshi Sugawa told Embassy Tokyo July 27. Sugawa came to the Embassy to deliver and discuss the DPJ's Policy Index 2009, a 60-page document outlining the Party's position on a full range of policy issues, both domestic and foreign. While covering a broad spectrum of topics, the Index does not, however, mention some of the more challenging issues the DPJ has said it plans to address, including calls for revisions to the US forces realignment package and Host Nation Support (HNS). The DPJ's manifesto, to be released on the evening of July 27, reportedly has more detailed policy stances, albeit not on security matters. Sugawa dismissed concerns over any divisions within the party between centrist and left-leaning elements and said this would not be an issue after the election. He noted that the DPJ's domestic policy plans, coupled with its stance on foreign policy issues, would help the DPJ in the July 2010 Upper House election as well. ¶2. (C) Bio note: Sugawa works as a senior researcher on the DPJ's policy research committee and covers foreign policy and national security issues. A former Sumitomo Bank employee and Brookings fellow, he was hired to work for the Party by DPJ President Hatoyama and is reportedly one of Hatoyama's closest confidantes. End bio note. -------------- What's in the Index and What is Not -------------- ¶3. (C) Sugawa provided Embassy Tokyo with the DPJ's Policy Index, which was released internally on 23 July without posting on the Party's website. The Index is essentially a compilation of short summaries of the DPJ's position on various foreign and domestic policy matters. The foreign and defense policy section of the Index targets a broad range of goals, including establishing a new era for the U.S.-Japan Alliance (suggestions for SOFA revision, frank dialogue, and an equal partnership); strengthening Asian diplomacy; deepening relations with China, Russia, and Europe; strengthening trust between Korea and Japan; fighting piracy and securing the safety of the oceans (including recognition that the Self-Defense Forces will sometimes be required in counterpiracy operations); proactive DPRK diplomacy (with the central goal of resolving the abductee problem); spearheading the drive to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world; improving information gathering, analysis, and control; missile defense; and reform of the Ministry of Defense (including procurement reform and increasing public awareness and understanding of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)). Conspicuously absent from the index is any reference to revisions to Host Nation Support (HNS),Japan's ongoing Indian Ocean refueling operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),or specific plans regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) or the realignment process. -------------- Index vs. Manifesto -------------- ¶4. (C) Sugawa said the DPJ's "manifesto" (Party platform),a more detailed description of the DPJ's planned policies should it win the next election, would be released on July ¶27. He noted, however, that the manifesto focuses on policies that the DPJ expects it can achieve in its four-year term in office. As such, he added, it does not have details on foreign and national security matters as these "depend on the U.S." and other partners and because the DPJ would like to maintain "as much flexibility as possible." Sugawa said that the Index provided the best read on the DPJ's security policies. ¶5. (C) The basic strategy of the DPJ is to focus on domestic policy first and foreign and security policy second. TOKYO 00001706 002.2 OF 003 Pointing to North Korean contingencies, the possible POTUS visit in November (widely reported in the Japanese press),as well as UNGA and the G-20 summit in the early fall, however, Sugawa questioned whether foreign affairs would take a backseat to domestic matters early in the DPJ's term. "The world won't let us wait" to take up international issues, Sugawa said. -------------- -------------- Alliance Important - Find Solutions Through Dialogue -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Sugawa emphasized that the DPJ understands the importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and planned to work with the U.S. to find solutions to problems. Because the Alliance is so important to both countries, a "unilateral approach is insufficient," according to Sugawa. He stressed that the DPJ knows the importance of continuity in the relationship. This does not mean changes should not be made, but rather that any changes should be handled through open, bilateral dialogue. (Note: the text of the Index calls for the DPJ to make "suggestions" for revisions to the SOFA, a significant moderation of previous calls for "drastic" changes. End note.) -------------- Futenma -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to Futenma, Sugawa said the DPJ's "basic thinking" is that the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) should be outside of Okinawa. The DPJ understands the strategic importance of Futenma, but because the party has been in opposition, it has not been privy to much of the detailed information related to strategic planning behind relocation. Regardless, the U.S. and Japan should proceed "step by step" to resolving differences over Futenma. Sugawa emphasized that the July 24 Sankei Shimbun report (reftel) was inaccurate and that DPJ President Hatoyama did not suggest relocating Futenma to one of two Self-Defense Force bases in Kyushu. -------------- DPRK -------------- ¶8. (C) Many Japanese believe that the Alliance is of utmost importance in countering potential threats from the DPRK and China, Sugawa said. Neither the U.S. nor Japan can stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, he opined, regardless of negotiations and sanctions. It is against Japan's national interest for the DPRK to possess these weapons, but Japan has no means to stop this. Sugawa said that under a DPJ administration, resolving the abductions issue would remain the central platform of Japanese policy toward the DPRK, but added that Hatoyama and Party Secretary General Okada would likely be more "flexible" in their dealings with the regime. Sugawa stressed that his comments on the DPRK were his personal opinion, not the official position of the DPJ. -------------- China -------------- ¶9. (C) Sugawa said he perceives U.S. policy toward China as having two pillars - one being engagement and one focusing on "hedging" our relationship. The DPJ will follow a similar policy to the U.S., he said, with a greater focus on engagement than recent Japanese governments have had. (Note: The Index calls for "friendly, cooperative relations" with China "for the sake of peace and prosperity in the East Asian region." The DPJ plans to resolve any outstanding issues with China through "constructive dialogue." End note.) -------------- Decline of Japanese Influence -------------- ¶10. (C) The DPJ recognizes that Japan's influence is in TOKYO 00001706 003.2 OF 003 "relative decline," and that this often creates a "difficult diplomatic situation" for Japan. Sugawa said the typical Japanese citizen does not recognize this fact, but that if China's GDP surpasses Japan's, possibly as early as this year, this will shock many. Sugawa was confident, however, that Japan still had opportunities to be influential in global affairs and have a stronger, improved foreign policy. Sugawa did not, however, offer specifics in this regard. -------------- Divisions in DPJ? -------------- ¶11. (C) The "so-called divisions" among various DPJ factions will not be a problem once the party is in power, Sugawa said, adding that he was not pessimistic about the DPJ's ability to control its party members. While acknowledging that former socialists within the DPJ could have a "veto vote" in a DPJ government, these party members "are not really interested in foreign policy," Sugawa noted. That said, it is "out of the question" that left-leaning members of the DPJ would be able to negatively impact important foreign and security policy goals. -------------- Long Term Issues and the UH election -------------- ¶12. (C) In order to make any progress on longer-term issues like collective self-defense and constitutional revision, the DPJ will need to have a strong showing in both the August 30 election and the Upper House polls set for July 2010. The goal for the Party is to show that it has changed peoples' lives relative to what the LDP has done. Lowered taxes, subsidies for high school students, and allowances for children are three areas in which the DPJ plans to focus after the election. Sugawa noted these are not only subsidies for the recipients but would also be part of an economic stimulus plan. Success with these policies, coupled with a "stable" foreign and security platform, would enable the DPJ to succeed in the July 2010 election as well, Sugawa said. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) The contents of the Index and comments from Sugawa are consistent with what we've been hearing from various DPJ interlocutors in recent weeks. True to Sugawa's comment about the DPJ focusing on domestic issues first and foremost, the very small section of the Index that focuses on foreign and national security policies (only two pages out of nearly 60) indicates that the party sees resolving domestic discontent over economic issues as driving its platform. Moreover, the decided lack of detailed plans on foreign and security policy matters is not particularly surprising. DPJ contacts, including Sugawa, have told us that they have been purposely vague in policy development in order to "maintain maximum flexibility" if and when they take power. Additionally, though, the lack of detail may be driven by the widely varying opinions in the party or, simply, that the DPJ has yet to finalize its stance on complex national security matters where it has limited experience. ZUMWALT